

Insights into the Modern Construction of States

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Abstract: *The importance of understanding the ways in which the inception and early years of states can be critical to their long-term success cannot be overstated. Examining how this stage of statehood has unfolded and what lessons can be drawn from it remains ever relevant as countries continue to emerge and dissolve. In the 21st century, there have been a total of ten countries that have experienced a complete overhaul of their governments. The circumstances of these cases are far from similar, though, ranging from domestic revolution, foreign invasion, separation from another state, or some combination of those three. In order to aim for a more holistic view of early state development, this project examined data regarding governance, culture, and economics using separate indices for each. This was done with the aim of answering several key questions about the factors that most impact growth after a country's independence, the main area of interest being the relationship between development and more community-driven environments for these states. The results lead to a variety of findings that include, on some level, evidence of a positive relationship between these elements.*

INTRODUCTION

Through man-made change or external factors, the systems that influence local, national, and international community norms are constantly shifting, now more than ever. It may not always be quick progress or positive progress, but the progress exists nonetheless. This is especially true in governance, where changing technology and social viewpoints have rapidly adjusted the ways in which governments must behave. It is a constant game of catch-up that all governments must play, but one that is especially hard for governments that are still trying to find their legs. There is no playbook for states born in any period, let alone the present period of rapid change. There has never been a consensus around exactly how recently formed and/or developing countries should go about creating growth for their people. Beginning in the mid to late 20th century, there has been significant focus on the development of the previously colonized world, most often found in the Global South. Not all young countries fit this mold, though, and even

when they do, the discussion tends to center around Western, capitalist, liberal, democratic ideals.

During the first quarter of this century, only a handful of governments around the world have been completely overhauled or created for the first time. The group includes Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Montenegro, Myanmar, Nepal, Serbia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Tunisia. Differing in regional location, history, resources, international support, and what led to the creation of each government, this group of ten countries provides a very diverse array of situations that all shed light on governmental construction. Some were heavily influenced or even backed by regimes that support the aforementioned Western slant on development, but others strayed farther from that blueprint, making for a useful variety. The ultimate goal of studying the early years of these states, their successes, and their failures is to learn as much as possible about what is most valuable to providing for the governed, and diversity is critical to not becoming pigeon-holed

into one way of thinking or another. There are lessons that can be taken away from every example of state formation that will be forever relevant because, regardless of specifics, the examination of broader patterns in governing thought processes can offer wisdom to the next group that is tasked with building itself a country.

This construction of government and society must be viewed as a question of human security beyond anything else. The fabric of a state is woven together by its government, whether the people recognize it or not, through both tangible policy across sectors and the framing of social viewpoints. Local communities and the individuals within them are impacted from the top on down by governmental decision making, so ensuring that that decision-making has their best interests in mind is paramount. Attempting to center governance at all levels around the people and their communities, whether that be through locality, ideology, ethnicity, or otherwise, can provide more of a participatory system that allows citizens to more effectively interact with their government and have a say in the way that they are ruled. It can also easily create unforeseen issues or fall short of its goals because of how complex it can be to properly embed unity and equity into a country on so many levels.

In order to assess the merits behind different approaches to community-based development, this study looks to the previously mentioned group of ten countries for contemporary attempts. The goal is not to focus on the ways in which each new government differs from the last regime, but rather where they went from there. All ten countries will be given aggregate scores using a variety of development, social progress, and economic indicators that will then be compared with examples of their policy to understand how certain initiatives did or did not support these states. The idea being to understand where

human-focused policy was instituted, how it fared, and why, with the hypothesis being that focusing on participatory governance yields, on average, higher scores in all three areas of metrics. It is far from a small topic in academia, so an understanding of the conceptual arguments around modern development is necessary information that will be provided prior to any analysis. There will then be a discussion surrounding the selection of indices, the scoring process, the results, how they align with each state's policies, and then an evaluation of any conclusions that can be drawn from the exercise.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Building the foundation of a country is never an easy task, and in a world that is constantly evolving, it presents a highly unique challenge. Technology is advancing at a faster rate than it ever has, and the international community is changing shape both due to that and a political landscape that continues to fluctuate (Roser 2023). New governments are not born out of perfect conditions either; the vast majority of new states are a result of conflict or disagreement arising from deep-rooted societal issues. When looking to understand what the key elements for success are in modern government formation, both theoretical and case-based literature must be consulted. The philosophies and frameworks of academics are greatly valuable, but they must also be studied in the field. This review uses academic literature to determine what factors are the most critical on paper and then looks within the applicable cases for the ways in which those were or were not implemented. While the factors in question vary, they can be split into three main conceptual umbrellas at the national level: the major social, procedural, and economic elements.

In the 21st century, there are a handful of applicable cases: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Montenegro, Myanmar, Nepal, Serbia, South

Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Tunisia. Countries in different areas of the world, with very different historical and political circumstances, arising out of different methods for gaining independence. Ensuring a diverse selection of cases allows for conclusions to be applicable to a wider variety of scenarios and helps to prevent bias in the framing of issues. Each country engages with the theoretical literature and state formation as a whole in a unique way, and with mixed results, giving a wide range of outcomes. A perfect plan for the creation of a new state may never exist, but providing as much of a helpful framework as possible can save lives and provide much needed security for thousands if not millions of people.

THE IMPACTS OF COLLECTIVE CULTURE ON THE STATE

The social atmosphere of a state influences so many vital parts of society that fostering an environment supporting the people is integral to a successful state. Trust networks must be established amongst the people and between institutions and the people (Tilly 2011). It is a foundational step towards a populace that is connected through community and actively interacts with the systems that govern them. These networks form the basis for highly important long-term enterprises like financial relationships and identity-based organizations, and they are not a new phenomenon. The interplay between the government at different levels and groups that formed in society has been documented throughout history and is seen as necessary in order to build a functioning society (Tilly 2011). Social networks also help to create a shared culture, which in turn influences the governmental structure. By shaping public opinion on democratization, civil liberties, and other policy issues, society can be as influential on a state as the government itself (Collier 2017). There can be trouble measuring it, but ensuring

that a given body of citizens is satisfied with the way things work in their country, at least for the most part, is a major piece of the puzzle as well. It is a vague and complex ask, but it can produce more happiness and aspirations for success that, in turn, catalyze advancement and development (Collier 2017).

These concepts are reflected in the composition of young governments like Tunisia, where a dissatisfied public body overthrew the old government and put in place a new one. From the beginning of the construction of this new government, addressing social issues and rebuilding trust were of the utmost importance (Mahmoud & Ó Súilleabháin 2020). The execution was not perfect, but the Tunisian people had a “shared culture and a tolerance for pluralism” that fostered an environment in which many parties had a seat at the table (Mahmoud & Ó Súilleabháin 2020, pg. 104). In Iraq, similar issues caused widespread public discontent, but the state failed to take a community-focused approach and establish mutual respect with communities (Ar dovini & O’Driscoll 2023). There were internal and external factors that made social dynamics somewhat precarious, many of which stemmed from the ramifications of the 2003 invasion. This led to splinters in public ideology that prevented trust networks from fully tying together the country and made the government’s relationship with the people contentious over time. A similar result occurred in Timor-Leste, where competing social groups were unable to build trust amongst one another and with the government in ways that hurt the state (Verkhovets & Sahin 2024). Serving to illustrate that even in wildly different situations, the same conceptual issues can do a great deal to inhibit a young government.

INSTITUTIONS REQUIRE PROPER SETUP

A governmental framework can also do a great deal to advance or hinder the development of new

states, and often it cannot be separated from the culture or the economy of the given state. Many facets are influential on the lives of citizens and the general well-being of a country, but the makeup of the governing structure dictates the environment of a state in the most literal sense. Institutions like armies, tax authorities, and courts are some of the most important arms of government due to the nature of the service they provide and how much they are involved in the lives of the people (Collier 2017). If these departments and others do not properly cater to the people they serve, the ramifications can be serious. Ensuring that inequality in class, gender, or other areas is at least in part addressed is and will continue to be a major part of development because of the need to satisfy the public will (Evans & Stallings 2016). If this takes place, the number of people who are invested in interacting with their government will grow, and democratic participation will increase (Evans 2020). It is not a perfectly causal relationship, but it goes a long way towards engaging citizenry and building the kind of trust needed to get social buy-in.

Nepal fully embraced the interplay between governmental structure and social norms when they rewrote their constitution in 2015. They prioritized creating a multilevel governing system that encouraged participation from the bottom up (Bhusal 2023). In doing so, the Nepalese government hoped to foster an attitude of self-efficacy within their citizenry that does not guarantee perfect results but lays the groundwork for dialogue between the government and the governed. They also put a lot of importance in the use of cooperatives, something that can be especially useful for smaller economies built around communities. Nepal made it an official policy to foster cooperation amongst the people, growing trust networks, and benefiting the economy at the local and national levels (Paudel & Acharya 2022). The human-based approach

taken by Nepal can also be seen in Myanmar's post-2008 government, where the government provided much more power to the people coming out of a military regime. Emphasis was put on encouraging engagement like in Nepal, and delivering on election promises as much as possible in order to show people that their voices counted for something (Cook 2018). The execution can differ, but when creating a new government, proving to the populace that the new system not only works but also values the will of the people is paramount.

MONEY IS ALWAYS A TOP PRIORITY

Similarly, economic viability must be demonstrated on the domestic and international levels for any young country. There is not a need to be a powerhouse immediately, but showing the potential for growth and financial stability is key. A more holistic economic platform that "includes issues of human development and ecology" can help to prevent economic stagnation and pigeon-holing into one sector (Williams 2014, 7). In order to construct an effective floor for domestic industry, governments of all kinds, but especially young ones, must invest in their people. Putting production at the forefront of priorities and trying to ensure that it comes from a variety of sectors involves the people and maintains economic dynamism for emerging markets (Chang & Andreoni 2021). It sets the economic foundation in ways that then allow countries to enter into ever-important trade relationships with regional and trans-regional partners. The role of any given state on the international playing field continues to shift, but it remains clear that for a developing country to truly rise through the global ranks, it must engage in trade and participate in international financial bodies (Evans 2003).

This process can take a number of different forms based on the resources available, but establishing domestic production and using it to

carve out space at the international level remains the basis of economic development for young countries in recent years. Many such efforts have centered around agricultural or natural resource-based industries, given the permanent need for products of that kind across the globe. Afghanistan looked to farming to be the bell cow in their post-invasion economy but had mixed results due to inconsistent government regulation (Groninger, Ruffner, and Walters 2013). Timor-Leste also focused on utilizing its unique resources, but, being an island nation, created a blue economy that has also had its struggles, but laid a solid foundation for development. Putting serious emphasis on sustainable use of oceans and coasts, as well as trying to distribute “equitable benefits” to citizens have put Timor-Leste in position to maintain their economy if not grow it given the large potential for maritime business (Voyer 2020, 7). Myanmar had a much more established economy, but, after operating without democracy for so long, adjusting the institutions at work to fit the new government became the chief task (Bissinger 2014). That concerted effort to do so proved useful in sparking a noticeable increase in international business and foreign investment in Myanmar, and, while it was not perfect, the influx of economic activity greatly aided the new government.

FAR FROM A PERFECTED PROCESS

Despite the relative success stories from newly created states, there have still been a number of issues in all three of the aforementioned aspects of development. Chiefly, accomplishing all of the things laid out earlier requires a great deal of government intervention. Working to ensure that people trust the government and are willing and able to engage with it takes meaningful effort over long periods of time. Creating effective institutions for governance takes much forethought and planning, but it is integral to

building a system that can sustainably and efficiently develop over time (Zdravkovic & Radukic 2012). Taking multifaceted, human-based approaches to economic issues is a much more complex task than allowing the markets to more or less run themselves in a more neoliberal fashion (Williams 2014). On top of it all, it is often the case that governmental or societal shifts create counter movements. Serious political changes can create resentment amongst those who disagree with the direction of the change and, if extreme enough, can lead to the downfall of a government or at least some level of failure in important areas (Tilly 2017).

Even with the relatively small sample size of this study, challenges in development are evident and, at times, have been too much to handle. Afghanistan’s less-than-perfect policymaking and execution in economic and social sectors made for a largely ineffectual economy (Safi 2024). Myanmar’s substantial changes in government focus after their people’s revolution bred discontent among those who had been rich and powerful during the military regime, and when the chance presented itself, they seized back control and ended Myanmar’s short-lived but somewhat effective democracy. The global economic system is far from perfect, and domestic economies tend to have a litany of their own shortcomings, but working to prevent or curtail them as much as possible is all that can be done. Class issues continue to be deeply important to the livelihood of both people and countries, so ensuring that all parties have a seat at the table and supporting as much of the populace as possible is greatly advantageous (Evans 2020). The greater good does not always win out, whether through opposition, ineptitude, or unpredictability, but the work must be put in to try and achieve it.

WHERE TO GO FROM HERE

The goal of my project is to pair the conceptual frameworks put forth by development scholars, economists, sociologists, and others with the tangible results from states that have undertaken the formation of a new government. Theory alone cannot effect change, but action without proper study will not yield the desired results either. Evaluating “success” and “effectiveness” can be difficult, but I will try to use a varied approach incorporating data-driven metrics, case studies, and academic analysis to get as complete of a picture as possible. Much research has already been done in this field, and I certainly do not believe myself to be profound enough to offer some groundbreaking insights. That being said, the future is constantly unpredictable, and studying the past is the best way of learning how to handle it. In doing so, there may be patterns or insights that can meaningfully contribute to current and/or future dialogue in the development field. Correcting the failures of the past may not be possible, but providing future states and scholars with the relevant analysis they need has the potential to save lives. This project will almost certainly not do that on its own, but it can be one of many efforts made to understand and better work with developing nations.

METHODOLOGY

The goal of this study was to use both relevant literature and data to create a comparative analysis of the relationship between the amount of governmental effort that displayed a vested interest in engaging with their given citizenry and their rates of development, governmentally and otherwise. To examine the governance, society, and economic outlooks of each country separately, three different indicator aggregation indexes were used. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), published by the World Bank, the Social

Progress Report (SPR), published by the Social Progress Imperative, and the Human Development Index (HDI), published by the United Nations, respectively. Each was selected due to their reputability, comprehensiveness, and aggregation of a variety of factors in their assessments, making them much more useful than one-dimensional metrics. The research asks and, using a combination of descriptive and inferential analysis, hopes to help answer these questions: Where were community-driven efforts shown, how did those young countries fare according to these aggregations of growth and security indicators, and what is the relationship between those two factors? The hypothesis being that increased public interaction with the government through incentivizing institutions, policies, or attitudes breeds higher scores across the board over time.

CASE SELECTION

To maintain relevance to any future cases, a recency threshold was instituted into the selection criteria that narrowed the field to only countries that have experienced a complete governmental overhaul or the creation of a government post-2000. This left the ten cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Montenegro, Myanmar, Nepal, Serbia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Tunisia. Within this group, Afghanistan and Timor-Leste underwent their reformation in 2002, Iraq in 2005, Montenegro and Serbia in 2006, and Libya, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Tunisia in 2011. Given these differences in time, data for each country was collected either from the year in which the new government was created to the present or, in the case of the Social Progress Report, the earliest possible year that data was being collected. The only exception to this rule is Afghanistan, which had its government toppled by U.S.-led forces in 2001, but was led by an interim government for a year before new institutions were created. The smaller sample size raises

concerns about the viability of the data collected, however the data spans decades across different measurement systems, and the circumstances surrounding each country's situation vary greatly.

VARIABLE SELECTION

Obtaining viable data on all ten of the chosen countries proved somewhat difficult, not only due to gaps in data collection, but also a general lack of data collection for some of the lesser talked about states on this list. Ultimately, the three selected indices provided the most thorough and all-encompassing examinations of the governmental, social, and economic atmospheres in each of these countries. The United Nations and the World Bank come with reputations that speak for themselves, and the Social Progress Imperative is a highly respected initiative that has partnerships with organizations across the globe. The Human Development Index, the Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the Social Progress Report all collect data from a variety of sources across different areas before completing their final assessment.

The only drawbacks to the use of these three resources, beyond the inherent issues in composite scoring, are the lack of inequality studies in the Human Development Index and the late start date of the Social Progress Report. It would be ideal for the HDI to focus more closely on the levels of wealth equity within each country, but it also looks into other indicators of strong or growing economies like health and education levels, in combination with the more purely economy-focused gross national income per capita. The same goes for the Social Progress Report, which was started in 2011, years after some of the countries in this study were born, however the data that the SPR has produced since its inception is extremely well done.

MEASUREMENT SPECIFICS

The three indices used in this work all grade countries on different scales and impact the hypothesis differently. The Worldwide Governance Indicators using six main categories: Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and the Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability. Each combines a range of variables to grade countries on a scale of approximately -2.5 to 2.5, leading to separate insights for each area. The Human Development Index and Social Progress Report are both singular scores, differing from the WGI, with the former using a scale from 0 to 1 and the latter opting for 0 to 100. That being said, the HDI combines its Life Expectancy Index, Education Index, and Gross National Income per capita Index to create its composite score, and the SPR uses fifty-seven different drivers of social and environmental change to create its composite score. In terms of the relation to the research question and hypothesis, these metrics help grade the relative success of each country in the desired areas, but they also help determine which countries have shown themselves to be invested in public engagement with the government by looking at them in relation to one another and the literature.

CONNECTION TO LITERATURE

The literature discussed in this study focuses on a mixture of theoretical opinion and observed occurrences from within the desired states. The theoretical aspects add to the more conceptual discussions around community-based and/or bottom-up governance, and the applied elements add context to some of the trends that can be found in the data. Being able to understand the patterns found in the increase or decrease of different countries' scoring over time in the HDI, WGI, and/or SPR, with the knowledge of how the governments behaved, is extremely useful, albeit

still a step short of being able to determine concrete causality. It is paramount to be aware of what should be done, what has been done, and what happened during relevant time periods, and skipping any one of those can lead to serious holes in any conclusion drawn from the study.

CASE PRESENTATION


The data is best explained by examining each aggregate index used individually and then moving into the ways in which they may interact with one another. Each case alone contains insights into the domestic situation of each country, and, when compared to one another, can possibly show where more viable strategies lie for the future. The six Worldwide Governance Indicators cover different elements of governance that can all reflect community focus, so beginning there is ideal. Understanding the environment of the ten countries' institutions also helps to inform on some of the results in the Human Development Index and the Social Progress Report.

Descriptive analyses of each index, including a combined analysis of all Worldwide Governance Indicators by country and individual analyses of each WGI, examine trends over time and provide context to the progression, or lack thereof, of each country. It serves as a way to view each of the cases in this limited sample size as more than simply data, and, in combination with the literature, find similarities within the ten countries. These similarities organize the description of findings into categories based on the relative context of each country and the trends in their behavior.

WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS


CASE BY CASE

Figure 1. Libyan World Governance Indicator scores over time




Source: World Bank

Figure 2. Iraqi World Governance Indicator scores over time



Source: World Bank

Figure 3. Afghani World Governance Indicator scores over time




Source: World Bank

Figure 4. Burmese World Governance Indicator scores over time



Source: World Bank

Figure 7. Nepali World Governance Indicator scores over time




Source: World Bank

Figure 5. Timorese World Governance Indicator scores over time




Source: World Bank

Figure 8. South Sudani World Governance Indicator scores over time



Source: World Bank

Figure 6. Timorese World Governance Indicator scores over time




Source: World Bank

Figure 9. Serbian World Governance Indicator scores over time



Source: World Bank

Figure 10. Tunisian World Governance Indicator scores over time



Source: World Bank

These data visualizations are oriented by country with the Worldwide Governance Indicators compared to one another, and by showing the data through this lens first, state-by-state trends are easier to detect and can be put into context compared to their peers in the following sections. Some countries, such as Libya, Myanmar, and South Sudan, have more closely grouped indicators, highlighting that the different aspects of the governments of those countries behaved fairly uniformly. Others show broad patterns but with less uniformity like in the case of Montenegro, or with greater variance, as is the case with Nepal and Timor-Leste. The remaining four countries display relatively closely grouped indicator scores with similar trends over time, excluding one category. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Tunisia, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism grades are far below the other five Worldwide Governance Indicators, an understandable phenomenon when considering the history of conflict in both the Middle East and North Africa during this period. Tunisia scored much higher than Afghanistan and Iraq in Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, but it was an outlier compared to the other five indicators, nonetheless. Libya and South Sudan scored much more closely to the Middle Eastern states, given

their shared high-conflict environment with Tunisia. Serbia is the fourth and final country with one very different grade, but the Serbians fall short in Control of Corruption rather than Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism.

VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Figure 11. WGI Voice and Accountability scores over time.




Source: World Bank

Given that the Voice and Accountability indicator, in concert with relevant literature, offers insight into how committed to public engagement each government has been over time, assessing the results first gives useful context when working through the rest of the scoring. None of the ten countries were given particularly high grades in this category, with only Montenegro, Serbia, Timor-Leste, and Tunisia receiving any scores above 0. Even amongst these four, both Serbia and Tunisia fell below 0 after the Tunisian president suspended parliament in 2021 and consolidated power. Nepal is the youngest government of the ten but has shown steady growth in the Voice and Accountability indicator almost every year since 2015. Afghanistan and Iraq lead the lower scoring bunch, with Iraq displaying relative stagnation and Afghanistan seeming to improve after back-to-back years in 2008 and 2009 that saw

their score fall from -1.06 to -1.4 by 2010. The withdrawal of U.S. forces and the collapse of the Islamic Republic government in 2021 returned power in Afghanistan to the Taliban, causing the sharp drop from -1.08 to -1.85 that can be seen in the last three years of the data. A very similar trend can be seen in Myanmar, which operated under a semi-democratic system from 2011 to 2021 until a military coup d'état removed much of the power held by the people. Lastly, Libya and South Sudan sit at the bottom of this indicator, having yet to put together a governing system that gives much self-efficacy to the people at all.

POLITICAL STABILITY AND ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE/TERRORISM

Figure 12. WGI Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism scores over time




Source: World Bank

Like the last data set, Timor-Leste worked its way past Montenegro and Serbia for the lead in the Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism category. The European members of this group of ten initially led this indicator, as they do for almost all six, but saw a dip in their ratings over time that brought them closer to a net neutral score. Nepal showed very solid improvement over the eight years that this data covers, moving from a -1 to a -0.23 by 2023. Libya, Tunisia, and South Sudan have similar trend patterns across their data, despite Tunisia's

much higher scoring compared to the latter two. Given the regional proximity of the three, it would stand to reason that this comes from overlapping regional security issues. Myanmar demonstrated a relative decline in scoring over the years before falling to the near bottom of the scale after the dissolution of the National Unity Government during the military coup. Afghanistan and Iraq grade out similarly near the bottom for the same reason as the North African countries. The instability and terrorism in the Middle East over the last two plus decades were so serious that both countries actually scored lower than -2.5 multiple different years. The twenty-year war between the Western-backed government and the Taliban solidified Afghanistan's last-place rank, but, along with Iraq, Libya, and South Sudan, it also had at least one year scoring below -2.5.

RULE OF LAW

Figure 13. WGI Rule of Law scores over time




Source: World Bank

The Rule of Law indicator saw much less volatility as a whole than the previous two, however the stagnation offers fewer substantial insights into trends that may be occurring. Montenegro and Tunisia lead the pack, with Serbia gradually catching them, followed by a large gap between them and the rest of the field. Nepal is the best of the rest, initially improving from 2015 to 2018 and then somewhat flattening

out at about -0.5. Timor-Leste began at about that level just after earning its independence from Indonesia, sharply declined, scoring between -1.11 and -1.21 every year from 2006 to 2020, and has since slightly recovered, earning a -0.83 in 2023. Myanmar showed initial signs of growth before steadily declining during the latter half of the 2010s and into the 2020s. Once again, Afghanistan and Iraq nearly mirror each other, and Libya and South Sudan display almost identical trends, with South Sudan consistently scoring slightly lower.

CONTROL OF CORRUPTION

Figure 14. WGI Control of Corruption scores over time




Source: World Bank

Control of Corruption resembles the Rule of Law indicator in terms of its relative levelness, but the average score for the cases is noticeably higher than the previous section, a difference of -0.87 compared to -1.03. Montenegro and Tunisia are once again in the front, with Timor-Leste closing the gap in recent years after increasing every year in scoring since earning their all-time low of -0.82 in 2011. Nepal initially fell from -0.6 to -0.83 in 2015 and 2016 but were able to make it back to -0.51 in the years since. Myanmar is one of the only countries to show substantial change throughout their data in this indicator, beginning at -1.59 in 2011, making significant improvement in order to reach -0.59 only six years later, and

remaining in that ballpark until the coup pushed them back down to -1.22 in 2023. Afghanistan and Iraq both fluctuated around the same range for most of the last twenty-five years. Interestingly, though, in the years since the Taliban’s return to power Afghanistan’s Control of Corruption score jumped from -1.45 to -1.15, -1.18, and -1.15. Libya dips initially and then tapers off at or just below -1.5 for much of the studied period, while South Sudan sits alone at the bottom, having continuously decreased since 2011.

GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS

Figure 15. WGI Government Effectives scores over time



Source: World Bank

The Government Effectiveness indicator has the largest gap between the upper and lower clusters of countries, making it a similar but more extreme case to the Voice and Accountability indicator. Instead of five countries in each group separated by -0.38 points at the closest point as in Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness data shows Montenegro, Serbia, and Tunisia alone at the top with a -0.46 point gap at the closest point to fourth place Timor-Leste. The lower group is somewhat tightly clustered after that, with Nepal joining Timor-Leste in slow improvement in the -1 to -0.75 range. Myanmar was in that group during its time as a republic, but

once again, the coup that returned most of the country's power to the military caused a serious drop in this category. The Middle Eastern countries both showed substantial improvement in the first few years of their new governments before tapering off and eventually backsliding, especially after the return of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Libya scored in the range of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Burmese military junta, showing a consistent decrease with a slight upswing in the last three years of available data. South Sudan sits in a class of its own at the bottom in this indicator, scoring as low as -2.44 in 2017, compared to the next lowest score from any other country being Afghanistan's -1.99 from 2023.

REGULATORY QUALITY

Figure 16. WGI Regulatory Quality Scores over time




Source: World Bank

The Regulatory Quality Indicator, despite some poor grading, demonstrates the greatest relative improvement for the majority of the ten countries in this study. It is tied with the Voice and Accountability and Rule of Law indicators for the most countries that showed improvement at seven out of ten, but has an average margin of improvement of 0.25 compared to the other two that changed on average by 0.01 and -0.08, respectively. Montenegro and Serbia showed

continual improvement and finished as the only two countries in positive territory for this metric. Nepal, Tunisia, and Timor-Leste all finished in the same 0.15 point range from -0.49 to -0.66, however Nepal and Timor-Leste grew to reach that range while Tunisia declined into it, likely due to their return to authoritarian government. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Myanmar make up the next bunch, showing many of the same patterns from previous indicators. Afghanistan and Iraq are up and down but remain very closely linked after 2012, and Myanmar was increasing its score almost every year before the coup. Libya joins South Sudan at the lower end of the range in this category, with Libya achieving the six lowest scores of any country from 2015 to 2020.

SOCIAL PROGRESS REPORT

Figure 17. Social Progress Report scores over time.




Source: World Bank

The Social Progress Report offers only one composite score rather than the six separate WGI scores, but, when considering the fifty-seven different factors it takes into account, the one score provides a very thorough look into any given country's social environment. Montenegro and Serbia present the highest scores and continuous growth over the thirteen years of available data. Tunisia ranks just below but is beginning to show signs of regression since the stripping of most of

the people's power in 2021. Iraq, Libya, Nepal, and Timor-Leste all sit near one another with somewhat similar slopes of gradual improvement in the last decade and a half. Myanmar once again was in the company of many of the other middle ranking countries and showing signs of growth before the coup knocked them down a tier, peaking at 57.37 in 2020 but sitting at 51.46 as of last year. Afghanistan is in a similar situation but much farther down the grading scale. Despite scoring well below the 40s, Afghanistan was on a solidly positive trajectory in terms of its social environment until the Taliban regained control of the country. South Sudan is by far the lowest scorer of these ten cases and has remained largely stagnant. The North African country earned a 26.85 in 2011, fell to 24.09 in 2018, and then crept back to 26.5 by 2024.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX

Figure 18. Human Development Index scores over time



Source: World Bank

The Human Development Index paints the most positive picture across the ten countries, but some of the same patterns can be found in this data as well. Every country except South Sudan shows improvement from the time its government was formed to the most recent data which came in 2022. The dips in living conditions caused by the collapse of the more citizen-focused governments in Afghanistan and Myanmar can be seen, albeit

less significantly than in other measures. Most countries suffered some kind of dip in 2020, most likely due to the ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic that deeply affected economies across the planet. All of the countries outside of those that went through a leadership change were able to rebound save for Timor-Leste, which, as of 2022, was still on a developmental decline, albeit seeming primed to bounce back. The lack of significant movement for the majority of countries makes the HDI perhaps less insightful than the previous two, but it speaks to the fact that, on average, people are living longer, going to more school, and earning more in the vast majority of these developing countries.

DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS

To break down what is most relevant throughout the data, case-based literature, and theory, the ten countries in this study have been sorted into groups based on their similar characteristics and assessed within those groups. All of the research combined to provide valuable information in answering the research question, but only some of it confirms the hypothesis put forth at the beginning of this study. There can be no conclusions drawn about the overall success or failure of one country or another, as that is far too nebulous of a concept to make judgement calls, but pointing out areas of strength or weakness and understanding where improvement must be made can be done.

THE EUROPEANS

Montenegro and Serbia were sorted into a class of their own because they provide the most unique cases of state formation in this list. The two countries gained independence from one another via a referendum and had not been in particularly poor condition up to that point. Of course, they were and are far from perfect, but being peacefully created countries situated in a

fairly secure region of the world gives them a leg up on nearly all others in this study. This smoother transition into new statehood made it easier for both countries to maintain a relatively good quality of life and develop institutions that can continue to support their peoples. They graded as far and away the two best countries in the average Worldwide Governance Indicators scoring, and, by smaller margins, ranked as the top two HDI and SPR scorers as well.

While there certainly are lessons to be learned from Montenegro and Serbia, much of what makes them successful cannot be applied to most situations where a new country is being formed. The most interesting thing to note is the fact that Serbia's slightly lower WGI scores, especially the substantially lower Control of Corruption and Voice and Accountability scores, indicate that it is slightly less well-run than its neighbor. Montenegro leads Serbia in both the Human Development Index and the Social Progress Report, providing further evidence to that case as well.

MARKED IMPROVEMENT

This group is made up of four countries, two of which have asterisks next to their names. Myanmar, Nepal, Timor-Leste, and Tunisia all showed great strides in community-driven governance and creating a healthy public environment over the course of the studied period. Timor-Leste was the closest situation of all other countries to that of Montenegro and Serbia, having gained its independence from Indonesia in 2002 after a referendum several years prior. What sets them apart is the starting point for Timor-Leste compared to its European counterparts. The South Asian country scored higher in the Voice and Accountability, Control of Corruption, and Political Stability and Lack of Violence/Terrorism WGI categories than at least one of Montenegro and Serbia when comparing

their first years of independence, but landed lower in the other three Worldwide Governance Indicators, as well as the Human Development Index and the Social Progress Report. Timor-Leste did not find its strength in efficient procedure or extremely well-run institutions, and instead built itself on its economy. The lack of violence and the more inclusive atmosphere of the country allowed it to promote its blue economy and engage with the citizenry in that way, leading to a solid improvement in HDI score and a pack-leading improvement in SPR score.

Nepal is the youngest country of the bunch, but it has proven itself to be on a positive path early in its development. Since rewriting its constitution in 2015, the government has been extremely focused on a bottom-up style of processing that has yielded high rates of civil participation and cooperatives that have helped spur what was a very small and limited economy. The strides in the Social Progress Report and Human Development Index are certainly but not altogether extremely substantial. The grades in Worldwide Governance Indicators have improved noticeably in every category, supporting the idea that the community governance implemented by the Nepali government has done good work in making the relationship between the government and the governed a mutually beneficial one. Given that the available data for Nepal spans the shortest amount of time, one could also stand to reason that the full effects of these changes have not been felt. The country still has plenty of room to grow, but its body of work suggests that it will continue to do so through human-based initiatives.

Myanmar and Tunisia hold the asterisks in this quartet as they both faced governmental overhauls in 2021 that saw much of the freedoms and voice given to the citizenry of the two countries stripped. The interest of this study is in

the more representative forms of government, so it certainly must be taken into account that they both failed, but it was not so much from incompetence as it was from outside actors. Tunisia worked very purposefully toward a sense of national identity that was inclusive of the diverse makeup of the country's population (Mahmoud & Ó Súilleabháin 2020). The trust networks talked about by Charles Tilly were being formed, public satisfaction with the government was at respectable levels, and growth was documented in all three indices. The same was true for Myanmar during its decade of representative democracy, but both were upended by power struggles within the same year, effectively killing whatever momentum had existed.

STILL SUFFERING FROM VIOLENCE

Four countries remain: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and South Sudan. This group had by far the worst circumstances at the time of their governments' inceptions. Two faced the tumultuous regional politics of the Middle East during a period of heavy Western, namely American, intervention, and two were born out of the Arab Spring with a similar lack of regional security. Much of the blame for the lack of serious growth across the three sectors studied lies in the high levels of violence and instability within and around these four countries, but it cannot all be chalked up to this. Libya and South Sudan were largely stagnant in the Social Progress Report and the Human Development Index, and saw decreases in every Worldwide Governance Indicator with the exception of Libya's Voice and Accountability Score. Despite similar levels of inactivity in the HDI and SPR, Libya scored much higher than South Sudan, ranking third in both, compared to South Sudan's two last place finishes. Being thrust into a volatile environment with little support domestically or internationally has

left the two countries simply trying to stay afloat as conflict continues within their borders. Having higher standards of living was not enough to save Libya from backsliding when faced with strife, and South Sudan faced worse without the advantage of a solid starting point.

Afghanistan and Iraq present interesting cases because they are the only two countries to score lower than South Sudan in the Political Stability and Lack of Violence/Terrorism Worldwide Governance Indicators. Both still managed to rank significantly higher than South Sudan in the HDI and SPR, and less obviously higher in all five of the other WGI categories. The Middle Eastern duo provide evidence to the idea that instability can be managed with more effective government, but the data shows all three of these countries, but especially Afghanistan and South Sudan, sitting at the bottom of just about every metric. Iraq scored more highly in the Voice and Accountability indicator within the WGI but failed to build the required trust networks amongst communities, and an inclusive environment was never fully fostered (Ardevini & O'Driscoll 2023). The combination of the partial framework for civic engagement and the lower levels of variation from year to year in the other WGI categories allowed them to stay much more steady in terms of social and economic improvement. Afghanistan's inconsistency on these fronts, namely in terms of fostering the economy, made what stability Iraq could muster unachievable (Safi 2024).

CONCLUSION

Dealing with a mixed bag of results, it is hard to make sweeping statements about state formation in a very general sense, but there are some useful takeaways. This comparative case study set out to assess where community-driven efforts were shown, how these young countries fared according to the different indicators used, and what the relationship was between those two

factors. In terms of these goals, the answers were relatively straightforward throughout the literature and data, and the relationship seemed to be that governments that prioritized public buy-in and maintained relative consistency over the years ended up in better places. It may not be the most groundbreaking findings in history, but it showed that supporting the people can be a more effective method of governing than trying to spur the economy or run a well-oiled but rigid machine of a country. The hypothesis that increased public interaction with the government through incentivizing institutions, policies, or attitudes breeds higher scores across the board over time was not entirely supported; however, in concert with a few other important variables, it exhibited a positive correlation with development. Things like external actors and conflict can still prove to be too much for community-driven governance to overcome, but it can put a country on the right track for development over time.

There are certainly limitations with these findings and, as always, room for more research, but the findings remain salient. Inferential analysis could be beneficial for further understanding of trends within the data, but this

study focused on the descriptive analysis that could be tied in with relevant literature. Whether carrying out inferential or descriptive analyses, working with indexes like these, even as good as they are, comes with trouble in terms of bias in evaluation criteria that cannot realistically be avoided. Abstract concepts such as governing effectiveness, economic growth, and a positive social environment are not things that can actually be measured in absolute terms, so there is certainly a gray area in that respect. The literature on these ten countries is also somewhat limited, as they are all young and most are not widely paid attention to across the globe. If more work is done in both of these areas going forward, more thorough assessments can be made about this topic, but this study can only work with what is available. An increase in research on specific kinds of human-focused governing could also improve the understanding of when and how they should be implemented. This could aid in remedying cases such as Iraq or Libya, where certain aspects that lead to positive outcomes are in place but outweighed by harmful factors.

APPENDIX

Table 1. Human Development Index data

Year	Afghanistan	Iraq	Libya	Montenegro	Myanmar	Nepal	Serbia	South Sudan	Timor-Leste	Tunisia
2002	0.368								0.522	
2003	0.379								0.522	
2004	0.395								0.536	
2005	0.402	0.591							0.553	
2006	0.41	0.591		0.771			0.743		0.579	
2007	0.426	0.596		0.783			0.753		0.601	
2008	0.431	0.612		0.797			0.764		0.627	

2009	0.441	0.622		0.798			0.766		0.625	
2010	0.449	0.629		0.806			0.768		0.639	
2011	0.457	0.637	0.734	0.811	0.517		0.773	0.408	0.649	0.715
2012	0.467	0.644	0.777	0.813	0.526		0.78	0.377	0.644	0.716
2013	0.475	0.648	0.766	0.819	0.538		0.785	0.378	0.64	0.719
2014	0.48	0.651	0.75	0.822	0.548		0.787	0.376	0.63	0.721
2015	0.479	0.656	0.749	0.827	0.557	0.568	0.794	0.381	0.621	0.724
2016	0.483	0.661	0.746	0.826	0.567	0.574	0.8	0.376	0.61	0.728
2017	0.485	0.667	0.761	0.833	0.58	0.581	0.802	0.378	0.614	0.732
2018	0.486	0.673	0.764	0.838	0.595	0.588	0.808	0.38	0.616	0.737
2019	0.492	0.678	0.756	0.841	0.608	0.598	0.812	0.391	0.627	0.74
2020	0.488	0.661	0.737	0.832	0.615	0.593	0.806	0.386	0.633	0.734
2021	0.473	0.667	0.746	0.84	0.599	0.591	0.804	0.381	0.574	0.729
2022	0.462	0.673	0.746	0.844	0.608	0.601	0.805	0.381	0.566	0.732
AVG	0.449	0.643	0.753	0.818	0.572	0.587	0.785	0.383	0.601	0.72725
CHANGE	0.094	0.082	0.012	0.073	0.091	0.033	0.062	-0.027	0.044	0.017

Source: World Bank

Table 2. Social Progress Report Data

Year	Afghanistan	Iraq	Libya	Montenegro	Myanmar	Nepal	Serbia	South Sudan	Timor-Leste	Tunisia
2011	33.1	50.59	55.43	69.33	45.77		66.64	26.85	48.94	61.08
2012	33.46	50.86	56.06	69.29	47.25		67.26	26.86	49.41	64.23
2013	34.57	51.31	58.07	69.86	48.41		68.34	27	50.55	64.15
2014	36.06	51.97	57.65	70.3	49.74		68.87	26.37	51.4	64.92
2015	36.66	52.92	57.39	70.79	50.47	52.24	69.69	25.81	51.76	65.82
2016	38.02	53.86	58.08	71.47	52.52	53.77	71.43	25.19	52.36	66.76
2017	37.27	54.15	57.52	71.58	53.91	53.85	72.38	24.7	53.02	66.64
2018	37.56	54.89	57.68	71.39	55.16	55.99	72.79	24.09	54.07	67.21
2019	37.38	55.13	57.76	72.05	56.15	55.87	73.01	25.09	54.48	67.37
2020	37.56	55.48	57.68	71.81	57.37	55.94	73.56	25.15	55.43	67.53
2021	37.95	55.7	58.3	72.69	57.05	56.39	73.86	25.53	55.83	67.62

2022	33.91	56.64	58.21	73.16	52.57	56.8	73.73	25.52	56.69	66.73
2023	33.05	56.79	58.92	73.9	51.81	57.28	74.44	25.99	57.42	66.62
2024	32.11	57.21	58.96	74.27	51.46	57.57	74.17	26.5	57.4	65.98
AVG	35.619	54.107	57.694	71.564	52.117	55.57	71.441	25.761	53.483	65.904
CHANGE	-0.99	6.62	3.53	4.94	5.69	5.33	7.53	-0.35	8.46	4.9

Source: World Bank

Table 3. WGI Control of Corruption Data

Year	Afghanistan	Iraq	Libya	Montenegro	Myanmar	Nepal	Serbia	South Sudan	Timor-Leste	Tunisia
2002	-1.25								-0.22	
2003	-1.34								-0.25	
2004	-1.35								-0.34	
2005	-1.45	-1.38							-0.57	
2006	-1.45	-1.45		-0.38			-0.28		-0.6	
2007	-1.61	-1.46		-0.38			-0.34		-0.65	
2008	-1.67	-1.46		-0.24			-0.3		-0.65	
2009	-1.55	-1.33		-0.22			-0.32		-0.8	
2010	-1.65	-1.36		-0.25			-0.32		-0.75	
2011	-1.6	-1.26	-1.23	-0.22	-1.59		-0.3	-1.09	-0.82	-0.02
2012	-1.43	-1.25	-1.32	-0.13	-1.07		-0.36	-1.3	-0.74	-0.03
2013	-1.45	-1.32	-1.44	-0.29	-1.01		-0.33	-1.4	-0.69	-0.04
2014	-1.36	-1.36	-1.52	-0.08	-0.88		-0.25	-1.61	-0.53	-0.02
2015	-1.35	-1.43	-1.58	-0.12	-0.85	-0.6	-0.32	-1.72	-0.55	-0.08
2016	-1.54	-1.46	-1.58	-0.08	-0.64	-0.83	-0.38	-1.76	-0.54	-0.16
2017	-1.53	-1.43	-1.56	-0.08	-0.59	-0.78	-0.44	-1.75	-0.57	-0.16
2018	-1.5	-1.46	-1.53	-0.01	-0.61	-0.69	-0.4	-1.74	-0.51	-0.11
2019	-1.42	-1.39	-1.57	-0.03	-0.64	-0.69	-0.45	-1.8	-0.4	-0.14
2020	-1.49	-1.33	-1.58	-0.04	-0.68	-0.6	-0.45	-1.94	-0.34	-0.12
2021	-1.15	-1.27	-1.58	-0.04	-1.05	-0.56	-0.46	-1.84	-0.07	-0.26
2022	-1.18	-1.21	-1.53	-0.12	-1.15	-0.53	-0.46	-1.86	-0.27	-0.3
2023	-1.15	-1.32	-1.53	-0.08	-1.22	-0.51	-0.45	-1.97	-0.23	-0.34

AVG	-1.431	-1.365	-1.504	-0.155	-0.922	-0.643	-0.367	-1.675	-0.504	-0.137
CHANGE	0.1	0.06	-0.3	0.3	0.37	0.09	-0.17	-0.88	-0.01	-0.32

Source: World Bank

Table 4. WGI Government Effectiveness Data

Year	Afghanistan	Iraq	Libya	Montenegro	Myanmar	Nepal	Serbia	South Sudan	Timor-Leste	Tunisia
2002	-1.59								-0.76	
2003	-1.18								-0.97	
2004	-0.95								-0.69	
2005	-1.23	-1.64							-1	
2006	-1.47	-1.73		0.16			-0.24		-1.22	
2007	-1.44	-1.56		-0.28			-0.26		-1.15	
2008	-1.53	-1.24		-0.01			-0.25		-1.07	
2009	-1.51	-1.19		-0.01			-0.07		-1.19	
2010	-1.48	-1.1		0.13			-0.08		-1.25	
2011	-1.47	-1.07	-1.05	0.08	-1.61		-0.13	-1.59	-1.19	0
2012	-1.38	-1.06	-1.27	0.12	-1.48		-0.17	-1.61	-1.2	-0.05
2013	-1.4	-1.05	-1.32	0.15	-1.51		-0.18	-1.68	-1.25	-0.06
2014	-1.36	-1.06	-1.52	0.29	-1.3		0	-2.09	-1.21	-0.07
2015	-1.4	-1.2	-1.49	0.17	-1.29	-1.14	0	-2.15	-1.08	-0.1
2016	-1.29	-1.23	-1.75	0.14	-1.01	-0.89	-0.04	-2.34	-1.04	-0.21
2017	-1.39	-1.22	-1.61	0.17	-1.09	-0.94	0.07	-2.44	-1	-0.05
2018	-1.5	-1.27	-1.69	0.09	-1.09	-0.95	0.07	-2.32	-0.94	-0.01
2019	-1.52	-1.31	-1.77	0.11	-1.19	-1.09	-0.02	-2.38	-0.86	-0.04
2020	-1.61	-1.3	-1.86	-0.11	-1.02	-0.99	-0.04	-2.32	-0.76	-0.19
2021	-1.67	-1.32	-1.75	-0.03	-1.42	-0.93	0.01	-2.4	-0.75	-0.21
2022	-1.88	-1.3	-1.76	-0.03	-1.69	-0.92	0.07	-2.39	-0.77	-0.26
2023	-1.99	-1.39	-1.64	0.25	-1.75	-0.81	0.01	-2.33	-0.84	-0.3
AVG	-1.465	-1.276	-1.575	0.077	-1.342	-0.962	-0.069	-2.157	-1.009	-0.119
CHANGE	-0.4	0.25	-0.59	0.09	-0.14	0.33	0.25	-0.74	-0.08	-0.3

Source: World bank

Table 5. WGI Political Stability and Absence of Terrorism/Violence

Year	Afghanistan	Iraq	Libya	Montenegro	Myanmar	Nepal	Serbia	South Sudan	Timor-Leste	Tunisia
2002	-2.04								-0.49	
2003	-2.2								-0.29	
2004	-2.3								-0.16	
2005	-2.07	-2.69							-0.71	
2006	-2.22	-2.83		0.05			-0.54		-1.16	
2007	-2.41	-2.77		0.11			-0.59		-1.1	
2008	-2.69	-2.47		0.77			-0.54		-0.8	
2009	-2.71	-2.17		0.82			-0.48		-0.57	
2010	-2.58	-2.24		0.58			-0.42		-0.47	
2011	-2.5	-1.85	-1.29	0.57	-1.11		-0.28	-1.43	-0.46	-0.35
2012	-2.42	-1.93	-1.59	0.6	-0.94		-0.22	-1.16	-0.28	-0.72
2013	-2.52	-2.01	-1.84	0.5	-1.14		-0.08	-1.73	-0.38	-0.9
2014	-2.41	-2.48	-2.35	0.22	-1.09		0.18	-2.65	-0.18	-0.85
2015	-2.56	-2.25	-2.19	0.14	-1.17	-1	0.23	-2.37	-0.27	-0.96
2016	-2.66	-2.3	-2.27	0.27	-0.81	-0.85	0.13	-2.41	-0.02	-1.14
2017	-2.79	-2.3	-2.35	-0.06	-1.08	-0.58	0.08	-2.45	0.07	-1.02
2018	-2.75	-2.52	-2.44	0.04	-1.27	-0.54	0.01	-2.43	0.23	-0.87
2019	-2.65	-2.61	-2.57	0.06	-1.33	-0.45	-0.08	-2.52	0.24	-0.88
2020	-2.7	-2.47	-2.46	-0.06	-1.51	-0.18	-0.17	-2.19	0.2	-0.59
2021	-2.52	-2.38	-2.31	-0.05	-2.08	-0.19	-0.09	-2.29	0.19	-0.76
2022	-2.54	-2.41	-2.19	-0.14	-2.2	-0.24	-0.17	-2.21	0.26	-0.59
2023	-2.48	-2.41	-2.17	0.07	-2.13	-0.23	-0.04	-2.19	0.26	-0.63
AVG	-2.487	-2.373	-2.155	0.249	-1.374	-0.473	-0.171	-2.157	-0.268	-0.789
CHANGE	-0.44	0.28	-0.88	0.02	-1.02	0.77	0.5	-0.76	0.75	-0.28

Source: World Bank

Table 6. WGI Regulatory Quality Data

Year	Afghanistan	Iraq	Libya	Montenegro	Myanmar	Nepal	Serbia	South Sudan	Timor-Leste	Tunisia
2002	-1.81								-1.23	
2003	-1.46								-1.27	

2004	-1.51								-1.15	
2005	-1.64	-1.54							-1.15	
2006	-1.69	-1.4		-0.55			-0.53		-1.55	
2007	-1.71	-1.32		-0.13			-0.44		-1.63	
2008	-1.61	-1.15		-0.07			-0.39		-1.34	
2009	-1.66	-1.01		0.03			-0.18		-1.16	
2010	-1.52	-1.03		-0.01			-0.07		-1.11	
2011	-1.54	-1.01	-1.43	0	-2.1		-0.02	-1.72	-1.05	-0.27
2012	-1.19	-1.14	-1.62	0.03	-1.83		-0.07	-1.45	-1.02	-0.24
2013	-1.19	-1.13	-1.75	0.09	-1.5		-0.06	-1.52	-0.99	-0.29
2014	-1.12	-1.13	-2.1	0.18	-1.4		0.18	-1.64	-0.91	-0.34
2015	-1.02	-1.15	-2.25	0.23	-1.25	-0.83	0.14	-1.67	-0.99	-0.39
2016	-1.34	-0.99	-2.22	0.23	-0.87	-0.79	0.02	-1.8	-0.99	-0.45
2017	-1.36	-1.11	-2.15	0.32	-0.84	-0.74	-0.05	-1.93	-0.74	-0.36
2018	-1.14	-1.06	-2.22	0.39	-0.75	-0.78	0.1	-2.04	-0.79	-0.49
2019	-1.11	-1.1	-2.3	0.39	-0.75	-0.74	0.1	-1.98	-0.78	-0.39
2020	-1.39	-1.34	-2.22	0.42	-0.62	-0.74	0.08	-2.01	-0.76	-0.3
2021	-1.31	-1.13	-1.97	0.42	-1.12	-0.64	0.04	-2	-0.78	-0.4
2022	-1.27	-1.18	-2.09	0.54	-1.24	-0.65	0.14	-2.1	-0.47	-0.41
2023	-1.27	-1.44	-1.95	0.37	-1.44	-0.66	0.14	-2.12	-0.49	-0.62
AVG	-1.403	-1.177	-2.021	0.16	-1.208	-0.73	-0.048	-1.845	-1.016	-0.381
CHANGE	0.54	0.1	-0.52	0.92	0.66	0.17	0.67	-0.4	0.74	-0.35

Source: World Bank

Table 7. WGI Rule of Law Data

Year	Afghanistan	Iraq	Libya	Montenegro	Myanmar	Nepal	Serbia	South Sudan	Timor-Leste	Tunisia
2002	-1.81								-1.23	
2003	-1.46								-1.27	
2004	-1.51								-1.15	
2005	-1.64	-1.54							-1.15	
2006	-1.69	-1.4		-0.55			-0.53		-1.55	
2007	-1.71	-1.32		-0.13			-0.44		-1.63	

2008	-1.61	-1.15		-0.07			-0.39		-1.34	
2009	-1.66	-1.01		0.03			-0.18		-1.16	
2010	-1.52	-1.03		-0.01			-0.07		-1.11	
2011	-1.54	-1.01	-1.43	0	-2.1		-0.02	-1.72	-1.05	-0.27
2012	-1.19	-1.14	-1.62	0.03	-1.83		-0.07	-1.45	-1.02	-0.24
2013	-1.19	-1.13	-1.75	0.09	-1.5		-0.06	-1.52	-0.99	-0.29
2014	-1.12	-1.13	-2.1	0.18	-1.4		0.18	-1.64	-0.91	-0.34
2015	-1.02	-1.15	-2.25	0.23	-1.25	-0.83	0.14	-1.67	-0.99	-0.39
2016	-1.34	-0.99	-2.22	0.23	-0.87	-0.79	0.02	-1.8	-0.99	-0.45
2017	-1.36	-1.11	-2.15	0.32	-0.84	-0.74	-0.05	-1.93	-0.74	-0.36
2018	-1.14	-1.06	-2.22	0.39	-0.75	-0.78	0.1	-2.04	-0.79	-0.49
2019	-1.11	-1.1	-2.3	0.39	-0.75	-0.74	0.1	-1.98	-0.78	-0.39
2020	-1.39	-1.34	-2.22	0.42	-0.62	-0.74	0.08	-2.01	-0.76	-0.3
2021	-1.31	-1.13	-1.97	0.42	-1.12	-0.64	0.04	-2	-0.78	-0.4
2022	-1.27	-1.18	-2.09	0.54	-1.24	-0.65	0.14	-2.1	-0.47	-0.41
2023	-1.27	-1.44	-1.95	0.37	-1.44	-0.66	0.14	-2.12	-0.49	-0.62
AVG	-1.403	-1.17 7	-2.021	0.16	-1.208	-0.73	-0.048	-1.845	-1.016	-0.381
CHANG E	0.54	0.1	-0.52	0.92	0.66	0.17	0.67	-0.4	0.74	-0.35

Source: World Bank

Table 8. WGI Voice and Accountability Data

Year	Afghanistan	Iraq	Libya	Montenegro	Myanmar	Nepal	Serbia	South Sudan	Timor-Leste	Tunisia
2002	-1.43								0.27	
2003	-1.18								0.17	
2004	-1.2								-0.09	
2005	-1.13	-1.3							-0.21	
2006	-1.11	-1.28		0.26			0.21		0.06	
2007	-1.06	-1.13		0.26			0.31		0.15	
2008	-1.17	-1.1		0.24			0.28		0.22	
2009	-1.38	-1.02		0.24			0.33		0.1	
2010	-1.4	-0.99		0.19			0.29		0.06	

2011	-1.34	-1.07	-1.59	0.21	-1.85		0.28	-1.11	0.13	-0.37
2012	-1.27	-1.08	-0.9	0.22	-1.62		0.2	-1.33	0.1	-0.17
2013	-1.24	-1.06	-0.97	0.18	-1.46		0.29	-1.44	0.09	-0.08
2014	-1.14	-1.14	-1.11	0.16	-1.34		0.21	-1.62	0.15	0.19
2015	-1.12	-1.13	-1.34	0.14	-1.22	-0.42	0.23	-1.6	0.19	0.24
2016	-1.04	-1.02	-1.43	0.08	-0.8	-0.25	0.2	-1.8	0.22	0.3
2017	-0.99	-1.05	-1.44	0.12	-0.86	-0.2	0.12	-1.82	0.34	0.16
2018	-1.01	-1	-1.53	0.06	-0.9	-0.13	-0.01	-1.99	0.32	0.19
2019	-1.01	-0.96	-1.48	0.02	-0.86	-0.15	-0.05	-1.99	0.36	0.27
2020	-1.08	-1.01	-1.36	0.04	-0.94	-0.09	-0.12	-1.81	0.37	0.28
2021	-1.57	-0.96	-1.45	0.17	-1.66	-0.09	-0.13	-1.72	0.45	0.11
2022	-1.75	-0.95	-1.38	0.28	-1.81	-0.04	-0.1	-1.7	0.49	-0.25
2023	-1.85	-0.96	-1.39	0.34	-1.84	-0.02	-0.06	-1.68	0.43	-0.21
AVG	-1.249	-1.064	-1.336	0.178	-1.32	-0.154	0.138	-1.662	0.199	0.051
CHANGE	-0.42	0.34	0.2	0.08	0.01	0.4	-0.27	-0.57	0.16	0.16

Source: World Bank

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