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By Alan McPherson

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New Web Page

Greetings from the Ninth Floor of Gladfelter Hall! The fall 2018 semester is coming to an end, as is another half-year of activities at CENFAD. Since I have taken over as Director a year and a half ago, CENFAD has been humming along with the usual fascinating speakers, dedicated graduate students, and a successful conference on Cuba in war and peace.

You may notice our new web page, redesigned along with all the other ones in the College of Liberal Arts. We took the opportunity to streamline it by highlighting the three most important contributions that CENFAD makes to the Temple community—hosting scholars, funding student research, and publishing the newsletter you're currently reading. We are also highlighting this year's Non-Resident Fellow, Eric Moore of the University of Oklahoma.

Fall 2018 Colloquium

The just-concluded Fall 2018 Colloquium series has a special focus. Apart from the first two talks, all the others were by Temple PhDs who recently published their first book. We invited them so that they could present their work to the next generation of Temple scholars while their former advisors—especially Richard Immerman and Gregory Urwin—looked on with pride.

On September 5, our first lecturer was an exception to this pattern. A personal request by Mike Fischer, this year's David Fellow, Professor of History David Foglesong of Rutgers University spoke about "American Interventions in Revolutionary Russia: Methods, Motives, Memories." A specialist of U.S.-Russia relations, Foglesong urged historians to expand their sense of the U.S. intervention there after World War I beyond the U.S. expedition to Siberia.

On September 17, CENFAD quickly organized a gathering for Alejandro Bendaña, a historian and former Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United Nations for the Sandinista government of the 1980s. Bendaña was on his way to New York to lobby against the current Nicaraguan government. He stopped by to talk about "The Nicaraguan Civic Insurrection: A Historical Perspective," framing the current unrest in his country as a historically informed response to his former *compañero* , President Daniel Ortega, who, in Bendaña's thinking, has seriously steered off the Sandinista path of fostering social democracy.

Days later, on September 20, the first of five former Temple PhDs visited CENFAD. Matthew Shannon, Assistant Professor of History at Emory & Henry College, discussed his new book, *Losing Hearts and Minds: American-Iranian Relations and International Education during the Cold War*. It is a study of how US educational exchange programs attracted Iranian students in order to improve their view of the United States but instead ended up making them more critical of U.S. foreign policy, thus contributing to the rift between both nations.

The Control War: The Struggle for South Vietnam, 1968-1975 is the title of Martin Clemis's book and of the talk he delivered to CENFAD on October 3. An Assistant Professor of History and Government at Valley Forge Military College and Assistant Director of Research at the H. R. McMaster Center for Security Studies, Clemis made the case that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong partly won by establishing greater control over the rural civilians of South Vietnam than the U.S.-allied South Vietnamese military ever could.

Kelly Shannon's talk, two weeks later on October 17, was inspired by her own book, U.S. Foreign Policy and Muslim Women's Human Rights. Shannon, an Associate Professor of History at Florida Atlantic University, focused in her talk on the 1990s and the Bill Clinton administration. That White House, especially because of the work of First Lady Hillary Clinton and of transnational women activists, achieved a rare feat in U.S. history by placing the goal of achieving Muslim women's human rights above the extraction of natural resources, in this case new oil and gas pipelines. You can see an interview with Prof. Shannon here.

On November 15, Jason Smith, Assistant Professor of History at Southern Connecticut State University, discussed his own work, *To Master the Boundless Sea: The U.S. Navy, the Marine Environment, and the Cartography of Empire*. In the book and talk, Smith blends his love of naval history with an innovative look at the goal of mapping the constantly changing environment of the oceans, in the greater mission of expanding U.S. power abroad.

Finally, on November 29, Associate Professor of History at Louisiana Tech University Drew McKevitt presented his book, *Consuming Japan: Popular Culture and the Globalizing of 1980s America*. This pathbreaking cultural history presents the myriad ways in which Americans experienced the "Japan panic" of the 1980s. VCRs, anime, new auto plants, and so much more forced Americans to recalibrate their relationship with the former enemy.

Thanks to all our Fall 2018 speakers, and congratulations to all the first-time authors!

Fall 2018 Prizes

In other CENFAD news, in October, the following two graduate students won fellowships to advance their dissertation research in spring or summer of 2019:

- Alexandre Caillot won a John Votaw Endowed Research Award to visit several area archives in support of his dissertation project on the performance of Union soldiers who filled newly-raised regiments fighting through the Civil War's final year.

- Eric Perinovic won a Jeffrey Bower Endowed Research Fellowship to support research at the NATO Archive in Brussels, Belgium, as part of his larger dissertation on U.S.-German relations during the Cold War.

Congratulations to the winners. Their continued determination to explore the past of diplomatic and military history speaks to the core mission of our center.

Spring 2018 Lineup

Please join us starting in January for an impressive lineup of speakers, including our Non-Resident Fellow, Erik Moore.

Wednesday, January 23 at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room). **Melani McAlister**, Professor of American Studies and International Affairs at George Washington University.
"The Kingdom of God Has No Borders: A Global History of American Evangelicals."

Tuesday, January 29 at 10 AM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room). **Colonel Edward A. Kaplan, USAF and the US Army War College.** A round-table discussion of US military history and military culture.

Wednesday, February 6 at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room).
Erik Moore, CENFAD Non-Resident Fellow and Postdoctoral Associate at the University of Oklahoma Humanities.
"Activists and Insurgents: Human Rights Advocacy During the Contra War, 1981-1988."

Thursday, February 21 at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room).
Eliga Gould, Professor of History at the University of New Hampshire.
"Harry Washington's Peace: Slavery and Freedom in the United States' Founding Treaty."

Thursday, March 14 at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room). **Ali Ahmida**, Professor of Political Science, University of New England. "The Ghosts of Colonial Past and the Crisis of Post-Qadhdhafi Libya."

Thursday, April 4 at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room). **Nancy Mitchell**, Professor of History at North Carolina State University. "Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War."

Wednesday, April 24 at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room).
Mark Lawrence, Associate Professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin.
"In the Shadow of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson and the Third World."

Please join us for as many talks as you can. If you're an instructor, please incentivize your students to attend. See you in the spring!

Note from the Davis Fellow

By Michael Fischer

It is hard to believe that another semester has past, and what an eventful semester it was! I would like to thank all of you for making this fall semester an incredibly successful one for the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy. We have hosted seven distinguished speakers in our Colloquium Series, welcomed back a number of Temple University graduates whose first books have been recently published, and rolled out a revamped website on the College of Liberal Arts' new platform. It has truly been a whirlwind of exciting events for CENFAD!

None of these events would be possible without the support that you, the CENFAD community, gives with each and every event. Speaking for both our director Alan McPherson and myself, I would like to extend our deepest gratitude.
Speaking of Dr. McPherson, it has been an absolute honor to work with him in pursuit of maintain and furthering CENFAD's legacy. This semester with CENFAD has been one of the most fulfilling periods of my academic life, and I look forward to continuing our work in the coming months.

This edition of Strategic Visions contains a variety of rich contributions from members of the CENFAD community. Temple University's graduate students have been enthusiastic and instrumental in delivering a wide variety of interesting content for our magazine. Joshua Stern contributed a section of his master's thesis entitled "The Action Plan, Or: How Reagan Convinced the American People to Love the Contras." He argues that a document from the Office of Public Diplomacy titled Public Diplomacy Action Plan: Support for the White House Education Campaign served as the "primary organizational blueprint for one of the largest domestic propaganda campaigns of the 20th century."

Furthermore, we have brief pieces written by two individuals who have recently been very involved with CENFAD. First, the 2017-2018 Davis Fellow Eric Perinovic writes an update on his time in Germany as a Fulbright Scholar. Next, this years non-resident fellow Erik Moore writes an introductory note on is research interests and current projects.

Additionally, *Strategic Visions* contains books reviews of the recent books that our colloquium speakers have published, interviews with select speakers from our colloquium series this fall, and a brief piece that I composed after a conversation with Marc Gallicchio, the Villanova University Professor who earned his PhD at Temple University and is the co-author, along with Waldo Heinrichs, of the Bancroft Prize winning book *Implacable Foes: War in the Pacific, 1944-1945.*

As we move into 2019, I would like point you to our upcoming events. We will be continuing our successful Colloquium Series featuring esteemed historians as well as a conversation

with students from the Army War College in January. Be sure to be on the lookout for future emails with more information. If you have any questions about CENFAD events, both past and present, please do not hesitate to reach out to me.

Along similar lines, I would also like to invite you to provide me with any feedback about CENFAD. What have we been doing that you like? What can we improve? This invitation is always open, as is my door. Please feel free to send a message or drop by for a chat!

I look forward to seeing you all at our spring events. Have a wonderful break and a Happy New Year!

Sincerely,

Mike Fischer

Note from the Non-Resident Fellow

By Erik Moore

Dear CENFAD Community:

My name is Erik Moore, and I am CENFAD's Non-Resident Fellow for the 2018-2019 academic year. I earned my PhD in U.S. history from the University of Oklahoma in 2018 and my JD from the University of Missouri – Kansas City School of Law in 2004. In addition to serving as a Non-Resident Fellow at CENFAD, I am a postdoctoral associate at the OU Humanities Forum.

My research focuses on law in U.S. foreign relations to explain how domestic conceptions of law interacted with that of other nations to influence international affairs. As a practicing attorney and as a historian, I interpret law as an expression of American culture, social values, and politics. Law and foreign relations embody the fluid, and often contradictory, popular, and governmental discourses that underpinned the nation's social hierarchies, individual rights, and the role of the state in society. As such, the study of foreign relations in the context of law examines the negotiation that took place as different worldviews came into contact.

My current project examines the contested legal conception of human rights as a point of transnational interaction. The research shows that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) advocating for peace in Nicaragua successfully used human rights discourse against President Ronald Reagan to limit U.S. support for the counterrevolution and help end the Contra War. Through a combination of grassroots activism, Congressional lobbying, and investigations and reporting, these organizations worked to reframe the Contra War as an issue of human rights and not Cold War anti-communism. In doing so, NGOs convinced enough members of Congress to cut off military funding to the Contras in 1988, which pushed the guerrillas into in a ceasefire and peace agreement with the Nicaraguan government.

This research changes the narrative of the Contra War and human rights in the 1980s. My work refutes arguments that NGOs had minimal influence over policy in Washington. Scholars have understood the conflict in the context of Cold War geopolitics, that Reagan wanted to aggressively confront communism in Nicaragua but regularly ran into trouble with Congress because of errors in judgment or policy, such as the Iran-Contra Affair. My research intervenes to show that NGOs were necessary to hold the popular president accountable when Congress was unable or unwilling. The research is also the first to investigate Nicaragua as the subject of a human rights debate during the Reagan administration. While historians research human rights in U.S. relations with other countries in Latin America, Nicaragua has been left out. It did not fit the model of state-sponsored terror, like that in Chile and Argentina, against which activists organized or testified in Congress. The Contra War was also outside the 1970s, a pivotal decade for human rights in American politics and culture and the subject of the majority of research. Furthermore, my work is part of a new direction in scholarship examining interpretations of human rights at the grassroots and cultural level in the United States rather than focusing on government officials or international lawyers.

My article "Rights or Wishes? Conflicting Views Over Human Rights and America's Involvement in the Nicaraguan Contra War," appearing in the December 2018 issue of *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, discusses how different interpretations of human rights influenced how Americans viewed the Nicaraguan Revolution and Sandinista government. Human rights also provided a language of opposition to Reagan's policies. I am completing a second article that focuses on how the anti-Contra movement led NGOs to expand their scope and seek change to the underlying principles of Cold War ideology in American politics.

Best Regards,
Erik Moore

An Update from Germany
By Eric Perinovic

Hello CENFAD Community!

Greetings from the beautiful city of Freiburg-im-Breisgau! I am currently starting the fourth month of my stay here as a Fulbright scholar, and I've been asked to provide an ex-Davis Fellow in the field report. I arrived in Germany on September 15, and my first few weeks were spent in a whirlwind of bureaucratic hoops, jetlag, and the Fulbright Orientation in the historic university city of Marburg. The orientation was a wonderful opportunity to meet brilliant scholars from all over the United States that study disciplines and topics from across the spectrum. Marburg itself is a picturesque city dotted with statues and other homages to the Brothers Grimm, who began collecting folk tales when they attended the university. It took about of month of concerted effort, but my conversational German has gotten much better. I am approaching the level of fluidity I last had as an undergraduate when I lived in the Max Kade German House at Ohio State. Speaking German has been something of a rarity for me over the last 8 years, and it's been an empowering experience to reclaim these language skills.

I was cleared to start archival work on October 1, and I spend around 30-35 hours a week in the Federal Military Archive conducting primary source research in support of my dissertation on the long-term political, military, and economic ramifications of West Germany's decision to procure the Lockheed F- 104 Starfighter in 1960. The Starfighter was an infamous widow-maker in West German service, and the high mortality rate of its pilots caused a widespread domestic political scandal in the late 1960s. While this will play an important role in my research, I'm focusing more on how the Starfighter was leveraged by the Federal Republic to achieve normalized leadership within NATO by leading the NATO-Starfighter Management Office. To that end, I will be making a trip to Brussels this winter to spend time in the NATO Archive, which has been facilitated through the conferral of CENFAD's Jeffrey Bower Endowed Research Fellowship.

In contrast to my first visit in 2016, I was incredibly fortunate to be greeted on my arrival in the archive with around 50 pounds of new materials the archivists had pulled for me. This was especially welcome given that the archive's search and retrieval system is more than a bit byzantine and counter-intuitive. While archival work can sometimes feel interminable, I have found some great source materials. At the moment, I am reviewing East German intelligence reports and assessments of the Starfighter and West Germany's ambitions in pursuing it. Unfortunately, due to privacy laws, I'm prevented from photographing them, so it's been a prolonged adventure in translation. I'm examining the Starfighter's role in the complicated Intra-German relationship of the 1960s with the hope of turning it into an article and dissertation chapter.

Beyond my archival work, I've been very active in and around Freiburg. A key component of being a Fulbright scholar is serving as a cultural ambassador to one's host community. To that end, I have joined the Lehrstuhl für Neuere und Neueste Geschichte Westeuropas at the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, where I am taking part in seminars and research colloquia with

German historians and doctoral students. It's been a great opportunity to build both personal and professional bridges and has provided me with the chance to discuss my research and practice the pitch for my dissertation in German. I generally take an excursion a week in and around Baden-Württemberg, which is facilitated by my wonderful landlord, Anita, who has taken me to more festivals and wine tastings than I can count and "on tour" in Alsace, the Black Forest, and to many villages and towns throughout the Breisgau. Additionally, I learned on November 15 that I have been selected by the German-American Fulbright Commission to serve as a representative at the February 2019 EU-NATO Seminar hosted by the Fulbright-Schuman Program. It will be a five-day seminar that takes place in both Belgium and Luxembourg and will include tours and briefings at the EU Commission, European Court of Justice, NATO Headquarters, U.S. Mission to the EU, and Bastogne War Museum among other locations.

While the Fulbright has been a wonderful experience, it's also been difficult due to being separated from my wife Jenny and daughter Eleanor. Being apart from them has been full of heartache, but I can't wait to see them over the holidays. I returned to Philadelphia for Thanksgiving, and they will be joining me for two weeks in Germany over the holiday season. Jenny has shown an astonishing amount of strength and perseverance over the last several months, and I stand in awe of her.

That about does it for this check-in. I hope everyone is doing well, and that your semesters have been productive! As ever, feel free to drop me a line.

Best,

Eric

A Conversation with Marc Gallicchio

By Michael Fischer

"This is really a Temple project," Villanova University's Dr. Marc Gallicchio said of Implacable Foes: War in the Pacific, 1944-1945, the Bancroft Prize winning 2017 book that he co-authored with mentor and long-time friend Waldo Heinrichs. Considering the collaboration between Gallicchio and Heinrichs, combined with the inspiration from giants of Temple University and military history such as Russell Weigley, that assertion is not difficult to believe.

Through an ambitious reinterpretation of the United States' political and military efforts in the final months of the Pacific War, Heinrichs and Gallicchio point out to the reader that, though a traditional invasion of Japan may not have been impossible, there were a great many logistical obstacles and domestic political constraints unhinging American strategy at the end of the war. After the end of the European War, Gallicchio explains, many in American business (big businesses, small business, and labor) began pushing for a reconversion toward a peacetime economy. The army, still fighting against a viable Japan in the Pacific, was vehemently opposed to reconversion, as it would draw out the war and play into Japan's hopes. This economic reconversion, coupled with logistical concerns of redeployment to name a few factors, brought up questions to American leaders and germinated thoughts that maybe the United States would have to settle for something short of unconditional surrender.

While working on related projects such as the role of unconditional surrender in the American war plans and other issues that built upon his 2008 book The Scramble for Asia, Gallicchio was approached by Heinrichs about collaborating on a project that would eventually become ImplacableFoes. The two have exchanged ideas and writing projects going back to Gallicchio's days as a graduate student of Heinrichs's at Temple. So working together on a project such as this was a relatively organic transition. Gallicchio was delighted, honored, and just a bit scared to co-author a book with his mentor. He said that, at the outset, it "felt like I was back in grad school," and that the test for his writing and arguments was "whether or not I could convince Waldo Heinrichs."

However, working with Heinrichs proved to be a rewarding and productive process. The two were able to pull together several different threads in domestic and international affairs to produce a compelling account of the end of the Pacific War. The collaborative process, Gallicchio explains, was an incredibly rewarding one that proved both fruitful and enjoyable. It was not without its challenges however, as writing for a wider audience brought its own challenges. For example, Gallicchio and Heinrichs were instructed not to list other historians (save for a few big names) in their text, so as not to alienate the wider public. For the same reason, Gallicchio stated that his editor instructed him and his co-author to only quote directly from primary sources. Even if another historian articulated an idea perfectly for their purposes, Gallicchio and Heinrichs were tasked with paraphrasing. While it is certainly difficult to strike a balance between effective analysis and accessibility, this raises an important question for historians with respect to audience and the effectiveness of our writing.

Despite the challenges that accompanied the research for and writing of Implacable Foes, Gallicchio would have done few things differently. For instance, he would "try to make it a bit shorter, which it already is

compared to what it started as initially." Looking forward, Gallicchio is returning to some of the ideas he had before Heinrichs approached him about collaborating on Implacable Foes. "I'm interested in writing a book on the politics of unconditional surrender during and after the war," he states, while adding that he is also interested in writing a political biography of Albert Wedemeyer, a United States Army commander who served in Asia during and after the war. Regardless of the approach that Dr. Gallicchio takes in his upcoming project or projects, between his relationships, methodology, and influences, his work will inherently be of great interest to CENFAD and the Temple University history community.

Interview with Kelly Shannon of Florida Atlantic University

By Michael Fischer

Kelly Shannon, who received her PhD from Temple University is the author of *U.S. Foreign Policy and Muslim Women's Human Rights.*

Q: Is there anything in particular that pushed you to study American foreign relations or Muslim women's human rights?

A: Foreign relations, I got interested in as an undergraduate. I actually started as a theater major. Vassar had a great theater department but also an incredible history department. I took a course on US Cold War history as a junior, and that is also when 9/11 happened. Between class and world events, I got really interested in US and world behavior. I initially was interested in US-Irish relations, but I moved beyond that through paying attention to world events and TAing a course for women's studies when I was a master's student.

Q: Your book argues that, as U.S. attention to the Middle East and other Muslim-majority regions became more focused and sustained, the issue of women's human rights in Islamic societies was one that Americans gradually identified as vitally important to U.S. foreign policy. What made Americans key in on this as opposed to other aspects of foreign policy?

A: The story that I've traced is that this issue gets identified outside of government circles. The American public reacted to the loss of women's rights in Iran in 1979 sparks this sustained American response hat would only deepen in the years following. There had always been orientalist imagery, but the actual, substantive discussion of the real-life situation was new in 1979. People started incorporating languages of universal human rights and ideas coming out of the international feminist movement. By the 1990s, they had these successful campaigns the US government. Once you get the Clinton Administration, which was already sympathetic to feminist issues, in power, you get this moment of change.

Q: So you look at 1979 as a turning point, but it fluctuates with changes in administrations and the international political situation?

A: Yes policy-wise it starts in the 90s, but with respect to social movements and feminism, it starts earlier.

Q: How have American foreign policy aims with respect to Muslim women's human rights changed since the late 1970s, and perhaps an even more pointed question, how have they changed during the Trump Administration?

A: In terms of pre-Trump, there wasn't a policy until the Clinton Administration. The Clinton people, especially the First Lady, tried to mainstream women's issues across the Executive Branch. There were attempts to put women's issues front and center as a policy focus, along with arguments, for instance, that women's rights were also economically beneficial, in order to bring in as many constituents as possible. They tried to avoid that imperialist type of approach. With Bush, you get a focus on women's rights in the Islamic world as well, but it is not paired with the broader women's rights movement you had under Clinton. Those policies in Afghanistan, Iraq, I see them as being genuine, but he went about them in a way that was flawed. It bred resistance when paired with American military intervention. That was highly problematic. With Obama, there was an attempt to go back to that broader approach, but Obama was also trying to withdraw troops, which led to a tension. What happens to Muslim women's rights when we withdraw? I would say under Trump, there really is no women's rights agenda that I have seen.

Q: Where does this story end?

A: My original goal was to get this book out while Obama was still in office, but with publication and things, I wasn't in control. I ended up having to rewrite the conclusion the day after the election. The problem with doing something current events related is that you have to continuously add things.

Q: What types of roles do domestic social movements, such as the MeToo Movement, play in the reorientation of American foreign policy aims with regard to things like human rights abroad?

A: Depending on who ends up in the White House next, I think current movements are changing the ways in which people think about how women have to move in the world. We could end up going back to the policy trajectory that I found for the book before Trump. Trump has chosen not to fill those positions and offices, but those offices still exist.

Q: If I may shift gears a bit, what were some of the biggest challenges when writing this book, either in terms of particularly troubling sources or methodology?

A: There were several. One is the issue of source availability. There are government classification issues. The Clinton Library online made it look like there were all these available sources that were classified when I got there. But there were still lots of available sources, especially those relating to the First Lady. I consider my book a type of first draft on this topic. I did interviews to try and fill in the gaps in the record and also to confirm things. I did totally strike out trying to get Madeleine Albright and the Clintons, but I ended up interviewing some other individuals such as Theresa Loar and Mahnaz Afkhami who provided a great deal of information.

Q: Were all of your interviews in English?

A: Yes, for this project, the voices of those Muslim women who contributed to the conversation were largely in the United States and speaking Americans' language, both literally and figuratively.

Q: Contrarily, what were some of the fondest moments you had while researching and writing this book?

A: I would say doing the archival research was great, but my favorite thing was interviewing Mahnaz Afkhami. I know you're supposed to maintain a historical distance between yourself and your subject, but she was so great. She spent a whole day with me, and she was still running an NGO. She provided so much valuable information. She taught me so much, maybe a fraction ended up in the book.

Q: What is next for you?

A: I am starting a book project on US relations with Iran from 1905-1953. I'm looking at foreign relationsas a broad category, so it's not just state to state. I'm looking at missionaries, financial advisors, travelers, things like that. There's not really a monograph that covers that period, so it's exciting to be able to break
a whole bunch of new ground.

Interview with Jason Smith of Southern Connecticut State University

By Michael Fischer

Jason Smith, who received his PhD from Temple University, is the author of To Master the Boundless Sea: The U.S. Navy, the Marine Environment, and the Cartography of Empire

Q: What in particular pushed you to study what you do?

A: Well, I always came to Temple with the idea of being a military historian. I was always interested in the Navy in particular, even as a young child. I remember I was about nine years old on the fiftieth anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1991, and I remember all of the media coverage of that as a kid really affected me. I became fascinated with that in particular. I was lucky enough at my undergraduate institution to unknowingly stumble upon two maritime naval historians in this department. When I got here, under the advisement of Dr. Urwin, I began to dig deeper into questions of science and exploration. Just taking classes with different faculty helped to broaden my methods.

Q: What were some of the chief methods that you used in writing this book?

A: I cast a pretty wide net. I began with more traditional questions of military power, of naval power. Then I sort of broadened that to include maritime history, environmental history, and also the history of science and cartography. I tried to bring as many of those approaches as I could.

Q: What type of sources does that involve outside of the more traditional military history type sources?

A: What you find among people who sea-fare, whether they are naval officers, or merchant mariners, or whalers or whatever is that they have a very visceral relationship with the sea and they write very prolifically about that. Then you have the official navy records. I was also interest with the people's everyday experience with the ocean and context within which these things occur. There is a lot of log keeping that records environmental data and various observations about the ocean.

Q: For those who will either not be able to attend your talk or those who will not be able to read your book before *Strategic Visions* comes out, do you have one or two points that you would like them to take away, either from the talk or from your book?

A: Sure. The first is that the sea matters, to us now in an era of climate change and the sea matters historically. It has been overlooked, up until quite recently, even by naval and environmental historians. We tend to be terrestrially minded, but I would say that the sea matters.

Especially for a military, diplomatic crowd, we should always look at what might otherwise be overlooked in terms of staking claim in the development of a particular American identity. For me in this case it was these naval charts that shed a great deal of light on that.

Q: What were some of the biggest challenges you faced while researching and writing this book?

A: I guess my biggest challenge was in trying to bring together several different subfields that don't really often talk to each other. I had to wrap my head around several different methodologies and several different historiographies in a bunch of different subfields. That was a challenge that requires you to put yourself out there and into a situation where you might be a bit of an outsider where you are not as engaged as other scholars might be. Seeing so many different ways of taking this story and to do justice to all of them in a cohesive way was quite challenging.

Q: On the other hand, what were some of the more enjoyable moments?

A: There are any number of stories in the archives, in reading these people. Some of the wonderful ways in which the journals of these explores took me to places I've never been to or could never dream of going was a delight. Getting into the journals of people that I thought were incredibly influential was amazing. To page through and see a signed letter from Theodore Roosevelt or George Dewey or something like that was really wonderful. But also in taking me to places to do research in places like the Naval War College at Newport was a nice experience.

Q: What is next for you?

A: I'm thinking that my second book is going to be a cultural history of American navalism at the turn of the twentieth century, particularly focusing on the Navy and political officials, navalists, who tried to relate and sell the idea of a big navy to the public. There are interesting ways that the Navy tried to use new advertising techniques, relatively new motion pictures, festivals and fairs, the Great White Fleet and things like that to make this idea appeal to the public.

Interview with Drew McKevitt

Michael Fischer

Drew McKevitt, who received his PhD from Temple University, is the author of *Consuming Japan: Popular Culture and the Globalizing of 1980s America*

Q: What in particular pushed you to study what you study?

A: That's a good question. When I arrived at Temple, I was interested in the Cold War. I wanted to do traditional diplomacy, something to do with the anti-nuclear movement. I came across a 1988 anime film called Akira that my brother had. I happened to borrow that film and I was struck by the Cold War resonances in there. It is filled with these anti-nuclear messages and Japan's place in there. And that got me thinking "what is it doing in there, and what does that have to do with the United States?" And that got me thinking about the first American anime fans who started forming fan clubs in the 1970s and 1980s, and connecting with each other through a grass roots, transnational fandom. I use that as a sort of launching point to think about other ways that Americans interacted with Japan in the 1970s and 1980s.

Q: Was there one moment that facilitated the formation of these anime fan clubs?

A: Japanese animation was on American television in the 1960s, but most people didn't recognize it as Japanese. They were things like *Speed Racer* and *Gigantor,* and they were completely de-Japanized. Any association with Japan was erased, Japanese characters were written out. This type of product comes back in the late 1970s through cheap syndication. Distribution companies are buying up Japanese products, flipping it, and putting it out very quickly. This appealed to teenage and young-adult audiences because it was so different. That got them asking questions. In 1977, the very first anime club is founded in the United States, the Cartoon Fantasy Organization in Los Angeles. It's a combination of Japan's projection of cheap pop culture, and the tools that allow Americans to engage with it, particularly the VCR. It is very much grassroots.

Q: For any readers of *Strategic Visions*, do you have one or two main points for them to take away if they are not able to attend your talk today?

A: The book argues that the U.S.-Japan relationship in the 1970s and 1980s contains a way in which citizens of both countries began to engages in many ways the properties of what we call globalization. We start talking about globalization as a thing in the 1980s. You can't understand how Americans come to understand globalization without considering Japan's contribution to that, including the flow of transnational capital, the role of popular culture, things like that. A kind of corollary to that is while we have been thinking about globalization in nationalistic terms, it has transformed average American's lives in ways we don't normally think of. The celebration of Japanese pop culture or the dozens of Japanese-owned automotive facilities dot the American landscape. It is sort of a counternarrative to this nationalist-globalist dichotomy.

Q: With respect to historiography, where does this fit in? Is there anybody that is talking about these things in particular?

A: No, not really. It is a patchwork of different things, one is the increasing importance of consumption including works by T.H. Breen and Lisabeth Cohen. One person who does it for foreign relations is Kristin Hoganson. Mari Yoshihara wrote a book called *Embracing the East* which is about white women in the United States who are consuming Japanese things by dressing up or decorating their homes in Japanese ways. There are precedents for Americans consuming these Japanese things. The difference by the 1970s and 1980s is the type of things that Americans are consuming. Rather than traditional things such as clothing, it is things that are seen as forward thinking: the VCR, the car, anime. The scale is also much greater. So I was inspired by these things but also by the broader sort of cultural turn in U.S. foreign relations. Obviously working with people like Petra Goedde and Bryant Simon influenced me and gave me very good advice.

Q: What were some of the biggest challenges you faced?

A: One of them is methodological, archival. If your question is "what did the VCR mean to Americans" then what is your archive for that? I still don't know if I have a good answer for that. I looked to consumer reports and sociological studies and things like that. For each chapter, and the book is kind of a series of case studies built around a series of goods, the challenge was to answer my questions without a more traditional type of archive. For every chapter, that was a challenge. And then the bigger challenge is a conceptual one. Writing a book like this is an act of creation and doing so is very challenging.

Q: Did you consult any Japanese sources?

A: I didn't. Part of it is because the difficulty in language, but the other part is that I didn't really need to. I'm writing a book about consuming Japan. There is another book to be written called "Producing Japan," and other people are more qualified to write about the Japanese side of it, and have done so.

Q: What is next for you?

A: Lots of things are next. I have two book projects, one I am working on with a co-author. One is a history of the intersection of U.S. foreign relations and U.S. gun violence. This project began for me with coming across a 1992 shooting death of a Japanese exchange student in Baton Rouge, LA. A 16 year old kid, dressed up for Halloween, knocks on a door and is shot to death. His killer is acquitted of manslaughter charges. It becomes an international incident with outrage in Japan. In the aftermath, his host family starts a gun control campaign in cooperation with his parents in Japan, starting a transnational campaign. I want to use that as a launching point for how gun violence in the U.S. intersected with the United States as a world power or a declining world power. That is the next book project.

Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallichio, *Implacable Foes: War in the Pacific, 1944-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp xiii + 711. $34.95 hardcover, ISBN 978-0190616755

On May 8th, 1945, the United States celebrated Victory in Europe Day. The nationwide celebrations provided a catharsis to Americans who had long sacrificed in the name of unity. From victory gardens to laboring in munitions factories, the fall of Nazi Germany unleashed euphoria and a feeling of accomplishment. The victory was a long time coming, with the German retreat in late 1944 bringing a swell of anticipation that the war would soon be at an end. Despite the jubilation, however, the war was only half won. *Implacable Foes: War in the Pacific, 1944-1945*, written by long-time Temple professor and World War II veteran Waldo Heinrichs and Temple alumnus Marc Gallicchio, tracks the American effort to win the war against Japan. To this end, the authors provide a comprehensive, in-depth view into the final years in the Pacific. The scope of the work is impressive, encompassing military, social, and political aspects of the war by bringing the reader from the long slogs endured by American troops in island warfare to the headquarters of the nation's most illustrious generals – without ever feeling as though it had bitten off more than it could chew.

The visceral field issues that U.S. soldiers experienced in the Pacific theater are consistent throughout the book: coming face to face with tenacious Japanese defenses and their changing tactics, a shortage of food and equipment as supply lines stretched with military advances, an inhospitable topography obstructing soldiers' ability to dig into the earth for their own protection, and the oppressive heat and all manner of diseases that accompany it.

The horrors of battle – the combat fatigue, the stress, the restless nights compounded by commanders misestimating the real needs on the ground – are laid bare in lively and engaging writing. Yet Implacable Foes goes much further than the islands of the Pacific or the battlefields of Europe and explores the innumerable dimensions of waging war. The war effort was a complex one, and the United States military faced a myriad of logistical and political problems – from within and without – while fighting to bring the Pacific theater of operations to a close. A global conflict requires a global perspective from the authors.

Everywhere the historians look, a tense tug-of-war lurked beneath the veneer of American unity. In the highest offices, George Marshall struggled with perpetually Philippines-minded Douglas MacArthur over the best course of action to take and whether a speedy or discretionary advance was preferable. The commanders of the European and Pacific Theaters competed over the desperate need for finite numbers of resources, men, ships, and even news coverage, and after the conclusion of the European Theater, American forces struggled with the decision and implementation of redeploying already battle-weary troops to the Pacific Islands. Waldo Heinrich's 86th Army Division was the first to redeploy to the Pacific following victory in Europe.

At home, with the entire economy turned over to the war effort, tensions ran high between workers and businesses and between the more meticulous military leaders and the anxious public's desire for a swift end to the war so that economic reconversion could begin. After the fall of

Germany – with Japan left to fight - the army's still-pressing requirements contended with the promises of political leaders and Congress, who adhered to public opinion and pushed for demobilization and reconversion as quickly as possible. Waging a successful war to an unconditional Japanese surrender, then, required weathering the storms of debate on the home front – debate that reached its zenith over the immense human sacrifice that an invasion of Japan would require.

Implacable Foes is a thorough, kaleidoscopic view of the Pacific theater that utilizes an impressive array of primary sources, including personal and official accounts of the theater. The authors insert themselves into one of the most contentious historiographical debates in American foreign policy: why did its leadership use the atomic bomb? This decision, our authors tell us, did not come from a forward-looking strategy to intimidate the Soviet Union at the advent of the Cold War, as some revisionist historians assert. To the contrary, the bomb's use was the result of more practical concerns. For Harry S Truman and General George Marshall, facing an enemy determined to fight to the bitter end and its own restless public unwilling to sacrifice more of its sons, the bomb became an "indispensable" tool to end the war.

Constraints at home hindered the war-making effort abroad. Congressional and presidential accountability to war-fatigued voters anticipating a transition to a peacetime economy compounded interservice rivalry competition for resources, and visions for how best to end the war. Ultimately, the American's ability to confront logistical problems – and the ultimate weapon with the capacity to level cities - prevailed over the burdens emanating from the home front. Cutting across large swaths of themes and topics, it is a highly recommended read that holds appeal for those with interests in military history, the public and political dimensions of war, and the intersection of state and society.

Brandon Kinney
Temple University Graduate Student

Andrew McKevitt. *Consuming Japan: Popular Culture and the Globalizing of 1980s America.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press: 2017. Pp. 276.

In the field of American foreign relations, few works examine such issues as anime or sushi. Andrew McKevitt's *Consuming Japan: Popular Culture and the Globalizing of 1980s America* addresses both as part of an effort to understand how Americans came to terms with a globalizing world in which Japan seemed poised to eclipse the United States' economic and cultural hegemony. *Consuming Japan* traces the interactions of ordinary Americans with Japanese goods and ideas, beginning in the 1970s. Most of the text focuses on the 1980s, when an economic reversal of fortunes cased Americans to reevaluate earlier conceptions of Japan as exotic but harmless. In this anxious decade, Americans both resisted and facilitated the inroads made by Japanese businesses and culture. By the late 1990s, yet another reversal devastated Japan's economy, leaving Americans free to enjoy the fruits of globalization without scrutinizing its consequences. In tracing the disparate strands of public opinion throughout these tumultuous years, McKevitt recovers Japan's ubiquitous, yet largely unquestioned role in the creation of modern America.

McKevitt contends that the American consumption of "all things Japan helped create a globalized America" (2). Rather than treating globalization as a totalizing force of amorphous change, McKevitt historicizes this process of consumption, which he defines as "the production and reproduction of cultural meaning through the acquisition and/or use of goods," through analyses of the public discourse surrounding Japan's cultural penetration into American life (4, 11).

For instance, in 1975 Americans enjoyed exotic depictions of Japan in popular novels as James Clavell's *Shogun* and later that same year welcomed the emperor to the quintessential American spectacle of football. Yet in 1992, Michael Crichton's *Rising Sun* portrayed the Japanese as adversaries who stole America's capital, land, and women (48-50). This marked regression of Japan's popular depiction from Cold War ally to World War II enemy reflected new anxieties about America's place in the world, which McKevitt links to the emergence of postmodern thought in America. In the ideological struggle of the Cold War, Japan's purported lack of moral absolutism made its usurpation of America's value-laden soft-power all the more frightening (12-13, 50-56). In this context, Japan represented a cultural threat for some and an economic threat to others.

Complicating this shift, McKevitt looks beyond the binaries of a globalizing force and instead locates "an intensification of multiple forms of global interconnectedness" in communities throughout the United States (11, emphasis added). In Marysville, Ohio, for example, the Japanese car maker Honda established a new manufacturing plant at a time when General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler shuttered plants and laid off workers. More than jobs, Honda brought distinctly-Japanese manufacturing practices and opportunities for workers to continue their training in Tokyo. A complicated web of changing global realities ensued as out-of-work plant workers in Detroit blamed Japan for taking jobs, while the Ohioan plant workers rejected nationalist xenophobia and union representation which they feared might threaten their new American jobs.

Concentrated on the coasts, but present throughout the country, other communities formed to share in their appreciation for Japanese animation or "anime." These groups grew at a time where many Americans feared Japan's economic growth but coveted the goods it produced, such as the new video cassette recorder (VCR), which promised to free Americans from the rigid imetables of broadcasting companies. Beyond enabling Americans to watch television at a time of their choosing, this new technology allowed anime club members to record and exchange programming with fans across the Pacific who exchanged un-dubbed Japanese animation for Stark Trek and other American programming. *Consuming Japan* thus explains the ways in which Americans accommodated new, global realities into their existing world view.

McKevitt divides his monograph into case studies, each addressing a distinct aspect of Japanese expansion in America. The introduction and first chapter dispense with theory and historiographical jockeying. The remaining chapters take a much different tone, addressing popular depictions of Japan through books and film, the establishment of a Honda plant in Ohio, the VCR, sushi as part of Yuppie food culture, and anime clubs.

McKevitt places his work in conversation with such works as Lizabeth Cohen's A Consumer's Republic and T.H. Breen's The Marketplace of Revolution. Much like Victoria de Grazia's Irresistible Empire, McKevitt's blend of cultural and diplomatic history is representative of larger trends within the field. In justifying his botton-up approach, Meckevitt notes that formal Japanese-American relations displayed none of the animosity or concern that characterized American sentiment during the 1980s. As might be expected in such an approach, Consuming Japan eschews the traditional archival sources of traditional, top-down diplomatic histories in favor of unexpected and creative sources. For instance, McKevitt looks to archived blog posts from the early days of the Internet, anime journals, and food critic's reviews of their first encounters with Japanese cuisine. He also relies on an interdisciplinary body of secondary texts written by sociologists and literary scholars.

Unifying *Consuming Japan*'s distinct case studies, McKevitt repeatedly emphasizes authenticity—both how producers and consumers perceived and constructed authenticity, and how people used the pretense of authenticity to legitimate their perspectives. The perception of a film's accuracy or of a sushi restaurant's quality depended upon whether or not the respective experiences comported themselves to American expectations of authenticity. That *Shōgun*'s TV adaptation included untranslated Japanese dialogue enhanced the film's authentic feel and its reception as an accurate depiction of Japanese life (58). Likewise, one food critic dismissed a sushi bar not for its food, but for the cramped atmosphere which lacked the spacious garden rooms of authentic Japanese dining—a hallmark which McKevitt wryly dismisses, noting the population density of the archipelago (173-174).

A few minor quibbles detract from this otherwise excellent monograph. The brevity and compartmentalized nature of the text at times leaves the reader uncertain of the interconnection and larger ramifications wrought by the consumption of Japanese goods. The two-part analysis of Honda in Ohio, for example, better contextualizes globalization's consequences in the U.S. than does the twenty-two-page chapter on VCRs which attempts to explain the effects of the new technology in both the United States and the world.

It is fitting that McKevitt ends his introduction with the hope that readers might find a nostalgic moment somewhere in Consuming Japan—that most readers will find such a personal connection demonstrates the degree to which Americans have consumed Japan.

Taylor Christian
Temple University Graduate Student

Jason Smith. *To Master the Boundless Sea*: *The US Navy, the Marine Environment, and the Cartography of Empire.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press: 2018 Pp. 280.

Jason Smith's 2018 monograph, *To Master the Boundless Sea: The U.S. Navy, the Marine Environment, and the Cartography of Empire*, puts the high seas at the center of American empire. Merging the environment al history of hydrography with the military history of the United States Navy, Smith successfully contends that the evolution of nineteenth century American imperial thought can be best described through the "interplay among science, environment, and military power" (5). This book interrogates the navy's struggle to control nature through various delineations of exploration, combat, naval officers, and most prominently, the marine environment. By blending the historical narratives of naval doctrine and seafaring with the science of hydrography, the U.S. Navy's efforts to control "the great common" are treated with wider cultural context (209). In so doing, Smith adds a fresh and insightful perspective on the rise of an American maritime empire.

Ultimately, *To Master the Boundless Sea* argues that a thirst for maritime knowledge erupted as the United States became a commercial power during the nineteenth century. This yearning for knowledge facilitated a comprehensive charting of the seas for the purposes of American commercial and military preponderance. As Smith notes throughout the book, this aim was attained through hydrographic charts. These charts, which originated as the tracking of winds and documentation of aquatic resources, came to represent the harnessing of nature and were deemed as "a better representation" of oceanic science "than reality itself" (190). Smith's argument coalesces with his interpretation that American naval officerscoopted maritime charting to suit expansionist Mahanian naval doctrine.

As the U.S. Navy grew, and ultimately came into conflict with other seafaring powers, the maritime knowledge that had once served the interests of scientists and capitalists became the focus of the nation's military minds. Naval surveying of strategic waters led to an explosion of maritime knowledge that allowed the U.S. Navy to effectively operate in both the Pacific and the Caribbean during the rise of the U.S. empire. Smith contends this "hydrography of empire" replaced many of the pre-existing incomplete charts with accurate detailed surveys that professionalized strategic charting and legitimated naval science. Beyond geographic proximity alone, intimate knowledge of the maritime environment contributed greatly to the Caribbean becoming the linchpin of American empire. This cartographic conquering of the seas allows the reader to clearly see he centrality of hydrography to American naval development and imperialism.

Impressively written and meticulously researched, To Master the Boundless Sea brings together naval diaries, government documents, and a wealth of academic scholarship to tell the story of the relationship between U.S. naval science and overseas power projection. Smith also takes the story forward to the Pacific Theater of World War II and beyond, showing that despite their many achievements, the U.S. Navy has not been able to completely harness the sea. Hydrography has bridged the gap between humans and the physical and abstract environment of the ocean (13). The U.S. Navy used this technology to propound its influence and power both domestically and abroad. However, as Smith notes, the inability to comprehensively chart the majority of marine environments makes the sea a continued force "for which the navy must reckon" (208). By presenting this contemporaneous issue within the larger historical discussion, Smith makes a relevant and thought-provoking argument.

This book contains several omissions that would be beneficial additions to any future scholarship on the subject. Primarily, Smith does not compare American naval science and maritime empire with the aspirations and pursuits of other powers. With the study being primarily focused o nineteenth century hydrography,

an appropriate treatment of American practices with those of the British, German, or French navies would have contextualized U.S. actions during an era of great naval competition. In addition, Smith does not address the role of public discourse in the development of naval science and maritime empire. Although his analysis of the discourse between naval officers, scientists, and politicians is compelling, the inclusion of U.S. public voices in both naval practise and hydrographic science would have buttressed the links made between oceanic charting and American conceptions of the sea.

Smith's To Master the Boundless Sea provides historians with an illuminating study of the relationship between naval science and the establishment of U.S. empire. Using hydrography as the primary vehicle, Smith successfully moves beyond more traditional histories of early American imperialism that tend to focus on the broader geopolitical and social motivators of nineteenth century U.S. expansion. Its accessible prose and concise arguments makes this book suitable for popular audiences while the inclusion of detailed research notes and historiographical discussion appeals to the more inquisitive academic consumer. Consequently, this book is a rewarding read for anybody interested in either the history of the U.S. Navy or the development of American empire.

Graydon Dennison,
Temple University Graduate Student

Losing Hearts and Minds: American-Iranian Relations and International Education During the Cold War. By Matthew K. Shannon. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017. 256 pages.

In *Losing Hearts and Minds*, Matthew Shannon offers a new look at the little-explored topic of the Cold War-era Iranian student movement in the United States. He argues that the Iranian student movement served a dual-function for American-Iranian relations, one intended and the other not. International education was to serve as a means to entice Iran into the Western sphere in exchange for Western education and the route to economic modernization. The student exchange program, however, also allowed Iranian students a safe position from which to criticize Pahlavi Iran and forge alliances with progressive Americans against the Shah's regime. Through its attempts to balance its relationship with Iran against this unexpected student activism, the United States fatally undermined its image among Iranians at home and abroad, supporting the repressive and illiberal Pahlavi regime despite America's claim to sponsor liberty. *Losing Hearts and Minds* thus tells a cautionary tale, warning of the consequences of foreign policy angles that overemphasize utility at the expense of safety.

As Shannon notes, international education was a "soft power" alternative for spreading Western influence compared to manifestations of "hard power" such as war. Education, as soft power, was enticement into the Western sphere rather than compulsion, offering poorer unaligned countries economic and political modernization in exchange for Western alliances. In the case of Pahlavi Iran, however, the United States forewent liberal modernization. America offered education that would yield economic modernization, nuclear technology, and a new technocratic elite in exchange for Iranian solidarity against the Soviet Union. President John F. Kennedy had concerns about the Shah's political repression, Shannon notes, but these concerns evaporated in later administrations' policies, in part because of a "good economics is good politics" stance that National Security Council staffer Robert Komer promoted and in part because of diplomatic expediency. Educating Iranian students to modernize undemocratic Iran's economy was acceptable if the Shah could keep communism out, a compromise characteristic of President Richard Nixon's later, formal support for strong man police states; the Nixon Doctrine.

Political repression at home did not disappear from Iranians' minds once they left Iran though, Shannon explains. On the contrary, figures such as Ali Fatemi and Sadeq Qotzbadeh quickly formed or took over diaspora student groups, most notably the Iranian Student Association (ISA), and used these as a vehicle to criticize Pahlavi Iran. The liberal and accepting atmosphere of the US was central to this, offering students relative safety from Pahlavi responses while allowing them to foster friendship with liberal Americans. The Iranian students and their liberal American allies subsequently began to hound the US for not criticizing Pahlavi brutality, questioning why American guarantees of liberalism and democracy went unfulfilled with respect to Iran. As much as the student movement gave the Shah his desired technocratic elite, it thus unintentionally created a very large international headache for the Pahlavi regime as well. A population of critics now existed which could more or less befriend anti-Pahlavi elements with impunity, which only worsened the Pahlavi position as ISA students reached out not just to liberals but to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as well.

American attempts to handle this problem created another problem, though. Continued American support for the Shah's repression compromised America's reputation as a guarantor of freedom and democracy among the international student groups. The State and Justice Departments post-Kennedy cooperation with the Shah to deport students critical of the Pahlavi regime back to Iran for punishment further squandered the trust of Iranian students and their

liberal allies. That some of the ISA's liberal student allies were themselves funded by the CIA to frustrate Iranian student activism simply dug the hole deeper. American attempts to suppress the student movement undercut its Cold War claim to the high ground, as did the overbearing presence of American and American-trained officials in Iran proper which strengthened the notion of the Shah as a colonial pawn. Thus, American attempts to shape Iranian hearts and minds instead lost them.

Shannon's book is organized into several chapters after his summary introduction that tackle his narrative both chronologically and thematically. Chapters one and two summarize the conditions that led America to promote education efforts in Iran, invoking themes of defense and political concerns about human rights. Chapter two also connects to chapters three and four, sections which discuss the rise of student activists critical of the regime and whose central theme is political resistance, although the human rights theme sustains as well. Chapter five and the conclusion then assess the damage done to both the Iranian regime and American reputation, the titular "losing [of[hearts and minds". The epilogue subsequently summarizes all of this.

Losing Hearts and Minds uses a diverse assortment of primary and secondary sources to develop Shannon's arguments. His secondary sources allow him to establish existing views within the literature as well as to explain concepts such as Joseph S. Nye's Soft Power (165). The primary sources, however, are where he shines. The documents that Shannon draws upon allow him to employ a variety of different history methodologies. As an example, his assessment of the student movement's foreign policy impact draws not just on straight diplomatic history but on intellectual history as well, using documents that trace the interactions between the United States National Student Association and the ISA to measure the ISA's ideological turns. Similarly, his attention to the role that political history played in both Iran and the United States, including how the two major regime shifts – away from Mosaddeq and Kennedy towards the Shah and Johnson – directly shaped the course of the international education movement, show a steady attention to detail. So while Shannon's work is diplomatic history, it is also a cleverly diverse one.

Indeed, if Shannon's work has any issues, then the most this reviewer could say is that more on the absence of secular Iranian nationalist thought among the students would be welcome, assuming such evidence exists. The Shah's attempt to develop a new technocratic ruling class as a means to shut out more established factions in Iranian politics, however, may also be all the explanation necessary to understand nationalists' absence. The book is very convincing. Losing Hearts and Minds is an excellent work that certainly expands the field of knowledge available on the Cold War American-Iranian student exchange movement. It is easy to read and entertaining, making it useful not only for graduate seminars on Iranian history and American foreign policy but for undergraduate course introducing related topics.

Jonathan Shoup
Temple University Graduate Student

The Action Plan, Or: How Reagan Convinced the American People to Love the Contras

By Joshua Stern

In this section, Temple University Graduate Student Joshua Stern argues that that a document from the Office of Public Diplomacy titled Public Diplomacy Action Plan: Support for the White House Education Campaign served as the "primary organizational blueprint for one of the largest domestic propaganda campaigns of the 20th century."

For the first four years of the 1980s, a revolutionary Marxist movement called the Frente Sannista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) led by Daniel Ortega was fighting a United States supported paramilitary army famously named the Contras. Their official political organization the Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN), was struggling to gain public support from both inside and outside Central America. Ronald Reagan in his 1983 address before the Joint Session of Congress on Central America, made clear that his administration supported the FDN and their Contra freedom fighters, describing them as "heroes" who were "denied any part in the new government because they truly wanted democracy for Nicaragua."[1] The American People, however, were unwilling to support another war after their experience with Vietnam. As a result, the State Department and the CIA coordinated in an effort to convince Congress and their constituents that supporting the Contras was necessary to ensure freedom and democracy prevailed over communist tyranny. At the request of the Reagan White House, the Office of Public Diplomacy (OPD) was established in 1983 to convince Americans of the threat of communism in Central America and promote the Contras as fighters for freedom and democracy.

After a successful reelection campaign in 1984, the Reagan Administration went into high-gear to convince Congress to supply the Contras substantial military aid. The Director of OPD, Otto Reich, created a task force to strategize how best to "educate" the public that "a vote to aid the freedom fighters" in Central America was of "vital national interest." In a nine-page National Security Council staff paper written on March 12th, 1985 by Lt. Col. Daniel Jacobowitz titled Public Diplomacy Action Plan: Support for the White House Education Campaign, the goals, perceptions, impediments, themes, assets, and actions were outlined in incredible detail.[2] Jacobowitz was an expert in psychological warfare, a term that had a growing popularity in the field of low-intensity conflict, which was later defined as "a limited political-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, and psychological objectives" or in layman's terms "a struggle for people's minds."[3] A classic case of covert operations, the war for people's minds were targeted not just at those fighting for the Sandinistas, but primarily to three domestic audiences: "US Congress, US media, and

[1] Ronald Reagan, Address Before the Joint Session of Congress on Central America, April 27, 1983

[2] U.S. State Department: Office for Public Diplomacy, "Public Diplomacy Action Plan," 1. The Action Plan can be found here https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB40/00934.pdf

[3] United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report: Volume I Analytical Review of Low-Intensity Conflict," August 1, 1986, 14-1

Interest Groups."[4] The Reagan Doctrine was unofficially, and illegally, at war with the minds of the American public.[5] For nearly five years they had rejected the Reagan line of militarization as a mechanism of democratic change, and now they needed to be convinced of their ignorance.

The Action Plan served as the primary organizational blueprint for one of the largest domestic propaganda campaigns of the 20th century. An analysis of the document's themes, language and stated goals within the context of an increasingly anti-interventionist populace demonstrated the importance of domestic propaganda in supporting the Contras, and by extension, the foreign policy goals of the Reagan Administration.

The language used in the Action Plan document highlighted the Reagan Administration's cynical nature toward the American people. To start, the phrase public diplomacy implies a duty by the US government to persuade the public of the truth of their intentions. However, the a panel of high ranking military officials defined the term in a report on low-intensity conflict as "the use of international information programs together with cultural exchanges to create ideas and attitudes which support foreign policy and national goals."[6] The key word here is "create," which implies that the State Department along with the NSC was in the business of manufacturing a story, and selling it to the public. The Action Plan does not list the creation of ideas as truths, but rather as "perceptions." Disseminating truth was not their prerogative. Convincing Congress of its duty to support freedom fighters, and by extension the American people, from Soviet and Cuban expansionism was their true goal. This would help to elongate the sustainability of the Contras and thus threaten the Sandinista revolution. The more the Sandinistas were forced to spend their miniscule revenues on defense rather than on their popular social programs, the more their legitimacy would degrade.

Following the list of "primary perceptions" on the Action Plan was a list of "supporting perceptions" that the OPD could propagate to the public.[7] One was that "US history requires support to freedom fighters." The document didn't include any explicit mention of historic US support for freedom fighters abroad. One can assume OPD was referencing the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Time magazine gave the man of the year title to the "Hungarian Freedom Fighter."[8] Ironically, the leader of the FSLN, Carlos Fonseca, also justified his guerrilla war by historical means. His interpretation of Augusto Sandino's writings during his war against US imperialism painted the revolutionary as a Marxist. Historian Steven Palmer described Fonseca's interpretation as the "FSLN's Sandinismo," consisting of "a settling of the possible contradictions inherent in the synthesis of Sandino's discourse, political project, and mythical legacy" and a "justification of the primacy and moral authority of the FSLN as the revolutionary vanguard."[9] Fonesca's history

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4 U.S. State Department: Office for Public Diplomacy, "Public Diplomacy Action Plan," 1

5 Section 501 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1985 Section 501 states "No part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes not authorized by the Congress." Letter from Comptroller General Harry Van Cleve to Chairman of Committee on Foreign Affairs Dante B. Fascell, September 30, 1987

6 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Joint Low-Intensity Conflict," 15-2

7 U.S. State Department: Office of Public Diplomacy, "Public Diplomacy Action Plan," 1

8 "Freedom Fighter," Time, 7 January 1957

9 Steven Palmer, "Carlos Fonseca and the Construction of Sandinismo in Nicaragua." Latin American Research Review 23, no. 1 (1988): 97

created a historically deterministic authority over the Nicaraguan revolution when many different factions were vying for power. A similar production of history was propagated during a speech by Secretary Shultz when he stated, "throughout our own history, we have always believed that freedom is the birthright of all people and that we could not be true to ourselves or our principles unless we stood for freedom and democracy not only for ourselves but for others."[10] Just as Fonseca argued that the true principles of all Nicaraguans was to fight the moral battle against imperialism and capitalism, Shultz propagated that Americans should fight for freedom and democracy against the tyranny of communism.

Other supporting perceptions said that the FSLN were "puppets of the soviets" and "racists" who "repress human rights."[11] From the beginning, US politicians highlighted the lack of freedoms and rights the people of the Soviet Union had under Stalin's dictatorship and subsequent regimes. OPD propagandists wanted Congress to make the logical conclusion of Sandinistas repressing human rights, proving their proxy status to the Soviet Union and the threat they caused to US national security. The indigenous populations were the faces of Sandinista repression, with the Miskitus being the largest and most publicized. Populations on the eastern coast had a complex history of struggle against the Spanish colonizers and the independent Nicaraguan state stretching back centuries along lines of class and race (the eastern coast had a large black population due to Jamaican settlement). This continued with the Sandinista Revolution and was the topic of many historical monographs produced during the late 1980s and early 1990s.[12] There was also well documented reports of war crimes perpetrated by the Ejército Popular Sandinista (EPS or Sandinista Popular Army), including the forced migration of some 10,000 Miskitu peasants from sites with high risk of violence. Even though these actions were nowhere near the quantity or horror of contra war crimes, the forced relocation eliminated any remaining Miskitu sympathy with the Sandinista government in northeastern Nicaragua.[13] Reagan used the event to garner international sympathy for the counterrevolutionary cause by classifying the move as a human rights violation, and likening the Tasba Pri refugee camps to Nazi concentration camps.[14] In reality, human rights observers found the camps to be as adequate if not better than the standard of living in traditional villages.[15]

The Catholic Church in Nicaragua was one of the major opposition groups to the Sandinista Government and the OPD used this fact to highlight what they considered an attack on freedom of religion. Under the sub-header

10 Special to the New York Times, "Excerpts from Shultz's Speech Contrasting Communism and Democracy," New York Times, February 23, 1985

11 U.S. State Department: Office for Public Diplomacy, "Public Diplomacy Action Plan," 1

12 See Baracco, Luciano. "We Fought for our Land: Miskitu insurgency and the struggle for autonomy on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast (1981-1987)" in AlterNative, Vol. 7 no. 3, 2011. 233-245. Hale, Charles R. Jr. Resistance and Contradiction: Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan State, 1894-1987. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1994. Vilas, Carlos M. State, Class, and Ethnicity in Nicaragua: Capitalist Modernization and Revolutionary Change on the Atlantic Coast, trans. Susan Norwood. Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989. 13 Rone, Human Rights in Nicaragua: 1986, 15-18

14 Dunbar-Ortiz comments extensively on the allegations of human rights abuses committed by the Sandinistas and proves that the vast majority of allegations did not occur. Furthermore, in a speech by U.S. President Ronald Reagan, he refers to the Miskitu as "Freedom Fighters" and claims that they in serious danger of extermination at the hands of the communist Sandinistas: Reagan, Ronald, "Let me Set the Record Straight on Nicaragua," from The Nicaragua Reader: Documents of a Revolution Under Fire, edited by Peter Rosset and John Vandermeer (New York City, NY.:, Grove Press, Inc., 1983), 14-17.

15 Katherine Yih, "Documents of a Revolution Under Fire" from The Nicaragua Reader: Documents of a Revolution Under Fire, edited by Peter Rosset and John Vandermeer (New York City, NY.: 1983), 90-94

"Supporting Perceptions," a bullet point read "Sandinistas as Anti-Religious," exemplifying propaganda produced by the FDN and third parties aligned with the Reagan Administration characterizing the Marxist government in Nicaragua as atheists out for revenge against the church. For example, with the help of Woody Kepner Associates Publishing in Miami, the OPD produced and dropped thousands of posters and leaflets that proclaimed God supported the Contras. One leaflet had a picture of Jesus with text reading "Libéranos del yugo. Dános la Libertad. Cristo es El Libertador" ("Liberate us from the yoke. Give us freedom. Christ is the Liberator") above the FDN logo.[16] Edgar Chamorro confirmed the use of anti-religious propaganda after he stopped receiving a paycheck from the CIA. "The agency knows what a tremendous influence the [Catholic] Church is in Central America, and they told us to emphasize religious themes," he said. "We were to make the contra war look like the Crusades--an effort to stop the Sandinistas' 'evil, godless empire.'"[17]

Also present in the Action Plan were two key "Impediments" to US government propaganda: "the idea that: US actions violate international law, and aid to the contras hurts 'the moderates in Nicaragua.'"[18] The first impediment was almost certainly included because of the World Court decision made in October of 1984 claiming the US broke international law with the covert mining of Nicaraguan harbors and the obligation not to violate national sovereignty by supporting the Contras.[19] The international response was nearly unanimous. Nicaragua's sovereignty should be "fully respected" and that Washington should halt any blockade. Reagan later deemed the decision a "propaganda spectacular."[20] In an attempt to initially hide the CIA's responsibility in the mining, CIA officials told former Sandinista government official turned FDN spokesperson Edgar Chamorro to take full responsibility for the mining. This was later leaked by the press.[21]

The second impediment revealed the ignorance of US State Department officials of the political complexity in Nicaragua. Since the phrase "the moderates in Nicaragua" was quoted in the document, one can assume that Jacobowitz and those in his circle did not believe there to be any moderates in Nicaragua. On the ground, however, political scientists conducted interviews with people across the economic spectrum from 1982 to 1990 and found, in each economic class, there existed people that opposed certain Sandinista policies and agreed with others.[22] Since there was very little understanding by the average American about the composition of the Nicaraguan population and their relationship with the government, the second impediment was largely inconsequential while the first was marginal.

16 Kornbluh, The Price of Intervention, 40
17 Janet Sharkley, "How the CIA's secret propaganda campaign controls what we know about Nicaragua," Common Cause, September/October, 1986.
18 U.S. State Department: Office of Public Diplomacy, "Public Diplomacy Action Plan," 2
19 Martin Cleaver and Mark Tran, "US dismisses World Court ruling on contras," The Guardian, June 28, 1986
20 Kornbluh, The Price of Intervention, 51-2
21 Ibid, 49
22 Rose J. Spalding, Capitalists and Revolution in Nicaragua: Opposition and Accommodation, 1979-1993. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 133

The section "Assets" in the Action Plan, included "the Great Communicator [Reagan]" and "some supportive media representatives."[23] One of those representatives was a Mr. John F. Guilmartin, a professor of history at Rice University and former Lt. Col. in the Air Force, who wrote an article in the *Wall Street Journal* that was "prepared at the request of government officials and partially or wholly paid for with government funds."[24] In the article titled, "Nicaragua is Armed for Trouble," Guilmartin minimized the falsely reported delivery of Soviet MiG fighters to Nicaragua. He instead played up the antiquated 12 helicopters found in the actual cargo, insisting that these were just the first step in a probable escalation of Soviet military support. The goal of Guilmartin's article was to convince the American people that the Sandinistas were a growing threat to US national security, a gross exaggeration. Furthermore, Guilmartin insisted that the helicopter deliveries were characteristic of a purely offensive military strategy by the Sandinista government, similar to the arrival of Soviet tanks years before.[25] In reality, the Soviet tanks were purely a defensive measure according to retired marine Lt. Col. John Buchanan in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.[26] In the same month, the CIA released a white paper titled The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America that highlighted the increase of Sandinista troops and quoted Panamanian General Manuel Noriega's fear that, if left unchecked, a "holocaust in the entire Caribbean region" could take place.[27]

* * *

On June 25th, 1986, the House passed $100 million in military ($70 million) and non-lethal ($30 million) aid to the contras by a vote of 221 to 209. The propaganda action plan by OPD proved successful with the help of White House Cold War rhetoric. According to historian Peter Kornbluh, the propaganda campaign "cast the debate in black and white, East versus West, totalitarianism against democracy."[28] Reagan increasingly painted Congress as the enemy, saying that those who voted against the Contras were voting for communist tyranny. There were no "palatable alternatives" in Nicaragua because the Sandinista government was incapable of democratic reform in the eyes of the Reagan administration.[29] Congressional aid for the Contras allowed them to survive through the 1980s, continuing a war that had already seen close to 200,000 displaced and tens of thousands dead.[30]

Problems of underdevelopment and political corruption continued in Nicaragua, partly as a result of the Contra war. The targeting of cooperative farms, schools, and peasant political institutions in the countryside eliminated a grassroots peasant movement stymied the success of democratic organizations like the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG). As a result, the political and economic system reoriented back towards dependency on the United States through neoliberal economic policies, the most recent case being Daniel Ortega himself. His presidency (2007-present) was only won by ridding himself of his previous Sandinista backers, embracing corporate capital, adopting the most retrograded positions of the church, and reached an understanding with the U.S foreign policy platforms of anti-immigration and anti-drug policies.[31] Recent attempts at

23 U.S. State Department: Office of Public Diplomacy, "Public Diplomacy Action Plan," 2
24 Letter from Harry Van Cleve to Dante B. Fascell, 2
25 John F. Guilmartin, "Nicaragua is armed for trouble," *Wall Street Journal*, March 11, 1985. The original false report was an article in the *New York Times* on November 7th, 1984 titled by Philip Taubman titled, "Nicaragua Said To Get Soviet Helicopters."
26 Chamorro, *Packaging the Contras*, 48
27 Central Intelligence Agency Report, "The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean," March 11, 1985, 11-13
28 Ibid, 192-3
29 Scott, "Interbranch Rivalry," 250
30 Dianna Melrose, Nicaragua: The Threat of a Good Example? (Oxford, UK: OxFam, 1985), 37

cutting the state pensions that he helped create decades only demonstrates the depressed state of economic, political, and social life in Nicaragua.

Similarly, the US has changed little in regards to domestic propaganda permeating the mainstream media to promote executive power and interventionist foreign policy. The War on Terror, much like the War on Communism, inundates mainstream media outlets. From August 2002 through March 19th, 2003, there were more than 140 front page stories at the Washington Post that focused heavily on administration rhetoric against Iraq.[32] The associate editor for the Post at the time, Karen DeYoung, said in 2004, "We are inevitably the mouthpiece of whatever administration is in power."[33] With the rise of executive branch power in the form of Authorized Use of Military Force in combination with incredibly powerful media tools like Facebook, academics of history and international relations should give domestic propaganda appropriate scrutiny when analyzing foreign relations.

Joshua Stern
Temple University Graduate Student

32 Howard Kurtz, "Media's Failure on Iraq Still Stings," CNN, March 11, 2013
33 Michael Massing, "Now They Tell Us," The New York Review of Books, 26 February 2004