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News from the Director

By Alan McPherson



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In my physical absence during a sabbatical, I entrusted the day-to-day management of CENFAD largely to Davis Fellow Casey VanSise, and he did not disappoint! From organizing talks to editing the newsletter you see on your screen, Casey acquitted himself with grace and creativity. With the generous help of five of my faculty members, who stepped in to host the lectures (see the Davis Fellow's more detailed message), Casey not only revived the in-person lectures that CENFAD is known for but also ushered in the era of the hybrid CENFAD lecture. For the first time, lectures this semester could be seen live in person or online. This trend might just have legs. Another novelty that CENFAD has been working to develop has been to make *Strategic Visions* more multimedia since it is now exclusively distributed digitally. In keeping with this initiative, several interviews in this edition include accompanying videos.

I also wanted to thank Chair of the Department Petra Goedde and other colleagues, who largely managed the awards that CENFAD gave out this fall.

Thanks again to everyone who helped CENFAD and showed up at its talks this semester. Happy Holidays, and I'll be back in January!

Fall 2021 Lecture Series

Our first lecture of the Fall 2021 semester was delivered by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, professor of strategy at the US Army War College. On September 9, he presented a lecture entitled "Reconsidering the American Way of War from the Revolution to Afghanistan," partly based on his 2014 book *Reconsidering the American Way of War: US Military Practice from the Revolution to Afghanistan*. Considering the roughly contemporaneous US military withdrawal from Afghanistan, it was a topical and timely presentation in several respects, exploring the "American way of war" as a national military tradition, how it has fared since the end of the Cold War, and how effective it has been against the challenges of the twenty-first century.

On October 6, Dr. Judkin Browning, a history professor at Appalachian State

University and co-author (with Dr. Timothy Silver) of the 2020 book *An Environmental History of the Civil War*, presented the lecture "Slogging to Richmond: Environmental Influences on the Union's Failed Peninsula Campaign, 1862." Browning examined how natural factors such as weather, geology, disease, and nutrition converged with the personal command styles of Union and Confederate commanders to bring about the defeat of Union General George McClellan's forces in their failed 1862 bid to capture the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia, illustrating the role that the environment often plays in human conflict.

Only two weeks later on October 20, there was another presentation, "Calamitous Encounters: U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance in the 'American Century,'" by Dr. Julia Irwin, an associate professor of history at the University of South Florida. True to the title, Irwin's lecture examined US responses to external catastrophes primarily during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, thereby showcasing the origins of US foreign disaster assistance provided by government, military, and private voluntary organizations. She devoted particular attention to case-studies from Cuba, Haiti, and Yugoslavia, and the way that disaster aid has been leveraged for foreign policy purposes historically and contemporarily.

On November 4, Dr. Glenn E. Robinson, professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, presented his lecture "Global Jihad and Movements of Rage," based on his recently-released 2021 book *Global Jihad: A Brief History*. In the lecture, Robinson stated that there have been four separate variations of global jihad since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, with the most recent iteration involving "personal jihad" relying on information technologies to indirectly motivate individuals to perpetrate stochastic terror attacks. He also compared global jihad to many non-Islamist violent political movements over the past century to argue for the overall concept of "movements of rage."

Finally, on December 6, Joseph "Joe" Weisberg, a CIA intelligence veteran, television screenwriter-producer, and creator of FX Network's critically-acclaimed series *The Americans* (2013-18), delivered a lecture based on his eponymous 2021 book *Russia Upside Down: An Exit Strategy for the Second Cold War*. In the presentation, Weisberg contended that Russian/Soviet policy and motivations have been misunderstood by many in the United States, while making a case against US responses that would contribute to a new "Cold War" with Russia by suggesting that we are fighting an enemy with whom we have few if any serious conflicts of interest, with ineffective and dangerous tools to boot. On this basis, he examined ways that the United States and Russia might productively move forward with forging a better relationship.

Fall 2021 prizes

In October, the following two graduate students won CENFAD research awards:

- Ryan Langton earned a Jeffrey Bower Endowed Research Scholarship of $1,000 to pursue research on his project, "Ambivalent Empire: Intermediaries Negotiating Colonialism on the Trans-Appalachian Frontier, 1720-1776."

- Stanley Schwartz won a John Votaw Endowed Research Award in the amount of $1,000 in support of research for his dissertation project

on how volunteer and regular officers in the Civil War perceived and interacted with each other.

Some of the planned research may be delayed due to the pandemic.

Congratulations!

New: The Emerging Scholar Graduate Award!

For the second year in a row, CENFAD is able to announce a new grant for graduate students. This one aims to enhance the connection between CENFAD and the History Department's Master's students. The official announcement follows here, but I also wanted to give props to Patrick Daley, assistant dean of development at Temple, who got the ball rolling this time around.

Please help to spread the word among any undergraduates who may be considering Temple's History Program for an MA. For one deserving applicant, it has just become a bit more affordable!

Thanks to the generosity of Todd Davis (Temple History PHD), CENFAD is delighted to announce its Emerging Scholar Graduate Award, a new scholarship for applicants to the Temple University MA Program in History. The purposes of the award are to recruit and support MA-level students interested in diplomatic and military history and to do so especially among underrepresented candidates, including women.

Each year, one awardee will receive $12,000 in tuition remission over a two-year period (covering about one 3-credit course per semester at in-state rates). The inaugural scholarship will be awarded in Spring 2022 for the 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 academic years. If the awardee's GPA is below a 3.5 after his/her first year of studies, second-year funding is subject to review.

There is no application procedure. All students admitted to the MA program, including the MA Concentration in Public History, will automatically be considered. The awardee will be notified at the time of admission to the MA program.

Spring 2022 Lecture Series Announcement

Finally, in Spring 2022, we will be back to hosting six scholars per semester (and maybe more!), starting the very first week of classes. Please join us online or in person:

- Thursday, January 20, 4:00pm EST in Weigley Room (914), Ninth Floor, Gladfelter Hall
  "Robert E. Lee as Confederate Strategist, Tactician and Logistician."
  Allen Guelzo, Senior Research Scholar, Council for the Humanities, Princeton University
  Zoom Link:
  https://temple.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_sG8DRMq4Tk2H0p5NbpVM0A

- Tuesday, February 8, 4:30pm EST in Weigley Room (914), Ninth Floor, Gladfelter Hall
  "Oilcraft: The Myths of Scarcity and Security That Haunt U.S. Energy Policy."
  Robert "Bob" Vitalis, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania
  Zoom Link:
  https://temple.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_iS6oQG6dQ8emyY-xoeiqgA

- Thursday, February 24, 4:00pm EST in Weigley Room (914), Ninth Floor, Gladfelter Hall, *"Armies of Deliverance: A New History of the Civil War."*
  Elizabeth R. Varon, Professor of American History, University of Virginia
  Zoom Link:
  https://temple.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_7HKyViGURraR1Lb12x2abA

- Tuesday, March 15, 4:30pm EST in Weigley Room (914), Ninth Floor, Gladfelter Hall
  "*The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought Between Germany and the United States."*
  Matthew Specter, Professor of History, University of California at Berkeley
  Zoom Link:
  https://temple.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_wHKmEZ_cTQWurSmHcUW59Q

- Monday, March 21, 4:30pm EST in Weigley Room (914), Ninth Floor, Gladfelter Hall
  "With Masses and Arms: Peru's Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement"
  Miguel La Serna, Professor of History, University of North Carolina
  Zoom Link:
  https://temple.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_f6ukzuabQ5Sc1yu6RY84Pg

- Monday, April 4, 4:30pm EST in Weigley Room (914), Ninth Floor, Gladfelter Hall
  "No Globalization Without Representation: U.S. Activists and World Inequality."
  Paul Adler, Assistant Professor of History, Colorado College
  Zoom Link:
  https://temple.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_aHCUwI4jQyKPlCU_7JGIzQ

Note from the Davis Fellow



Dear CENFAD Community,

This has most assuredly been an intriguing time for the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy. The knock-on effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have presented new innovation opportunities for CENFAD in general and myself as the 2021-22 Thomas J. Davis Fellow in particular. For instance, many of us have become much more familiar with Zoom during the past academic year, and now that we also have the ability to have in-person meetings once again, CENFAD has opted to host hybrid events as part of our Fall 2021 lecture series. This has permitted lecturers and attendees to be present in the flesh (yay for human contact!), while also continuing to deliver quality content to remote audiences in a "best of both worlds" manner.

Though CENFAD's director Dr. Alan McPherson himself has been on sabbatical during the past semester, I have nevertheless been extremely grateful for his remote assistance in adjusting to my new responsibilities, and I have also had the benefit of receiving help from the following CENFAD faculty affiliates, towards whom I am also deeply appreciative: Dr. Jay Lockenour, Dr. Bryant Simon, Dr. Harvey R. Neptune, Dr. Benjamin Talton, Dr. Artemy Kalinovsky, and the CENFAD chair Dr. Petra Goedde. Together, those Temple University faculty and I have coordinated five lectures, each respectively delivered (in order of appearance) by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Dr. Judkin Browning, Dr. Julia Irwin, Dr. Glenn E. Robinson, and Joseph "Joe" Weisberg. All are available for retrospective viewing on the CENFAD website.

Additionally, in this edition of *Strategic Visions*, readers will find five interviews/Q&A sessions, one being print-exclusive with CENFAD's inaugural Immerman Fellow, Ethan Cohen, and the other four appearing in both print and video formats: one with Temple doctoral candidate and former 2017-18 Davis Fellow Eric Perinovic concerning his dissertation work; one with the aforementioned Dr. Talton regarding his 2019 book *In This Land of Plenty: Mickey Leland and Africa in American Politics*; one with Dr. David B. Zierler, Temple PhD alumnus, former 2005-06 Davis Fellow, and current director of the Caltech Heritage Project; and one with another Temple PhD alumnus and former 2014-15 Davis Fellow Dr. Silke Zoller, discussing her 2021 book *To Deter and Punish: Global Collaboration Against Terrorism in the 1970s*.

Finally, this edition of *Strategic Visions* also contains two book review submissions authored by Temple graduate students. These include a review of Mark Philip Bradley and Mary L. Dudziak's edited collection *Making the Forever War: Marilyn B. Young on the Culture and Politics of American Militarism* by Alexandra Southgate, and a review of Temple alumnus David Johnson Lee's 2021 book *The Ends of Modernization: Nicaragua and the United States in the Cold War Era* by Joseph E. Johnson.

If you have any ideas for submissions or improvements to subsequent editions of *Strategic Visions* (especially the upcoming Spring 2022 edition) or regarding other CENFAD activities, please do not hesitate to let me know. In the meantime, I hope you have a festive and joyous holiday season!

Sincerely,

Casey VanSise

Q&A with Ethan Cohen, Inaugural Immerman Awardee!

Ethan Cohen is currently a second-year history PhD student at Temple University, and the inaugural recipient of the new Richard Immerman Research Award (named after one of CENFAD's co-founders and former directors), with amounts up to $1,500 given to students whose research projects are congruent with the mission of CENFAD. In this print-exclusive feature, I speak with Ethan about the prize and the research project that it has helped to support in his case.

Casey VanSise: Congratulations on being the inaugural recipient of the Richard Immerman Research Award for the 2021-22 academic year! How have you applied the funds that you procured from this award toward your own recent research endeavors?

Ethan Cohen: I had the privilege of visiting the archives of Purdue University for a whole week. The staff there were outstandingly organized, knowledgeable, and informative, and they were generous about my lack of archival knowhow, this being my second-ever archival trip. They showed me the "snakes," "book cradles," and other tools that archivists use to keep old materials sound. I read through more than twenty boxes of material from around 1905-1955 relating to global aviation. Spain and Morocco are my focus, and I found collections of aviation stamps from those countries. But much of the material, even the many documents left by Americans, helped clarify my sense of a *global culture of aviation*. I knew there was a relationship between aviation and colonialism, but I did not realize its extent. From the photographs, scribbled notes, and telegrams by American and British aviators, mostly women, I learned that Africa and Asia provided essential refueling stops, first of all. More importantly, the white aviators both relied on African and Asian labor of and made a theatre out of using it. They visited British, American, French, Italian, and Dutch colonies both for fuel and for performance. Also, aviators like Amelia Earhart were quite literally charting new territory by establishing air routes, say, from California to Java for American and Dutch businesspeople. By mobilizing their talents to advance colonialism, Earhart and other women achieved relative parity with male aviators among their social scene.

CV: Are you engaged in any ongoing projects that have also benefitted from being a recipient of the Immerman Award?

EC: I must answer first that I am certainly thankful to Professor Richard Immerman for

co-creating and bestowing his name onto this award. I owe Immerman a debt for teaching through his scholarship how to open up the history of one country by both zooming out and looking beneath into the international and transnational dimensions that make the story make sense. His scholarship also shines light on the rhythm of intra- and inter-national power struggles happening at the same time. This is important instruction for me, especially since Spaniards and Moroccans both participated on both sides of the Spanish-Moroccan wars. I am equally grateful to the donors to this prize endowment, whose large contributions, for example, made possible my relatively lengthy research sojourn in Indiana. The research that CENFAD funding has propelled is adding up to what I hope will be my first published article. As of now, it revolves on two themes: colonial and anti-colonial struggles over the airplane as a symbol of modernity, and colonial feminism. I will show that Spaniards and Moroccans, not unlike their neighbors around the world, felt a pressing need to prove to their possible followers that the state they planned to build–whether the Republic of the Rif or the Spanish Protectorate–would be the most modern. They used machines like airplanes and radio for theatrical value as much as logistical. It may even be that the theatrics were more impactful, for I find as much evidence of aerial warfare failing as of its success in 1920s Morocco. Colonial feminism is an essential part of this story because the Spaniards – ongoing Arabic study will eventually enable me to think on Moroccan women in this – could not have built their empire without women (again, not unlike their global neighbors). Spanish women writers, for example, who coupled their campaigns for suffrage with pro-colonial propaganda, used gender politics to affect public opinion in favor of colonialism as both traditional and modern. Nurses who brought domestic work into the ugliest North African war zones and wrote about it were tantamount in repackaging such contradictions for their political gain as white women. And what of the Spanish women aviators of the 1930s? Further research will tell! If this article does its job right, it will appreciate "modernity" not as stuffy jargon but through the understandings of the historical actors, and it will welcome seeming contradictions like colonial feminists' union of tradition and modernity.

CV: In addition to receiving the Immerman Award for 2021-22, you were also a recipient of the Jeffrey Bower Endowed Research Fellowship for the 2020-21 academic year, given to students who incorporate a study of technology into their work (congratulations on that achievement as well!). How did you or have you benefit[ted] from that?

EC: Both the Immerman and the Bower awards are supporting archival research for this same project. I am currently scheduling a visit to Princeton. Unfortunately, NYU, Yale, and Columbia are still closed to outsiders (even alumni) due to the pandemic, so I cannot yet see those rich documents. But the larger point is that CENFAD has made possible some thrilling and useful research within the United States while many institutions remain closed and brief travel to the Mediterranean is almost impossible. CENFAD truly allowed me to make the most of my time as a researcher during a pandemic.

CV: Given your experiences with these two CENFAD awards, are you encouraged to apply for other CENFAD awards in the future? Do you have any personal or general advice for future applicants of the awards that you received, or even just things that

you appreciated from your experiences with either or both awards that have not already been brought up?

EC: Professor Bryant Simon says, "Apply for everything." But even if I were selective with my grant applications, I would still apply to CENFAD every time. These awards' emphasis on the relationship between technology and interstate relations is directly reflected in my study of the conflict between imperial Spain and the Republic of the Rif over technological symbols of modernity. Also, I always lean cultural, so conversations with CENFAD faculty like Professor McPherson help deepen my sense of the more materially measurable military and diplomatic history (and its literature) happening at the same time. Reading diplomatic histories like Immerman's remind me that notwithstanding the great power of theatrics and gender politics, much of this twentieth century history hinges on money, assassinations, and sheer physical force. I seek to balance these poles in my writing as many role models at Temple do.

Interview with Eric J. Perinovic



Casey VanSise: Hello, everyone. This is Casey VanSise, current Thomas J. Davis Fellow at the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy (CENFAD), and I am serving during the 2021-22 academic year for those who have not already met me or know me. This video was recorded on November 10, 2021. And we are speaking today with Eric J. Perinovic [initially mispronounced as "Purr-in-oh-vick"]. Am I pronouncing that correctly?

Eric J. Perinovic: Uh, "perry-no-vick." Ellis Island is very phonetic!

CV: Wonderful! And as you can tell, this is my first time actually getting to meet Eric, virtually or physically – in this case, virtually. So, yeah, that is why I was asking for the clarification on your surname. But, yeah, so he is a history doctoral candidate—he is currently a history doctoral candidate at Temple University, and himself a former Davis Fellow for CENFAD from the 2017-18 academic year. So I would like to welcome him today!

EP: Thank you so much! It is great to be here.

CV: Perfect. And I was wondering then—I guess maybe to get started, I was wondering if you could perhaps describe for our audience just a bit about your academic background? And we can go from there.

EP: Yeah. So, I am a PhD candidate at Temple. I have been enrolled originally in 2015, so I am approaching the terminal stages of my dissertation right now – I am going to defend this winter. Prior to coming to Temple, I was—I earned my Masters degree at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, and before that, I was a double-major in History and German at Ohio State.

CV: Wow, very good. Thank you for describing that to our viewers! So I guess since you mentioned that you are currently working on your dissertation, I guess I would love to hear more about your research interests and your current work. For instance, I understand that you are in the later stages right now of your dissertation work, because you are in the later stages of being a history doctoral candidate. So could you describe perhaps for our audience both your overall research interests just generally, and then your current dissertation topic in particular? And just like what is the thesis of your dissertation, and what is the subject matter that you are covering, if that makes sense?

EP: Yeah. So I say I like to "wear a lot of hats" as a historian. I am a Germanist, a Europeanist, a post-war historian, military, diplomatic – unfortunately getting more toward economic stuff lately, which I never thought that I would get into. But it is a fascinating interchange. I just have never been a numbers person. But it—so I, at my core, am a post-war historian of modern Germany. So my dissertation topic examines how the Federal Republic of Germany, so the post-war West German state, essentially employed the purchasing of advanced licensed production contracts for advanced weapons systems – in my case, the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, which is this really crazy-to-look-at fighter-craft that just looks like a needle with very short and stumpy wings. But the West Germans bought it – they were the largest operator of the Starfighter. And, famously from an operational military perspective, it was a disaster. In the first five years they flew it, there were, like, over 100 training accidents in the first—yeah, for a variety of reasons. But I look at the Starfighter from kind of a flipped-over perspective as kind of a long-term success, because West Germany was not really buying the Starfighter for its overt military capabilities. I mean, it does – the Starfighter serves a lot of—they tried to use it as kind of—they forced this highly, highly specialized aircraft into this very sort-of "jack of all trades" role that it was not designed for. And bought it for a significant reason, because it can deliver tactical nuclear weapons. But, really, they bought it because it served as a great means of elevating its leadership status in NATO, which is what I look at. It was for a strategic purpose, [indecipherable] purpose to take what had been, you know, a state that had just re-armed – that had previously been a fascist state that had been demilitarized – and this was the means by which it could achieve a leadership role. And so, between 1960, when they acquire the Starfighter, and 1965, the West Germans go from having no capability whatsoever in designing and building an advanced military aircraft to being the locus for kind of what becomes the pan-European multinational nation sector. So, in a lot of ways, this explanation of the Starfighter – of the NATO consortiums they build and the [indecipherable] aircraft that they build – is sort of an origin story for Airbus and BAE and a lot of these European multinational kind of defense companies. But it really has not been looked at terribly much, because the Starfighter—people especially in Germany, but also frequently in the United States, get bogged down with just seeing, you know, a really problematic aircraft to fly and operate.

CV: Yeah. Well, that is fascinating that you are looking at that, and the early West German contributions to NATO aircraft—and, yeah, that sounds like fascinating subject matter to explore. And, certainly, I am not familiar with it. So, yeah, I am looking forward to seeing when your dissertation comes out. And, yeah, I think that gets into something that is fascinating that I have seen in a lot of your extant research work, and just your extant academic career and your career in general thus far. I mean, you are very interested in this sort of intersection between what insights can we get from academic history, but then also—what insights do we gain from academic history that we can apply towards public policy from looking at past case-studies, such as the one you are investigating for your dissertation. So I guess my next question that would follow from that is what motivated you to get into this topic, or how do you see your present dissertation work as an outgrowth of what you have done thus far in your academic career?

EP: Yeah. That is a great question. So, like I said, my Masters degree was actually International Security and Relations. I focused mostly on kind of the post-war security order. My MA thesis examined the NATO-Russia Council while that was still a thing – that was kind of like a marker of progress between some of these erstwhile rivals – viewing this—like, trying to view the efficacy of it as a policy forum to see if there had actually been progress over important issues. And at the time, I was looking at from '97 to 2012, so of course, within two years, my Masters thesis definitely was kind of blown up by Crimea and everything. But after my Masters degree, I worked in Washington DC as a research analyst at a consulting company. And I—even though I was kind of doing much more international trade, international—I mean, hence my kind of shock that I am now doing a lot of economic stuff in my research, because I was doing a lot of trade and economic analysis, and it was just not my thing. But I kept falling back less on my IR scholarship toolkit, and more on the history major one that I had cultivated as an undergrad. And I kind of—history has always been my first academic love. I have always—you know, ever since I went to the public library, when I first picked up—you know, found the history section, and read a translation of *The Iliad* – which is going to sound horrible. But, yeah, that was like my first "man, this is really cool!" But that really showed me how much the recent past just continues to reverberate today, and how much we are just sort of shackled to things that have happened, especially since 1945, but really in the past century – and there is some change now since, you know, the end of the long nineteenth century. And I—over the course of working in this position, sort of doing kind of my own kind of—I had research projects and topics that I was interested in. You know, I have spoken German – I took German in high school and college, so I was kind of leaning more toward post-war Germany. It is a place that I have lived in. I am interested in Germany. And so I kind of settled on this topic of examining the West German Air Force, because I have—I come from something of an Air Force family, and I have always been interested in aircraft. And I kind of had this realization that this branch of the military—in that any branches of the military after the war was dominated by a lot of people who had served in the Nazi-era *Wehrmacht*, the West German Air Force is fascinating to me, because you would take essentially this air force that was predicated entirely on supporting *blitzkrieg*, supporting this very offensive—what would become a form of warfare defined by conquest, human rights violations, and genocide. And then you are asking these people who have thrived in that environment, turn around and say, "here is a German rump state – you have to protect it." And so I was fascinated by this paradigm shift, like going from hyper-aggressive warfare to "okay, we have to try to prevent another apocalypse from coming upon this country." And so I was really interested, initially, in kind of who these people were, and all of that. And so, at the time, I was researching certain PhD programs, like doing some very—just kind of testing the waters, cold-calling some professors, getting a feel for, like, what it takes to apply for a PhD. And sort of stumbled on Temple. Dr. Lockenour, who is my advisor, was unfortunately on leave at that point – he was at the Air Force Academy teaching for a year or two. And so I was admitted for a year and deferred a year, because he was not there, and I had nobody to work with. But he was really interested in my topic. His—you know, he is also really into aircraft, even though that is not his kind of research focus, by any means. And so we really hit it off!

And ever since—you know, between my first and second years, he helped work to get me a research grant from the [Temple] College of Liberal Arts to get me to Germany for a very quick six-week preliminary dive into the archives there, so I would have an idea of what I was getting myself into. And that archival trip was really foundational, because it completely shifted what I was looking at entirely. I was doing this very "grab bag" [approach] of just kind of like anything that I could find that was pertinent to the post-war period. And the thing that kept coming up over and over again was the Starfighter, which was not something I was interested in. I knew it mostly as—I spent a lot of time as a kid at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base where my grandpa had served. And it was at the gate guard there. And I remember just being a kid thinking "that is a weird-looking airplane." But I kept coming back to this aircraft, because it became the primary locus of everything in the post-war period, especially beginning in the late 1950s, when Lockheed is courting the West German state really heavily, all the way up through the '70s, when the Starfighter program is kind of entering its maturity – it is being used—the full spectrum of lessons learned, good and bad, are being used to inform how West Germany wants to manage itself as an international plane-maker in aviation. And so I had to come back to it, and I took very detailed notes. I came back, [and] I had all these ideas in my head on how I was going to tackle this topic, which was giant and amorphous. And in my third year of my PhD, I applied for and got a Fulbright, and then spent eight months in archives in Germany. I spent two weeks at NATO, which was really cool. And, yeah, ever since then, it has just been a lot of writing. I also had the privilege of serving as a Guggenheim Fellow at the Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian in DC, which was a really awesome experience. I never in my life had been around so many aviation historians before, and it was just a very—it was just a really positive environment. I never—like, I had been so used to giving the thirty second elevator pitch of my dissertation, and these people were demanding, like, a twenty minute one, which was exhausting that first week – just going over this over and over again. But, yeah, then unfortunately COVID happened halfway through that, so I had to finish it out at home. But as far as the kind of intersection of policy and history, that is really what I have been fascinated by the most. I came into this program sort of—definitely as a person who did not do the R1 as my "end-all, be-all" career track. I believe historians have a really awesome methodological skillset that we all-too-frequently do not employ on anything other than our own work, or in a traditional university environment. And so I kind of angled my track at Temple in a lot of ways beyond Temple. I have worked with a Fulbright and Guggenheim. I have worked at the RAND Corporation for the last couple of years as a research analyst. Which I am happy to talk about too. But for me, my ideal career path right now would be working as a historian either with the federal government or with a policy center or a think-tank – something that really tries to grapple with the recent past, articulate it, and extrapolate how that impacts contemporary events, how policymakers deal with the past. Or how they try to, for better or for worse—try to articulate a new trajectory away from or in line with things that have gone before. So we can talk about the RAND stuff as well?

CV: Yeah, I would love you to—yeah, that was one of my questions!

EP: Sure. So I have worked twice now as a summer associate at the RAND Corporation, which is a large think-tank based primarily in Santa Monica, California, but I worked out of the DC office. They have offices in Santa Monica, DC, Pittsburgh, and Boston. So I have worked there for two different summers, and I have worked as an adjunct as well in the in-between times, but mostly I have done projects for the Department of Defense, a few for the service branches, and then one for the Office of the Secretary of Defense itself. But essentially working as a historian – in a lot of cases in very multidisciplinary teams, which has been a really cool, awesome experience, because it is a chance to not only apply history in a very sort of tangible and practical sense of, you know, "here is what you have done before," and I offer sort of analysis and critique on courses of action that somebody very important could take, based on what has gone on in the past. But also in meshing that with various different methodologies that are not historical in the slightest. [For] my first project, I was the only one doing historical analysis. You know, I had a bunch of people who were not—there was a team of about seven or eight people, and we had mathematicians, we had mechanical engineers, people who do a lot of organizational and personal management kinds of extrapolation and analysis. And so it was a really fascinating experience to sit in on these team meetings and say, "well, this is what I have been up to," and then listen to what they have been talking about. They talk about "how do we mesh things?" Like, "how do you take what I am looking at," such as things that are happening in, say, the 1940s, and then you mesh that with a mathematical breakdown of how often spare parts are needed at an Air Force base somewhere. And it is like, at first, it seems really esoteric, and "can you really put these things together in the same room?" But that was kind of the beauty of working there—is that "yes, you can and you should and you do," because these methodologies are all deeply important to each other. And even though we all come from very different places – from different scholarly or methodological backgrounds – we are all working toward a common purpose within this report. And so it was just a very constructive environment, and everybody was very supportive. It was also a challenge, though, because we only had so much space for our own stuff, and so a lot of the issue was—that at meetings we would tackle was "well, okay – how do we mesh all of this in a very clear and concise manner?" And I remember thinking that my initial project at RAND, I spent the whole summer and I wrote some sixty-some odd pages, and none of them got used. So you had to kind of get past that "sunk cost" fallacy of "I put so much work into this!" And you would be like, "well, you know, sometimes brevity really is what we are striving for here." So it was very much the polar opposite in a lot of ways of what the academic historic experience is like. You know, more is more a lot of times, when really, less is more.

CV: Yeah. Well, that makes total sense. And I guess—obviously, I see some parallels between yourself and sort of my own academic trajectory. Not that I have gotten nearly as technical as you have, but just inasmuch as I started out with an interest in history as well as an undergrad, and even before that. And, you know, eventually added kind of an IR component to that mid-way through my undergrad, and into getting a Masters [degree] at the University of Denver as well in International Studies. So I definitely see some parallels there. And I guess one thing is, I have struggled myself to apply a lot of—like incorporating a lot of quantitative stuff into my purview of research abilities. So I guess

I was curious, not just for people like myself but just, in general, historians, what are your thoughts on how would you encourage them, or perhaps move them towards kind of assimilating more of a quantitative skillset? What advantages do you see in that even for people who might not initially think that is something that they want to do in their [history] careers?

EP: Yeah. I mean, I am not doing super quant-heavy stuff. This is nowhere near social history, so I am going to preface that right away.

CV: Okay.

EP: But I would say, as somebody who did not enjoy taking math classes all through school [and] who never saw the application of math in my life, numbers in a lot of cases are very concisely-packaged little bits of information that you can draw a lot of qualitative analysis from even without having to do a ton of quantitative analysis. So in my case, a lot of the quantitative stuff that I look at is predicated on logistics. It is whether the logistics of the German Air Force in the 1960s or the US Air Force in the 2020s—it is a matter of looking at numbers, and not letting them just be numbers, but using them as sort of a jumping point for analysis, for contextualization, for finding within that a sort of fallible human element of "okay, what does this number really say?" Because, you know, even if you are looking at things like spare parts or whatever, there is still a human element there. You can look at the person that is building them, installing them, shipping them – you know, people get tired, people get bored, people do not inspect things super-thoroughly sometimes. So it is just one of those things where you have to—numbers on their own do not tell a very great story for me. But I think they are an integral component to a lot of analysis, even within history. It should not be—it is not for everyone to be like "yeah, a number must be the undergirding foundation of all analysis." You know, it is not. I mean, qualitative analysis is qualitative analysis for a reason. We are trying to look at the human element – trying to examine things that are oftentimes intangible. You know, you cannot really quantify a lot of—and, of course, that leads to that argument of "is history a [humanities subject] or a social science?" Oh, boy! Anyway, that is just one of those things where numbers have utility, but they are not everything. So, for me, they are something that can greatly inform analysis, and they are a way to convey concise information without having to maybe—without having to get really elaborative on certain things. Like, sometimes, it might be just like doing a table or a chart. That is a really concise and effective way to convey information that two or three paragraphs would not do quite as well. And on the flip-side, sometimes doing a long, written-out, qualitative analysis of what this number means provides you with much more context than just a table or a chart. So it is sort of a symbiotic relationship that, for me, always feels like a sort of case-study based approach – a "how am I going to look at it [and] how am I going to use it" sort of thing.

CV: Yeah. Well, that is great. And I appreciate your insights on that. Obviously, just in general, the people that are sort of more comfortable in a qualitative environment can still gain utility from using more quantitative methodology as well. Or even if that is only sort of a minor, peripheral part of one's studies, that is great to know that can be very useful for people engaged in more qualitative projects as well. I guess pivoting back to the historiography and looking at your dissertation subject, I

was curious – where do you see—obviously, having just done my fifty book exam [written comprehensive exam] a month and a half ago, these books are sort of fresh in my mind – so that is why these titles are coming to mind – but looking at, for instance, Robert Citino's work [e.g., *The German Way of War*] or Isabel Hull's work [e.g., *Absolute Destruction*] on Germany, do you see—where do you see your dissertation making an intervention in that historiography of Germany in a post-war moment? Because I recall when I was reading at least one of those works – perhaps more—I recall that one aspect of things that are neglected – and understandably so – is the post-World War II period of Germany when it was within NATO, in the Cold War and moving into the twenty-first century as well. What continuities [were there] from early German history, and do you see, perhaps, your project making an intervention there as well?

EP: Yeah. So, first—sorry, my dog is circling my leg.

CV: No worries.

EP: But, first, congratulations on finishing the exam! That is definitely a stress test I do not want to run into again. I was on the "old school" comprehensive exams, because I was a Europeanist. And so I did not do a fifty book exam. I just had 200-some odd books in three different fields that I got grilled on. So, you know, it is something that I hope to never repeat. But I would say I like to think of myself as a Trans-Atlanticist, because my project, while it deals overtly with modern Germany, also is sort of a story of the United States in a lot of ways. And it is reflective of a moment of time in which the United States is sort of grappling with what it means to be a hegemonic power in Europe in the late 1950s. It is part of—like, politically-speaking, Germany in the form of the Adenauer government, and then the Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss – he is a major figure in the whole Starfighter thing, for better or for worse—you know, there is a whole lot of scandal attached to Franz Josef Strauss and the Starfighter—but they are sort of making a very calculated political move in light of the Eisenhower administration's decision to sort of step back – take a half-step back – from Europe, as far as putting a bunch of conventional American forces on the continent. And instead putting more responsibility on European partners to provide the conventional and tactical and nuclear defense for the continent. And so, in that case, my work examines the Starfighter not only from that perspective – in which the Germans are sort of actively manipulating the system – but also it is a moment of time in which the United States is trying to figure out—as kind of that initial, headlong rush of the Cold War arms race ends, the United States is trying to figure out "what do we do with some of these aircraft we have purchased and funded?" So in the Starfighter's case, Lockheed nearly goes bankrupt on the Starfighter. It is like the third of several major financial catastrophes that the company suffers. They had the misfortune of unveiling two airliners that were prop-powered in the jet age. And the US government did not like the Starfighter – it was, kind of—it was one of those aircraft that Lockheed had actively designed it based on feedback from these Korean War-era air pilots, and the Air Force is like, "no, we do not want this aircraft – it is way too small, it is way too limited in what it can do. Sure, it is cool to look at, and it pushes a lot of envelopes, and it is very technologically-advanced and everything, but, you know, we like big, heavy airplanes that can do lots of things." And so the US government is looking at Europe not only as a sort of the logical writer of its own common defense,

but also as a very, very fertile market for American arms exports. And so this is how the US government effectively saves Lockheed then at that time – they say, "look, we are going to help you – you are going to sell the Starfighter to NATO." And so the government does this public-private partnership with Lockheed to essentially sell the Starfighter to NATO. There is a lot of buzz about it. Multiple European countries—because the West Germans have just re-armed, mostly with kind of obsolescent stuff. And so most—several European countries including Belgium, the Netherlands, [and] Italy have all indicated that, whatever the Germans buy, they are going to buy too, and kind of piggyback on the common NATO thing. Which is what the Germans grapple onto, and this is when they really sort of view NATO as a means of mobilizing their political, economic, and security leadership on the continent again. But I guess in a very circuitous way what I am trying to say is, I feel like it makes interventions in a couple of different historiographies. It is definitely—I am trying really hard to not have it be an operational military history, because I feel that narrative is pretty well-documented, especially the first years of the Starfighter program – which are characterized by a lot of what I will charitably call incompetence on the part of the German Air Force. It is an aircraft that is far too advanced for its abilities – they do not meet even basic needs for the aircraft program to operate in a safe fashion, including things like having covered spaces to work on them and store them, or having enough people who are capable of knowing how to fix them, or runways that they do not just slip and slide off of, or trained German pilots to fly in northern Europe being in Arizona. But I digress. So I try really hard to kind of—like, the operational military component is definitely in the background in a lot of this, but really, it is an analysis of West German policy, both economic and political, in the post-war period. And in a lot of ways, the Starfighter program is sort of viewed as this "silver bullet" solution for the West German aviation sector, which is effectively defunct in 1950, but by 1960, it is really ramped up and rolling again. And so, in that way, it is sort of a hard one to peg, because it feels—and this is like what I was saying earlier, when I felt that it was so giant and amorphous when I was in Germany. It just felt like the Starfighter touched on everything. There is a social history of the Starfighter—or, sorry, a cultural history of the Starfighter. It really comes to dominate the German press, because its crashes are so high-profile. And especially when it comes out that Lockheed may or may not have bribed West German officials to buy it, it becomes this driving force of American skepticism that really dovetails with that 1968 moment in Europe of, like, "what are we doing? Why are we essentially within the American orbit like this?" So it makes a lot of interventions in that way. But I mostly try to angle it toward NATO. NATO is like the crux of a lot of this. Beyond the economic stimulus, because it provides—they are very up front with the whole thing, because they are like "the Starfighter is step three of a four-step plan to get the West German aviation sector from 'we can maybe repair old engines that we bought from the Americans' to 'we can design and build our own aircraft' – our own highly-advanced kind of aircraft – by 1965." But that also dovetails thoroughly with NATO – you cannot talk about the German military in the post-war period, and not discuss NATO. They are strictly linked. The *Bundeswehr* only exists because there is the whole debate in the post-war period about "how do we re-arm Germany?" And it winds up being through NATO as the means of being kind of this multinational—essentially, "this is how we are going to

ensure the Germans do not ever become aggressive again is to get them into bed with NATO – we can always have operational leverage over it that we would not otherwise have." And so, in that way, I really try to frame it within that narrative of "this is very much West Germany embracing the multinational system after the war." And at least in the security realm, which is dovetailed very closely to both the policy and economic realms, to NATO – which does have some carryover to what will become a version of the European Union eventually. But mostly focused on the CDU governments in Germany, like the Adenauer government and its follow-on governments until Willy Brandt in the late '60s, [which] really view NATO as a mechanism by which West Germany can have a normalized political leadership role in the continent in this very touchy security environment.

CV: Well, very fascinating stuff. And I guess that is kind of a good segway into what I think will be my final question for this interview. I mean, obviously, your work is—one major kind of thing that CENFAD does, the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, is this sort of—a lot of the fellowships – for instance, the Jeffrey Bower Endowed Research Fellowship – are kind of devoted to historians wanting to look at kind of technology-related issues and how that contributes to even cultural histories. For instance, Ethan Cohen, the inaugural Immerman Fellow at CENFAD—his work—I interviewed him in a Q&A as well recently, and that will be featured in the December edition of *Strategic Visions*. But his work is looking at, very similarly, the impact of—the introduction of aviation into Spanish politics and Moroccan politics during the interwar period preceding the Spanish civil war and, of course, World War II. And so, I mean—obviously, technology is this sort of very important historical consideration that CENFAD likes to promote. I guess, then, I was curious – how did your time as Davis Fellow contribute to your academic and professional career? And I understand that you were also a recipient of the Jeffrey Bower Endowed Research Fellowship from CENFAD, and that was in 2018 – the 2018-19 academic year. How did you feel that those CENFAD opportunities have benefitted your professional and research interests? And did you receive any other CENFAD funding that I missed?

EP: No. Just the Davis, and then the Bower. Yeah, no. The Bower, I would say, directly funded my NATO trip, which I am eternally grateful for, because I do not know how I would have—I mean, Brussels is a little expensive – especially [because] NATO is nowhere near the center of Brussels. It is way out by the airport, and there is nowhere to stay. So having that extra money definitely made it possible for that research trip to take place, so I am very, very grateful for that, because the NATO documentation is really key to a lot of my analysis. But the Davis Fellowship, I will say, I really enjoyed it. I miss it a lot of times – even beyond the office, because the office has one of the best views in the department, hands down! But the Davis Fellowship was a really—it was a really unique opportunity to meet a bunch of scholars who maybe just do not [editor's note: indecipherable] from the traditional ideas of what "force and diplomacy" mean. But their work demonstrates how these very diverse intersections occur, right? So it just kind of opened my eyes to the breadth and depth of what can be categorized as those things. When I first entered Temple, I thought "oh, CENFAD – that totally must be about war and policy. That makes total sense!" But in a lot of cases, it was studies about social movements or economic policy or what do borders mean and how they impact a whole

slew of issues. And so CENFAD, in a lot of ways, really opened my eyes to the diversity of academic scholarship that is conducted in these realms, and what can be very broadly construed as "force and diplomacy." It was just—it was a really great experience. I learned a lot of various management skills working as the Davis Fellow. I was Dr. McPherson's first Davis Fellow. So it was a bit of a learning curve for the two of us to try to figure out the job together. But I think we had a—I think it was a really successful year. And I think we definitely—we had a really good colloquium series. *Strategic Visions* migrated to kind of an online platform, and it started the spring before I had done it, but we really moved it over in the fall and spring of my year. And it—I do not know, it was just a—I look back on it fondly. It was definitely—it was very different. It was so different from TA'ing or teaching or doing anything else. I actually just got a lot of practical kinds of office management skills out of the Davis Fellowship.

CV: Yeah.

EP: It is really cool to say, "yeah, I helped to manage a research center for a year. I helped scholars from around the world come and give talks, and I got to go to some really cool restaurants in Philly." So, yeah, it was a really cool experience! I genuinely—there are times that I really miss doing it. It is so much fun, different work.

CV: Absolutely. And I would concur from my experience thus far as well! It is definitely a rewarding opportunity, as are the other CENFAD funding opportunities that are available to students in the program. But, yeah – Eric, I just really want to thank you for your time today, and I really appreciate all the information that you provided to our viewing audience and to our reading audience potentially, since I do intend to hopefully have a written transcript of this as well. But, yeah, thank you so much for your time, and I am really looking forward to seeing your dissertation and what transpires from that when that is published. So thank you so much for describing that to our audience!

EP: Of course! I am glad that you reached out. Thank you!

Interview with Dr. David B. Zierler

Casey VanSise: Hello, everyone. This is Casey VanSise, current Thomas J. Davis Fellow at the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy (CENFAD) for the 2021-22 academic year for those who do not know me yet. This video is being recorded on November 17, 2021. We are speaking today with Dr. David B. Zierler, current director of the Caltech Heritage Project, who has also served as an oral historian for the American Institute of Physics from 2019 through 2021 – until July this year, I believe, if I am not mistaken – and then previously as one of the editors for the US State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) collections from 2008-19. His first book, *The Invention of Ecocide*, was published by the University of Georgia Press in 2011, and that concerned the development of a US scientific movement against adverse human impacts on global ecology resulting from the use of Agent Orange and other herbicides during the Vietnam War. David Zierler is an alumnus of Temple University, having earned a PhD in History here from 2004-08, before which he acquired a Masters degree in History from the University of Montana in 2004, if I am not mistaken, and a Bachelor of Science in Media Theory from New York University in 2000. And while he was at Temple University, he served as the Thomas J. Davis Fellow as well for the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy during the 2005-06 academic year. So I would like to welcome him now.

Dr. David B. Zierler: Casey, thank you so much!

CV: Great! Wonderful, and we are so glad to have you here, and we are wondering—I guess my first question would be could you tell us a bit about what led you toward the academic trajectory that you ended up choosing, or being on in any case, and what drew you to working with oral history projects? What have been some of your most interesting experiences as an oral historian, and what drew you to that overall?

DZ: Well, I should say in the beginning that the prospect of working with Richard Immerman was what brought me to Temple, and I thought I was going to be a professor, being a diplomatic historian and continuing on that tradition. It was actually a notice in *H-Diplo*: a Masters student at the University of Basra in Iraq was asking for books on the Cuban Missile Crisis. And I thought to myself that this was—oh gosh, this must have been in 2006, 2007. The University of Basra's library had been destroyed during the war, and I just thought it was incredible that a fellow historian of foreign relations – in all places, of Basra – was interested in the

Cuban Missile Crisis, and had the ability to think about the Cold War in the middle of a warzone. I arranged, as a result, a book drive at SHAFR, at the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, because everybody has probably one too many books on the Cuban Missile Crisis. I thought it would be a great opportunity to engage fellow diplomatic historians, and get some books over to this student. In the course of that, I met Dr. Chris Tudda at the Office of the Historian at the State Department. We got to talking, and the Foreign Relations series, of course, I had used extensively in my graduate work. I never gave much thought to the people who actually produced the volumes. And so we got to talking, one thing led to another, a position came open, and that, by the time I had defended my dissertation, was the most exciting prospect for me at that time. That immediately took me off of the traditional academic path that I thought I had placed myself on when I got to Temple.

CV: Wow! Very interesting, and that is definitely something that I wanted to address in our discussion because you have had such an interesting trajectory that, I think, does diverge from so many of the people who you would expect at Temple might become academic historians or follow, perhaps, a more—I will not say more traditional, but a more stereotypical path – not in a bad way or anything, as someone at this point aspiring to become an academic historian myself but perhaps not knowing what serendipitous turns lie ahead for myself, and I am sure many others find themselves in that position as well. So it is great to hear how you got into oral history, and cultivated that interest.

DZ: I would say a secret weapon for diplomatic historians in particular is that we have interests in areas of expertise that obviously are quite relevant to international affairs and all the things for which today diplomatic history and a historical perspective are relevant and useful. I do not want to say that what we do is more relevant or useful than other disciplines, either in the humanities or in history, but we certainly have exposure and relevance to a wider variety of things beyond the quote-unquote "stereotypical path" that most PhDs in the humanities would take.

CV: Yeah. Well, very interesting. And I guess I was wondering, to spring off of that and move on, perhaps, to your more recent research efforts – I just wanted to ask you what recent research you are engaged in? For instance, you were mentioning to me that—I understand that you are currently working on an oral history interview right now with Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, who was the former—

DZ: Yeah.

CV: Very good. He was the former Director of the National Security Agency from 1977-81 during the Carter administration, and then later served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence under Reagan from '81-82. So I was curious, I guess, about that, and about what stage you are in of that, and have any interesting insights emerged from that at this point that you are at liberty to disclose at this time? And, yeah, I would just love to hear more about your recent research in general, concerning the interview with Admiral Inman or otherwise.

DZ: Yeah. Well, Casey, I should say that, you know, going all the way back to my dissertation research on Agent Orange and Vietnam, there was always a duality in my research with an interest in the history of science and the history of foreign relations. Obviously, when I was at the State

Department, I more fully wore the "diplomatic history/international affairs" hat, but because I always had that interest in science – the history of science, science policy, specifically the intersection between environmental issues like climate change and international security – that is what got me to the American Institute of Physics, where I directed the oral history program there. And because Caltech is still prominent in physics, that is where I developed connections which ultimately led me to Caltech, where I now direct the heritage program here, which is something that I made up all by myself – the Caltech Heritage Program – because I thought that Caltech should have a heritage program. I pitched that to the president of Caltech, and that is what got me here. And specifically to your question about Admiral Inman, Bobby Ray Inman is a trustee of Caltech. Very interesting, and it was an opportunity to—you know, I jumped at the opportunity to engage someone here at Caltech who is not—who does not have a background in science, but has a background, of course, in national security and international affairs. Bobby Ray Inman is a trustee of Caltech, and the origin story there was that, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Caltech needed some guidance in managing its relations with NASA. Caltech is home to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory is managed by Caltech, and it is a federally-funded facility under the NASA umbrella. And Bobby Ray Inman at that point had been out of government service for about a decade, and he had become quite accomplished in the broader world of government affairs but working from within the private sector. And so, Bob joined Caltech, and he has been central to guiding such a longstanding, successful relationship with NASA—between Caltech and NASA, in the thirty years that he has been there. So it was on that basis that I met him at a Board of Trustees meeting. He is ninety years old, so there is an urgency to capture his story. He is incredibly well-connected. His schedule is as busy as ever. And yet, amazingly, no one has ever really engaged him in oral history to the extent that I have. I did not want to just talk to him about his service to Caltech – I thought "this is a fantastic opportunity – let us go all the way back to World War II. Let us get all the stories about your interest in American military service, going from the Korean War and then the remarkable career he has had ever since." He shared so much – I am currently still in the middle of these discussions. We worked our way right up to the point in 1974 where he is named Director of Naval Intelligence. And so far—oh gosh, so many gems that stand out! He has told me some interesting information about Soviet naval maneuvers that worked their way up the chain of command that seem to have been quite important in how the Cuban missile crisis played out. There is so much written about this [that] I am going to have to go and look to see what is new and what has already been published, but that is something that I will be excited, once the transcript is out, to publicize that and have people look at that. He shared with me that, for some time, it was speculated that he was "Deep Throat" during the Watergate crisis – so that is one that I had not heard before, and I am not sure if he did not disclose that until it was revealed that of course it was—

CV: – Mark Felt. –

DZ: —Mark Felt, and not him. But that was an interesting historical nugget. And then, one of the real values, by the time we get to the Nixon administration and he is high enough up the chain of command—this is where, when he is named to direct naval intelligence in 1974, he is going to really

start to share with me some of the details – all, of course, in an open-source context – about how the intelligence community interacted. Because it is only when he gets to this level that he sees the intelligence community sort of at the "view from 35,000 feet," so to speak. So, in between, I take the opportunity to ask him about everything from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Berlin Blockade to Gulf of Tonkin; his views on anti-war protests in the United States when he was abroad – when he was serving on ships; the Watergate crisis and the constitutional crisis that resulted because of that, particularly with how the military might have gotten involved; his thoughts about raising the DEFCON alert readiness during the Yom Kippur War; what happened with regard to the CIA in Chile in the early 1970s; and, now next, we will get into the ways that Congress, both Senate and House investigations, dealt with what one person famously called – I think it was Mike Mansfield – "the elephant out of control," the intelligence agencies and what they were doing in the mid-1970s. So, I am going to continue with all of this. It is really exciting to think that I am getting some information from him that has not yet been part of the historical record. And I get to do that all from within my position at Caltech, which, traditionally, I would never have this opportunity before. So I am having a lot of fun with that.

CV: Yeah. Very fascinating stuff, and I am really looking forward to seeing the outcome of this when this is published, just because—particularly because the late 1970s and early 1980s are a time that fascinates me as well in my research. And I guess stemming from that—I mean, I notice that in your interview with Inman, obviously you have examined other periods throughout the mid- to late-twentieth century both in your interview with him and then in your earlier book, and just in some of the other research that you have engaged in – you know, the other oral history projects that you have done. But nevertheless, I could not help but notice that the late 1970s and early 1980s appears to be a time of interest for you as it is for me. For example, in addition to your interview with Admiral Inman, it also appeared that you edited several of the 1977-80 FRUS collections – Foreign Relations of the United States – when you were working at the Historian's Office of the US State Department. I noticed, for instance, that you edited the Afghanistan collection during that time period, dealing with the Saur Revolution and then, of course, the Soviet invasion in 1979, and then also Greco-Turkish relations with Cyprus. So those were the two I noticed. But yeah, I was curious – is that era an era of particular interest to you, and if so, what draws you to foregrounding that period in your research work? And maybe you could elaborate on some of the other work you have done concerning that period.

DZ: Well, one of the things I am particularly looking forward to when we get to the late 1970s—of course, as you mentioned, Admiral Inman was the Director of the National Security Agency. And my second volume that I worked on at the State Department was that Afghanistan volume – of course, this is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This is the first published volume – I did what turned out to be a trilogy of volumes covering the ten-year Soviet conflict in Afghanistan. So the first volume starts, of course, with the Carter administration – and just by way of context there, the Office of the Historian publishes foreign relations documents, give or take, about thirty or forty years in the past. And so when I joined the State Department in 2008, most of the Office was engaged in documenting the Ford and then the Carter

administrations. When I got to Afghanistan, I suggested – just because it would be most efficient to do so – that the programs that I needed to be read into were relevant both for the first volume and, of course, the two volumes that went into the Reagan administration. I said, "why don't I just do all three of them?" So I advocated that to the general editor at the time, and that is how we got to this trilogy of volumes. I believe right now the second volume, which covers the first Reagan administration through 1984, and then the [third] volume which goes from Reagan into Bush I – those are both in declassification review. So I am excited to push Admiral Inman to disclose as much unclassified information that he can, because, to state the obvious, the intelligence agencies were quite important for formulating US policy in a quite tense period in Soviet-American relations in the latter part of the Cold War. Let us see – in addition to those three volumes, my first volume at the State Department was on Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey – an area of the world that I knew next to nothing about. And so one of the fun things that the Office of the Historian is – it is almost like joining a baseball team where the manager needs to fill the rosters. So where there is a new historian, where there is fresh blood in the office, they throw a volume at you, and you go and get smart on the eastern Mediterranean. You learn all about NATO and the crisis with Turkey earlier in the decade, the Greek coup in 1980 [editor's note: it is unclear whether Zierler misspoke, and is referring to either the Turkish coup of 1980 or the Greek coup of 1967], and the longstanding and still unresolved conflict over the ultimate fate of the Mediterranean island of Cyprus, which has both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. So that was a lot of fun as my first project. And then, at the State Department, the two other volumes that I worked on—one was the Iran-Contra scandal, which was an extraordinarily difficult volume to work on for obvious reasons – who knows if that volume will ever see the light of day, but that was a lot of fun to work on that – and then the last one that I worked on was the breakup of Yugoslavia during the Bush I administration. So I was very lucky in my eleven years at the State Department to work on volumes spanning three presidential administrations. And, you know, during all of that time, because I was so interested in science and policy, whenever there was an opportunity to work on science-related issues from a historical perspective, I jumped at that opportunity. So, for example, in the Obama administration, the Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd Stern—I served as historical advisor and created a briefing packet that put all of the previous climate summits going all the way back to Rio and the Earth Summit of 1992 – I put them all in historical context for the briefing packet for preparation for the summit in Paris in 2016, which was billed at the time—and historians will debate this, if that was the most significant in all of these COP summits up to this point. It was experiences like that that encouraged me to think beyond the State Department. In federal positions, there is always the concern that when you get promoted enough, you stop doing the thing that you were hired to do and you start managing other people to do that job. And I was not ready to give up that much of my historian's portfolio, and that is where the opportunity at the American Institute of Physics became available for me.

CV: Well, wonderful. And that is a wonderful opportunity to, I guess, segue more into that, and your work with the American Institute of Physics, since we have not discussed that yet. And, of course, as you were saying, another major thematic trend in your work is the role of science in

mid- to late-twentieth century public policy, particularly foreign relations obviously, and diplomatic history. So I guess my next question from that is what motivated your interest in that subject matter, and with the American Institute of Physics, what sort of opportunities did you have to explore that? And yeah, we can start from there, I guess.

DZ: My dissertation centered around conducting oral histories of the key scientists who protested the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam. You know, the funny thing about oral history is historians generally are not trained in oral history. Even though there is the Oral History Association [and] even though there are such things as "best practices" in oral history, it is sort of "trial by fire," and you just sort of go in and you meet these people, you bring your recorder with you, and you ask the questions that you want to ask. It was sort of a—for me, it was a great opportunity, because almost all of the key scientists who were involved in the protests against Agent Orange in Vietnam were still alive, so why not engage them and ask them about their work, get it from their perspective – you know, straight from their own recollections? So that had always loomed large. And then at the State Department, there were certain opportunities to engage in oral histories. For example, I was part of the planning committee for the Clinton administration. So once you are wrapping up one presidential administration, then a committee is formed to figure out what volumes are we going to cover in the next presidential administration. That was an enormous amount of work for the Clinton administration because it is the end of the Cold War, it is a revamping of the entire American foreign policy establishment, and it is an opportunity to engage officials from the Clinton administration – the National Security Advisors, Departments of State, really high-ranking people—to engage them in oral histories, not full-life autobiography-level oral histories, but oral histories about their time in the relevant presidential administration. Because those transcripts are then really valuable for figuring out "okay, what are the volumes? How should we organize them? What should be the emphasis? Should we have more thematic volumes, should we have more bilateral volumes, should we have more regional volumes?" So I got to do several oral histories. So between my original research as a graduate student to the oral histories that I had done at the State Department, the Niels Bohr Library, which is the largest physics library in the world housed at the American Institute of Physics, they were looking to create an original content program. So what I mean by that is, the Niels Bohr Library goes back all the way, I believe, to 1962, and it has an oral history collection, but that collection was almost exclusively passively accepted – meaning that when scholars of—historians of physics – when they would conduct interviews, just like I did for my dissertation—when they conduct interviews and they write their books or articles, they have their tapes, they have their transcripts, they want to do something with them – the Niels Bohr Library would be a place that would serve as a long-term repository. In addition to that, as I learned later on, in the scientific community at annual meetings for whatever your sub-specialty is – meteorology, particle physics, whatever it is—at these annual meetings, scientists like to interview other scientists – which are great. The challenge is, is that they are very, as you can imagine, they are very technical, they are very "inside baseball," and they are not done in a way where there is a tremendous amount of concern for how enjoyable or relevant they might be to a broader audience, right? And so the American Institute of Physics was

looking to create a new oral history program where I would be conducting the oral histories, and I would be conducting them not as a physicist, not even as a historian of physics, but as somebody who has a good nose for oral history, a good nose to engage scientists in their craft, and to create themes based on branches of physics – themes like diversity in physics, themes like the Cold War in physics, just to name a few. So I was hired in the American Institute of Physics in November of 2019, and maybe you could tell where the timing is going with this. I was just getting started after getting the lay of the land and figuring out all of the things that I wanted to do, and then, of course, in February 2020, the pandemic hit. Now, for any oral historian, your gameplan before the pandemic is, you identify people that you want to interview, and then you go by car, by train, [or] by plane with your little audio-recorder, and you sit across the table from them, and you do your interview. So when the pandemic hit, all of a sudden I said to myself, "my goodness – what am I going to do now?!" And then I realized – like so many other people realized with their own craft, with their own discipline – Zoom, I can do this over Zoom! And what happened there was, it really revolutionized what I was able to do, because between how expensive it is to travel, how time-consuming it is to travel—where I thought I would do maybe thirty or forty interviews a year, now I could do, like, one a day, right? And so over the course of the pandemic, I feel so privileged that I was able to interview almost—the exact number is 494 physicists: almost every living Nobel Prize winner; physicists who are university presidents; former directors of the National Science Foundation; Secretaries of Energy – both President Obama's Secretaries of Energy, Ernie Moniz and Steve Chu, are physicists. So it was a great opportunity to engage all of these really interesting and important people in their career, their life, [and] their educational trajectory. And over the course of that—one thing, again, I always look for opportunities to look for the intersection between physics and science and international affairs. One of the opportunities there was talking with, in particular, directors of the national labs – Livermore Lab and Los Alamos, of course. These are the weapons labs in the Department of Energy. Lots of great stories, lots of great insight about the development of the US nuclear program and its obvious impact on the Cold War and US foreign policy. And then the other thing, as I mention later—because of Caltech's prominence in physics and astronomy and in astrophysics, I kept on getting this sense that Caltech was this really special place where there might be opportunity to do what I am doing at the American Institute of Physics, which is all of physics – specific to physics – I pitched the president of Caltech, Tom Rosenbaum, who is an eminent condensed matter physicist in his own right. And I said, "Tom, why don't I come to Caltech and do this in-house, not just for physics, but for all the incredible research that is going on?" And that it what led me to Caltech, and as you mentioned, I joined Caltech in July of this year. So it was really both a pandemic story for what I was able to accomplish at the American Institute of Physics, and because of the pandemic, because my kids were remote-learning, it was an opportunity for adventure to say, "let us all go to southern California and see what that is like for a couple of years." So here I am, and I am in the middle of it now!

CV: Well, wonderful. And I mean that brings up an interesting question—just your speculation, I guess, on where do you see the profession moving forward – you know, the historical profession? Do you think that oral history, inasmuch as it has not already been a major kind of methods approach for

historians—do you see that becoming more prominent because the barriers of entry are lower at this point, arguably, with Zoom and other things of that nature? Do you see oral history having a greater prominence of place among historians than it has so far?

DZ: That is a great question. So what I would say—and I should preface that by explaining that, as opposed to being a "historian of dot-dot-dot," where oral histories are part of the larger resource base that you use to write your books or your articles, I should specify that here at Caltech, it is as much institutional history as it is oral history. So what I mean by that is when I was coming up with this idea that I did with Tom Rosenbaum, he had the great notion to put me in the office of the vice-president for strategy implementation, and direct reports – her name is Diana Jergovic. And the idea there is that, in strategy implementation, Diana is involved in all aspects of the operations and strategy of Caltech. That means Caltech's relations with the federal government. It means Caltech's relationship with its efforts to promote diversity and inclusivity on campus. It means Caltech's relationship with its benefactors – some very significant benefactors who give to Caltech on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars. It means engaging with Caltech's alumni. And so the way I look at it is that I am using these oral histories both as an end product in and of themselves—Caltech archives has a longstanding oral history collection. So I am partnering with the archivists and the oral historians in the archives. The oral histories that I do will ultimately live in the archive, just as any other oral historian in the archive would do. So that is their ultimate destination. The difference is, I am using these oral histories for their operational value, for their value in telling the story of all of the things that Caltech has done. So I mean so many examples there. One, just briefly, that is recent in my memory – I completed a series of interviews with Charles Elachi. Charles is the former director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory – twenty-four hours of audio I did with Charles, just the largest, most incredible transcript I ever did! And in these stories, there is just so many amazing historical nuggets. Just two of which are—for example, I asked him about the importance of outreach and engagement – doing open houses, having wonderful websites that people can visit. And I said to him, "Charles, it is so important, obviously, to have these outreach experiences, but what are the feedback mechanisms that you would rely on to know it is all worth it – it is expensive, it is so time-consuming. What is worth it in JPL's strategic interests to be able to do these outreach activities?" So he shared with me one – on a blind date, he took his wife to JPL. She was in animation. This is Los Angeles – she was in movie animation at the time. There was a scientist working on what would become the Voyager mission, and he was working on computer animation. This is, like, thirty years ago – this is a long time ago already. He was working on computer animation to figure out ways to best visualize what the Voyager mission was doing. Charles Elachi's date Valerie, who would become his wife, turned to Charles and said, "Charles, this is going to put the animation business out of business in Hollywood – it is all going to become computer animation!" And that, actually, is the beginning of Pixar and Disney Imagineering. He also explained to me that the phones that now have amazing aperture – our iPhones and our Androids, where you have—how do you have these flat devices that can take such incredibly clear pictures with zoom capability? That was technology that was developed at JPL, having nothing to do with

phones, for one of JPL's telescopes. It was a result of outreach efforts where they publicized their research where somebody figured out "this would be amazing technology to have in a phone!" So these are vignettes that only come out of the casual and enjoyable and spontaneous conversation, and long-form conversation, that is really only possible as a result of these oral history discussions. That is an example of many, many, many opportunities to look at what is the research that has been done at Caltech, capture them in these oral histories, and then that becomes whatever it can become – it can become a documentary, it can become an opportunity to engage with alumni, for development, for benefactors, or really just for the sense of pride at Caltech and its research. So that is where I would say the benefits of these oral histories is really—it is a celebration of all of the work that has been done at Caltech, but it really is helpful in the day-to-day operations. That is something that I do not think is unique to Caltech. I do not even think it is unique to universities. I think—what I hope: as what I am doing gains greater visibility, that other institutions recognize the institutional value in doing these oral histories. Because that is the place where the real stories come out – because in that spontaneous, judgment-free zone of good conversation, people really say what is on their mind. And being able to transcribe it make it a transcript that can be accessed from a scholarly point of view. And it is something where history can be applied to daily operations, whether you are a university, whether you are a corporation, [or] whether you are a think-tank. So to get back to this idea of low barriers of entry, I think people should embrace Zoom. I think it is a wonderful medium – as we are doing now, of course – for engaging in these kinds of discussions. And I hope that more and more people recognize and employ historians in a variety of fields.

CV: Well, very good. And it is really great to see that you are making so many subjects that you would not expect accessible to more people through the practice of oral history, and through your ability to do that at a greater scale than you were before! And that is fascinating what you were saying about Pixar and all of these other sort of innovations – smartphones – that people do not often realize come out of public-private—you know, these kind of public-private scientific collaborations or, you know, DARPA and so on. And so it is fascinating to hear your insights on that! I know we do not have a ton more time, but I was wondering—I had one final question, which was how did your time as Davis Fellow contribute to your academic and professional career? And then if you received any other CENFAD opportunities – in which case, just in general, how did you feel that working with CENFAD while you were at Temple may have benefitted or furthered your professional and research interests? Obviously, you discussed your dissertation earlier, but I would love to hear how CENFAD, and being the Davis Fellow in particular, was pretty formative in what you are doing now?

DZ: Yeah, absolutely. So I should say that coming to Temple, my Masters degree was—it studied *détente*, Soviet-American relations, specifically during the Yom Kippur War. And the thing that I looked at there was, in the early 1970s, you have Nixon and Brezhnev, all of these agreements, all of these summits. And what they are all designed to do is improve communication, relax tensions, and to negate the possibility of anything approaching the Cuban missile crisis and anything close to a future nuclear war. And so then you have the October war, the Yom Kippur War, between the Arabs and the Israelis. And it was, in many ways, a real

test of *détente*. Would this become the classic, textbook case-study where a local conflict with its Cold War sponsors – of course, the United States supporting Israel, and the Soviet Union supporting the Egyptians and the Syrians—would this be something that preserved *détente*, or would it prove that all of these agreements, all of these negotiations, [and] all of these understandings really were not worth much of anything? And it could have actually spilled into something quite more dangerous. So that is all to say that circa 2002-03, I was unabashedly interested in diplomacy, in international affairs, and in the Cold War. Now, the political environment then and now in higher education was one that was distinctly shifting away from those interests. That is, there was much more interest, there was much more support, there were many more graduate students and professors working in cultural history, political history, subaltern studies, and all of that. My view on this is that, that is all fine, but I think it had one negative component, and that it was that diplomatic history was not as important. It was not considered as important, or to the extent that history and the historical discipline is subject to trends and fads like so many other aspects of life are, diplomatic history was not so "in" during that time, right? And so Temple – and this goes back, of course, to the late Russell Weigley and Richard Immerman – was a place that was unabashedly "we love diplomatic history! We are proud of the fact that we have military historians and diplomatic historians, and we not going to just say we are going to dismiss things as saying 'oh, that is [editor's note: indecipherable] and bugle history,' or things like that!" And, of course, CENFAD, the [Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy], that was the centerpiece for making sure that that statement, that sentiment that we are proud of our heritage in diplomatic and military history – that that would be the basis to do that. And so that was really what attracted me to Temple to work with Richard Immerman, one of the most eminent historians of US foreign policy of the twentieth century. And CENFAD was wonderful! Specifically, the Davis Fellowship—you know, I mean, the Davis Fellowship was my first academic prize, and as such, it was probably the first time that I thought to myself "oh, I might be good at this. People might value what I am doing." Both in terms of my scholarship, but because also – as all graduate students get to know – so much of being a professor is not just the research and writing and teaching. It is also your administrative service. And so it was an enormous confidence boost, not just in terms of recognizing what I was doing as a graduate student purely in the classroom and in the archives, but recognizing that maybe I had some capability to put together a speakers program, or put together ideas around which CENFAD could operate on a semester basis. So on that basis, Casey, it was enormously valuable because I thought to myself "I am in graduate school because these are the things that I am interested in," but being a Davis Fellow was probably the first time that I thought "you know, maybe I could just make a career out of this!" So it was enormously important to me. It was of great value in terms of, like I said, my confidence. And it was something where I got to know so many of my fellow graduate students, so many of the professors in Temple, and then all of the wonderful people that you have a chance to meet. You know, when you are in your twenties and you are a graduate student, and maybe you are not so confident about getting out there and being a productive member of society, when I was a CENFAD fellow, I got to email people – important people, high-ranking military and foreign affairs officials – and say, "would you come to Temple and

talk?" And it was my first opportunity not just to read about important people in the archives, but to interact with them, and to figure out how to hold your own, how to have confidence in talking to these people. And I guess it is, as we say now – I do not think the term was in use then – but it was probably the first way of getting over the "impostor syndrome" that we always feel. And that when you look at an important person who is respectful to you and takes you seriously, there is no better professional training than that, I would say!

CV: Absolutely. Yeah. And just in my experience as a Davis Fellow so far, I can attest to what you are saying – obviously having not served a full semester yet, but, you know, having a preliminary kind of experience. And, yeah, we have had some great speakers so far, and it looks—from what we are seeing, this next semester, we are going to have many more great speakers! Anyway, I definitely—I just wanted to thank you for your time, David, for being here, and I really appreciated just all of the insights you gave on oral history and your general research interests and where you see the profession going. It was great to hear your insights on all of those subjects! And thank you so much for joining CENFAD, and I look forward to seeing this published in *Strategic Visions*!

DZ: Well, Casey, it has been my pleasure! I am so glad that we connected, and most importantly, congratulations to you on being a Davis Fellow, and I wish you and CENFAD all the best!

Interview with Dr. Silke Zoller



Casey VanSise: Hello, everyone. This is Casey VanSise, current Thomas J. Davis Fellow at the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy (CENFAD) for the 2021-22 academic year. This video is being recorded on November 22, 2021. We are speaking today with Dr. Silke [mispronounced as "Silk-uh"] Zoller, Assistant Professor of History at Kennesaw State University. Am I pronouncing that pretty well?

Dr. Silke Zoller: Yeah, but I usually go by "Silk-ee" [like "silky"].

CV: "Silk-ee." Okay. Well, I will definitely stick with that pronunciation then. So, Dr. Zoller is an alumnus of Temple University, having earned her PhD in History here back in 2018. While attending Temple University, she herself served as the Thomas J. Davis Fellow for CENFAD during the 2014-15 academic year. Previously, she also earned a Master of Arts in Early Modern and Modern History from Eberhard Karls University in Tübingen, Germany. She has also held postdoctoral fellowships at Dartmouth College's John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, and then more recently at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin. She is the author of *To Deter and Punish: Global Collaboration Against Terrorism in the 1970s*, which was published by Columbia University Press earlier this year, in July of 2021, and is the main subject of our discussion today. Welcome, Dr. Zoller.

SZ: I am glad to be here. Thanks for the invitation!

CV: Perfect. I figured that I would start off by asking, I guess, what the basic premise of your book is. So could you introduce the subject matter and overall thesis of your book to our audience? For example, could you give just an overview of the period that you cover and what changes occurred regarding terrorism as a political strategy, and [also] basically responses thereto in the Global North over time? Which is the subject of your book as I understand it.

SZ: Yeah. So, I look at the long 1970s, so the period from 1968 to the early 1980s, and what you see there context-wise is this is the first time that you see, like, large-scale global hijackings, you see terrorist attacks or just attacks that seem to be multiplying, as people perceive it in the Global North – so in the United States, in Canada, in Western Europe, in Japan as well. And these attacks are very transnational in scope, so the people

committing them are either members of what they perceive as national liberation movements—so, Palestinians mostly, they see themselves as members of national liberation movements, and they work together with people who support these causes coming out of the leftist movements that radicalized after 1968. And so what happens is that these are very international attacks. These are people who are traveling across borders, who are committing attacks in Europe and then seeking refuge, for example, in the Middle East. So my book—I always say that is sort of the hook, that is the interesting part. My book brings in state officials [and] bureaucrats, who realize that these things are international. And the problem is that you can have domestic antiterrorism programs that you would like, but those stop at national borders. So the people that I look at are talking to one another and saying "what can we set up in the international sphere, so that we can stop these sort of people?" And it turns out that they really focus very much on legal arrangements, on extradition agreements—the idea being that if you have extradition agreements in place, that will either deter further attacks because people will know that they will no longer be able to flee and have safe havens, and you will also be able to punish the people responsible. So that is where the title of the book comes from, this is what they want to "deter and punish" attackers. It does not really work the way that they envision it, because, of course, extradition agreements are for criminals *per se*, and there is always the question with terrorism [about] "what is the political angle?" So the question is, if you have someone who is motivated for political reasons, do you extradite them or not? And the United States and Western Europe mostly say "yes, these are criminals, these are horrible crimes that they are committing," but the states where most of these people flee to, like North African states [such as] Libya [and] Algeria, [or] Lebanon, Syria—these sorts of states are arguing "well, yeah, these attacks are horrible, but these are political actors and we cannot just extradite people and not consider the political aspects." So there is a concentrated effort in the 1970s by the Global North to create an international legal regime that considers terrorism to be a crime and nothing else, but it is really, really hard to put that into practice because it is such a contested matter, because you are broaching issues of globalization and decolonization—and, of course, it is a question of how far you can go with decolonization or wars of national liberation, what is okay and what is not?

CV: Well, very good, and thank you for that overview for our audience, and I was certainly fascinated. I mean, this was a subject that fascinated me already, knowing the limited amount about it that I do. But being familiar, for instance, with Operation Entebbe in the 1970s and [the role of] Israel, and the coordination [among] groups like—well, "Carlos the Jackal," for one, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Revolutionary Cells (RZ) in Germany, and the Japanese Red Army—and the coordination between this kind of milieu of global transnational terrorist networks at this time, which makes it a fascinating period of time to study for looking at the development of global counterterrorism. And it is also a period that I do not think most people recognize—now, granted, it has been a while since I actually did check this, but I recall looking at the University of Maryland's START database, I believe it is called—

SZ: — Yeah. —

CV: —S.T.A.R.T. And, in the 1970s, there was more terrorist attacks—

SZ: – In one week! –

CV: —than there have been in the twenty-first century. Go ahead, I am sorry.

SZ: Yeah. There is about a hijacking per week. There is at least—these are big spectacular attacks. There are embassy takeovers, and these huge hostage situations. So, something that really does hit the media a lot.

CV: Yeah. And that is why I think it is such a fascinating period of time to look into. On that note, I was reading earlier this year as well—you know, for my fifty-book exam [written comprehensive exam], which I completed about two months ago now.

SZ: Congratulations!

CV: Well, thank you! You must know what that is like! But I was reading notable military historian Michael Howard's 2009 edition of *War in European History* at that time, and that was originally published back in 1976, but this was an updated edition for 2009 that included a new epilogue on modern Europe. And one critique that I have had of that, I guess, was that the epilogue that he added on recent European war—it focused especially on US participation, or *European* participation, excuse me, in the twenty-first century, US-led "war on terror." But it omitted so many of these potentially useful case-studies or examples that were antecedents of Western Europe beginning to formulate a counterterror strategy in the 1970s, and omitted all of these things—you know, the Troubles, the Basque conflict, the Years of Lead, pro-Palestinian solidarity terrorism, the German Autumn, the "strategy of tension" that was just going on in general—

SZ: Yeah. And I do think that is partially, probably because of the way that people were interpreting it in the '70s themselves, because you really see when Europeans in particular talk about terrorism in this time is they are framing it as a law enforcement issue, they are framing it as a policing issue, which is why I do not really use the word "counterterrorism" in the title. I use "collaboration against terrorism," because "counterterrorism" implies a sort of militarized view. So you do not really find that term very much in the sources from the '70s. You will find it later in the '80s. That is, part of the whole problem, the whole debate, is that the Europeans are very much thinking, "okay, this is a law enforcement issue, this is a judicial issue that we are talking about and that we are collaborating on," and it is not a military issue. Which later becomes problematic, because then you start using the military more and more, but there is sort of an insistence that remains that this is, in fact, a criminal issue, a law enforcement issue, but then you are using the military against it in ways that, maybe, people were using counterinsurgency tactics in the colonized areas. So there is some transfer there that is uncomfortable.

CV: Yeah, absolutely. I mean, that is definitely a point that comes across in your book, with looking at how things transition in the 1980s coinciding with the Reagan administration in the United States, and the sort of gravitation towards, I guess, more "micro-militarist" approaches, as it were, rather than these more traditional kinds of dealing with things diplomatically and through international law. That is a fascinating aspect of things, and I had a question related to that. I guess I was curious—I mean, one thing that I did not see

as much of in your book was that you were looking more at case-studies from Latin America as well in some cases—and the reason I ask this is because that is sort of my area that I know more about—you mention, for instance, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the role of Cuba at that time, and then, of course, the fact that "Carlos the Jackal" himself, Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, was actually Venezuelan [despite] participating in these attacks in Europe, the Middle East, and so forth. So I was wondering, then—I was curious if you had any insights, perhaps, regarding the role that other Latin American actors or US policy toward Latin America may have played in affecting the development of "collaboration against terrorism" and then eventually "counterterrorism" over time? Because that is an interesting aspect in itself—for instance, Dr. Alan McPherson, who is the current director of CENFAD, [though] I am not sure if he was at the time that you were—

SZ: He came in as I was finishing my dissertation.

CV: Okay, yeah. That is roughly when I thought. But he wrote a book, I think, a couple of years ago in 2019—

SZ: – *Ghosts of Sheridan Circle* –

CV: Right. And that was examining the state-sponsored terrorism against Orlando Letelier, the car bombing in Washington DC that took place. And with Operation Condor going on at that time where there was this sort of overseas assassination of political dissidents and so forth by different South American military governments, and then also Cuban exile terrorism by the likes of Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles to match what the [Cuban state was] doing at this time with certain sponsorship of terrorism, [or] sheltering, at the very least, terror suspects in Cuba at this time. So, I was curious, I guess, perhaps what you had to say how that might have played a role, even though it was sort of on the periphery of the narrative in your book?

SZ: So, yeah, Latin America really shows up in the first chapter, sort of in the early chapter, that sets up how the officials think about terrorism, because early US policy against this sort of international terrorism is really shaped by policy towards Latin America, by policy towards Cuba and Latin American leftist groups. So those are the groups that the State Department is labelling as "terrorists." These are groups that have specifically leftist associations. So the US officials are more likely to think of leftist-associated groups as "terrorists" and use that label than they are to use it against right-associated groups, which is why Latin American actors disappear a little bit in the later parts of my chapter and parts of my book, because then people are talking about "terrorists" and what they mean is leftist-associated terrorists. But part of the initial US goal is to prevent hijackers from fleeing to Cuba and to prevent attacks on diplomats in Latin America. In the late '60s and early '70s, there is this slew of attacks on government officials in Latin America, and also businessmen and diplomats. There is US military attachés, US representatives, US ambassadors that are being kidnapped and sometimes killed. And so the very early US policy is to make sure that governments in Latin America have all the options that they can to be able to negotiate for the safe return of their own—of these US State Department representatives. So they are creating policy to protect themselves, basically, [as] the State Department. And so the idea is that if you create these extradition agreements, you can give the government the option to free prisoners or something like that, because if

they disappear and they are arrested later, you can get them back by extradition. And then Latin American governments are also, throughout the ’70s, really important allies in places like the United Nations, because—especially conservative Latin American governments that are doing things like Operation Condor, they have a vested interest in making sure that terrorism is declared a crime without any political context because that makes it easier for them to go after their own citizens. So, ironically, whenever Americans and Europeans are working within the United Nations to pass extradition agreements and make sure that there is no room for protections for political offenders. So Latin Americans are in lockstep with them, and they are saying “yeah, we have got your back on this.” So they form sort of a coherent voting bloc in the ’70s within the United Nations on that.

CV: Well, very interesting, and thank you for expanding more on the role of Latin Americans in your answer! Because that is an important point that definitely come across in your book in other cases. I mean, I do not know if this exact quote appears, but William Odom certainly is a figure [that appears] as one of your sources, his papers, and he was the former NSA head under Reagan and Brzezinski’s—Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former National Security Advisor under Carter, [Odom] was his military assistant before that. Anyway, he stated that from 1978-79, I believe, the Senate was trying to pass an Omnibus Antiterrorism Law against international terrorism, and in every version that they produced, the lawyers said that the United States would be in violation at that time, even though the bill was dealing with air piracy and things like that, which you would think would be a more straightforward matter. But I guess that is an interesting point in time because that is when you perhaps see things transitioning more towards a militarized approach and paradigm for dealing with things. Could you explain a bit how that process came into play, and why governments—national governments started to view a militarized approach as more ideal compared to the previous circumstances?

SZ: Yeah, of course. So in the United States, that is really closely related to the Reagan administration, to that sort of conservative surge in the late ’70s. This militarized approach is around in the ’70s, [and] the Israelis are very, very strongly for it. So they are, of course, using the military against what they consider Palestinian insurgents. They are using deterrence operations against their neighboring states, especially Lebanon. And so the Israelis throughout the ’70s are trying to convince the Americans to come on board with them, and the Americans really do not want to do so publicly. In the late ’70s, they are able to talk more to conservative Americans. What actually happens is Benjamin Netanyahu is a young political activist at this time, and his brother Jonathan Netanyahu is the only officer killed at Entebbe, in that spectacular 1976 rescue. And Benjamin Netanyahu starts this lobbying group called the Jonathan Institute, which reaches out, among other things—this is just an example that I was able to pin down really well—to a bunch of conservative Americans. What the Israelis are able to do is to connect their fear of terrorism to Cold War arguments. So what they are saying is, “oh, these Palestinians are not just these cosmopolitan terrorist actors; they are also receiving backing from the Soviet Union and from Eastern Bloc states.” Which there is some [evidence] for in this time – we do know that Palestinians are, for example, getting some weapons. But there is nothing like the huge support that these conservatives argue

is happening. Conservatives are arguing this is a way for the Soviets to actually influence the Cold War by deploying terrorism as a large-scale weapon against the West, and they are using it and breaking all sorts of laws. The idea is that the Soviets are masterminding all sorts of terrorist attacks around the world, which is not happening. The Soviets would love to, but the Soviets do not really want anything to do with a lot of terrorist groups. So it is only if you have *bona fide* leftist credentials that you are often getting Soviet support. But this is the sort of discourse on terrorism: the idea that there is a sort of network of terrorists, a "terror network," and it is a compelling one, it is a scary one. And so when Reagan comes into office, he brings with him a lot of people that adhere to this sort of idea. The top officials have it in their head that terrorism is this Cold War threat. It takes a long time for that to sort of translate into policy, because people in the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency that have been working on terrorism for years and years and years, they know that it is not necessarily the case, that this is a Soviet-directed Cold War threat. But slowly, very slowly, the Reagan administration starts building up, and then finally goes after a state sponsor of terrorists – Gaddafi in Libya, 1986, and that is sort of the turning point for when the United States engages its military against a sponsor of terrorism.

CV: Right. And your point about the Soviets, I mean, I think it reminds me of that probably, possibly apocryphal story of the Soviets—I think it was in one of Thomas Friedman's books—of Hezbollah supposedly kidnapping a Soviet diplomat or something of that nature, and then the Soviets in turn kidnapping Hezbollah militants, and sending body parts in the mail or something of that nature [editor's note: press accounts from newspapers such as the LA Times attest to four Soviet diplomats being kidnapped by Hezbollah in 1985, and facing retaliation from the KGB].

SZ: Yeah. I have heard about it. I do not know if it is true. The problem with the Soviets is that they were really, really good at suppressing any notion that they themselves were having terrorist problems, so I have a hard time getting at those kinds of sources.

CV: Were you able to consult the Mitrokhin Archives or anything of that nature? I did not notice.

SZ: I did not, because I was really looking at the United States and US-allied actors. So they sometimes talked to the Soviets, but the Soviets are far more inclined to be operating in support of the Global South position: the idea that terrorism is bad, but you cannot really resolve it without resolving the underlying political issues – for example, the Middle East conflict. They are far more likely to be supporting that kind of position than they are to be looking at terrorism as purely a criminal issue. So most of my sources are from the United States, from Germany, and from Great Britain as well.

CV: Right. And I did notice that you did have very impressive, multi-archival research looking at English-language sources, but also having the advantage of being German and that you could look at those sources as well. And I believe things from France as well, if I am not mistaken?

SZ: Yeah. I wanted to go to France, but that was the thing that I never quite managed to do.

CV: Okay.

SZ: But the Germans were really meticulous about keeping all of their correspondence with their European neighbors, so I got a little bit of a view into what the Dutch were doing, what the French were doing. Of course, it is through a filter – the Germans were grumbling about the French a lot, so there is a bias there, definitely, that I needed to be careful about.

CV: Sure, yeah. And I guess one other question of mine was obviously looking at this transition from—well, I guess, a first question would be that I thought the parts of your book that you were sort of just alluding to that dealt with how terrorism was politically-defined, and what the sort of political implications of—obviously, terrorist groups in many cases in the '70s wanted to present themselves as advancing a political cause and not principally as just violent criminals on the fringes of society, as it were. But the Global North nations themselves, on a state basis, they wanted to categorize them as criminals, in many cases, that were acting outside the law. And that was a fascinating point in the book. Could you perhaps elaborate more on, politically, how things were defined?

SZ: I was really inspired because I read, for my dissertation exam, Paul Chamberlin's book, *The Global Offensive*. So a lot of the violent actors in that era are defining themselves in that discourse of 1968, that discourse of national liberation. And the idea is that, in the '70s, that sort of momentum of national liberation movements and the momentum of decolonization slows down. So, in the '60s, you have countries like Algeria and Cuba that are becoming independent, where national liberation movements and revolutions are overthrowing governments. And so Palestinian extremists and Vietnamese insurgents – these sort of people really believe that they are going to be able to do the same thing. And there is a lot of supporters, especially in leftist milieus around the world, who are using that same sort of idea and ideology, and talking about the fact that colonialism is bad and that one needs to be supporting this liberation. So definition really matters, and the problem with "terrorism" is actually in the definition, is pinning it down. Most of the treaties that I look at in my study are really specific treaties against very individual offenses. So you have a treaty against hijacking. You have one against attacks on airport facilities. There is one against attacks on diplomats. These are able to pass because they are so specific. But the moment that you start trying to regulate "terrorism," the question of definition comes up, and the question is, is it a political offense and how do you define it? The United States introduces a convention draft in the United Nations, for example, after the Munich attack in 1972 – which is probably, if you say terrorism in the '70s, the first thing that most people will think about. And the problem with that draft is that the definition of "terrorism" is really vague. For instance, you have a list – you have hijacking as a terrorism attack, bombing as a terrorism attack, but then you also have any sort of violence for political purposes in which somebody is hurt. And that is very, very vague, and that is actually what stops that initiative in its tracks. It is because all of the countries that have recently become independent states – for example, Cuba and Algeria and a lot of their supporters in the United Nations – are saying, "Hey, wait! If we label all of these things as terrorism, then anything that national liberation movements do in the future, you are going to be able to label as terrorism, because you are using such a vague definition. So we cannot let this happen, because you are handing the opportunity to state like" – I think they talk

about Israel, they talk about South Africa, about Rhodesia – "to label national liberation movements as 'terrorists.'" So defining terrorism is what stops that entire initiative in its tracks, and that has stopped most other initiatives in the United Nations. I think since 9/11, there has been a further attempt in the UN to create a really big convention against terrorism, and they are still discussing it, because definition is the main problem. And then you have little things that are attached to it, especially to the political angle. For example, in the '70s, there is a really big discussion in this terrorism convention about if terrorism is just an "attack against people," or if it is an "attack against 'innocent' people." So all of the recently independent states, the Global South states, they want that word "innocent" in there, because then by definition, they could argue, for example, that a US military attaché who is helping to train officers in counterinsurgency is not "innocent." Whereas the Global North states are saying, "no, we cannot have that 'innocent' word in there, because then you are able to discriminate, and say 'oh, state officials are not innocent; they are valid targets.'" And at the same time, the Geneva Conventions are also being sort of renegotiated, the addendums to the Geneva Conventions are being negotiated. So that is all part of this really large conversation about how far can national liberation movements go, and are we going to treat them as political actors or not. That is a really big conversation, [but] I am getting off on a tangent. But the definition part is really, really difficult, and it is usually what halts most things in its tracks. So the way that Global North states work their way around it is by going after and regulating very precise types of attacks.

CV: Yeah. Well, that is a great explanation. Thank you for that. And then, I guess following from that, how terrorism is defined—I guess I am curious then, what were your thoughts on what other implications your book carries for how we should view and analyze the contemporary "War on Terror," post-2001, not least since the full-scale US involvement in the War in Afghanistan prompted by 9/11 has ended twenty years later? Despite focusing on this earlier period that ends in the mid-'80s, what does your book have to say for how things developed later down the road? Obviously, your book stops perhaps before—you were mentioning, obviously, Operation El Dorado Canyon against Qaddafi—and you end your book, I believe, right around when Reagan declared sort of a "war on terror" in approximately 1984?

SZ: Yeah, around that time. So when he starts advocating for more militarized measures is when I end. For one thing, the definition is the question. The problem if you declare a "war on terror" is, of course, what does that mean? And I think we have seen much more of a conversation recently about "what is terrorism?" Is it only this sort of Middle Eastern type of thing, and what happens when you label something as "terrorism," because it is automatically delegitimizing? And it is very difficult, because if you label somebody as a "terrorist"—I think this sort of idea comes from the '70s, and has sort of continued—the idea in the United States, often, is if you label someone as "terrorist," you do not have to think about their political goals, about their political aims, about the fact that they might be rational actors who are really going for specific aims. And oftentimes, terrorism is a deeply political thing. So, I think my book is trying to remind people a little bit that everyone has got a political agenda, and if you are just going after the crime itself, it is a very specific approach from the '70s and it does not necessarily work. But then, of course, solving the larger

problem is also not easy. It is like, "oh, maybe terrorism will stop if we solve the larger Middle East conflict" – yes, you just have to solve the Middle East conflict. And then there is also, of course, the legal conundrum angle, in that terrorists are not combatants. That is one of the things that I discussed in the '70s, is what legal status do terrorists have. The idea is, if you are extraditable, you are an ordinary criminal. We also saw in the "War on Terror" that, I think, [George W.] Bush called the terrorists illegal or illegitimate combatants, or something like that. And so the problem is, if you are deploying the military against someone but you are not giving them combatant status, then you get into all sorts of legal gray zones, which I think we saw in the "War on Terror" in really problematic manners. Like "how do you treat people like that [and] what sorts of rights do they have?" And so just being aware of what language you are using and how you are thinking about terrorism, I think is important, because we make so many assumptions, or at least a lot of people in the general public do. And I am hoping that my book can help make people aware that these assumptions are happening, because then you can maybe just open your mind and consider other options.

CV: Right. I mean, I really thought your writing was very accessible for, potentially, not just members in the academic community but also people in the general public as well. I commend you on that accomplishment.

SZ: That is quite a compliment. Thank you!

CV: And obviously, it brings to mind—in 2008, Seth Jones and Martin Libicki published a monograph for the RAND Corporation at that time, "How Terrorist Groups End." It was looking at from 1968, when your book begins, to 2006, obviously later than your book, but [it showed] that military force had only been responsible for ending terrorist groups in, I think, seven percent of the cases that they examined, compared to more typical anti-crime policing and intelligence techniques, integrating terrorist groups into the political process, or, in rare cases—ten percent of cases, I believe—it was because the terrorist groups, or what were considered terrorist groups, achieved an outright victory in the conflict. So, yeah, I mean I think your book sort of brings that study to mind, and examining the implications of what we are labeling as terrorism and what the most—depending on how we define it, what the most effective responses to it are. So I really appreciated that aspect of your book. And I also wanted to get into, perhaps, *The Washington Post* article that you wrote recently on May 27, right before your book was published. For viewers that want to look it up, that was entitled "The Swift Response to the Belarus Plane Hijacking Signals a Historic Shift." In that article, you were looking at the case of the Ryanair civilian plane that was grounded by Belarusian authorities under false pretenses earlier this year, and the European Union's response to the detention of Roman Protasevich, but more importantly, the grounding of a civilian airliner to basically arrest him in Belarus. And it seemed topical, of course, given the recent attention on Alexander Lukashenko's migrant policy, and the tension with Poland and the European Union. Could you go into perhaps a little more detail on your article and your reasons for reaching the conclusions that you did?

SZ: Sure. So, I was very surprised, because usually what happens—the main organization that is responsible for aviation regulations around the world is the International Civil Aviation Organization

(ICAO), which is a branch of the United Nations. People do not hear about it a lot, and things in the ICAO usually moves slowly. That is one of the main things that I saw in my own research as well. Once they started negotiating a convention on hijacking—the ICAO negotiates some of the earliest conventions that others then use, and sort of copy and paste the language into their own conventions. Things are slow. It takes a really long time to get everyone on board, and a lot of the things they do are completely on a voluntary basis. And I was shell-shocked at the fact that the European Union was acting so quickly, because international civil aviation is governed by bilateral treaties and by multilateral treaties – so if you want to do things, you have to talk to a lot of different people. So the fact that, suddenly, people were moving very quickly is something that is very unusual. The question is, then, are we going to see more of this in the future, and are we going to see more action against people who are maybe blatantly not regarding ICAO rules and standards.

CV: Well, very fascinating. And yeah, I definitely commend that to readers, and congratulations also on getting published in *The Washington Post*.

SZ: Thank you!

CV: But, yeah, I definitely thought that was an interesting article that brought up some more contemporary things that your book is germane to, despite focusing on this earlier period.

SZ: Yeah. Airline security is an interest of mine. I am currently trying to work on an article figuring that out, and I keep being drawn to it, especially when I am standing at the airport, thinking "oh, this again," and sort of seeing the history of how this develops is a side project of mine.

CV: Wonderful. Well, I look forward to potentially seeing that materialize into a new work of research.

SZ: Hopefully. We will see.

CV: And I guess that brings up an interesting point. I wonder, overall, what sort of contributions—we have been over this in various ways already, but just in general, how do you see your work as sort of enhancing or contributing to the historiography on these matters, or where would you like to hopefully see scholarship go based on your contributions?

SZ: I see myself as part of a conversation about the history of terrorism and counterterrorism, [about which] there is not necessarily a lot of historical research. There is a lot of political science research on terrorism; there is not a lot by historians, because, of course, historians are really aware of the fact that this is a highly politicized term, that it is used in different ways. So historians will write about insurgencies, they will write about wars, they will write about urban riots – they will talk about the same things, but they will not frame it the same way. What we have seen in the past five years, I would say, is that there is a group of historians that are starting to write about the history of terrorism and counterterrorism, and they are writing about the ways in which people in the past used those terms to frame their actions. So I see myself as joining that conversation, and making, maybe, the work of those scholars a little more accessible to the public, building a bridge, maybe, and saying these ideas about insurgency, about national liberations, about decolonization, about terrorism – they are all interlinked. And terrorism is one of

the ways in which people are talking about it, so by making terrorism and counterterrorism the central category of analysis—you have to be careful because, of course, this is the way people are talking about it, [but] that does not necessarily make it reality. But by showing that this is the way people are framing their thoughts and ideas, you bring all these bigger issues to a general audience, and getting people to think about the fact that these big picture, catchy slogans have really complex, nuanced backgrounds. And if I can do just a little bit for that, I am hoping it works. The way I was trying to work my book is I am just looking at bureaucrats who are sitting around a table and talking, so I have to put in "terrorist attacks" just to lure people in.

CV: Yeah. Right, and I definitely appreciate this project of bringing intellectual history, as it were, to bear on these topics that are typically in the purview of political science, particularly yourself as someone who was affiliated with CENFAD, and was formerly the Davis Fellow here. I guess that is a great opportunity to segue into that, because I did want to ask you as well about your experiences during your time as the Davis Fellow, and how you thought they might have contributed to your academic and professional career trajectory? And then also if you received any other CENFAD opportunities, and in any case, how do you feel that working with CENFAD may have benefitted your professional and research interests overall?

SZ: Yeah. I loved my time at CENFAD. It was amazing! And I also received several CENFAD research grants: I got the Wachman Award, the Votaw Award. There were a couple of things that I was able to do. So, at that time, I had—I need to make sure that I am dating this accurately—I was just putting together my project, and I did end up doing my dissertation in a way that is maybe not ideal, in that I saw a subject that was interesting and started researching it, and really did not know what the thesis would be coming out of it, which is not—I do not really recommend it to anyone. It worked out for me, but it could have gone the other way as well. So, for one thing, being the Davis Fellow allowed me to talk to a lot of people about my work, and to talk about other people we were inviting to the Center – for example, I was able to talk to Tim Naftali, who wrote one of the early studies on US counterterrorism and one of the only historical studies—there are not that many around, and I was able to bounce a lot of ideas off of him. He was very patient. So I was able to do that, and just talk to a lot of people. Also, just at CENFAD events, I was able to meet people who had sort of the same interests. I got to talk to Dr. McPherson about sort of the Latin American angle, and he later kindly agreed to be in book workshop for my book manuscript, so I was able to pick his brain about his ideas. So that was the one thing, just having that community of scholars was very, very helpful. And then, of course, the research awards allowed me to go places and do things that I otherwise might not have been able to do. So I was able to go abroad and spend a summer doing research. I went to Germany, and then later on, I went to the United Kingdom, but mostly I was in Germany. I looked at the federal archives there, I looked at the Foreign Office's archives, and CENFAD really gave me that support to look at those archives, and I also looked at a couple that I might not have been able to otherwise. So there is—in the 1970s, the United States had a pilot union, the Airline Pilot Association, so I went to Detroit and looked at their records. That was really interesting because it brought in a perspective that I really might not have had otherwise. And I went to a couple of other

places. So just being able to do that research was really good. I think one of my first publications was in *Strategic Visions* as well. So I had, I think—I do not even know, I think it might have been 2016 or 2017—I had a short piece. So that was also really good that they were willing to publish me.

CV: Well, very good. Was this an article or a book review?

SZ: Uh, I wrote book reviews at first, which was good for getting that practice in. And then I also had an article, a short article about the idea that national liberation ideology was coming in and at the same time, you had hijackings, and you were trying to develop anti-hijacking programs. So it was sort of the conglomeration of that.

CV: Well, now I would love to read that, having read your book and seen your other work, so thank you for bringing that up! So then, I guess I was wondering, perhaps more generally, what made you perhaps choose Temple University out of all the possible institutions you could have gone to—I mean, was it this focus that they had on diplomatic and military history relative to a lot of other institutions? How did that sort of inform your work later on?

SZ: Yeah, it was. I was applying from Germany at the time, so I was looking for schools that were particularly focused on diplomatic history, because that is what I was interested in, and military history. So, Temple—the idea of living in Philadelphia was very attractive to me—and then once I got there, I thought that the way that I was not just pushed into a diplomatic history quarter was great. I was able to talk to a lot of different professors about their sort of ideas, and to make sure that I was not just writing about diplomats doing diplomatic things or military officers doing their thing. I was able to draw a lot of connections. That was great. And while I was looking for my project, I was trying to play to my strengths and think, "okay, what sort of things can I do that I would be good at?" And since I am bilingual, I have access to the German archives much more easily than somebody who is not bilingual. So I figured, okay, I would like a project where I am able to use these different sources and different languages. And I was interested in the '70s. So then I started looking at records on terrorism, and I initially realized that Americans were talking about terrorism in very martial terms, but they were talking about it from the '80s forward, and Europeans were talking about it from the '70s onward in very law enforcement terms. So I thought, "okay, there is a really big difference here – let me dig a little bit further into that." And then I went down this rabbit-hole, and Dr. Immerman, my advisor, was great. He let me go all over the place, but he always made sure to keep me in line and say, "Remember, you need to focus. You are on one track. You need to write your dissertation." So there was a really good balance, I thought, at Temple of focusing the diplomatic history and the military history, but also being open to other things and getting that support that I needed.

CV: Well, wonderful. From my own experience, I would absolutely agree thus far. And I was wondering, then, did you have anything else that you wanted to add or contribute about your book or your work in general? Obviously, you alluded to where you are going with things next, but did you have anything else to add?

SZ: I am just—right now, I have been very busy. I get to develop a course on the history of terrorism that I am teaching next year, so it is interesting. I would always just say for anyone, I was very lucky, I was able to

research to my strengths and play to my strengths, and that has been so beneficial for my career. And what I really also enjoyed at Temple which I have not really brought up—well, only a little bit—is I was able to work in an interdisciplinary way, so I was a [Center for the Humanities at Temple ("CHAT")] associate fellow, one of the short-term fellows at the Center for the Humanities. So I was able to present my work to others who were not historians, and who really pushed me to make the work more accessible and to make it interesting. And I think if you have a subject that can be interdisciplinary, there are also so many more opportunities for you out there. Which was really helpful to me – being able to market myself as someone who was able to speak to political scientists and sociologists and language experts, that was very helpful for my career. So I think Temple does offer the opportunities for that. Both of the fellowships that I had were at interdisciplinary centers. So that was good thing. If one is able to present their research that way, it can be a really big boon.

CV: Yeah. I would love to engage with that more than I have thus far. And yeah, I think that is a really great point about the value of interdisciplinarity and how Temple University can facilitate that for history students and others.

SZ: Yes. Plus, also, CHAT has coffee.

CV: Yeah. That is always helpful!

SZ: I do not know if the quality has improved, but that hit of caffeine was very helpful many times throughout my time as a graduate student.

CV: Well, very good. And I appreciate—I guess this is probably a good place to draw our interview to a close, but I really appreciate you taking the time, Silke, Dr. Zoller, to present for our audience and introduce your book to our audience, as well as your other work and your time at Temple. So, thank you very much for agreeing to take the time out to do this!

SZ: Thank you! I was delighted at the opportunity!

CV: And I know it was a little bit spur of the moment, but I am glad we were able to do this!

SZ: Yeah, definitely!

CV: And that this will appear in the upcoming edition of *Strategic Visions*.

SZ: That will be exciting. I enjoy *Strategic Visions*!

CV: Perfect. Well, thank you very much, Silke—"Silk-ee," I should say!

Interview with Dr. Benjamin Talton



Casey VanSise: Hello, everyone. This is Casey VanSise. I am the current Thomas J. Davis Fellow at the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy (CENFAD) for the 2021-22 academic year, for those who do not know me yet. This video is being recorded on November 12, 2021. We are speaking today with Dr. Benjamin Talton, Professor of History at Temple University. To give a little overview of his background, Dr. Talton earned his doctorate at the University of Chicago, and also a Bachelor of Arts at Howard University. Before joining Temple's faculty, he was a Visiting Senior Lecturer and Scholar-in-Residence at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana, and an Assistant Professor of History at Hofstra University. He is the author of three books, including *In This Land of Plenty: Mickey Leland and Africa in American Politics*, published by Penn Press in 2019, University of Pennsylvania Press, and that [book] won the 2020 Wesley-Logan Prize and is the subject of our conversation today. So welcome, Dr. Talton.

Dr. Benjamin Talton: Thank you, Casey!

CV: Perfect. So I was wondering, I guess, firstly—I just kind of wanted to give our audience a bit of an overview about your book in general. So, sort of like the subject matter and what your main overall thesis is, and then in particular, just kind of introduce the figure of Mickey Leland to our audience and how he matters to your book, if that makes sense.

BT: Well, let me start by asking, how much time do I have? Because I could go on for about three hours introducing that part—

CV: I am aiming for about an hour. We can go a little over that if necessary.

BT: No. That is fine. So the book is about a congressman from Houston, Texas, Mickey Leland, but it is not just about him. I situate him as a way of telling a broader story about the afterlife or the jetstreams of "Black Power" and the Civil Rights movement as we move into the 1980s, and what some of these figures were doing. Some activists moved into organizing schools, some opened clinics, some became teachers, some people—Mickey Leland became a member of Congress. And what is significant about Mickey Leland is that he did not just move away from the movement. He brought that movement with him into Congress, first in the Texas state legislature in 1972, and he was there until '78, and then as a member of Congress from 1980 until 1989. And so part of the story that I am telling is what happens to some of these activists after the movement, and for him, he brings the

movement into Congress and also some of the issues that he was concerned with. But I also use him to tell the story of the last decade of the Cold War. I use him to talk about the anti-apartheid movement in the United States, and I also use him to talk about humanitarianism. Because these are all issues that he was involved in, and more. But also, he was one of the most outspoken members of Congress on issues of African affairs, and Caribbean affairs as well. This was a point in our history when Africa was very much in the news, in large part because of the anti-apartheid movement, but also because we have figures from the Civil Rights movement and the Black Power movement, very much internationally—very much invested in international issues: Vietnam, what is going on in Cuba, but also what is going on in Africa. And he brings us—that positionality, with him into Congress, continuing to raise issues like that. So he was a significant figure because he was—he did not stand alone, but he was unique in the ways that he approached this, [and] also because in this moment when apartheid dominates the ways in which we are engaging Africa—the United States during the 1980s—he does not want to just rest and say "we are dealing with apartheid in South Africa, and the ties that the US has to the apartheid—the white minority regime, the apartheid regime in South Africa." He also wanted to deal with issues of hunger. This is a decade that saw historic famines in the Sahel region of Africa, and also the Horn – Ethiopia and Somalia, what is now [South] Sudan. And so he had a very broad take on African affairs that really was instrumental in elevating African affairs within Congress. But also on the point of the Cold War, and dealing with hunger, and dealing with apartheid—one initiative that tied all these together for Mickey Leland – again, coming out of the Black Power movement and the Civil Rights movement – he was very much against this idea of dealing with international affairs through a Cold War lens. The Cold War is the way that the US was engaging the world in general, and specifically Africa. Anti-communism was the platform that the United States government [used to deal] with most African countries – whether they were anti-communist or not, the United States put them in a category of being either aligned with communism or not, [which] really drew along the lines of whether these countries were allied with US interests. And if they were not, they were seen as more tied to Eastern Bloc nations or to Cuba, or Marxists in some way. So Mickey Leland and some of his colleagues rejected this idea of anti-communism. They did not see communism as a threat. Some of them may have—some of them were Marxists, Mickey Leland was not. But communism was not an existential threat to the United States. Communism was not something that was really prevalent in terms of African regimes on the continent. And so, therefore, to deal with the continent through a Cold War lens, through anti-communism, was deleterious for US standing in the world, and also destructive to African nations. So he very much wanted to push the United States to engage countries that were left-leaning—well, let me rephrase that. At independence, there were no countries that were communist or Marxist, but by the time we get to the 1980s, obviously there were communist countries – Ethiopia being one of them, Angola being another one, Mozambique. And so Mickey Leland wanted the United States to engage with these countries, to say that political ideology should not matter – we should just respond to the needs, help them develop—in the case of Ethiopia, help them resolve this issue. And so Ethiopia is going to be our case-study – we have got to address this historic famine in Ethiopia. There was one in 1983, one in 1985, another one in 1987,

1989. And his idea was that Ethiopia is a Marxist country facing a food crisis. The United States has no diplomatic ties with it. Ronald Reagan is president. Ronald Reagan is really the most extreme in his use of anti-communism as foreign policy, [and] he has very little interest in Africa. And on the point of apartheid, [Reagan] is actually on the side of the white minority regime. One of the sayings about Reagan when he enters office in January 1981: "the only thing he knows about Africa is that he is on the side of the whites, right?" And so Mickey Leland and his colleagues helped put US foreign policy toward South Africa against apartheid, bringing a civil rights, Black Power position – really a Third World political position – into Congress, into the White House, and things shifted. So then the United States imposes these sanctions on South Africa. Reagan vetoes this, but they overturn the veto – this is the first time in history that—the first time in the period of the Cold War that the president had his veto overturned on foreign policy. But in Ethiopia, Mickey Leland really wants the United States to respond to this famine despite this Marxist regime to demonstrate that the United States can work with communist countries, and also that the United States, putting ideology aside, can resolve the problem of hunger. So finally, one thing I state distinguishes Mickey Leland is his death. He led seven delegations to Ethiopia. On the seventh, his plane entered cloud cover and crashed into a mountain, and he and his fourteen-member delegation died in that crash. And so he served in Congress from '80 to '89, and was this charismatic, dynamic figure who really helped shift the United States's approach to African affairs.

CV: Well, very good. Thank you so much for that very thorough yet contained summary! I really appreciated it. I think you did well with that—

BT: – Okay. Good. –

CV: —of describing your book, giving a general overview to our audience. And so I do definitely want to get into the sort of intellectual and policy diversity that emerged from this sort of outgrowth of the Civil Rights movement and the Black Power movement, as you say, and how that related to a lot of the transnational themes you are exploring. And I think—I guess a good way to get into that just from—initially, before we get into other questions—your book is part of the "Politics and Culture in Modern America" series. And to quote the editors of that series, from the statement that appears toward the beginning of your book, the series seeks to "analyze political and social change in the broadest dimensions from 1865 to the present, including ideas about the ways people have sought and wielded power in the public sphere and the language and institutions of politics at all levels—local, national, and transnational […] motivated by a desire to reverse the fragmentation of modern U.S. history and to encourage synthetic perspectives on social movements and the state, on gender, race, and labor, and on intellectual history and popular culture." And you were alluding to quite a bit of this in your overall summary of the book – basically how you are trying to sort of cross these different historical boundaries that previously were kind of confined and segregated among historians—that these sort of transnational, local, and national perspectives were not dealt with as synthetically or as systematically. Just in general, there was not this crossover between always examining, perhaps, African-American politics and what was going on in Africa, and relating that to Cold War themes as well. So I guess I was

wondering, could you describe some of the ways that your book seeks to expand intellectual frontiers consistent with the goals of the "Politics and Culture in Modern America" series?

BT: So, Casey, the thing is—this is an interesting question you pose, because—and it gets into the politics and practices of publishing. I love my editor at U. Penn Press, Bob Lockhart. He is amazing! Penn Press has been great. But I did not choose to be part of that series. I allowed my book to be included in that series, and in fact, I was not really thinking about the series to the extent that I have never read that description that you just described. And we can get into the ways in which academic books are written, edited, ultimately published. That being said, I do not mind being part of the series, but it was not the same. Usually, when you are part of a series, you go through the vetting process with the editors, and then the series editors will also go through it, or the series editors recruit your book—usually recruit the book to be part of the series. That is not the case. I know Thomas Sugrue, but he was not part of the editing and soliciting and writing evaluation process for the book. But your question still is a good one, and I think the themes of the series are excellent. I do think it is worth a conversation and thinking about. I have not had that question posed to me in that way, to think about the way that my book, let us say, pushes the frontiers of—what is the last part of that, intellectual?

CV: It was "… motivated by a desire to reverse the fragmentation of modern U.S. history and to encourage synthetic perspectives on social movements and the state, on gender, race, and labor, and on intellectual history and popular culture."

BT: Okay, very good. So one thing about me and my book is that I am not a historian of the United States, so I am coming at the US and Mickey Leland and what I am calling the "African life of black radicalism" in the 1980s, and really trying to situate this decade and make sense of what it really meant, the 1980s as a period—as a distinct historical period, not "post-anything," not a precursor to something, but the '80s as something worth reckoning with historically. But I am coming at it as someone trained in African history, as someone who is—most of my work, I am writing on Africa. And so that means that—it meant a lot of relearning US history, correcting preconceived notions that I had about Reagan, about the nature of anti-communism in the United States, about the US left, *et cetera*, and bringing my African—my "scholar of Africa hat" to US history, and marrying the two. But that also means, as someone trained in African history, we are—many of us are very concerned with non-state actors – typical of social historians, people on the ground—capturing the voices of those marginalized people, bringing the margins to the middle. And so what I have tried to do is not just write a biography, but use the format of a biography – use the individual – to tell, as I said in my stump, these broader histories plural. So histories of movements, histories of humanitarianism, histories of protest, histories of foreign relations and diplomacy, and also the history of black political figures. But also I wanted to tell a story—that is a very elite history, because Mickey Leland was a member of Congress, right? So I also wanted to get some voices on the ground. And so the ways in which I do that is, I travelled to Ethiopia. And part of the stories of the famines from the Western sense is that, on television, we are seeing feeding camps filled with seemingly helpless people, mostly mothers and

children. We are seeing foreign workers, usually whites, who are responding to this famine, right? We are seeing planes. And that is our story of the famine – that is what I am calling the "famine narrative." But it is—it is a true narrative in the sense that we are perceiving that and responding to that with donations to UNICEF, or politicians lobbying for a government response, or volunteer relief organizations responding. It is real, in a sense. But it is not the experience of Ethiopians. It was not the experience of most Ethiopians. Most Ethiopians responded to the food crisis in different ways, myriad ways – not just going and seeking help. Most were helping themselves, and the government was helping them as well. So I had to go there and I had to see the spaces where these feeding centers were. That is part of my method. I also had to see Ethiopians on the ground, and I do not speak the local language, so I could not bring that into the book. But I have read translations of writings, Ethiopian writings, on the food crisis, and I used poetry as well – poetry that talks about the experiences of farmers and how they are dealing with this crisis, and bringing that into the book – to say that there is this famine narrative in the West, but there is a very different famine experience in Ethiopia. So my method is always to think about—broader than just the events that happened, and the individuals and issues driving the events, but the experiences, right? How do we capture these experiences? How do we imagine what the places might have smelled like and looked like for these individuals? Even for Mickey Leland. He made seven delegations, the seventh was a deadly one, but the previous six, he was going to these feeding centers, and I wanted to capture what he might have seen, what he might have smelled, what the air might have felt like. Because that is an important part of that history. Also, in terms of intellectually—usually, we think of international relations as government-to-government, not showing the ways that individuals who are in and out of the government shape foreign policy, shape engagement between countries, in Ethiopia, in the Caribbean, in South Africa, as I write about. So it is not just government. Government is individuals, actors, people on the ground—individuals on the ground communicating with each other in common cause and solidarity, particularly in the case of South Africa. So part of the method is to get beyond just the sources that we can touch and read, to capture experiences. And also part of the method is to being people up from the margins, sort of the subaltern – combining subaltern history that we get from South Asian scholars historically with traditional international relations history, with diplomatic history. So we have the government level, but it is also on the ground. It is not easy. It takes a lot of rewrites. It takes a lot of critical thinking. But I think if we do it, and do it reasonably well, we get a full sense of the period and what it meant, and the possibilities that the people involved in these events foresaw.

CV: Well, very fascinating, and I am glad that you went into that, for myself and for our audience. I mean, as someone who is trying to embark on sort of a comparable project myself of trying to integrate, less, kind of—well, [having] high politics perspectives from foreign relations history, but also integrating—

BT: Yeah, the high politics – even that is sort of difficult to reconstruct, because what do you produce so many papers – this is pre-email. There was email, but it was not being used in that way. So you have so many documents from the '50s and '60s and '70s and '80s – what do you choose to leave out? Because you have to leave out something. And what do you choose to include? And

then that is difficult, and there is also the task of getting the voices on the ground and their experience – also very, very difficult, intellectually, to think about and imagine, and to synthesize. So it is a tough task, but I think if we do it—as I said, if we do it and do it reasonably well, it gives us a fuller, more robust picture of past events.

CV: Yeah, absolutely. And I guess I am wondering then—well, I guess maybe to get back into some of the specific components of your book—one of my questions that I posed earlier, or that I alluded to earlier – and that you alluded to earlier as well – was examining what are the affinities and differences in ideology, strategy, and approach between Mickey Leland and other African-American policymaking contemporaries – Ralph Bunche, Ron Dellums, Andrew Young are different people that come up in your book, for instance – but then also from the kind of civil society actors that were in the Civil Rights movement and were in the Black Power movement that perhaps did not want to engage in politics. What sort of—how did Mickey Leland taking things in a more policymaking direction affect the movement and maybe bring more people over to that perspective, and what merits did you see in the more civil society approaches? Not that they were not—not that you could always separate them, by any means.

BT: Sure, yeah. He was—so, I described him as unique. He was unique in his personality, in his drive, and just the diversity of issues that he was engaging. Which is not uncommon for members of Congress – they have signature issues that they hold over other issues. But just his relations with—his relations abroad [were] really unique. And I will get back to this sort of community, civil society engagement that you set up there. But, for example, he has this personal relationship with Mengistu Haile Mariam, who is the head of state of Ethiopia. He had a personal relationship with him, and he kind of had to, because he led these delegations over there, he wanted access. Meaning that, in particular, his Republican colleagues would criticize him for colluding with the communists and being soft on the communists, ignoring [Mariam's] human rights record. He had close ties with Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, he has this direct line. Again, there are ways to look at policy at a high level, and then we have mid-level – he is a mid-level actor with direct ties to individuals on the African continent. He had very close ties with Fidel Castro, and he made several trips to Cuba. He was one of the few members of Congress that Fidel Castro had a personal relationship with. He would speak to other members of Congress, he intervened particularly in issues surrounding Americans being arrested in Cuba and being released. But Mickey Leland had a personal relationship with him. So just these dynamic ties that he had abroad allowed him to engage in more foreign policy issues in a unique way. That is his unique characteristic, I think. But he really is pushing a tradition of black politics in America, and in that way, he is not so unique. And I liked him as a historical figure for that reason, because he is part of a legacy of African-Americans engaging Africa, African-Americans being in solidarity calls with African movements, whether it is apartheid in South Africa, or independence in Gold Coast (which becomes Ghana), independence in Kenya, the civil war in Algeria for independence against France. African-Americans were engaged in that, and Mickey Leland represents that legacy, even back to—if you read the African-American historic newspapers, this deep, deep, deep engagement with India and this valorization of Gandhi and his movement, based around whether his past nonviolent

civil disobedience would be a model for African-Americans. They are doing this—this is in the 1920s and 1930s, and after independence in the 1940s, African-Americans engaged with this. And again, not all African-Americans, but this is common in the press to see these stories. So he falls in this line. What is different is that in the 1950s, it enters Congress with the first group—the growing group of post-Reconstruction African-American members of Congress. That is different. So, in 1955, there are only three members of Congress: Dawson – I forgot where he was from, and I do not have my notes here; Powell from Harlem; and Charles Diggs from Michigan. And what I write about in the book is that Charles Diggs lays the model for what Leland and Dellums—you mentioned Dellums—and our own from Philadelphia, Congressman Bill Gray – who we now have our train station named after him, he is responsible for Temple University have their SEPTA station—but they in particular are, again, a small but radical, impactful group of African-Americans engaged in foreign affairs. What they are doing as members of the Congressional Black Caucus – this group of—this kind of collective of African-Americans who strategized together and voted as a bloc – they were deeply invested in foreign affairs. And I will tell you why – I will stretch back to Charles Diggs in 1955, and his caucus. And he realizes that he cannot gain traction on domestic issues that are important to African-Americans, because most of his colleagues are racist and they are not going to support issues that advance African-American causes. So he immediately pivots to foreign policy. And he also comes from an activist background, obviously, from the Midwest, so he is a union guy, and he brings that ethos with him into Congress, and he—but he begins to deeply engage Africa. At this point, all but just a few African territories are colonies, so he is pushing to raise Africa's profile in Congress, for the United States to deal with African territories and see them as legitimate, significant foreign policy issues, but in particular in South Africa, where there is white minority rule. So he brings that into Congress and is pushing it. Now, he does not have a whole lot of support, but he also does not have a whole lot of resistance to that. But what he does is he organizes delegations to African territories, he protests in Congress, he protests outside of Congress on issues in solidarity and in coalition with other activist organizations in the United States and abroad. And he uses the media in a very savvy way. He continues to push this, and as the numbers of African-Americans grow, so too does his influence, because he is able to bring these voices together. And in 1972, he brings them together in the Congressional Black Caucus. That is when the Congressional Black Caucus was formed, continuing this practice of focusing on foreign affairs primarily, but not ignoring domestic issues – protests in and out of Congress, leading delegations to Africa, elevating Africa's profile within Congress, and using the news media in a very, very savvy way. And this is Charles Diggs, and he continues this and holds Congress engaged in African affairs. He helped to found TransAfrica, which is an African-American foreign policy lobby. So he is—again, you have organizations outside of Congress, as well as inside of Congress. And he also is central to creating the "Free South Africa" movement, which really gains traction in the early years of the 1980s, and Dellums is central to that – Ron Dellums, who is a congressman from Oakland. And by the time we get to the '80s, now we have twenty-seven African-Americans in Congress, a robust Congressional Black Caucus. But of this small group, most are interested in housing issues and employment issues and issues of crime bills, *et cetera*,

but this small but impactful group – Dellums, Alan Wheat, Mickey Leland in particular—he is chair of the Congressional Black Caucus from 1985-86 – are raising South Africa's profile, as I said at the outset. But the point is just about your question and his relations with these other people, where he stands. It was very clear that African-Americans in the 1960s could not just gain their rights and have their equality recognized and advance their interests just through protest organizations, and just through legal—lawsuits and all of that stuff, they cannot rely on the Supreme Court, and they cannot rely on the federal government. They had to use electoral politics as well. And so it is not as if there were these silos of African-American activism and engagement with political issues. They are in common cause. So many of the people who are schoolteachers, many of the people who are union organizers, they need the activists, they need the lawyers, right? And they also need the elected officials. So he was very, very close with many different figures – not Bunche so much, Bunche pre-dated him, but he is in the legacy of Bunche, kind of in a different way. Because Bunche represents the UN. He worked at the UN, he has to speak for the UN. Mickey Leland spoke for his constituents. That is the power of being within—being a member of Congress. And what I am saying is unique about this group that he was a part of as well, and gets into these other issues that I raise, is that he and Dellums, Gray to a slightly lesser extent, they saw themselves as not just representing their constituents, not just representing the United States, but they represented the Global South. They were trying to speak to people from the Caribbean, speak to African nations, and bring them into Congress. So [they were] very much global actors, and that is what is different about elected officials today, African-American elected officials – they do not have—most of them do not have that same internationalist mindset, and for many reasons that we can get into. But I hope that speaks to the thrust of your question there.

CV: Yeah, definitely. Thank you for that! And I guess maybe now it might be an opportune time to pivot into the more African side of things, and looking at the geopolitics of food aid that you examine. And I was going to mention that one recent CENFAD guest speaker who spoke on comparable subjects of disaster relief was Dr. Julia Irwin. She noted that at different times, such as under the Kennedy administration in 1963—she was looking at the case-studies of Haiti and Cuba. And the United States was actually more eager to provide relief, ironically enough, to communist and adversarial states, because they perceived that they could curry favor with the populace and embarrass the governments of those countries. And then in some anti-communist states, they were more reluctant to provide aid. And I guess I was wondering, based on that, could you outline whether you saw similar or different attitudes informing the approaches of US policymakers in different administrations and at different times that you examine in your book? And then how did Leland's own approach, [that being] "evaluating African issues on their merits," as you put it, "rather than with a Cold War litmus test," – you say that in the third chapter – fit into those dynamics? So, for instance, in what ways was it kind of an outgrowth of earlier approaches – Leland's kind of approach to food relief and disaster aid in general – and in what ways were his emphases distinctive, like bringing this energy of the Congressional Black Caucus to the geopolitics of food aid?

BT: So there is a lot in that question. There is some good stuff. I would argue that

Leland represents the standard American response to humanitarian crises, as conceived in the 1960s. It gained steam in ’67-’70 with the Biafra War and the resulting famine. If you have the resources and you respond—and you really see a growth of it, actually, in the aftermath of the Biafra War. It is really where humanitarian relief as we saw it in the ’80s took shape outside of—around the Nigerian civil war. And also his ideas around human rights as conceived in the ’60s and ’70s – he held onto some of these ideas. Now the change is Reagan. Reagan was very, very different. He fundamentally believed that we should not provide any assistance to communist countries, because that is aiding and abetting communism, and Reagan stood fundamentally in opposition to that position. But Reagan held the belief that our food aid should either be to support our allies or, as you say, sway those who may not be totally aligned with our foreign policy position, but not those that are opposed to us. In his eyes, communists are opposed to us, so if a communist country has a crisis, the United States should not respond to that. And so, again, Mickey Leland is—it is a good question that you ask, because it allows me to frame out what I was saying before. So he is not only bringing his Black Power and Civil Rights sensibilities and ethos with him into Congress, but he is also truer to the tradition of humanitarianism into the 1980s. But also he is a useful figure to look into humanitarianism, the way that he is engaging in a conversation with the international community – the Red Cross, *Médecins Sans Frontières*, others like Catholic relief charities. Because we are at a point when humanitarianism does—humanitarian intervention does mean relief, and it does mean bringing food aid and supplies. What we see – he died in ’89 – what we see toward the end of the decade and into the ’90s [is] that humanitarian interventions become military. And humanitarian agencies grow to such a scale that there is no oversight, and there is no accountability. So he could not have foreseen that – I believe that he would not have predicted that humanitarian intervention would be tied to a military intervention. And I doubt he would have predicted—well, he might have seen the rumblings of it. Just how the grand scale of humanitarian relief organizations—they are very large, and there is no oversight, and if there is a disaster or a crisis, they come in, and they are not accountable to anybody. And their record is not that great. Now, that is not me saying that I do not think that they should come in when there is a crisis – in the short-term, people need food. But what happens is that, as we have seen in many parts of the world, conflicts are prolonged because combatants do not need to worry about civilians because the NGOs are going to do that. Heads of state that are engaged in civil crises do not have to worry about civilians because NGOs are going to do that. Thus, the crisis is prolonged, [because] they do not have to deal with the casualties on the ground – civilian casualties on the ground. So he stands at an important inflection point in the idea of humanitarianism. I suggest that he is more of a traditionalist in terms of humanitarianism. And we see toward the end of his life and into the next decade the ways in which there is a radical change around shifting perspective on what “humanitarianism” is, what it means to “intervene,” and then what are the structures of these organizations, and what is the oversight, and who is accountable—who are they accountable to?

CV: Well, great. And that is kind of a fascinating segway into another question of mine. And it is interesting that, as you point out, he is at this inflection point of, I think, human rights becoming elaborated as an

idea initially in the 1970s, but then sort of dovetailing with Reagan's neoconservatism later on, and you saw sort of antecedents of that even in the Carter era with, perhaps, [Zbigniew] Brzezinski's kind of more militarized approach, standing kind of awkwardly alongside Cyrus Vance's diplomatic engagement approach. And those sort of merging in the Reagan administration with the neoconservatives and trying to militarize humanitarian intervention, [which] emerged in the 1990s more strongly, and then particularly into the twenty-first century. And I guess I was curious, were there a lot of ways that you saw Leland's ideas on Leland's part, but that the elaboration of transnational human rights norms wedded to certain intellectual/ideological programs – this kind of "end of history," Fukuyama—or like Samuel Moyn's thesis on human rights in the 1990s, as they developed post-1970s – do you see that he had kind of a lasting legacy on those human rights norms, whether he intended it or not, and what are the kind of lasting ramifications, even into the present era, that you see of Mickey Leland?

BT: Yeah. I have to think about that. In some ways, it is quite the opposite in terms of legacy. You know, his goal, of course, is a free South Africa. His goal is to end homelessness – he famously slept on the streets of DC to draw attention to it, the experience of sleeping on urban streets. He wanted to use Ethiopia as an example of how the United States had the capacity to end hunger in the world. He had a lot of issues – anti-nuclear proliferation, he wanted land rights for Native Americans, universal healthcare. He had a lot of issues that he wanted. None of them have become part of our political reality. None of them have come to fruition. And so, as an example, I think my project and the book that resulted from it—it is an example of the importance of writing on not just people who succeeded in achieving their goals, but people whose efforts to achieve those goals is also worth looking at, and also people who did not achieve their goals – failed efforts. I would not say Mickey Leland's was a failed effort, but he did not—his goals did not materialize. And so those are worth exploring as well – to look at this moment [and] what stood in his way of achieving those goals, and how he came up with those goals in the first place. So I think the world we live in, in terms of—and, again, as you know Casey, I am a historian, so I am not going to pontificate on our current political climate too much, because I have the skills for that when we are not being recorded. But on human rights, on humanitarianism, his—we do not see the fruits of his labor. I think we have gone in a completely different direction. But just in general, I think with his political legacy, we see the consequences of our political system where, in his day, it was not that expensive to run for Congress. And in his day, African-Americans were able to rise up the ranks of the Democratic Party. So they were not busy jockeying for seniority, and they were not caught up on the phone trying to raise money. And what you can achieve when you have that time, right? Also, the importance of people being in common cause with groups outside of Congress – that was very important for him. So I think a legacy of his is that we still have that – this type of congressperson – despite the obstacles. And I think of Alexandria Ocasio Cortez very much in the spirit of Mickey Leland, because she uses the media in a very savvy way – leading a delegation to the wall—to the border wall to raise awareness of that. She is an activist in Congress and an activist outside of Congress. I do not want to draw the parallels too closely, but we see that it is still possible. So it is the spirit that Dellums—

that Diggs created in the 1950s, and carried into the 1960s. It has not totally dissipated – it is still there. And there are still some people who have that activist energy who really want to create people-centered change in this country. It is still there. It is not as robust as it was, and the obstacles are greater, but I think he still has a legacy there. But unfortunately – just to add an editorial to it – in terms of humanitarianism and human rights, they have been weaponized in ways that we do not see the legacy of Leland, but we more see the legacy of Ronald Reagan, and just how consequential his presidency was in his approach to domestic and foreign affairs.

CV: Yeah. I guess I do not want to get too stuck in current affairs, and if you do not feel equipped to answer this question, we can move on to more historical questions – which I would like to as well – but I guess I was curious how is your book relevant to somewhat contemporary happenings? For instance, what might it have to say about the current crisis in Ethiopia that we are seeing regarding the Tigray region and its environs right now?

BT: Yeah. I do not feel—apart from it addressing issues in Ethiopia, and my time doing research in the north, which is where the [Tigray People's Liberation Front] was based, and they are apparently making their way south to Addis Ababa and last I heard they were about 150 miles outside the capital, if you believe the reports – I have been told by some of my Ethiopian colleagues that there is a lot of misinformation coming from both sides, so it is very difficult to really see what is going on there. But in terms of reading the book to help understand those issues, only in that I do address the Ethiopian student movement, and there is some carryover of that legacy into—of course, there was the dismantling of the [Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front], the governing party, and that is really the rub that the TPLF was excluded from that. And now the TPLF was very—Tigrayans are a very large part of – I do not want to get too much into the weeds – but a very large of the military. So that is kind of—not to do a disservice to the background of the conflict, but what I write about is that in the 1950s and '60s, Ethiopia had a robust student movement. And one of the issues that they were grappling with was how Ethiopia can include these different nationalities, these different ethnic groups, into a federated state. And it was never really resolved. It was addressed, but not resolved. So what we are seeing now is that "nationalities question" coming back again – where is Tigray compared to Amhara compared to Oromo. And many of the students active in the student movement of the 1960s and 1970s are [editor's note: indecipherable] of events today. So to that extent, I do address the origins of it, but I would not in any way claim to be an expert or a scholar of Ethiopian history. I think my—is my internet okay? Is it freezing up?

CV: So far, I have been able to hear you, and your image is coming through.

BT: Okay. Because I got a message saying that my internet was unstable. But other than that, I think it does not really address this crisis *per se*. But one issue is that Mickey Leland—I am writing about a figure who is not very well-known today in the United States outside of Houston, Texas, where he is from, and Washington DC, where many of his colleagues – former colleagues – still live. But he is very well-known in Ethiopia. He is very well-known in Ethiopia! You do not have to do any background—even for young people, they know Mickey Leland, because he was coming from this capitalist country, he was one of the good Americans,

right? And when he came to Ethiopia, he engaged with the people. The government-run Ethiopian Herald wrote approvingly of Mickey Leland. There are streets named after him after he died. There were—there are schools named after him. And it is common to find young people named Mickey – I am not saying that it is like Jacob or a common name here, but it is a name and people know it. And so his legacy lives on in Ethiopia, as an example. But he is also an idea—he embodies the possibility of reconciliation between the United States and Ethiopia. This goes back into a little history – it is not the present day – but Ethiopia and the United States today have diplomatic ties, and they are considered allies, regional allies. Ethiopia famously assisted—the United States and Ethiopia worked together in so-called "anti-terrorism initiatives" in the region, including Somalia, to detrimental effect – we will go into that. But the turning point in this relationship is when Mickey Leland went missing, because he was friends with the Ethiopian government and he is also friends with George H.W. Bush, the first Bush president – he was president in '89 when Mickey Leland's plane was initially missing. And then there was a joint US-Ethiopian military operation to find Mickey Leland's plane. People do not know this – I write about it in the book: it is the largest military search for a US civilian in the history of this country. And the search went on for about six days, and Ethiopian diplomats are communicating with their American counterparts. And Mengistu and George Bush are communicating directly to each other, as I write about in the book. So one of Mickey Leland's goals, of course, was to restore diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and the United States, going back to this idea that he did not believe that anti-communism should form the basis of foreign policy, that the Cold War is an illegitimate way of dealing with foreign affairs. But in this moment of crisis, searching for Mickey Leland's plane – ultimately finding his plane – the US and Ethiopia began to communicate again. Now, it is not that that event alone did this. There was the beginnings—Mickey Leland was beginning to have some success in bringing Ethiopia and the United States into conversation. Herman Cohen, who was in the Bush administration at the time, was beginning to reach out to his Ethiopian counterparts. But after Mickey Leland's death, the doors of communication were wide open. In fact, in 1991, the US helped broker peace talks in the civil war in Ethiopia, leading to the end of the Mengistu regime. So there is some relevance to what is going on today, but it is more rooted—I take it as, this is a historical moment that allows us to look back at past events, and some sense of where things are going. But the particular crisis that we are confronting today – there is a connection, but it is not particularly insightful for understanding the nature of it. I am saying my book is not a guide to understanding [that].

CV: Yeah. Well, that makes sense, and I still appreciate you providing insight into what your book perhaps can tell us about what is going on in Ethiopia right now. Also, I think that shows—what you just kind of elaborated shows that Mickey Leland did have, I guess, an impact on US-Ethiopian relations, and with the breakdown of the Cold War. Obviously, we cannot credit the whole kind of rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the communist world and the anti-communist world, at the end of the 1980s—we cannot credit that solely to Mickey Leland, obviously, but that he did have this sort of instrumental role in facilitating rapprochement.

BT: Oh, yeah! Yeah. And it is important to recognize that, when we talk about the end of the Cold War—and what do people say, they say "when the Berlin Wall fell." It continued in Africa for much longer than that. It continued on – this communism/anti-communism [struggle], and its consequences. We say the Cold War made domestic and regional issues in Africa international, because East and West are getting involved, and Cuba as well. But Mickey Leland is an example – as you say, it is not him alone, but he is an example of these individuals and organizations that were doing the hard work of reconciliation throughout the Cold War. He comes up until then [indecipherable], but he also does things like travel to the Soviet Union. There is a food crisis in Mozambique as a consequence of the civil war there, and he goes to the Soviet Union and he works out a plan where the Soviet Union and the United States would join together – this was in, I want to say, '87. It might have been later than that – '87, '88. I cannot remember if it was Bush or Reagan who was doing it – it might have been Reagan, because it was around '87. He goes to the Soviet Union, and he works out a plan where the Soviet Union and the United States would join together in helping to broker a peace deal in the Mozambican civil war between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO, but also to bring humanitarian assistance to Mozambique. The plan involved Soviet planes bringing US food aid to Mozambique – somewhat symbolic, but meaningful. The Soviet Union signed off on it, Gorbachev signed off on it and supported the deal. The US initially supported the deal, but then later on said, "well, we would prefer if it is Angola," so that it made it fall apart. But the point is that he is an example of the ways in which the Cold War is going to end in Africa – not just through government-to-government relations, but also through the hard work of lower-level government officials and people on the ground. And it was this long, tenacious slog to bring about this rapprochement.

CV: Well, very good. And then, I guess, stemming from that—I mean, since we mentioned the anti-apartheid struggle earlier in passing, but perhaps have gone more into detail on Ethiopia and Leland's work there. But I guess, since the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa and the global anti-apartheid solidarity with the [African National Congress] and so on—with that being a major theme in your book as well, I guess maybe we could touch more on how did Leland's activism on African and Third World issues overall basically foment—well, not foment, but had an important contribution to the global anti-apartheid struggle and popularizing that—

BT: – Oh, absolutely! –

CV: —not only in the United States, but everywhere.

BT: Yeah. Oh, absolutely, absolutely! South Africa was not the only significant African affairs issue for the United States, but it was the largest, in part because South Africa at the time had the largest economy, the US was South Africa's most significant trading partner at the time – it previously had been Britain, but then it became the United States. And there is this long history of partnership. And, not discounting the Reagan administration's perspective – and previous administrations' perspective—sorry, South Africa had an anti-communist at the center of its legal system. Anything that was against apartheid or against the white minority regime was considered "communism," but coupled with that is this narrative that the white minority regime pushed that "if we fall, and we become a

black-ruled nation, it is going to open the door to communists – and there is no way that the communists will not come in here and take over." So the United States was an important partner to South Africa. But South Africa was important to the African-American movement and the pan-Africanist world because it was the last stronghold for white minority rule. So if we begin with—I talked about Diggs, who was very anti-imperialist [and] anti-colonialist when he enters Congress, and pushes for the end of colonial rule in Africa. But then, as that European footprint shrinks, it comes down to southern Africa. So once we get to '75, it is only in southern Africa, where we have foreign colonialism and white minority regimes in southern Africa. So southern Africa becomes this focus, and this is useful, because it is easy to get a consensus. South Africa is an easy consensus, because we know who the "good guys" are and we know who the "bad guys" are – we know the white minority regime is "bad" and those opposing it [are] "good," so it is easier to rally around that. And so it was a useful organizing tool. When we get to the 1980s, then we have this global anti-apartheid movement, and the United States government is slowly coming around to that. And the Congressional Black Caucus is at the heart of that, and TransAfrica and the "Free South Africa" movement, but Mickey Leland is the chair of the Congressional Black Caucus in the 1980s – in '85 and '86. This is when, finally, after decades of trying to get sanctions on South Africa, a sanctions bill comes up in Congress. Mickey Leland is the chair, and it passes. I described, earlier, Reagan's response to that. Mickey Leland wanted a similar movement for hunger and for Ethiopia, to get a global response to it – grassroots, government, [and] NGOs together, focusing on Ethiopia. A little more complicated, right? You are not going to get the same kind of consensus on the issue. There is not the same history of engaging food crises. Many people saw South Africa as parallel to the [US] Civil Rights movement, so that was the history. So he was not able to get the same sort of attraction, but it is because so many people were focusing on South Africa that he – as is true to most congresspeople – wanted a signature issue, so he chose Ethiopia as his issue. That is going to be his issue, and he is going to bring others to it, [but] never quite got there. But South Africa is also important because it shows you how complicated foreign policy issues are for consensus. Now African-Americans were rock-solid against apartheid, and of course rock-solid against colonialism in general. But once apartheid ends in 1994, when we have democratic elections, foreign policy issues in Africa become a little more complicated for those on the continent and for those abroad. So at the same time we have South Africa, we also have Rwanda – the genocide in Rwanda. TransAfrica, African-American elected officials, activists on the ground, [and] grassroots actors did not respond to Rwanda like they responded to apartheid in South Africa, because it is more complicated – we do not know who are the "good guys" and who are the "bad guys." Similarly, Leland is trying to get attention for Ethiopia in the midst of a civil war, so Mengistu and the TPLF and the EPLF – who are these people? We do not know who the "good guys" are and who are the "bad guys." The crisis in Darfur is similar – it is hard to grapple with. So with race and racism at the center of affairs, it is easier to grapple with the issues, similar to the United States and communism, right? "Communists" – we do not like you, "anti-communists" – we like you. Absent communism, absent the Cold War, foreign policy becomes complicated, and it is difficult to engage. And so we see this kind of unraveling of a consensus on foreign policy within and among African-

American elected officials. In similar ways, we see the unraveling of solidarity on foreign policy issues after the fall of the Soviet Union—well, it did not really fall, but the ending of the Soviet Union, beginning with Gorbachev. And so we do not see the same consensus, and we see that today, because foreign policy in Africa is more complicated. In fact, they are not engaging Africa—actually, they are engaging Africa. African-American elected officials are engaging Africa, but it is not getting the same traction and there is not the same consensus. There is not the same enthusiasm for it as there was when they were battling colonialism and white minority rule. So it is a very, very different terrain. And so his place—again, [it was] a major inflection point, a major turning point for capturing the 1980s as this last moment when African-Americans—really, I say that African-Americans were at their most powerful, because they had this consensus on foreign policy, and unique influence on foreign policy toward the [African] continent and toward the Caribbean as well. When Reagan invaded Grenada in 1984, I believe it was – '83, '84?

CV: '83, I think.

BT: It is when African-American officials respond to that, and say "Reagan should be impeached for violating international law by invading Grenada." So it is not the same sort of consensus that we have that they had then – what we have now. This was a major turning point in the 1980s – I think it was the last moments of this solidarity.

CV: Well, very good. And we are probably getting toward the end of what we want to—I guess, the duration of our conversation. But, yeah, this is obviously very topical, to discuss Leland's role in the anti-apartheid struggle as the end of these opportunities for solidarity on geopolitical issues that became more complex in the aftermath of that. You know, with the death just yesterday of the controversial South African apartheid-era president—

BT and CV (in unison): – F.W. de Klerk –

CV: —who won the Nobel Peace Prize.

BT: I am interested in seeing how people write about him. I always say that, if you want good things to be said about you no matter how you lived your life, go ahead and die. Suddenly, people have nice things to say about you. So I am resisting reading what they say about de Klerk – who won the Nobel Peace Prize with Mandela and was very instrumental in bringing a conclusion to the apartheid era, but was also the head of a white minority regime in a majority black country in which the violation of human rights was fundamental to sustaining that regime. So, let us see what people say about him.

CV: And I guess to follow up from that—I mean, did you have anything else that we have not covered about the book that you think is kind of an important component or thing to add to the conversation, or what is your overall intervention in the historiography and what would you like to see emerge from it?

BT: Well, to answer that question, I think I will leave it to the reviewers. I am pleased that I have had some very nice reviews. People have engaged the book seriously. I hope people read it, not just for the sake of reading the book, but I am really invested in this idea of looking at the 1980s as this historical moment. And I think my book is part of that project. It was an important moment, and it has significance for our politics now, not just in the US but globally.

I hope people learn from the strategy of combining government and elected officials – their voices – with those people on the ground, using the strategy of a multiplicity of voices to give meaning and form and substance to a particular time period. And also just to appreciate that writing a book is very hard. It takes a lot of time, particularly when you are teaching and have a family. And just, when you are writing, you rewrite and you rewrite and you edit and you rewrite – it is a process, and tenacity pays off. And I think my book is a testament to it, the benefits of tenacity, and being humble and being able to have some teflon when people criticize you, and it is worth it in the end.

CV: Well, great. And I certainly appreciated your work – it was a very engaging book in my estimation.

BT: Thank you!

CV: And, yeah, I hope more people will read it. And I would just like to thank you, Dr. Talton, for speaking to CENFAD for the upcoming issue of *Strategic Visions*, and I look forward to seeing your interview published – hopefully in print form, as well as including this video, because I would like to write up a written transcript. But, yeah, thank you so much for joining us today!

BT: Okay. Thank you, Casey!

Bradley, Mark Philip, and Mary L. Dudziak, eds. *Making the Forever War: Marilyn B. Young on the Culture and Politics of American Militarism*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2021.

Marilyn B. Young was a preeminent historian of American foreign relations. Perhaps best known for *The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990* (1991), Young wrote and taught widely on war and international history. In *Making the Forever War: Marilyn B. Young on the Culture and Politics of American Militarism,* Mark Philip Bradley and Mary L. Dudziak assemble, for the first time, Young's scholarship on the broad nature of American militarism. Drawing from various writings and previously unpublished manuscripts, Bradley and Dudziak present a collection that testifies to the astonishing breadth and depth of Young's career. Her influence on contemporary American history is undeniable, and her strong voice of dissent and activist spirit shine through in her writing. A lifelong feminist and leftist who was unafraid to question accepted orthodoxies, Young pushed to interrogate the role of war in American society and the way it has become simultaneously invisible and ubiquitous.

Making the Forever War is divided into two parts. The first, "The Age of Global Power," catalogues Young's essays on twentieth-century American wars in Asia and the growth of the American empire. The second part, "Unlimited War, Limited Memory," chronicles Young's reflections on the normalization of ongoing conflicts in the Middle East in American public consciousness. Taken together, this collection presents a historian preoccupied with the meaning of war and a career spent grappling with militarism. The final essay in the collection is her SHAFR Presidential Lecture, aptly titled "'I Was Thinking, As I

Often Do These Days, of War'" (2011), in which she reflects: "I find that I have spent most of my life as a teacher and scholar thinking and writing about war. … Initially, I wrote about all of these as if war and peace were discrete: prewar, war, peace, or postwar. Over time, this progression of wars has looked to me less like a progression than a continuation: as if between one war and the next, the country was on hold. The shadow of war, as Michael Sherry called it fifteen years ago, seems not to be a shadow but entirely substantial: the substance of American history" (187). This volume speaks to the enduring importance of history and the politics of memory because it is in remembering that the meaning of war is created, recreated, and applied to subsequent conflicts.

Young's thoughtful analysis of American wars asks us to consider what war means, not just tactical or strategic imperatives. "There seem to be only two kinds of war the United States can fight" writes Young, "World War II and Vietnam" (165). World War II is the obvious symbol of a heroic and moral war, and yet even in the proselytising, there is a strategic forgetting of the role of the Soviets and other Allies in winning the war, and America's own culpability in atrocities. This heroic image was constructed even as it was being fought through military censorship of correspondence from soldiers and reporters. The brutality and senselessness of battle is obscured in the telling of war stories, and upon returning home veterans, "surrendered their war to the one civilians told them they had fought" (29). Vietnam, in contrast, had the unique combination of mass public attention (and outrage), veterans unwilling to relinquish their experiences and an embarrassing defeat for America. Through these reflections, as well as her analyses of other conflicts, Young articulated the way these wars are presented to the public. For

Young, "Vietnam Syndrome" no longer exists in the public sphere but is instead endemic in the government: "Vietnam, by negative example, had taught the civil and military branches of the government how to market a war as well as how to fight one" (165).

If there is one shortcoming, it is the repetitiveness of some of the essays which can be somewhat distracting and interrupt the reading experience. Young often returned not only to the same events, but to the same sources and quotations. In any other collection, this would feel completely redundant, but in this volume, repetition becomes a powerful tool for realizing the inner workings of a brilliant historical mind. At multiple points, Young recounts an American diplomat's speculations regarding the lessons to be learned from the war in Vietnam ("they will be whatever makes us think well of ourselves, so that our sleep will be untroubled"). She first uses this quotation as the introduction to "The Big Sleep," an essay published in *Red Badges of Courage: Wars and Conflicts in American Culture* (1998); it reappears in "The Age of Global Power," which was first published in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (2002) and acts as the introduction to this volume. In the repeated use of this quotation we are able to trace the ways in which Young's arguments changed over the years. The 1998 essay ends: "... I would like to think that many Americans have not been willing, or able, this time, to go back to sleep" (136), but by 2002, she made no such reassurances and instead spoke in present tense of the "need to keep in mind the reality of American hegemony and its dominant self absorbed culture" (34). Which is not to say that Young was a pessimist. Rather, she constantly called on historians to be critical and engaged. Through this repetition, we see her mulling ideas and allowing her analysis to evolve.

Making the Forever War is an excellent introduction to Young's work and stands as a testament to her career. It is required reading for anyone interested in the history of America's ongoing military actions around the world. Young's legacy is also a call to action for historians to decenter America's imperial self image, to make war visible, and to interrogate systems of power. The collection ends with her summation of the historian's craft: "It probably will not do for historians to howl or cry but it is certainly our work to speak and write so that a time of war not be mistaken for peacetime, nor waging war for making peace" (200).

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Johnson Lee, David. *The Ends of Modernization: Nicaragua and the United States in the Cold War Era.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021. xi + 254 pp., $54.95.

In *The Ends of Modernization: Nicaragua and the United States in the Cold War Era*, David Johnson Lee has complicated historical understandings of modernization theory and its impact on Central American political culture in the late-twentieth century. By exploring the Nicaraguan socioeconomic conditions and the 1972 earthquake that levelled Managua, Lee explains that modernization theory and foreign influence "created the grounds for contestation that led Nicaraguans to challenge US power in their country and beyond" (3). As a result, US intervention and modernization's socioeconomic failings brought about the Nicaraguan socialist revolution of 1979, which continues to influence the relationship between these two countries.

Lee analyzes the disparity experienced by peasants who populated rural Nicaragua, especially those who lived near the capital city of Managua. Economic stratification within the country appears in the lived experience of Nicaraguans. The 1972 earthquake left the city in a state of disrepair and created a humanitarian crisis. Thereafter, the United States attempted to modernize Managua by reimagining the city as a decentralized economic landscape akin to an American metropolis. Lee argues that the new organization of the city dissolved preexisting meeting places integral to social, cultural, and national identity, stating that "Managua was not becoming decentralized, but de-centered" (64). While these individuals served as inspiration for populist revolution against the Somoza regime, their political activism and identity was rooted in

an unlikely location: conservative elites who felt they were losing control of the country to Somoza's cronyism.

Elites attempted to give voice to the Nicaraguan masses they believed were being left behind by the influence of US cultural and economic forces. By shifting the narrative to these parties, Lee exposes the autonomy and self-determination experienced by Nicaraguan upper classes, and how that contrasted the socially-determined existence of many poor citizens. By increasing the profile of Nicaraguan national identity and employing cultural exceptionalist arguments, elites mobilized those at the bottom of Nicaraguan society to wrest control from the US technocratic influence. Lee states that "their efforts would bring about the 1979 Nicaraguan revolution and center a revived Cold War in Managua, where the dissonance between the promise and reality of modernization led to revolt against the new city and the geopolitical order that brought it about" (43). This revolution was embodied in the formation of the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN), otherwise known as the Sandinistas. It was named for national hero Augusto Cesar Sandino, who led Nicaraguans to resist US occupation in the early-twentieth century.

As the Sandinistas successfully installed a socialist government, their national status was immediately thrown into jeopardy by the US reaction. The crux of Lee's argument is that, in attempting to maintain control over the governance and economic structure of Nicaragua, the United States shifted its foreign aid priorities, illustrating that US hegemonic influence was not irresistible. The Nicaraguan people demonstrated that, by asserting their agency and capturing a renewed sense of national self-determination, they could cause even the mightiest giants to change course. Daniel Ortega rose from military ranks to lead the

country through its revolutionary phase, much to the dismay of US officials. Yet causing the United States to change course had unintended consequences that would reverberate throughout Central America.

This act of defiance brought the United States back to more direct intervention. Though US intelligence agencies were no longer legally permitted to cause regime change through assassination or other explicit means, the United States began to alter its methods of distributing financial aid.[1] For instance, Lee points to the fact that "Ronald Reagan in turn laid out the beginnings of what would become a global counterrevolution against the attempts of nonaligned and social democratic nations to reconfigure the structures of global trade and finance" (113). Consequently, the United States began funding a paramilitary group opposed to the Sandinistas: the Contras. Coupled with international economic sanctions, the US hoped to use its outsized economic influence to overwhelm the Nicaraguans on multiple fronts.

Ultimately, Lee points to a consensus that "[d]espite their differences, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary agreed that national identity – inscribed on the land itself – was scarred by decades of conflict over the meaning of modernity" (147). Irreconcilable differences between extremists in each political wing led to a fizzling of the tensions that brought the Sandinistas to power. This softened the political climate. Democratic elections were held, and revolution and counterrevolution both seemed to come to an end. The book ends with a look at the recapitulation of Nicaragua towards the socialist order that failed in the 1980s. Lee alludes to the "pink wave" that swept through Latin America in

[1] The US Congress placed strict limits on the active role that US intelligence agencies could play in regime changes following the findings of the Church Committee (1975) and the Pike Committee (1975). Findings from these investigations led to legislature that restricted the funding and ability of US intelligence to participate in forcible regime change.

the early-2000s, and the return of an Ortega presidency.

A Temple University graduate, Lee is primarily a historian of Latin America, whose research encompasses multiple archives located both within the United States and Nicaragua, as well as several others from Central America and even Europe. One interesting accomplishment is present on the cover of the book, where Nicaragua is given precedence in the subtitle over the United States. This is a welcome surprise that grants an increased degree of agency for the Nicaraguan people in the context of the Cold War. It goes hand-in-hand with his attempt to reclaim Nicaraguan autonomy in their attempts at national self-determination. One criticism of the book, however, is the lack of attention given to women and their role in the Nicaraguan revolution.

Historians of Latin America, US foreign relations, the Cold War, and economic development will gain the most from reading this book, as it complicates many issues that are currently at the forefront of discussion in these fields. This includes self-determination, pervasive US influence in the late-twentieth century, and unintended consequences of historicized modernization concepts. Lee's book shows scholars that there is a wealth of analytical benefit in the relationship between the United States and Nicaragua.

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