Interview with Eric J. Perinovic

Casey VanSise: Hello, everyone. This is Casey VanSise, current Thomas J. Davis Fellow at the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy (CENFAD), and I am serving during the 2021-22 academic year for those who have not already met me or know me. This video was recorded on November 10, 2021. And we are speaking today with Eric J. Perinovic [initially mispronounced as "Purr-in-oh-vick"]. Am I pronouncing that correctly?

Eric J. Perinovic: Uh, "perry-no-vick." Ellis Island is very phonetic!

CV: Wonderful! And as you can tell, this is my first time actually getting to meet Eric, virtually or physically – in this case, virtually. So, yeah, that is why I was asking for the clarification on your surname. But, yeah, so he is a history doctoral candidate—he is currently a history doctoral candidate at Temple University, and himself a former Davis Fellow for CENFAD from the 2017-18 academic year. So I would like to welcome him today!

EP: Thank you so much! It is great to be here.

CV: Perfect. And I was wondering then—I guess maybe to get started, I was wondering if you could perhaps describe for our audience just a bit about your academic background? And we can go from there.

EP: Yeah. So, I am a PhD candidate at Temple. I have been enrolled originally in 2015, so I am approaching the terminal stages of my dissertation right now – I am going to defend this winter. Prior to coming to Temple, I was—I earned my Masters degree at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, and before that, I was a double-major in History and German at Ohio State.

CV: Wow, very good. Thank you for describing that to our viewers! So I guess since you mentioned that you are currently working on your dissertation, I guess I would love to hear more about your research interests and your current work. For instance, I understand that you are in the later stages right now of your dissertation work, because you are in the later stages of being a history doctoral candidate. So could you describe perhaps for our audience both your overall research interests just generally, and then your current dissertation topic in particular? And just like what is the thesis of your dissertation, and what is the subject matter that you are covering, if that makes sense?

EP: Yeah. So I say I like to "wear a lot of hats" as a historian. I am a Germanist, a Europeanist, a post-war historian, military, diplomatic – unfortunately getting more toward economic stuff lately, which I never thought that I would get into. But it is a fascinating interchange. I just have never been a numbers person. But it—so I, at my core, am a post-war historian of modern Germany. So my dissertation topic examines how the Federal Republic of Germany, so the post-war West German state, essentially employed the purchasing of advanced licensed production contracts for advanced weapons systems – in my case, the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, which is this really crazy-to-look-at fighter-craft that just looks like a needle with very short and stumpy wings. But the West Germans bought it – they were the largest operator of the Starfighter. And, famously from an operational military perspective, it was a disaster. In the first five years they flew it, there were, like, over 100 training accidents in the first—yeah, for a variety of reasons. But I look at the Starfighter from kind of a flipped-over perspective as kind of a long-term success, because West Germany was not really buying the Starfighter for its overt military capabilities. I mean, it does – the Starfighter serves a lot of—they tried to use it as kind of—they forced this highly, highly specialized aircraft into this very sort-of "jack of all trades" role that it was not designed for. And bought it for a significant reason, because it can deliver tactical nuclear weapons. But, really, they bought it because it served as a great means of elevating its leadership status in NATO, which is what I look at. It was for a strategic purpose, [indecipherable] purpose to take what had been, you know, a state that had just re-armed – that had previously been a fascist state that had been demilitarized – and this was the means by which it could achieve a leadership role. And so, between 1960, when they acquire the Starfighter, and 1965, the West Germans go from having no capability whatsoever in designing and building an advanced military aircraft to being the locus for kind of what becomes the pan-European multinational nation sector. So, in a lot of ways, this explanation of the Starfighter – of the NATO consortiums they build and the [indecipherable] aircraft that they build – is sort of an origin story for Airbus and BAE and a lot of these European multinational kind of defense companies. But it really has not been looked at terribly much, because the Starfighter—people especially in Germany, but also frequently in the United States, get bogged down with just seeing, you know, a really problematic aircraft to fly and operate.

CV: Yeah. Well, that is fascinating that you are looking at that, and the early West German contributions to NATO aircraft—and, yeah, that sounds like fascinating subject matter to explore. And, certainly, I am not familiar with it. So, yeah, I am looking forward to seeing when your dissertation comes out. And, yeah, I think that gets into something that is fascinating that I have seen in a lot of your extant research work, and just your extant academic career and your career in general thus far. I mean, you are very interested in this sort of intersection between what insights can we get from academic history, but then also—what insights do we gain from academic history that we can apply towards public policy from looking at past case-studies, such as the one you are investigating for your dissertation. So I guess my next question that would follow from that is what motivated you to get into this topic, or how do you see your present dissertation work as an outgrowth of what you have done thus far in your academic career?

EP: Yeah. That is a great question. So, like I said, my Masters degree was actually International Security and Relations. I focused mostly on kind of the post-war security order. My MA thesis examined the NATO-Russia Council while that was still a thing – that was kind of like a marker of progress between some of these erstwhile rivals – viewing this—like, trying to view the efficacy of it as a policy forum to see if there had actually been progress over important issues. And at the time, I was looking at from '97 to 2012, so of course, within two years, my Masters thesis definitely was kind of blown up by Crimea and everything. But after my Masters degree, I worked in Washington DC as a research analyst at a consulting company. And I—even though I was kind of doing much more international trade, international—I mean, hence my kind of shock that I am now doing a lot of economic stuff in my research, because I was doing a lot of trade and economic analysis, and it was just not my thing. But I kept falling back less on my IR scholarship toolkit, and more on the history major one that I had cultivated as an undergrad. And I kind of—history has always been my first academic love. I have always—you know, ever since I went to the public library, when I first picked up—you know, found the history section, and read a translation of *The Iliad* – which is going to sound horrible. But, yeah, that was like my first "man, this is really cool!" But that really showed me how much the recent past just continues to reverberate today, and how much we are just sort of shackled to things that have happened, especially since 1945, but really in the past century – and there is some change now since, you know, the end of the long nineteenth century. And I—over the course of working in this position, sort of doing kind of my own kind of—I had research projects and topics that I was interested in. You know, I have spoken German – I took German in high school and college, so I was kind of leaning more toward post-war Germany. It is a place that I have lived in. I am interested in Germany. And so I kind of settled on this topic of examining the West German Air Force, because I have—I come from something of an Air Force family, and I have always been interested in aircraft. And I kind of had this realization that this branch of the military—in that any branches of the military after the war was dominated by a lot of people who had served in the Nazi-era *Wehrmacht*, the West German Air Force is fascinating to me, because you would take essentially this air force that was predicated entirely on supporting *blitzkrieg*, supporting this very offensive—what would become a form of warfare defined by conquest, human rights violations, and genocide. And then you are asking these people who have thrived in that environment, turn around and say, "here is a German rump state – you have to protect it." And so I was fascinated by this paradigm shift, like going from hyper-aggressive warfare to "okay, we have to try to prevent another apocalypse from coming upon this country." And so I was really interested, initially, in kind of who these people were, and all of that. And so, at the time, I was researching certain PhD programs, like doing some very—just kind of testing the waters, cold-calling some professors, getting a feel for, like, what it takes to apply for a PhD. And sort of stumbled on Temple. Dr. Lockenour, who is my advisor, was unfortunately on leave at that point – he was at the Air Force Academy teaching for a year or two. And so I was admitted for a year and deferred a year, because he was not there, and I had nobody to work with. But he was really interested in my topic. His—you know, he is also really into aircraft, even though that is not his kind of research focus, by any means. And so we really hit it off!

And ever since—you know, between my first and second years, he helped work to get me a research grant from the [Temple] College of Liberal Arts to get me to Germany for a very quick six-week preliminary dive into the archives there, so I would have an idea of what I was getting myself into. And that archival trip was really foundational, because it completely shifted what I was looking at entirely. I was doing this very "grab bag" [approach] of just kind of like anything that I could find that was pertinent to the post-war period. And the thing that kept coming up over and over again was the Starfighter, which was not something I was interested in. I knew it mostly as—I spent a lot of time as a kid at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base where my grandpa had served. And it was at the gate guard there. And I remember just being a kid thinking "that is a weird-looking airplane." But I kept coming back to this aircraft, because it became the primary locus of everything in the post-war period, especially beginning in the late 1950s, when Lockheed is courting the West German state really heavily, all the way up through the '70s, when the Starfighter program is kind of entering its maturity – it is being used—the full spectrum of lessons learned, good and bad, are being used to inform how West Germany wants to manage itself as an international plane-maker in aviation. And so I had to come back to it, and I took very detailed notes. I came back, [and] I had all these ideas in my head on how I was going to tackle this topic, which was giant and amorphous. And in my third year of my PhD, I applied for and got a Fulbright, and then spent eight months in archives in Germany. I spent two weeks at NATO, which was really cool. And, yeah, ever since then, it has just been a lot of writing. I also had the privilege of serving as a Guggenheim Fellow at the Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian in DC, which was a really awesome experience. I never in my life had been around so many aviation historians before, and it was just a very—it was just a really positive environment. I never—like, I had been so used to giving the thirty second elevator pitch of my dissertation, and these people were demanding, like, a twenty minute one, which was exhausting that first week – just going over this over and over again. But, yeah, then unfortunately COVID happened halfway through that, so I had to finish it out at home. But as far as the kind of intersection of policy and history, that is really what I have been fascinated by the most. I came into this program sort of—definitely as a person who did not do the R1 as my "end-all, be-all" career track. I believe historians have a really awesome methodological skillset that we all-too-frequently do not employ on anything other than our own work, or in a traditional university environment. And so I kind of angled my track at Temple in a lot of ways beyond Temple. I have worked with a Fulbright and Guggenheim. I have worked at the RAND Corporation for the last couple of years as a research analyst. Which I am happy to talk about too. But for me, my ideal career path right now would be working as a historian either with the federal government or with a policy center or a think-tank – something that really tries to grapple with the recent past, articulate it, and extrapolate how that impacts contemporary events, how policymakers deal with the past. Or how they try to, for better or for worse—try to articulate a new trajectory away from or in line with things that have gone before. So we can talk about the RAND stuff as well?

CV: Yeah, I would love you to—yeah, that was one of my questions!

EP: Sure. So I have worked twice now as a summer associate at the RAND Corporation, which is a large think-tank based primarily in Santa Monica, California, but I worked out of the DC office. They have offices in Santa Monica, DC, Pittsburgh, and Boston. So I have worked there for two different summers, and I have worked as an adjunct as well in the in-between times, but mostly I have done projects for the Department of Defense, a few for the service branches, and then one for the Office of the Secretary of Defense itself. But essentially working as a historian – in a lot of cases in very multidisciplinary teams, which has been a really cool, awesome experience, because it is a chance to not only apply history in a very sort of tangible and practical sense of, you know, "here is what you have done before," and I offer sort of analysis and critique on courses of action that somebody very important could take, based on what has gone on in the past. But also in meshing that with various different methodologies that are not historical in the slightest. [For] my first project, I was the only one doing historical analysis. You know, I had a bunch of people who were not—there was a team of about seven or eight people, and we had mathematicians, we had mechanical engineers, people who do a lot of organizational and personal management kinds of extrapolation and analysis. And so it was a really fascinating experience to sit in on these team meetings and say, "well, this is what I have been up to," and then listen to what they have been talking about. They talk about "how do we mesh things?" Like, "how do you take what I am looking at," such as things that are happening in, say, the 1940s, and then you mesh that with a mathematical breakdown of how often spare parts are needed at an Air Force base somewhere. And it is like, at first, it seems really esoteric, and "can you really put these things together in the same room?" But that was kind of the beauty of working there—is that "yes, you can and you should and you do," because these methodologies are all deeply important to each other. And even though we all come from very different places – from different scholarly or methodological backgrounds – we are all working toward a common purpose within this report. And so it was just a very constructive environment, and everybody was very supportive. It was also a challenge, though, because we only had so much space for our own stuff, and so a lot of the issue was—that at meetings we would tackle was "well, okay – how do we mesh all of this in a very clear and concise manner?" And I remember thinking that my initial project at RAND, I spent the whole summer and I wrote some sixty-some odd pages, and none of them got used. So you had to kind of get past that "sunk cost" fallacy of "I put so much work into this!" And you would be like, "well, you know, sometimes brevity really is what we are striving for here." So it was very much the polar opposite in a lot of ways of what the academic historic experience is like. You know, more is more a lot of times, when really, less is more.

CV: Yeah. Well, that makes total sense. And I guess—obviously, I see some parallels between yourself and sort of my own academic trajectory. Not that I have gotten nearly as technical as you have, but just inasmuch as I started out with an interest in history as well as an undergrad, and even before that. And, you know, eventually added kind of an IR component to that mid-way through my undergrad, and into getting a Masters [degree] at the University of Denver as well in International Studies. So I definitely see some parallels there. And I guess one thing is, I have struggled myself to apply a lot of—like incorporating a lot of quantitative stuff into my purview of research abilities. So I guess

I was curious, not just for people like myself but just, in general, historians, what are your thoughts on how would you encourage them, or perhaps move them towards kind of assimilating more of a quantitative skillset? What advantages do you see in that even for people who might not initially think that is something that they want to do in their [history] careers?

EP: Yeah. I mean, I am not doing super quant-heavy stuff. This is nowhere near social history, so I am going to preface that right away.

CV: Okay.

EP: But I would say, as somebody who did not enjoy taking math classes all through school [and] who never saw the application of math in my life, numbers in a lot of cases are very concisely-packaged little bits of information that you can draw a lot of qualitative analysis from even without having to do a ton of quantitative analysis. So in my case, a lot of the quantitative stuff that I look at is predicated on logistics. It is whether the logistics of the German Air Force in the 1960s or the US Air Force in the 2020s—it is a matter of looking at numbers, and not letting them just be numbers, but using them as sort of a jumping point for analysis, for contextualization, for finding within that a sort of fallible human element of "okay, what does this number really say?" Because, you know, even if you are looking at things like spare parts or whatever, there is still a human element there. You can look at the person that is building them, installing them, shipping them – you know, people get tired, people get bored, people do not inspect things super-thoroughly sometimes. So it is just one of those things where you have to—numbers on their own do not tell a very great story for me. But I think they are an integral component to a lot of analysis, even within history. It should not be—it is not for everyone to be like "yeah, a number must be the undergirding foundation of all analysis." You know, it is not. I mean, qualitative analysis is qualitative analysis for a reason. We are trying to look at the human element – trying to examine things that are oftentimes intangible. You know, you cannot really quantify a lot of—and, of course, that leads to that argument of "is history a [humanities subject] or a social science?" Oh, boy! Anyway, that is just one of those things where numbers have utility, but they are not everything. So, for me, they are something that can greatly inform analysis, and they are a way to convey concise information without having to maybe—without having to get really elaborative on certain things. Like, sometimes, it might be just like doing a table or a chart. That is a really concise and effective way to convey information that two or three paragraphs would not do quite as well. And on the flip-side, sometimes doing a long, written-out, qualitative analysis of what this number means provides you with much more context than just a table or a chart. So it is sort of a symbiotic relationship that, for me, always feels like a sort of case-study based approach – a "how am I going to look at it [and] how am I going to use it" sort of thing.

CV: Yeah. Well, that is great. And I appreciate your insights on that. Obviously, just in general, the people that are sort of more comfortable in a qualitative environment can still gain utility from using more quantitative methodology as well. Or even if that is only sort of a minor, peripheral part of one's studies, that is great to know that can be very useful for people engaged in more qualitative projects as well. I guess pivoting back to the historiography and looking at your dissertation subject, I

was curious – where do you see—obviously, having just done my fifty book exam [written comprehensive exam] a month and a half ago, these books are sort of fresh in my mind – so that is why these titles are coming to mind – but looking at, for instance, Robert Citino's work [e.g., *The German Way of War*] or Isabel Hull's work [e.g., *Absolute Destruction*] on Germany, do you see—where do you see your dissertation making an intervention in that historiography of Germany in a post-war moment? Because I recall when I was reading at least one of those works – perhaps more—I recall that one aspect of things that are neglected – and understandably so – is the post-World War II period of Germany when it was within NATO, in the Cold War and moving into the twenty-first century as well. What continuities [were there] from early German history, and do you see, perhaps, your project making an intervention there as well?

EP: Yeah. So, first—sorry, my dog is circling my leg.

CV: No worries.

EP: But, first, congratulations on finishing the exam! That is definitely a stress test I do not want to run into again. I was on the "old school" comprehensive exams, because I was a Europeanist. And so I did not do a fifty book exam. I just had 200-some odd books in three different fields that I got grilled on. So, you know, it is something that I hope to never repeat. But I would say I like to think of myself as a Trans-Atlanticist, because my project, while it deals overtly with modern Germany, also is sort of a story of the United States in a lot of ways. And it is reflective of a moment of time in which the United States is sort of grappling with what it means to be a hegemonic power in Europe in the late 1950s. It is part of—like, politically-speaking, Germany in the form of the Adenauer government, and then the Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss – he is a major figure in the whole Starfighter thing, for better or for worse—you know, there is a whole lot of scandal attached to Franz Josef Strauss and the Starfighter—but they are sort of making a very calculated political move in light of the Eisenhower administration's decision to sort of step back – take a half-step back – from Europe, as far as putting a bunch of conventional American forces on the continent. And instead putting more responsibility on European partners to provide the conventional and tactical and nuclear defense for the continent. And so, in that case, my work examines the Starfighter not only from that perspective – in which the Germans are sort of actively manipulating the system – but also it is a moment of time in which the United States is trying to figure out—as kind of that initial, headlong rush of the Cold War arms race ends, the United States is trying to figure out "what do we do with some of these aircraft we have purchased and funded?" So in the Starfighter's case, Lockheed nearly goes bankrupt on the Starfighter. It is like the third of several major financial catastrophes that the company suffers. They had the misfortune of unveiling two airliners that were prop-powered in the jet age. And the US government did not like the Starfighter – it was, kind of—it was one of those aircraft that Lockheed had actively designed it based on feedback from these Korean War-era air pilots, and the Air Force is like, "no, we do not want this aircraft – it is way too small, it is way too limited in what it can do. Sure, it is cool to look at, and it pushes a lot of envelopes, and it is very technologically-advanced and everything, but, you know, we like big, heavy airplanes that can do lots of things." And so the US government is looking at Europe not only as a sort of the logical writer of its own common defense,

but also as a very, very fertile market for American arms exports. And so this is how the US government effectively saves Lockheed then at that time – they say, "look, we are going to help you – you are going to sell the Starfighter to NATO." And so the government does this public-private partnership with Lockheed to essentially sell the Starfighter to NATO. There is a lot of buzz about it. Multiple European countries—because the West Germans have just re-armed, mostly with kind of obsolescent stuff. And so most—several European countries including Belgium, the Netherlands, [and] Italy have all indicated that, whatever the Germans buy, they are going to buy too, and kind of piggyback on the common NATO thing. Which is what the Germans grapple onto, and this is when they really sort of view NATO as a means of mobilizing their political, economic, and security leadership on the continent again. But I guess in a very circuitous way what I am trying to say is, I feel like it makes interventions in a couple of different historiographies. It is definitely—I am trying really hard to not have it be an operational military history, because I feel that narrative is pretty well-documented, especially the first years of the Starfighter program – which are characterized by a lot of what I will charitably call incompetence on the part of the German Air Force. It is an aircraft that is far too advanced for its abilities – they do not meet even basic needs for the aircraft program to operate in a safe fashion, including things like having covered spaces to work on them and store them, or having enough people who are capable of knowing how to fix them, or runways that they do not just slip and slide off of, or trained German pilots to fly in northern Europe being in Arizona. But I digress. So I try really hard to kind of—like, the operational military component is definitely in the background in a lot of this, but really, it is an analysis of West German policy, both economic and political, in the post-war period. And in a lot of ways, the Starfighter program is sort of viewed as this "silver bullet" solution for the West German aviation sector, which is effectively defunct in 1950, but by 1960, it is really ramped up and rolling again. And so, in that way, it is sort of a hard one to peg, because it feels—and this is like what I was saying earlier, when I felt that it was so giant and amorphous when I was in Germany. It just felt like the Starfighter touched on everything. There is a social history of the Starfighter—or, sorry, a cultural history of the Starfighter. It really comes to dominate the German press, because its crashes are so high-profile. And especially when it comes out that Lockheed may or may not have bribed West German officials to buy it, it becomes this driving force of American skepticism that really dovetails with that 1968 moment in Europe of, like, "what are we doing? Why are we essentially within the American orbit like this?" So it makes a lot of interventions in that way. But I mostly try to angle it toward NATO. NATO is like the crux of a lot of this. Beyond the economic stimulus, because it provides—they are very up front with the whole thing, because they are like "the Starfighter is step three of a four-step plan to get the West German aviation sector from 'we can maybe repair old engines that we bought from the Americans' to 'we can design and build our own aircraft' – our own highly-advanced kind of aircraft – by 1965." But that also dovetails thoroughly with NATO – you cannot talk about the German military in the post-war period, and not discuss NATO. They are strictly linked. The *Bundeswehr* only exists because there is the whole debate in the post-war period about "how do we re-arm Germany?" And it winds up being through NATO as the means of being kind of this multinational—essentially, "this is how we are going to

ensure the Germans do not ever become aggressive again is to get them into bed with NATO – we can always have operational leverage over it that we would not otherwise have." And so, in that way, I really try to frame it within that narrative of "this is very much West Germany embracing the multinational system after the war." And at least in the security realm, which is dovetailed very closely to both the policy and economic realms, to NATO – which does have some carryover to what will become a version of the European Union eventually. But mostly focused on the CDU governments in Germany, like the Adenauer government and its follow-on governments until Willy Brandt in the late '60s, [which] really view NATO as a mechanism by which West Germany can have a normalized political leadership role in the continent in this very touchy security environment.

CV: Well, very fascinating stuff. And I guess that is kind of a good segway into what I think will be my final question for this interview. I mean, obviously, your work is—one major kind of thing that CENFAD does, the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, is this sort of—a lot of the fellowships – for instance, the Jeffrey Bower Endowed Research Fellowship – are kind of devoted to historians wanting to look at kind of technology-related issues and how that contributes to even cultural histories. For instance, Ethan Cohen, the inaugural Immerman Fellow at CENFAD—his work—I interviewed him in a Q&A as well recently, and that will be featured in the December edition of *Strategic Visions*. But his work is looking at, very similarly, the impact of—the introduction of aviation into Spanish politics and Moroccan politics during the interwar period preceding the Spanish civil war and, of course, World War II. And so, I mean—obviously, technology is this sort of very important historical consideration that CENFAD likes to promote. I guess, then, I was curious – how did your time as Davis Fellow contribute to your academic and professional career? And I understand that you were also a recipient of the Jeffrey Bower Endowed Research Fellowship from CENFAD, and that was in 2018 – the 2018-19 academic year. How did you feel that those CENFAD opportunities have benefitted your professional and research interests? And did you receive any other CENFAD funding that I missed?

EP: No. Just the Davis, and then the Bower. Yeah, no. The Bower, I would say, directly funded my NATO trip, which I am eternally grateful for, because I do not know how I would have—I mean, Brussels is a little expensive – especially [because] NATO is nowhere near the center of Brussels. It is way out by the airport, and there is nowhere to stay. So having that extra money definitely made it possible for that research trip to take place, so I am very, very grateful for that, because the NATO documentation is really key to a lot of my analysis. But the Davis Fellowship, I will say, I really enjoyed it. I miss it a lot of times – even beyond the office, because the office has one of the best views in the department, hands down! But the Davis Fellowship was a really—it was a really unique opportunity to meet a bunch of scholars who maybe just do not [editor's note: indecipherable] from the traditional ideas of what "force and diplomacy" mean. But their work demonstrates how these very diverse intersections occur, right? So it just kind of opened my eyes to the breadth and depth of what can be categorized as those things. When I first entered Temple, I thought "oh, CENFAD – that totally must be about war and policy. That makes total sense!" But in a lot of cases, it was studies about social movements or economic policy or what do borders mean and how they impact a whole

slew of issues. And so CENFAD, in a lot of ways, really opened my eyes to the diversity of academic scholarship that is conducted in these realms, and what can be very broadly construed as "force and diplomacy." It was just—it was a really great experience. I learned a lot of various management skills working as the Davis Fellow. I was Dr. McPherson's first Davis Fellow. So it was a bit of a learning curve for the two of us to try to figure out the job together. But I think we had a—I think it was a really successful year. And I think we definitely—we had a really good colloquium series. *Strategic Visions* migrated to kind of an online platform, and it started the spring before I had done it, but we really moved it over in the fall and spring of my year. And it—I do not know, it was just a—I look back on it fondly. It was definitely—it was very different. It was so different from TA'ing or teaching or doing anything else. I actually just got a lot of practical kinds of office management skills out of the Davis Fellowship.

CV: Yeah.

EP: It is really cool to say, "yeah, I helped to manage a research center for a year. I helped scholars from around the world come and give talks, and I got to go to some really cool restaurants in Philly." So, yeah, it was a really cool experience! I genuinely—there are times that I really miss doing it. It is so much fun, different work.

CV: Absolutely. And I would concur from my experience thus far as well! It is definitely a rewarding opportunity, as are the other CENFAD funding opportunities that are available to students in the program. But, yeah – Eric, I just really want to thank you for your time today, and I really appreciate all the information that you provided to our viewing audience and to our reading audience potentially, since I do intend to hopefully have a written transcript of this as well. But, yeah, thank you so much for your time, and I am really looking forward to seeing your dissertation and what transpires from that when that is published. So thank you so much for describing that to our audience!

EP: Of course! I am glad that you reached out. Thank you!