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News from the Director
By Alan McPherson

This is a special moment for me. You hold in your hand—I mean, have on your screen—the inaugural issue of Strategic Visions under my directorship of the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy. I took over CENFAD in July 2017, as Richard Immerman, the Marvin Wachman Director, retired after a quarter-century of distinguished service to the History Department and the CENFAD community. Allow me to use this column first to recognize those who have made this moment possible, and second to report on happenings at CENFAD since I joined.

A Quarter-Century of Thanks

First and foremost, I must thank Richard Immerman for nurturing CENFAD into the institution it is today. Hired by legendary military historian Russell Weigley, and founding CENFAD with Weigley and David Rosenberg in 1993, Richard built a unique campus institution in Philadelphia that has, for twenty-four years, combined expertise in diplomatic and military history. Along the way, countless scholars, faculty, and students have contributed to its success, either through helping manage it, giving talks in its colloquium series, organizing symposia under its aegis, or writing book reviews or articles for Strategic Visions. And one should not forget the donors—those whose generosity allowed CENFAD to exist and to thrive. I take seriously my duty to uphold the standards of such a rich and enduring institution.

A Half-Year of Help

In my transition to Director and Thomas J. Freaney, Jr., Professor of History at Temple, Richard has been extremely gracious and helpful. Many a times I have called or emailed to ask about the most mundane logistics and Richard has always been generous in his hand-holding. Thanks also for handing down your majestic office, Richard, and I hope you hang around Temple a lot longer!

Thanks are also due Jay Lockenour, the chair of the History Department, who hired me and provided me with the background information and resources I needed to run a successful center. Among the department’s staff, Maggie Cogswell has been an invaluable bookkeeper, helping me navigate the financial intricacies of having so many generous donors. Djuna Witherspoon and Vangie Campbell have also been patient as I moved in and tried to grasp how everything worked. Among the faculty, friends of CENFAD have included Faculty Experts Gregory Urwin, Petra Goedde, Rita Krueger, Bryant Simon, and Harvey Neptune, and many more faculty from History, Political Science, Global Studies, and other departments and units who have attended CENFAD’s talks and dinners.

CENFAD’s purpose is primarily to serve Temple graduate students, and they seem to recognize it by participating enthusiastically in its many activities. Most prominent among these, of course, is Eric Perinovic, the 2017-2018 Thomas
J. Davis Fellow in Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, who truly runs CENFAD, from organizing and advertising its events to publishing *Strategic Visions* to manning the camera during our Colloquium talks.

**SV’s New Look**

Many of you will notice a new look to *Strategic Visions*. As of this edition, it is being hosted on the [Temple University Libraries Open Journal System (OJS)](https://ojs.library.temple.edu) website. Thanks to Annie Johnson at Temple University Libraries and Mary Rose Muccie at Temple University Press, along with Eric, of course, for making this happen. This online move will provide *Strategic Visions* with an enhanced design, higher readership, and more reliable presence on the web. While *Strategic Visions* looks new, its content has largely remained the same: news from CENFAD and its community, book reviews, links to our website, and more. All from the CENFAD community—especially the graduate students—are encouraged to propose articles to Eric Perinovic at eric.perinovic@temple.edu, especially now that they know their writings will garner a potentially much larger readership.

Eric and I also have ideas for sprucing up the CENFAD website itself, but we are awaiting a “extreme makeover” of the College of Liberal Arts’ pages.

**Fall 2017 Colloquium**

The just-concluded Fall 2017 Colloquium series represented what CENFAD does best, which is to host a diverse set of scholars as well as practitioners of diplomatic and military matters and have them interact with students and faculty in a congenial setting.

“**My**” inaugural lecture as host of the Colloquium series, on September 14, featured Stephen Kinzer, long-time *New York Times* foreign correspondent and now Senior Fellow at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs and award-winning author of non-fiction books about U.S. foreign policy. His animated lecture brought to life his new book, *The True Flag: Theodore Roosevelt, Mark Twain, and the Birth of American Empire*, which highlights a debate between proponents and opponents of the idea of U.S. empire during the War of 1898 and the Philippine insurrection. Please read Alexandre Caillot’s review of *The True Flag* on page 9, and please click [here](https://example.com) to read Eric Perinovic’s interview with Kinzer.

Two weeks later, I made good on my promise to feature Latin American affairs—my sub-specialty—more prominently at CENFAD by hosting Christy Thornton, an Assistant Professor of Sociology and Latin American Studies at Johns Hopkins University and a Fellow at the Weatherhead Center at Harvard University. Thornton’s lecture, “Neoliberalism and the Narco-State: The Political Economy of U.S.-Mexican Relations Today,” demonstrated that she is a rising star in the profession as well as a razor-sharp activist-scholar. She expertly intertwined Mexican democratic politics, the “war on drugs,” and neoliberal economics in a clear and devastating critique.

On October 19, Professor of History, Public Affairs, and Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin Jeremi Suri visited CENFAD to discuss his ninth book, *The Impossible Presidency: The Rise and Fall of America’s Highest Office*. His lecture focused on foreign policy and explained how American presidents have been increasingly
hamstrung by the very power they have aggregated: the more sway they have inherited from previous presidencies, argued Suri, the more has been expected of them, and therefore the busier and less effective they have become. Please read Manna Duah’s review of The Impossible Presidency on page 13.

Six days later, on October 25, came Judith Van Buskirk to Gladfelter 914. The Professor of History at SUNY–Cortland discussed her own new book, Standing in their Own Light: African-American Patriots in the American Revolution, a remarkable effort to resurrect the voices of these oft-ignored Patriots in light of the fact that few of them left any documentary records. The spring edition of Strategic Visions will feature Abby Gruber’s review of Standing in their Own Light.

Our fifth speaker of the semester was Jeffrey Engel, the Director of the Center for Presidential History at Southern Methodist University. He spoke about his new book, When the World Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War, arguing that Bush the elder was generally successful in his foreign policy because he practiced a subdued, personal style of diplomacy that largely avoided triumphalist celebrations during the collapse of the Soviet Union, an event that Bush saw as evolving in the United States’ favor. Please read Brian McNamara’s review of When the World Seemed New on page 7.

On November 29, Meredith Hindley, historian and writer for Humanities the magazine of the National Endowment for the Humanities, came to CENFAD to discuss her first book, Destination Casablanca: Exile, Espionage, and the Battle for North Africa in World War II, a thrilling retelling of the role of that great city during an even greater war. She introduced us to some of the characters in her book and emphasized the importance of Casablanca in Operation Torch and in the legacy of the awkward efforts at bonne entente between the Americans and the French in World War II. Mathias Fuelling reviewed Destination Casablanca, which can be found on page 11.

Finally, our seventh and last colloquium speaker was Lieutenant Colonel Keith Benedict, a Visiting Professor at Temple University’s ROTC. A Rhodes Scholar, a veteran of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, and the India-Nepal border, and a staff member of General David Petraeus and General James Mattis, Lieutenant Colonel Benedict gave us his views of “National Security in the 21st Century.” The U.S. military, he argued, needed to become a quickly adaptive force in order to meet both the asymmetrical and symmetrical--and largely unpredictable--threats that are bound to emerge in today’s theaters of battle. Please click here to read an interview Eric Perinovic conducted with Lieutenant Colonel Benedict.

Thanks to all our Fall 2017 speakers!

Fall 2017 Prizes

In other CENFAD news, in October, the following four graduate students won fellowships to advance their dissertation research in spring or summer of 2018:

- Brian McNamara, Marvin Wachman Fellowship in Force and Diplomacy, for research in the Maurice Dawkins collection.
- Andrea Siotto, Jeffrey Bower Endowed Research Fellowship, for research at the Imperial War Museum and the National Archives in London.
- Stephen Hausmann, John Votaw Endowed Research Award, for “Indian Country:

Congratulations to all the winners. Their continued determination to explore the past of diplomatic and military history speaks to the core mission of our center.

Final Words

Richard Immerman, upon retiring, stated in his history of CENFAD, “it’s more robust, it’s more diverse, and it’s more renowned” than ever. Those attributes have been evident upon my taking over the directorship, and I am confident that we can make CENFAD even more robust, diverse, and renowned in the years to come. Here’s to the next quarter-century!
Spring 2018 Lineup

Thursday, January 25 at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room).
Donald Abenheim, Associate Professor of History at the Naval Postgraduate School.
“European Security in Crisis.”

Wednesday, February 14 at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room).
Adriane Lentz-Smith, Associate Professor of History at Duke University.
“African Americans and the War for Democracy.”

Wednesday, February 21 at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room).
Vanya Bellinger, Professor of History at the U.S. Army War College.
“The Other Clausewitz: Marie and Carl von Clausewitz and the Creation of On War.”

Thursday, March 15 at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room).
Danielle Sanchez, Assistant Professor of African History at Muhlenberg College.
“Free(ing) France in Colonial Brazzaville: Propaganda and Resistance in Afrique Française Libre.”

Wednesday, April 4 at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room).
Madalina Veres, Postdoctoral Fellow in Digital History at the American Philosophical Society and Visiting Fellow at CENFAD.
“Mapping Untenable Habsburg Outposts in Eastern Europe and the Indian Ocean in the Eighteenth Century”

Thursday, April 19 at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room).
Sanjeevini Lohkande, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Temple University.
“International Human Rights and Forced Migration in National Politics: India since 2002.”

Finally, on April 19-20, CENFAD will help sponsor a one-day conference called “Cuba in War and Peace,” organized by Temple historian Monica Ricketts. Please look for posters and plan to attend.
Note from the Davis Fellow
By Eric Perinovic

Dear CENFAD Community:

What an exciting fall semester we've had at CENFAD! I want to extend my sincere thanks to everyone that has supported the Center over the term. We hosted seven distinguished speakers in our Colloquium Series, announced a slate of outstanding and deserving award winners, and launched a brand new hosting platform for *Strategic Visions*. Further, we should hopefully be transitioning CENFAD’s website to a new platform on the College of Liberal Arts’ server, so be on the lookout!

On top of everything else, we of course welcomed a new director. It’s been a privilege to work alongside Dr. Alan McPherson as he begins his tenure directing the Center. It is an honor to help him realize his vision for CENFAD, and I look forward to continuing our work together in the spring.

Speaking of spring, we're always on the lookout for books to review, scholars to interview, and successful graduates and current students to profile. Please contact me if you have any ideas or are interested in contributing!

I would also like to take this opportunity to invite you to provide me with feedback. What have we been doing that you like, and what can we do to improve? Please feel free to drop me a line.

I hope to see you at our talks in the spring, but until then I wish you all an enjoyable break and a Happy New Year!

Sincerely,

Eric Perinovic

Reviewed by Brian McNamara (PhD student, Department of History, Temple University).

In *When the World Seemed New*, Jeffrey A. Engel has crafted an engaging revision of the end of the Cold War. Combining the best aspects of monograph and synthesis in a volume written with verve, Engel focuses on the period from Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to the United States in September 1988 until Gorbachev’s deposition from leadership at the end of 1991. Engel centers his analysis on the presidency of George H.W. Bush, arguing that Bush employed a style of “Hippocratic diplomacy,” in which he “first strove to do no harm” (6). Tracing Bush’s actions – or more frequently, his inactions – through “the most internationally complex [presidency] since that of Franklin Delano Roosevelt,” Engel claims that Bush was, and is, an “underappreciated president” (4, 8). While Bush was perhaps never fully possessed of the “vision thing,” Engel portrays him as a steady hand, who believed in the righteousness of the United States, and was willing to let history unfold rather than to force himself upon events.

Engel begins with a brief biographical sketch of Bush’s public life leading up to the presidency before throwing him headlong into 1989’s various international crises. We see Bush get egg on his face over his refusal to publicly condemn the violence of Tiananmen Square while remaining noncommittal over his administration’s support for perestroika. Of course, the public face of the Bush administration was rather the tip of the iceberg. Underneath the surface, Bush and his supremely skilled diplomatic and national security team – including Secretary of State James Baker, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates – attempted to chart a course forward in which the United States could encourage democracy and integration in Europe unobtrusively and maintain American hegemony on the continent voluntarily. After watching the Berlin Wall come down, and meeting with Gorbachev in Malta in December of 1989, Bush entered 1990 with his hand firmly on the rudder, working through the issues of German reunification and NATO membership before transitioning into the Gulf War and the attempted coup against Gorbachev. Throughout, Engel portrays Bush as a man attempting not to overstep, concluding that he “rode the stream of history. And we all survived the Cold War’s surprisingly peaceful end” (484).

Particularly notable about Engel’s work is his extensive source base. A lengthy “note on sources” which follows the main text makes clear to readers that Engel has plumbed the depths of the major secondary literature, including those authors who make use of what Communist-bloc sources are available. Engel augments his voluminous secondary backing with newly-declassified American documents, noting that at one time his requests for declassification “exceeded the combined rolls of all other such requests submitted at all the nation’s presidential libraries” (6). Engel’s diligence has paid off in spades. His rich source base of government documents enabled him to credibly approach the end of the Cold War from the top down, rather than the bottom up.

It is this top-down approach that leads to the central question arising from Engel’s work: to what extent was Bush’s pattern of restraint and public-facing inaction a successful strategy? Engel believes that it was, noting that he assesses Bush by the baseline of whether or not he “accomplish[ed] all he... desired” (8). Because Bush believed his desires could be achieved through restraint – owing not least to his “belief
in the inherent superiority of the American ideas on which he’d been raised” – he let events come to him throughout a turbulent time in international history (479).

The challenge for Engel becomes that for much of the book, Bush recedes into the background. He notes in the introduction that his book is “at heart an international story,” and he takes us throughout 1989’s hotspots, from Dan Rather’s interrupted broadcast during Tiananmen Square to the “spokesman’s mistake” that brought down the Berlin Wall (264). Certainly, Bush was at work publicly and behind the scenes during this time, despite this decentering of the American perspective. Engel places specific emphasis on Bush’s work to maintain relations with China after Tiananmen Square, noting that he “accelerated a process of Chinese integration with the world that neither he nor his critics who called out for punishment and revenge could have halted even if they had wanted to” (193). Later, Bush “reached the most important decision of his young presidency,” after a trip to Eastern Europe in July of 1989, writing to Gorbachev to propose what would become their meeting in Malta, and writing to Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping to criticize his handling of Tiananmen Square (227). Yet, these letters remained unpublicized, opening Bush up to criticism from Congress and the media, which Engel dutifully documents. Helen Thomas of the Associated Press recurs as a delightful thorn in Bush’s side.

Indeed, it is only in 1990, a year of “more complicated realities” than its predecessor, that Bush emerges fully as the statesman that Engel has promised us (324). Engel shows us how Bush leveraged his connections built over decades of government service to forge support over his administration’s position on Germany and over the first Gulf War. Bush’s telephone diplomacy, in Engel’s vibrant rendering, shows readers a president engaged in his “finest moments in office” (352). Perhaps Engel’s focus on 1990 as a crucial year of reckoning for Bush is a subtle hint to reperiodize the end of the Cold War. Yet, given the book’s emphasis on 1989 – nearly two-thirds of the text is dedicated to that year alone – such a supposition seems unlikely. Ultimately, this reviewer finds much to admire in Engel’s concept of Hippocratic diplomacy. Given the contingent nature of historical events, it is difficult to say what a more assertive Bush in 1989 might have meant for the end of the Cold War. I also suspect, however, that Engel’s willingness to accept inaction – or at least the perception of it – as leadership will ruffle feathers.

Such a brief review can necessarily say only so much about such an impressive and detailed work of historical scholarship. Engel has forced us to reconsider both George H.W. Bush’s role in the end of the Cold War and, more broadly, how to evaluate a statesman’s success or failure. His scholarship will undoubtedly inform and animate the works of historians who grapple with these questions for decades to come.

Reviewed by Alexandre Caillot (PhD student, Department of History, Temple University).

In his 1959 classic, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, William Appleman Williams observed three tendencies in American foreign policy: a “humanitarian impulse…the principle of self-determination… [and] the third idea…that other people cannot really...improve their lives unless they go about it in the same way as the United States.”

Journalist Stephen Kinzer addresses the origins of these divergent motivations in *The True Flag*, contending that the Spanish-American War generated “the farthest-reaching debate in our history” (2-3). Per the author, this period – not the country’s post-1945 rise to superpower status – laid the foundations for all ensuing foreign policy dilemmas.

Kinzer outlines the positions articulated by imperialists and anti-imperialists. The former highlighted the popularity of colonialism among contemporary powers and the necessity of markets abroad as an outlet for the country’s burgeoning productivity. Critics rejected “colonizing, annexing foreign lands, taking protectorates, or projecting military power overseas” as antithetical to national tradition (11). Hawkish counterparts responded that democratic principles were solely applicable to (white) nations capable of self-rule. The author points to Theodore Roosevelt and Mark Twain as “the most prominent...admired, and...reviled spokesmen for their opposing cause.” (13).

Concerns over America’s global position shaped multiple registers of political discourse.

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Boxer Rebellion intervention with the likes of the Boer War and Belgian atrocities in the Congo: the likely result of dealing with recalcitrant natives. During his bungled second presidential run, Bryan’s free-silver rhetoric obscured his anti-imperialist message and lost him capitalist allies.

Kinzer asserts that the oppositional movement collapsed with Roosevelt’s presidential election in 1901. Captured Filipino resistance leader Emilio Aguinaldo personally affirmed U.S. hegemony, while the Supreme Court upheld the administration of “foreign lands indefinitely by decree” in the Insular Cases (202). General Jacob H. Smith suffered court-martial for his scorched-earth campaign on the island of Samar, though an investigative committee chaired by imperialist Henry Cabot Lodge dismissed this conduct as exceptional. The author states that “news of atrocities did not set off anti-war protests... [but rather] stirred patriotic backlash” (222). Citizens prioritized domestic affairs, a trend Roosevelt mirrored with his focus on antitrust legislation and national parks.

Anti-imperialists predicted that aggrandizement would trigger indigenous revolt, making certain “that the first burst of American annexation would be the last” (228). Kinzer nevertheless blames subsequent interventionism for an influential defense industry, massive budgets, elite political control, centralized governance, the esteem of martial values, and inadequate public scrutiny of potential wars. Underlying imperialism and intervention, he maintains, is the American belief in “providential access to secrets that can produce free and prosperous societies anywhere” (231). The First World War furthered the divide between isolationists and globalists, the latter casting themselves as defenders of “economic growth, human rights, and democracy” (233). During the Second World War, Germany and Japan’s reprehensible conduct justified intervention; notwithstanding challenges by the far right and left, the Cold War solidified this bipartisan consensus. Kinzer carries the argument forward, likening President Barack Obama to President Herbert Hoover for perceiving the confines of U.S. influence. An uninformed population’s acceptance of “preemptive war and ‘regime change’ operations reflect the quintessentially American view that the world is not a situation to be understood, but a problem to be solved” (247).

Kinzer surveys America’s imperialist turn in accessible prose, although he might have advanced a more original argument. He refers to historical archives in the acknowledgements, yet relies on published primary sources (newspapers, autobiographies, speeches, congressional records) and secondary literature. Moreover, his periodization claim ineffectually grapples with the relationship between westward and overseas expansion. Noting such ventures as Indian removal and the Mexican-American War, the author still purports that Roosevelt and Lodge’s embrace of “ruling people beyond their own continent, without those people’s consent...[was] an immense historical leap” (19). Oddly, he quotes period Americans cognizant of the parallels. Orville Platt derided anti-imperialist George Hoar for having “contradicted all of American history,” and Roosevelt declared that such “doctrines condemn your forefathers and mine for ever having settled in these United States” (104, 147). The True Flag rightfully calls attention to the great turn-of-the-century debate, but when Kinzer suggests that “it has faded from memory,” he would do well to openly concede the extensive academic attention this topic has enjoyed (3).

Reviewed by Mathias Fuelling (PhD student, Department of History, Temple University).

In *Destination Casablanca: Exile, Espionage, and the Battle for North Africa in World War II*, Meredith Hindley has written a lively and illuminating history of an underappreciated and understudied facet of the Second World War. Frequently, historians of the war have focused on the European and Pacific theaters. Frequently, historians of the war largely focus on the European and Pacific theaters. If the North African theater is studied at all it is often about the campaigns of Erwin Rommel and desert tank warfare. Hindley’s is a much needed work that helps to fill in an historiographical gap by showing the importance of the North African theater in providing a launching pad for the Allied invasions of France and Italy. This is, however, not a book just about the war in North Africa, but also a specific city, Casablanca. Casablanca within the Anglo-American mind may forever be associated with the eponymous film starring Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman, but Hindley demonstrates that the thrilling political maneuverings in the film were not even the half of it. Rick and Ilsa’s story was quite ordinary compared to the rest of the goings on in the city.

Hindley shows that after the fall of France, Casablanca became a hub for thousands of refugees including Jews, French soldiers, and a motley assortment of people of all stripes seeking to escape the Nazis. Many thought that they could make the passage from Casablanca to neutral Portugal, Canada, the United States, or South America. However, Morocco came under the control of the Vichy government after the French defeat. The Nazi government, seeking to stanch the flow of people out of Europe, pressured Vichy to take action. In August of 1940 the Vichy government forbade “men between the ages of seventeen and fifty who hailed from Britain, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Norway, and Poland from leaving Morocco” (57). One could still enter Casablanca but now could not legally leave without special approval. Thousands of people from across Europe became stuck in the city, forced to find some way to survive in the midst of the war and all the while desperately seeking underground passage out.

Hindley’s narrative rivals that of the best spy novels in showing the covert maneuvering (political and otherwise), that occurred in the pressure cooker of closed-off Casablanca. She showcases the myriad characters passed through, including the cabaret performer Josephine Baker and the itinerant ex-communist intellectual Arthur Koestler. There may perhaps never again be a city with such a concentrated population of spies and underground political actors as Casablanca between 1941 and 1943. In this shadowy world Rick’s Café would have been run of the mill. Hindley goes beyond the thriller elements, however, to integrate them with the city’s larger role in the Allied war strategy. Shortly after the fall of France, Casablanca and Morocco came to be seen by the Allied leadership as an ideal beachhead for a potential invasion. Hindley moves between the minute political conflicts within Casablanca, to the grand struggles within the Allied leadership in forging strategy, all the while showing the secret activities of Allied agents to create a favorable environment for an invasion. Her account of the invasion of Morocco and Casablanca in November of 1942 is gripping and also a successful example of the heights to which the new style of military history can rise. She carries her account through to the end of the war and the Allied occupation, showing the political relations set up after the war and the post war consequences of the major figures’ actions in Casablanca.

Readers will learn much that is new from Hindley’s narrative. She skillfully shows the
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global nature of the Second World War and the messy dynamic that existed between Allied grand strategy and its dependence on information passed on by covert agents. This is neither a purely military or covert operations history, but rather a fusion of the two. This book is highly recommended and will hopefully stand as a model for future historians of the Second World War.

Reviewed by Manna Duah (PhD student, Department of History, Temple University).

In *The Impossible Presidency*, Jeremi Suri contrasts the successes of early presidents against the struggles of their modern successors (xv). When the delegates to the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia, they set out to create a system that would prevent abuse of power while empowering a strong national leader. Thomas Jefferson warned that failure to ensure a restrained use of power and a focus on the national interest would lead to excess, despotism, and decline (xi, 6). Presidents George Washington, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and Franklin Roosevelt could invent and evolve in the office by expanding the power of the presidency. Their accomplishments have left modern presidents and citizens with outsized and unrealistic expectations for the office. America’s disenchantment with the modern presidency is due to the discord between presidential promises and possibilities (6). Suri states that President Donald Trump’s election is the product of a widening gap between power and values. Trump “is the final fall of founders’ presidency – the antithesis of what they expected from the office” (xi).

Suri praises the early presidents’ ability to redefine presidential power and apply it to the national interest. Washington was a humble commander guided by a complete concern for the national interest (27/28). Jackson redefined the presidency to become the voice and protector of forgotten citizens, those who did not traditionally wield power or possess wealth or large tracts of land (51). Suri states that Lincoln transformed the nation from a political arrangement into a scared whole (xii). Theodore Roosevelt followed progressive reforms at home, and military strength abroad (xiii). Franklin Roosevelt pursued international peace as complementary to his reform at home (127).

Modern presidents John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama became managers of the world’s largest economy and military. They dealt with new security threats, from nuclear crises to terrorist attacks, while a vocal and global constituency utilized the 24-hour news cycle to express outrage over presidential decisions. Today, modern presidents in response overcommit, overpromise, and overreach (ix, 260). However, the presidency is ill-equipped to police the domestic and global world these U.S. policies created (x). Presidents are thus overwhelmed by abundant capabilities, diffuse interests, and differing demands. Suri describes modern presidencies’ crisis management as the effect of an “undisciplined power” (xiv).

thesize Kennedy's anti-communist policy in Latin America, particularly in Cuba, as overstretched his administration mentally and physically (203). Missiles and the USSR's interest in Cuba were an immediate military threat to America's national security, whereas Washington and Jefferson’s interest in helping crush an ill-equipped slave rebellion in Haiti was primarily concerned with alleviating the concerns of American business interests – namely its slave holders.

Suri questions the central purpose of Johnson’s Great Society and its proliferation of laws such as the Voting Rights Act in securing the national interest (223). However, Johnson’s legislation was fundamentally an enforcement of the virtue-signaling in Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address when he promised to realize a nation with equality and
freedom for all. Lincoln’s presidency itself is mired in the kind of mission creep Suri decries as contributing to the decline of the modern presidency (ix). With Southern Democrats out of Congress, Radical Republicans passed laws previously held up by opposition including the Homestead Act and Pacific Railway Act. Lincoln’s overreach was often reluctant and contested. He clashed with his own party and military commanders (notably George McClellan and Henry Halleck) who disagreed with his military strategies and domestic policies, including the designation of African Americans as “contraband of war.” In a single decision in January 1863, Lincoln deprived American citizens in the Confederacy of their property with the Emancipation Proclamation. Together with Congress, he overturned a Supreme Court ruling with the 13th Amendment and expanded the definition of full citizenship to include African Americans. The presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson contended with the abrupt end to Lincoln and Reconstruction Era Congressional over-reach, over-promise, and virtue signaling.

Suri does not fully grapple with the profound ways the “great early presidencies” failed Native Americans, African Americans, and women. He briefly mentions Jackson’s violent policies towards these constituents in the context of the great work Jackson does on behalf of common Americans, defined as white men. The Trail of Tears – a bloody campaign against the Cherokee nation - becomes about Jackson’s ability as a “remarkable strong advocate” for common Americans (53). The Indian Removal Act was in the national interest, as Jackson used the power of the federal government to expand opportunities for those left behind – “the bone and sinew of the country” (51, 67). Suri, however, describes Johnson and Kennedy’s attempt to utilize presidential power in the 1960s to expand opportunity for those left behind – non-white men – as contributing to the distractions of presidential power. In a similar vein, Suri defends FDR’s dismissal of civil rights as necessary for protecting the national interest from the threat of fascism (187). FDR, however, went to war to end the violent power of white supremacy in Europe while ignoring the same at home, to protect his New Deal agenda from opposition.

Modern presidents face modern constituents who demand that the office utilize the virtue-signal, open wallets, and flexed muscles precedents set by early presidents. This includes presidential actions such as Washington’s interest in the Haitian Revolution on behalf of slaveholders, his response to the Whiskey Rebellion, Jackson’s Indian removal policy to secure land for poor whites, and FDR’s public spending on New Deal programs. Modern constituents are asking the presidency to live up to American ideals of liberty and equality for all, and expand these rights to them. That is essentially the vision of the Founding Fathers, even if they themselves did not always live up to it.