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By Alan McPherson

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The issue of *Strategic Visions* before you almost did not see the light of day. Early in the Spring semester, the Temple graduate student workers' union, TUGSA, went on strike. As a loyal member, CENFAD's Davis Fellow, Ryan Langton, withheld his labor from the university. For about six weeks, CENFAD carried on its colloquium series, but without any video or Zoom capabilities and with smaller audiences. For that reason, three of the talks below—by Engerman, Reichardt, and Vindman—contain no links.

Most endangered during the strike was this publication, which relies almost entirely on graduate students' writing and editing. Thankfully, TUGSA and the administration reached terms and ended the strike, and we have Ryan and his contributors to thank for finishing the issue on time and featuring its usual high-quality content.

Please catch up on how the CENFAD community is doing on Page 6.

AHA Reception

Taking advantage of the American Historical Association meeting in Philadelphia in early January, CENFAD took the lead in hosting a Temple reception at the Marriott. The room was packed! Alums, faculty past and present, and friends from all around stopped by to have a drink, reminisce about their days on campus, and learn about our ongoing successes. Do you recognize any faces from these photos?

Spring 2023 Colloquium

CENFAD once again hosted several highly interesting—and some high-profile—speakers. The invasion of Ukraine continued to concern students and faculty, who turned out in large numbers for two talks. The first, on January 24, was by Mitchell Orenstein, a political scientist from the University of Pennsylvania, who discussed "Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: Hybrid War, Cold War, or the Start of World War III?" Based on his book *The Lands in Between: Russia vs. the West and the New Politics of Hybrid War*, Orenstein's talk argued that Russia's war was not only military but included economic sanctions, energy blackmail, and disinformation. You can see CENFAD's interview with Orenstein here. In his own assessment of "The War in Ukraine One Year In," Col. Alexander Vindman, former Director for European Affairs for the National Security Council, would not have disagreed with Orenstein. But he emphasized that the Western military alliance supporting Ukraine cannot waver in the face of "the biggest country in the world" invading "the biggest country in Europe." Vindman catapulted to fame when he testified against the president in Donald Trump's first impeachment. Thanks go out to Prof. Artemy Kalinovsky for inviting Col. Vindman as part of his course on Ukraine.

Col. Alexander Vindman (above) discusses the war in Ukraine with a filled Weigley Room (below).

The American Revolutionary War also produced two talks this semester. The first, on February 21, was by Alec Zuercher Reichardt, a historian from the University of Missouri, who spoke on "Path Diplomacy and Infrastructural Power in Eighteenth-Century North America." The second, on April 25, was on "Securing Borders: The Champlain Valley to Coos Country, 1778-1779," and featured Duquesne University's professor emerita of history Holly Mayer. Both made the case for the importance of roads and geography in the military and political decisions during the Revolution. CENFAD also interviewed Dr. Mayer.

On February 13, David Engerman, a historian from Yale University, shared findings from his latest book, *The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India*, demonstrating that India was a hotbed of ideas about development coming from all sides during the Cold War as well as a contested terrain for those ideas.

On March 14, Marc Selverstone, a historian from the University of Virginia, presented his new book, *The Kennedy Withdrawal: Camelot and the American Commitment to Vietnam*, weighing in on the debate over whether President Kennedy would have withdrawn troops from Southeast Asia. Selverstone counted himself among the skeptics.

Finally, in what was likely a first, on March 28 CENFAD hosted a television producer. In an interview format, Natasha Lance Rogoff talked about her memoir, *Muppets in Moscow: The Unexpected Crazy True Story of Making Sesame Street in Russia*, relating her years creating a post-Cold War Russian version of the popular children's television program with all the financial and cultural roadblocks one can imagine—even a car bomb!

Alan McPherson (left) interviews Natasha Lance Rogoff (right). Pictured behind them is Zeliboba, one of the Muppets designed for the Russian production of *Sesame Street*.

Army War College Visit

Thanks to Profs. Jay Lockenour and Gregory Urwin, CENFAD once again hosted a panel from the Army War College in Carlisle. On February 7, to the delight of "American military culture" students at Temple, the panelists discussed "Future Challenges in the Indo-Pacific for the U.S. and Its Allies."

Spring 2023 Prizes

In March, the following six graduate students won CENFAD research awards:

- **Ethan Cohen** won a Marvin Wachman Fellowship in Force and Diplomacy in the amount of $2,000 in support of his dissertation research in Morocco and Spain.
- **Graydon Dennison** won a Marvin Wachman Fellowship in Force and Diplomacy in the amount of $500 in support of his dissertation research at Yale University.
- **Anthony Guerrero** won the Richard Immerman Award in the amount of $1,500 in addition to a Marvin Wachman Fellowship in Force and Diplomacy in the amount of $1,000, both in support of his dissertation research in Maryland and Virginia.
- **Joseph Johnson** won a Marvin Wachman Fellowship in Force and Diplomacy in the amount of $2,500 in support of a Spanish-language acquisition program in Guatemala.
- **Brandon Kinney** won a Marvin Wachman Fellowship in Force and Diplomacy in the amount of $2,500 in support of his dissertation research in Germany.
- **Alexandra Southgate** won a Marvin Wachman Fellowship in Force and Diplomacy in the amount of $2,000 in support of her dissertation research in Texas and Maryland.
- **Casey VanSise** won a Marvin Wachman Fellowship in Force and Diplomacy in the amount of $2,500 for his dissertation research in Bolivia.

The following students received CENFAD funds to present their work at academic conferences:

- **Amanda Summers**, at the Mid-Atlantic Conference on Latin American Studies in Salisbury, Maryland, and the Rocky Mountain Conference on Latin American Studies in Santa Fe, New Mexico.
- **Duncan Knox**, at the conference of the Society for Military History in San Diego.
- **Ariel Natalo-Lifton**, at the conference of the Society for Military History in San Diego.
- **Grace Anne Parker**, at the conference of the Society for Military History in San Diego.

- **Ilyssa Yahmi**, of the Political Science Department, at the International Studies Association annual meeting in Montreal, Canada, and the European Conference on African Studies in Cologne, Germany.

In addition, **Grace Anne Parker** will be the Berger Fellow next academic year, and **Kaitlyn Ley** from Rowan University won the Sherman Prize for undergraduate research.

Congratulations to all the winners!

Second CENFAD Emerging Scholar

Again this year, thanks to the generosity of Temple History PhD Todd Davis, CENFAD helped in attracting a promising Master's student with the Emerging Scholar Graduate Award. The award aims to recruit and support MA-level students interested in diplomatic and military history and to do so especially among underrepresented candidates, including women.

The Emerging Scholar incoming in the 2023-2024 academic year will be Elías González, whose research interests lie in the complicated relations between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Welcome to the CENFAD community, Elías!

Thanks to the Davis Fellow

Finally, I want to heartily thank Davis Fellow Ryan Langton, who administered CENFAD with aplomb during a year that should have been smooth after a full recovery from COVID-19 but instead was made uncertain and painful by the mid-semester strike. Thanks for hanging in there, Ryan!

Next year's Davis Fellow will be Joseph Johnson, whose interests center on U.S.-Latin American relations and especially the creation of a nuclear-free zone in South America. Welcome to CENFAD, Joe!

News from the CENFAD Community

Dr. Beth Bailey, Foundation Distinguished Professor in the Department of History at the University of Kansas and former Professor of History at Temple (2004-2015), recently published her new book, *An Army Afire: How the U.S. Army Confronted Its Racial Crisis in the Vietnam Era*, with the University of North Carolina Press.

In April 2023, **Alexandre F. Caillot** (PhD, Temple, 2023) successfully defended his dissertation, titled "The Forgotten Boys of the Ninth Corps: Reappraising the Combat Performance of the 31st Maine and 17th Vermont Volunteer Infantry Regiments."

Ethan Cohen (PhD Student, Temple) was awarded a grant from the American Institute for Maghrib Studies (AIMS) to support a month of archival research in Morocco. It was CENFAD funding that facilitated his first stay in Morocco last summer, and Ethan looks forward to expanding that base of knowledge.

Dr. Paul J. Cook (PhD, Temple, 2020) became a contract historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. He has been commissioned to write a volume for the U.S. Army's official history of the Global War on Terror.

Graydon Dennison (PhD Candidate, Temple) won the Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations at the American Historical Association's 2023 Annual Meeting. He also received a John Votaw Endowed Research Award from CENFAD in the fall of 2022. He also received a Brady-Johnson Predoctoral Fellowship from the International Security Studies program at Yale University's Jackson School of Global Affairs.

Alexander A. Falbo-Wild (MA Student, Temple) had a book chapter, "Semper Ubique: The Royal Engineers at Arras, 1917," included in Spencer Jones, ed., *The Darkest Year: The British Army on the Western Front, 1917*, published by Helion & Company.

Matt Fey (MA, Temple, 2014) completed his PhD in Political Science at George Mason University in 2022 and was recently hired as an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation.

Harvey Finkle (BA, History, Temple, 1958; SSW, University of Pennsylvania, 1961) is a documentary still photographer whose work is concerned with issues of peace and social justice. In 2022 Tursulowe Press in Philadelphia published two books of his photography. The first, *Mothers*, deals with the commercialization of Mother's Day, and benefits two local community organizations. The second, *Under One Sky*, follows his exhibition at the Fleisher Art memorial and reflects on the immigrant resettlement experience. A third book in the series called *Readers* is forthcoming, and a book signing at Fleisher will take place on May 18 from 5:30-7:30PM.

Temple History PhD (2016) and former Davis Fellow **Dr. Carly Goodman** has published her first book, *Dreamland: America's Immigration Lottery in an Age of Restriction*, which is based on her Temple dissertation. Published by University of North Carolina Press, *Dreamland* is available at uncpress.org, amazon.com, bookshop.org, and wherever you buy books. Early reviews have been encouraging. To attend a book event, check out her website carlybethgoodman.com. Dr. Goodman also recently published two op-eds in the Washington Post titled "We've erased Black immigrants from our story, obscuring a racist system," and "St. Patrick's Day reminds us of the importance of welcoming immigrants."

Dr. Cory S. Hollon (PhD, Temple, 2022) was hired as a professor and administrator at the Air University's Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama.

Dr. Shawn David McGhee (PhD, Temple, 2022) was hired as a social studies teacher at Cinnaminson High School, Cinnaminson, New Jersey. He also had two articles appear in the online *Journal of the American Revolution*. "'Characters Pre-Eminent for Virtue and Ability': The First Partisan Application of the Electoral College," appeared on October 6, 2022, and "Reframing George Washington's Clothing at the Second Continental Congress," appeared on December 20, 2022.

Dr. Andrew C. McKevitt (PhD, Temple, 2009), a former Davis Fellow, was appointed the John D. Winters Endowed Professor in the School of History and Social Sciences at Louisiana Tech University. Also, in November 2023 his book, *Gun Country: Gun Capitalism, Culture, and Control in Cold War America*, will be published with the University of North Carolina Press.

Kevin J. McNamara (BA, Journalism, Temple, 1989; MA, International Politics, Temple, 1995) published a review of Eugene M. Fishel's *The Moscow Factor: U.S. Policy Toward Sovereign Ukraine and the Kremlin* titled "None Dare Call It Treason" in *Orbis*. The Center for European Policy Analysis also published his article, "Europe's New Military Frontline," which appeared online on October 17, 2022.

CENFAD Director **Dr. Alan McPherson**, with the help of several Temple student researchers, finished the research on and wrote his next book, tentatively titled *The Breach: Iran-Contra and the Assault on American Democracy*. He benefited from a CHAT faculty fellowship to help finish the book. He also published one article, "Sub-Perpetrators in the Chilean Security State," in *The Latin Americanist*, and this article won an Honorable Mention for the Helen Delpar Prize of the Southeastern Council for Latin American Studies. He continued to serve on the editorial board of the *Journal of American History* and had two additional articles accepted for publication and finished a few chapters, all of which should appear in late 2023. He also had three book reviews appear, and he presented his work at several conferences. Most exciting, his last book, *Ghosts of Sheridan Circle*, is being translated into Spanish, and Apple had optioned the rights to it for a limited series on its streaming service.

Former Davis Fellow **Dr. Kaete O'Connell** (PhD, Temple, 2019) began a new job as Assistant Director of the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University.

Former Davis Fellow, **Dr. Eric Perinovic** (PhD, Temple, 2022), earned his doctorate in Spring 2022. His dissertation, entitled "Ex Machina: The Lockheed F-104G Starfighter, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Origins of the Modern European Military Aviation Sector 1955-1975," was the recipient of the 2022 Barnes Dissertation Prize. He has since relocated to Washington, D.C. and is employed as a Historian in the OPNAV Support Section at the Naval History and Heritage Command. In this role, he provides critical historical research and analytical support for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Stanley G. Schwartz (PhD Candidate, Temple) became an instructor of history at Cedarville University.

Amanda Summers (PhD Candidate, Temple) will be the E. Rhodes and Leona B. Carpenter Fellow in Early American Religious Studies at the McNeil Center for Early American Studies for the 2023-2024 academic year. She will also have a chapter, titled "Sex Magic, Sex Work: The Gendered Labor of Maria de Rivera and Isabel de Montoya in Puebla, Mexico in the Mid-Seventeenth Century," appear in the forthcoming *Histories of Sex Around the World*, a new book in the Routledge Research in Gender and History series.

Dr. David J. Ulbrich (PhD, Temple, 2007) published a book, along with his coauthor Michael J. Lyons, titled *World War II: A Global History* with Routledge Press. Ulbrich has also coedited a volume with Brian P. Farrell and S.R. Joey Long titled *From*

Far East to Asia Pacific: Great Powers and Grand Strategy, 1900-1954 that was published as part of De Gruyter Publishing's series on Studies in Military History.

Dr. Gregory J.W. Urwin, Professor of History at Temple, had his article that appeared on October 19, 2021 in the online *Journal of the American Revolution*, "The Yorktown Tragedy: Washington's Slave Roundup," reprinted in hardcopy form in Din N. Hagist, ed., *Journal of the American Revolution: Annual Volume 2022*. Urwin wrote the "Forward" for Gabriel M. Brady's *Wake Island: New Insights into the Past: The Story of Rear Admiral Winfield Scott Cunningham's Struggle for Justice*. Urwin also published book reviews in *Parameters: The U.S. Army War College Quarterly* and the *Journal of Military History*. He chaired and commented on a panel concerning "At the Tale End of War: Case Studies in World War II." Finally, Urwin is writing the second chapter of his current book, "When Freedom Wore a Red Coat: The British Invasions of Virginia, 1781."

Dr. Ralph Young, Professor of History at Temple, was awarded a Fulbright Specialists Fellowship to teach a four-week seminar on Cold War culture at Roma Tre University in Rome, Italy.

At the 2023 Barnes Conference held at Temple's Center City campus on March 17 and 18, 2023, PhD students **Ethan Cohen**, **Lucas de Souza Martins**, **Duncan Knox**, **Audrey Rankin**, **Andrew Santora**, **Peter Sicher**, **Alexandra Southgate**, PhD candidates **Susannah Burger**, **Graydon Dennison**, **Donald Dostie**, **Joe Eanett**, **Anthony Guerrero, Madison Ingram**, **Brandon Kinney**, **Ariel Natalo-Lifton**, **Grace-Anne Parker, Amanda Summers**, **Abby Whitaker**, and MA student **Paul Hewes** participated as organizers, panelists, commentators, and chairs. The conference was organized by committee chair Donald Dostie and committee members Duncan Knox and Alexandra Southgate. Papers presented included de Souza Martins's "Shifting Discourses: The U.S. Reactions to the 1991 Colombian Constitution," Summers's "Sex and Pregnancy as Prison Space Negotiation Strategy: Lorenzana de Acereto and the Cartagena Inquisition, 1610," Guerrero's "A Unique Capability: The 82nd Airborne Division and the Construction of Memory," Eanett's "The Least Manly Way to Die: Martial Masculinity and the Typhoid Epidemics of the Spanish-American War," Hewes's "Where Pennsylvania Began: Revitalizing and Restructuring Delaware County Historical Society," and Ingram's "'Allies to Democracy': The Savannah Public Library as a Library War Center during World War II." Summers and Eannet also served as commentators on panels, as did Burger, Cohen, Dennison, Kinney, Knox, Natalo-Lifton, Parker, Rankin, Santora, Sicher, and Whitaker. In addition to presenting a paper, Ingram also served as a commentator and chair. CENFAD faculty members that served as chairs included Dr. Rita Krueger, Dr. Alan McPherson, Dr. Mónica Ricketts, Dr. Gregory Urwin, Dr. Bryant Simon, Dr. Harvey Neptune, Dr. Petra Goedde, Dr. Eileen Ryan, and Dr. Artemy Kalinovsky. Congratulations to all of those participants for making this year's Barnes Conference a great success!

Note from the Davis Fellow

Dear CENFAD Community,

As my time as the Thomas J. Davis Fellow draws to a close, I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who made this year such a success. It was an honor to meet and learn from so many different people studying such diverse topics. I would like to thank especially CENFAD's director Alan McPherson, whose leadership and direction continues to make the Center a vibrant and engaging community for the study of military and diplomatic history. Thank you, also, to all the members of the CENFAD community. Your support guarantees that the Center continues to thrive.

The Center's colloquium series welcomed seven distinguished speakers who discussed topics that included the war in Ukraine, the Cold War, Indigenous diplomacy in eighteenth-century North America, the creation of *Sesame Street* in post-Soviet Russia, and the Revolutionary War – easily one of the most topically diverse colloquium series we have had in recent memory. I would like to thank Mitchell Orenstein, David C. Engerman, Alec Zuercher Reichardt, Alexander Vindman, Marc Selverstone, Natasha Lance Rogoff, and Holly Mayer for sharing their research and experiences with CENFAD. Some of the lectures were not recorded due to the Temple University graduate student worker strike in which I participated, but lectures that were recorded can be viewed at our website.

In addition to our colloquium series, the Center also hosted a panel organized by the U.S. Army War College. Lastly, we also announced a partnership with the Consulate of Mexico and the Mexican Cultural Center in celebration of the bicentennial of Mexico-U.S. diplomatic relations.

This semester's edition of *Strategic Visions* includes two interviews from visiting speakers. I met with Mitchell Orenstein and Holly Mayer over Zoom to talk about their recent works. These interviews appear in print and video below. This issue also includes two essays from members of the CENFAD community. In his essay, "So You Want to Be President," former Vice President and Treasurer of the World Bank and current member of Temple's College of Liberal Arts Board of Visitors Gene Rotberg discusses opponents of globalization and ways the United States could compete in an increasingly globalized world. Philip Evanson, Associate Professor Emeritus of History at Temple, explores the new obstacles facing Brazilian democracy in "The Brazilian Presidential Election of 2022 and the Crisis in Brazilian Democracy."

Strategic Visions also features news and reviews from current faculty and three graduate students. We highlight a new course, designed by CENFAD-affiliated faculty member Dr. Artemy Kalinovsky, which explored the problems of post-Cold war peace and security in light of the ongoing violence in Ukraine. Graydon Dennison reviewed Robert Kagan's *The Ghost at the Feast: America and the Collapse of World Order, 1900-1941*, Grace Anne Parker reviewed Tanya L. Roth's *Her Cold War: Women in the U.S. Military, 1945-1980*, and Audrey Rankin

reviewed Erin Woodruff Stone's *Captives of Conquest: Slavery in the Early Modern Spanish Caribbean*.

Finally, I wish good luck to my colleague and friend Joseph Johnson, who will be succeeding me as the Davis Fellow for the 2023-2024 academic year. I hope everyone has an enjoyable summer.

Sincerely,

Ryan Langton

CENFAD Professor Artemy Kalinovsky Introduces New Course on the War in Ukraine

By Ryan Langton

This semester, Dr. Artemy Kalinovsky, Professor of Integrative Knowledge in History and Political Science at Temple University and a CENFAD-affiliated faculty member, introduced a new course addressing the ongoing war in Ukraine. Cross listed as a History and Political Science course, "Russia's Aggression in Ukraine and the World after February 24" took an interdisciplinary approach to analyzing the contexts, causes, and repercussions of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

The course explored the problems of peace and security in the post-Cold War world, what observers around the world got right and wrong before and after Russia's unprovoked attack on Ukraine, and the reasons why. "[The war in Ukraine] is a major conflict which has clearly transformed how many people think about security in the post-Cold War world," explained Dr. Kalinovsky. "It seemed to me teaching last spring that students were looking for ways to better understand what was going on and for tools to be able to evaluate what they heard. My idea was to give students the tools to better understand what was going on – not just in terms of the battlefield or the relations between Russia and Ukraine, but also the national projects in these two countries that emerged after the USSR collapsed in 1991, the ways the war has affected (and been affected by) the European Union, as well as how this conflict is seen beyond Europe and the U.S."

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In addition to holding regular class meetings, Dr. Kalinovsky also partnered with CENFAD and the *Dissent in America Teach In* series organized by Dr. Ralph Young, Professor of History at Temple, to welcome several visiting speakers who gave public talks held in-person and over Zoom on the war in Ukraine. Dr. Serhii Plokhii, Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard and a former CENFAD speaker, addressed the different ways nationalism and history influenced Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Dr. Olya Oliker, Program Director for Europe and Central Asia for Crisis Group, drew on her experience working at think tanks to discuss how analysts studied the war and crafted reports often used in wider media. To address misleading post-Cold War worldviews, the course welcomed Dr. Maksym Yakvlyev, Professor of Social Sciences at Kyiv-Mohlya Academy. Russian environmental activist and peace advocate Yevgeniya Chirikova visited Temple, as well, to talk about civil resistance to Vladimir Putin's regime. In addition to these speakers, two faculty members from Temple, Professor of Law Dr. J. Benton Heath and Professor of Political Science Mark Pollack, explored the role of sanctions and the possibilities of Ukraine joining the EU, respectively.

On March 2, CENFAD and Dr. Kalinovsky welcomed Dr. Alexander Vindman, a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel and former director for

Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Russia on the National Security Council. Now a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a Hauser Leader at Harvard's Kennedy School, Dr. Vindman drew on his experience as a Political-Military Affairs Officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to talk about the current military situation on the ground in Ukraine. He also examined broader perspectives on the diplomatic relationship between the United States and Ukraine, which is also the topic of his recently completed PhD dissertation at Johns Hopkins.

Alexander Vindman (right) sits with Artemy Kalinvosky (left) during his visit to CENFAD

One of the major lessons students took away from the course was the problem of grappling with the ever-changing stream of information and analysis generated about the war in Ukraine. "I wanted students to think about how they learn about the war – how the war gets reported, why so many analysts seem to have gotten things wrong at different times, and so on," said Dr. Kalinovsky. This turned out to be a lesson he learned himself. "One of the surprising things about this course was how difficult it can be to find really good analysis that stands the test of the time. I've taught courses on contemporary foreign policy before, but I've never taught a course that would progress in real time, so to speak. That was also a challenge with putting together the syllabus – I knew that what I read in November could well be irrelevant by the time the course started in January."

Interview with Dr. Mitchell Orenstein

On January 24, 2023, CENFAD and Temple University's Department of Political Science welcomed Dr. Mitchell Orenstein, Professor of Russian and East European Studies and Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, to Philadelphia for a presentation on the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War and his 2019 book *The Lands in Between: Russia Vs. the West and the New Politics of Hybrid War* (Oxford University Press). CENFAD's Davis Fellow Ryan Langton met with Dr. Orenstein over Zoom to discuss his book. The complete interview can be viewed here.

RL: Welcome, Dr. Orenstein, and thank you for joining me.

MO: Thanks a lot, Ryan. Happy to be here.

RL: To start off, how did you come to study what you call Russia's hybrid war with the West?

MO: I've been studying the political economy of Central and Eastern Europe for a long time, since 1990, actually, when I first moved to Prague and worked there for a year. I was lucky to be in the middle of the 1989 revolutions and the immediate aftermath, and I traveled all around the region. When I took a job at Johns Hopkins SAIS (School of Advanced International Studies) in Washington, D.C. – one of the top international affairs schools – I realized that most people in D.C. were not that interested in the political economy or really the politics of individual countries in Eastern Europe, but they were much more interested in U.S. foreign policy towards those countries, and I began learning a lot about the foreign policy of those states towards one another and towards the West, and also their role in U.S. policy. I began working with a former ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Adrian Basora, who I still work with at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and we began working on topics like democratic backsliding in the region and how countries are becoming less democratic and, in some cases, out of the Western sphere of influence. This was also after the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, and that was another external event that made it seem like times were really changing in that part of the world.

RL: How would you characterize Russia's hybrid war? What do you see as its methods and goals?

MO: The Russian hybrid war…was characterized largely by their consciousness that they were not the stronger actor. In a way, hybrid war is a form of asymmetric warfare. It is a type of warfare that is meant not to be detectable in some cases, or just under the radar screen, or below the threshold for military retaliation. Things like party financing where Russia might finance extremist parties in France or the U.S. – the kind of thing that could have a very important impact on politics, but it wouldn't really rise to the level where there would be a military response from the West. It was an attempt, essentially, by a variety of nonmilitary techniques, to achieve some of the effects of a successful military campaign – to change political

systems, influence politics, and destroy western institutions such as NATO and the European Union by trying to elect politicians who oppose those institutions.

I think the [hybrid war] campaign can be divided up in a number of different areas. One of those would be actual military methods, which are used primarily in what Russia would sometimes call its "near abroad," the countries of the former Soviet Union. Elsewhere, [Russia] was using tools such as energy blackmail – trying to get West Europe dependent on Russian fossil fuel sources in order to be able to demobilize Western opposition to, say, the Russian invasion of Ukraine. [Russia also used] huge disinformation campaigns. I think everybody in the U.S. knows something about this, though people may not believe it happened, but there was a massive disinformation campaign that hit the United States during the 2016 election, and it really hasn't stopped since then. The 2020 election was also one where there were lots of bots spreading false information. More sophisticated ways [of spreading misinformation] were harder to trace back to Russia, but nonetheless they were happening. There were also cyber-attacks. The U.S. is the number one country as a recipient of cyber-attacks. A lot of times these are relatively small scale where they hit individual companies and involve blackmail or ransomware, but in other cases they have had pretty substantial influences. For example, the Colonial Pipeline that brought fuel from Texas up into most of the southern states was shut down because of a Russian attack just last year for weeks. Disinformation, economic warfare, energy conflicts, political subversion – there is a variety of different types of what you could think of as battlefields that exist in this hybrid war, a variety of different techniques, all of which their common similarity is that it is a war fought largely by nonmilitary means. It still has pretty ambitious objectives, such as pulling the U.S. out of NATO, which almost happened pretty recently. John Bolton, I think, said that Trump, had he been reelected, would have moved to pull the U.S. out of NATO. If that indeed was Russia's objective in supporting Trump in 2016 and 2020, then that would have paid off very handsomely for them and would have been tantamount in some ways to winning a war. I think it's fair to look at these techniques as mostly sub-military – mostly designed not to get a military response. Now, of course, Russia has seriously overreached with its most recent invasion of Ukraine, and maybe tossed some of their playbook out, but that has been the playbook Russia has been using from 2007 up until 2022.

"Disinformation, economic, warfare, energy conflicts, political subversion – there is a variety of different types of what you could think of as battlefields that exist in this hybrid war, a variety of different techniques, all of which their common similarity is that it is a war fought largely by nonmilitary means."

RL: That's a good transition for my next question. Your book came out in 2019, and obviously there have been major developments in world politics and Russia since then, particularly Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. How does the war in Ukraine fit or differ from the practices and strategies of Russia's hybrid war?

MO: Absolutely. I argue this in the book – all along, Russia was using military might and actual fighting since its 2008 invasion of Georgia. That's one of the reasons why I argued in the talk that this isn't a Cold War. It's actually a hot war, it's been hot since 2008. [The use of military force in Ukraine] in itself was not a big change. But, I think the change, in my estimation and the estimation of many others, was that Russia had been trying to calibrate its use of military force to be relatively small scale and to always have a pretext. For instance, in Georgia [Russia claimed] they were

just helping out the South Ossetians. In the case of Crimea, [they claimed] "that was always Russia, those people wanted to be in Russia," or in the case of Donbas [they claimed] "those people were also Russian and they weren't being treated right by the Ukrainian government." They were very careful to create these kind of contexts or information warfare, trying to create some sort of plausible deniability about why it seemed reasonable, to some extent, why Russia was doing this. I think the thing that was different in 2022 was that when Russia decided to invade Ukraine, and invade the whole country, their pretext got called out by the Biden administration. Before the beginning of the war, the Biden administration was saying that Russia was going to invade and it was Putin's choice, he could invade or not, but they were planning to invade. It was an interesting technique because they made a lot of intelligence public about predicting that Russia was going to invade, in fact rightly. What that did was it got rid of the pretext – Russia did not really have any pretext for why it invaded Ukraine. They went in without carefully constructing the information space and ended up being blamed pretty much universally for invading Ukraine. That was one change.



The other change was that it was a wider scale war. [Russia] will always deny that there were Russian fighters or Russian troops in Donbas – so going from denying this sort of [military action] to invading the whole country is a very big step, and it seems wildly imprudent to me. At the time I actually doubted that Russia was going to do that, but it appears to mark some type of change in strategy by Putin, that he was throwing aside the primacy of the small, undetectable steps and just throwing caution to the wind and invading more frontally. But the hybrid war concept remains important now. Actually, hybrid warfare is a term in military usage that always refers to the association of military and nonmilitary techniques. Sometimes nonmilitary techniques are predominant, prominent, or more important than the military ones. Hybrid means a combination of military and nonmilitary techniques. I think you still see that with Russia's strategy. Just because they are really wrapped up in this war in Ukraine does not mean that they have stopped information warfare in the U.S. Quite contrary, it appears to have ramped up quite a lot. Similarly, Russia launched this very elaborate plan to freeze Europe during the winter, to bring Europe to its knees by not delivering gas, pushing up prices, and fostering street protests in Europe, and that seems to have failed. But it doesn't mean that it wasn't part of their strategy – that was what they were trying to do**.** I think that this isn't just a war in Ukraine. This is a war that on both sides is being fought in multiple different venues – from the European and Western side largely through sanctions, but also arming Ukraine, and disinformation campaigns. I think that the framework of hybrid war allows you to look at the full extent of what's going on rather than just look at this as a war in Ukraine.

RL: What lessons can the European Union and the United States take away from over a decade of hybrid war with Russia?

MO: It's an interesting question – what have we learned from all of this? One thing we've learned is that we have to be way more sensitive to when we are being attacked in these ways. At the beginning, most people didn't really realize that the United States was under any sort of attack really until the 2016 election. The 2016 election was a huge wake-up call for people that there was foreign intervention in our elections. Still, a lot of people deny that, but it's right there in the Mueller report that Russia launched this massive attack on the U.S. one of the things I have seen is a revolution in awareness, and that has gone hand-in-hand with the greater use of this term "hybrid war." When I started initially looking at terms, I just happened upon it. I was not the inventor of this term, but I was looking at

different terms in different ways that people were describing what I saw going on. I liked the term "hybrid warfare" because it seemed to really underline the multifaceted nature of the conflict and its prosecution through nonmilitary means. That wasn't a widespread term at the time – people didn't really know what it was and many probably still don't, but it has come much more into common usage, interestingly, predominantly from policy makers. Academics tend to be kind of skeptical mostly of the term "hybrid warfare" but we've seen it more and more used by [individuals] like European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who talks about hybrid techniques and hybrid warfare. For instance, when Belarus started pushing immigrants across the Belarus-Polish border, she said that this is a hybrid warfare technique that is being used against us. [Using the term hybrid warfare] induces a lot of public consciousness about the nature of warfare that we are fighting in the twenty-first century.

We've also seen the Russians start using the term "hybrid warfare." In the past couple months, [Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs] Sergey Lavrov has started saying that Russia is suffering from a global hybrid warfare attack from the West. The only key difference between the way he is using the term and the way I did in my 2019 book was that I thought I was talking about Russian hybrid warfare on the West and he is casting the West as fighting a global hybrid war against Russia. I personally agree to some extent that this goes both ways. There is a means of war in this century where we have nuclear-armed powers, and more of them [than before]. The means of war have changed – it's shifted somewhat because it is too dangerous to have direct military conflict between nuclear powers, so there has been a shift into the use of hybrid techniques, and I think Russia showed that those can be very potent…Now, after ten years, I think people have wised up quite a lot…People are aware of that kind of thing, they are aware of ransomware, they are very aware of disinformation because it was such a huge part of our presidential elections. All that awareness is important – it's important for the public to understand, which is why I give so many public talks about what is happening. The military theorists who I read – Frank Hoffman, among others – talk about this as being a new era of warfare. A lot of people point out that none of these techniques are actually new – the Soviet Union often deployed this exact same type of tactics. But, what I think is new is that great powers no longer feel safe engaging in the type of brinksmanship that happened in the Cold War, and they are more likely to be using these hybrid techniques and more likely to be pursuing nonmilitary techniques of warfare.

"I think that this isn't just a war in Ukraine. This is a war that on both sides is being fought in multiple different venues…I think that the framework of hybrid war allows you to look at the full extent of what's going on."

RL: Are there any new projects that you are working on now?

MO: Absolutely. I am in the process of editing a special issue of the *Journal of European Integration* on the transformation of Europe after Russia's attack on Ukraine. I've gathered a group of papers, maybe more than a dozen papers, from mostly European scholars who look at different aspects of [changes in Europe following Russia's invasion of Ukraine]. I am planning on developing that theme into new research and a new book. I just applied for Sabbatical in Fall 2023 to get that project moving. I am hoping to interview European leaders – thought leaders and other leaders in European security – to understand how a geopolitical Europe is emerging to take on the challenges of Russia and China and try to manage its security interests more than it has in the past. Europe has been extremely effective in responding to Russia with economic sanctions, with humanitarian aid to Ukrainian refugees, and with energy policies that are going to green Europe and wean the continent off fossil

fuels to a large extent, but it has been very challenged to provide for its own security, and I think the war really showed that the continent of Europe remains reliant on the United States for security in ways that make some Europeans feel quite uncomfortable, because they saw the U.S. almost pull out of NATO, so they are wondering, "if the United States did pull out of NATO, what would we do?" They are pushing for more strategic autonomy and responsibility. I am interested in that, as well as the power shifts occurring within the European Union, and the border shifts. I think this war has had very substantial implications on Europe's borders and boundaries. It has pushed Ukraine and Moldova to be new candidate members of the EU; it has pushed Finland and Sweden to be members of NATO, awaiting some ratification by Turkey and Hungary. I think it basically pushed Europe's boundaries to the north and east, and created a different geopolitical space. That's the topic I want to explore – how are European leaders thinking about [these shifts], and how should they be looking at their security?

RL: Thank you so much for your time.

MO: Thank you. It's a pleasure talking to you.

Interview with Dr. Holly Mayer

On April 25, 2023, CENFAD welcomed Dr. Holly A. Mayer, Professor Emerita of History at Duquesne University, to Philadelphia for a presentation titled "Securing Borders: The Champlain Valley to Coos Country, 1778-1779," which drew from her recent book *Congress's Own: A Canadian Regiment, the Continental Army, and American Union* (University of Oklahoma Press). CENFAD's Davis Fellow Ryan Langton met with Dr. Mayer over Zoom to discuss her book. The complete interview can be viewed here.

RL: Welcome, Dr. Mayer, and thank you for taking the time to speak with me.

HM: It's great to be with you, and it was great to be with everybody at CENFAD earlier this week.

RL: Your book, *Congress's Own*, studies the 2nd Canadian Regiment, which fought in favor of the American Revolution. How did you first come across this regiment? What about it made you want to write a history about this particular regiment?

HM: I was not seeking to do a regimental history, actually. My primary goal was to write about the creation of American identity while in military service in the Continental Army. I've always been interested in how these provincials became Americans or defined themselves as Americans. I was actually here in Philadelphia, at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, searching for personal sources where people might reflect on what they were doing, why they were doing it, and who they were in the process of fighting in the American Revolution. I had come across a great journal – Sergeant Major John H. Hawkins's Journal – and I started to read it and said, "Oh, this is fantastic, I might want to work on this," but he wasn't telling me much about American identity. He was telling me about this regiment – he talked about what it was doing, and the biggest thing that struck me was that I did not really know anything about this regiment. I had not encountered many people who had heard about Canadians serving for the American side in the American Revolution – in other words joining the Continental Army. But this did make sense – we were talking about a Continental force, the Continental Congress had been urging Canadians to join in the rebellion and fight for independence, so why didn't they fight for their independence along with the rest of the provincials? I thought this was fantastic and I had to do more research. The typical thing that we all find is when we come across something in our research, we have to know more. You end up going off in another direction in some form, and I've got to tell people – do it. Let the sources sometimes guide us, instead of saying we are going to make sure the sources give us exactly what we want and nothing more beyond that.

So that is how I started doing research on what was nicknamed "Congress's Own," which was the 2nd Canadian Regiment that was commanded by Colonel Moses Hazen. There was one book out, written around 1976, about Moses Hazen and the Canadian refugees. That was great for getting into the information but the book was all about Canadian refugees, yet I had a journal from a

Philadelphia guy (John H. Hawkins) who was in the regiment. What about all the others in the regiment, not just the Canadian refuges?…That's how I found the topic – Sergeant Major Hawkins led me to the 2nd Canadian Regiment, and as I followed his story, I was following the story of the regiment. I ended up working on that whole regimental story because it is a story of a diverse regiment with members from all of the states except for Georgia and South Carolina that also included German POW's and some British deserters. I asked – how did they do this? How did they integrate all of these men from different regions, different backgrounds, into a fighting force?

RL: One of the points you make in your book is that Congress's Own and the Continental Army as a whole can be considered a moving borderland. When we think of borderlands in eighteenth-century North America, particularly during the Revolutionary Era, scholars more often focus on fixed geographic spaces where individuals with these trans-imperial, transnational, and cross-cultural connections negotiated among competing opportunities and loyalties. How did Congress's Own and the Continental Army constitute borderlands in their own right?

HM: It comes back to my interest in identity formation, in some form or another. I had studied some borderlands and been teaching some aspects of them in my classes, and I came back to this because I kept asking myself – what kind of community is this? How do you bring all of these people together, to work together, to live together, and then, ultimately, because it is a military community, to have a shared mission? The thing that came closest to this kind of formation was what we see often in older community studies or borderland studies, where they talk about how various groups of people come into contact and intermingle with each other, and not always in conflict. These studies ask how do people intermingle and work together and create new identities, new communities, new systems that are not one or the other. Many of these studies are about the borderland between Mexico and the United States. We also have many borderland studies between Canada and the United States. They are usually very nation-oriented, and about different peoples with different languages, distinct and different cultures. The same thing we see in borderland studies in Europe – between different nations or distinct different cultural groups, often different linguistic groups as well. What about the Continental Army? Members came from different regions. We know from our own studies of early America that [colonies and regions] often had different cultural components to them. They sometimes had different languages – obviously with Congress's Own the different languages included French, from the Francophones coming from Canada, Anglophones, and then, in some cases, German because of the German POW's. So, we have multi-linguistic groups from different regions of early America with their particular cultures, and they all came together. How did they do that? That's part of the definition of a borderland. I wanted to think about an army as a different kind of community – one in which all these different components may intermingle, intersperse, and maybe integrate.

"[The story of Congress's Own] is a story of a diverse regiment with members from all the states except Georgia and South Carolina that also included German POW's and some British deserters… How did they integrate all of these men from different regions, different backgrounds, into a fighting force?"

RL: What were some of the challenges involved in forming and maintaining this regiment that drew its soldiers from so many different communities?

HM: … Each of the states saw itself somewhat as a different nation and this army maneuvered between all of those state lines, those borderlands between these states. This created a conflict that we can see with the Continental Army at large and with Congress's Own. Each one of these states deemed itself independent and wanted to have control over its own people. In the Continental Army, that meant these states recruited the men for their own particular regiments – 1st Pennsylvania, 1st Virginia, and so forth. They were also supplying those particular troops instead of Congress providing a uniform kind of payment and supply for all of the soldiers.

This happened in Congress's Own. Congress gave the regiment permission to recruit from all the different states and that those states could count these soldiers as part of their quotas, but in turn those states were supposed to pay those soldiers, which meant that the regiment – just like the Continental Army – was dealing with states who weren't always coordinating with one another. Instead, they tried to trump one another with how much they were willing to pay, how good they were with supplying the men with the materials – food, supplies, everything they needed. Colonel Moses Hazen was fighting with the different states, just as George Washington was writing to governors and Congress saying his different regiments needed supplies from these different states or more recruits from these different states. There were constant negotiations back and forth with multiple states, with Congress trying to reign in multiple regiments from different states, and then there was this regiment that had companies with soldiers from different states. It is a very complicated mix…By 1781 when the Articles of Confederation were being ratified in the midst of war, some people were looking at these complexities about manning, supplying, and fielding an army and saying that these articles are not going to be enough. You can't maintain a proper defense if everything is scattered around. They are already starting to think about a "big U" United States that has a central government that can work with a centralized military to support all, instead of each individually.



RL: Your book also discusses the different formal and informal names the regiment had during its existence and how that was a product of these intersecting identities. Could you tell us more about these names?

HM: Congress had to authorize the 1st and 2nd Canadian regiments, and they had done so in early 1776 when the revolutionaries were still hoping that Canadians would join in this push for independence from Great Britain. They had hoped if Canada and Nova Scotia had joined as new states, then they would supply soldiers and support regiments like the other states were doing. Obviously, that did not happen. By June of '76, the Continental Army had retreated from Canada and they didn't go back up into Canada. So, what to do with these regiments? At first, it was perhaps just let them go – Canadian regiments wouldn't be reauthorized. In the end, Congress continued them, but it recognized that if you can't recruit among Canadians because you were not there in Canada then you have to recruit elsewhere, and they opened up recruiting throughout the states. That's already a really big move, if you think about it. The states were already recruiting within their states for their state-affiliated regiments…But now the Continental Congress – still a coordinating body and not a fully-fledged government – put out the call for [the Canadian regiments] to recruit anywhere they could get men. Congress was now taking on another power, but that meant that Congress needed to become a central body telling the states that they need to support these regiments in some form or another.

The 2nd Canadian was reauthorized, but the officers knew full well that they were not going to get a lot of people joining this regiment if it was called the 2nd Canadian – who from Pennsylvania was going to join the 2nd Canadian? Why wouldn't they join a Pennsylvania regiment instead? So, one of the officers – it could have been Hazan but I think it was Lieutenant Colonel [Edward] Antill for various reasons – came up with calling it Congress's Own. In other words, they gave it a special name – an honorific – and said it was a special regiment. This was not unusual – in the British Army, there were many regiments with honorifics such as the Queen's Own and the King's Own, which meant the Queen or King was the honorary colonel. Calling it Congress's Own made Congress its honorary colonel – that helped recruit people. They attracted a bunch of other officers from various other states who said, "I'm going to go into Congress's Own, this special regiment," and they then recruited other soldiers. It was a great recruiting pitch. It was what many of the officers preferred to call themselves as opposed to the 2nd Canadian. The problem was that Congress's Own kept having fights; it was a rather rambunctious regiment with a lot of good fighters, but the fighting occurred not just against the enemy but sometimes with [other Continentals], and that could make them a little hard to handle. A few people called them "Infernals," and these "Infernals" irritated Congress to the point that Congress told them to stop calling themselves Congress's Own…This is one of the things we need to recognize when we are looking at these regiments, and we're looking at them as communities – what did they call themselves, and why? What identity were they giving themselves? How does that help them as a fighting force or develop a sense of belonging between them all?

"This is one of the things we need to recognize when we are looking at these regiments…what did they call themselves, and why? What identity were they giving themselves? How does that help them as a fighting force or develop a sense of belonging between them all?

RL: The book argues that Congress's Own Regiment can serve as a microcosm for the Continental Army and the revolutionary United States. In what ways did the regiment reflect the possibilities and problems of the emerging U.S.?

HM: The regiment had companies from different states, two francophone Canadian [companies] with an officer who spoke French that were a little separate from the rest. As recruiting went underway in 1777, companies that were primarily from Pennsylvania had a Pennsylvania officer, the Delaware company had a Delaware officer, so on. What we see in the company level is what George Washington had to deal with among the regiments. The 1st Pennsylvania Regiment had Pennsylvania soldiers and Pennsylvania officers, for example. Officers and soldiers were coming from particular states or regions, and they brought this sense of belonging or connection among them all. Washington, originally and for a quite a few years, hoped that he would not have to deal with the constant necessity of having officers be from the same state as their soldiers. He wanted to be able to move officers who had proven themselves to be really good officers into the regiments where he needed their expertise, but he kept getting push back in that the states had control about who they nominated for these positions and then Congress would confirm the appointment. We see this with the companies in Hazan's regiment. Initially, officers and soldiers shared a regional connection. What I was interested in was, do they ultimately integrate? In other words, do we finally see Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, Connecticut men integrating as Americans in the regiment? Could they get beyond staying in their own little enclaves? Well, it did not happen quite as

well as I had hoped. Again, you have to stick to what the sources say, not what you hoped you would find. There was a lot of push back – the soldiers held on to these older regional identities.

The issue in the case of multiple identities is which takes precedence – when, where, why? In this case, as Hazan's regiment started to decline in numbers, as all the regiments did when they lost men over the course of the war, the regiment eliminated companies because it didn't have as many soldiers and officers. They started moving one company into another company, and that led them to start moving Pennsylvanians in with Virginians or New Yorkers for very pragmatic reasons. Because of necessity we see the start of integration. This tells us that this coming together was not necessarily ideological – it is not about ideals and that they were all fighting together. It was for pragmatic reasons – they needed numbers to work effectively within all of these companies. That is one of the lessons that we get out of looking at the army and these companies – how does the pragmatic interconnect with idealism. Sometimes, pragmatism meant they needed to put the ideals aside, but sometimes pragmatic reasons brought the army closer to these ideals.

RL: Do you have any plans for what you will work on next?

HM: I have retired as a professor but not as an historian, so it's just a matter of what projects I want to do. Right now, I am thinking of two different things in terms of writing projects. One would be another monograph, and another would be an edited account, for instance, of Sergeant Major Hawkins's Journal. It is a wonderful piece. I have it transcribed, now it is just about what is the next step with it. The other part is, since I am not teaching formally, whether to teach informally in continuing education programs or at historical sites, not necessarily as a docent, but certainly by supporting sites with their own historical research and how it is presented to the public. There are other avenues along which to keep, as Poirot might say, the little gray cells moving.

RL: Dr. Mayer, thank you so much.

HM: Thank you very much, Ryan.

So You Want to Be President



By Gene Rotberg
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What is it about the term globalization that has mobilized the far right to coalesce into a potent political force – a force that questions the advantage of diversity and the free flow of ideas, goods, and people? This essay explores the deep-seated appeal of the antagonists to globalization, the prideful posture of its supporters, and how the United States might compete in those sectors where it has a comparative advantage.

In recent years we have seen political movements to the right throughout the world, not just in North Korea, Hungary, Iran, Yemen, and Syria, but in Greece, the Philippines, Poland, the Stans, Cambodia, Venezuela, and, yes, even in France and the United States. Beggar thy neighbor. Do it alone. Isolate. Brexit. MAGA. Punishing tariffs. Restrict the flow of savings to within one's borders, limit immigration, subsidize domestic investment, and penalize foreign investment. The bedrock principle of these policies is to insulate – perhaps isolate is the better word – one's country from the "foreign" influence of trade or immigration, which are considered by the antagonists of globalization as a dilution of the purity of their society.

So, what are the characteristics of globalization that created hostility? Immigration, perceived as pushing wages down and diluting the traditional ethnicity of those holding power. The open and free flow of goods, perceived as damaging the manufacturing base of industrialized countries. Open cross-border finance, which permits both the public and private sector of even the poorest country to tap into the wealth of richer countries. The direct investments by industrialized countries in lower-income countries, primarily because of lower-cost labor, tax advantages, and fewer regulatory controls.

Moreover, many lower-income countries hold raw and rare materials and sources of energy, and control, politically or geographically, the indispensable supply chain for finished products. Therefore, it remained only for lower-income countries to take advantage of these factors, and the removal of virtually all restrictions on the cross-border flow of goods and finance, to implement their plans for economic development.

The industrialized countries, in short, no longer have all the marbles to play with. Globalization did not cause, but simply reflects, the diminished capacity of industrial powers to implement policy unilaterally. Thus, it is not at all clear that when the Federal Reserve raises interest rates in an effort to slow down inflation, it will be effective if Russia blocks the shipment of grain from Ukraine or reduces the supply of heating oil to Europe, or if Saudi Arabia substantially reduces the pumping of oil, or if China moves its dollar holdings into the euro, or if the global pandemic interferes with the supply chain for consumer goods – all inflationary matters outside the control of industrial countries or the Federal Reserve.

An economic negotiating session with China might look like this, for example. The U.S. states that it intends to protect its own manufacturing base from any further inroads from China by imposing tariffs and sanctions and subsidizing our manufacturing base. China could then respond by telling the U.S. not to expect any help in their future relations with North Korea or Iran. Instead, China communicates their intent to meet their energy requirements by purchasing oil from Iran, and that they will pay for it by offering Iran nuclear expertise. They would suggest North Korea do the same. China could announce plans to enter into a mutual defense and weapons-sharing pact with Iran, North Korea, and Russia. They could bar any company with 50% shareholders in the U.S. from bidding on infrastructure projects in China, or allow no finished goods manufactured in the U.S. from being imported into China. It is irrelevant to China whether their tractors are Caterpillar or Komatsu, so long as the plant where they were made is in Shenzhen Province. China could also provide highly concessionary grants of substantial magnitude in South America, Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East. They could also substantially reduce their dollar foreign exchange reserves and invest alternatively into the euro, Japanese yen, and other currencies. That is leverage.

But political candidates do not win elections by admitting to the leverage held by others. Galileo, Darwin, and later, Jimmy Carter, did not have an easy time contending that we are not the center of the universe, that we are not unique or special, that we are not immune from the leverage held by others. That is not a message the electorate wants to hear.

China cannot be pushed around. Neither can former colonies that are now independent countries. Many have suffered civil war, revolution, and starvation. They have withstood privation. Moreover, they have benefitted from tremendous improvement in their living standards, driven by the removal of restrictions that for hundreds of years impeded the free flow of goods and services.

MAGA, however, denies reality and instead offers the promise of a return to relevance and control – a psychologically uplifting message. That puts pressure on globalists to compete. But they soon realize it makes little sense to compete on "rust belt" products with the likes of China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. They have competitive advantages that they will not give up. The United States could compete only by substantially lowering its wages, restricting imports, loosening environmental and work condition controls, purchasing raw materials and commodities at extremely high prices, and restricting the outsourcing of services. Highly inflationary. It is a game that is better to lose or, better yet, not play.

"The industrialized countries, in short, no longer have all the marbles to play with. Globalization did not cause, but simply reflects, the diminished capacity of industrial powers to implement policy unilaterally."

What arguments can the globalists make that might temper the hostility to globalization and be politically attractive? They can point with pride to the tremendous increases in the standard of living throughout the world. They can point out that in the 1980s two billion people on our planet lived in extreme poverty earning less than $2 a day. Today, 500 million. In 1970, 280 million children under the age of five were underweight. Now 80 million. Life expectancy in India went from 41 years in 1958 to 65 years today. In Bangladesh, 21% were literate in 1960, 65% today can read and write. In China, in 1960 37% were literate, now over 90%. Child mortality worldwide in 1960 was 22%. It's now 4%. Globalization provided the underpinning that made these gains possible.

The battle lines are drawn. One side chooses Machiavelli and Adam Smith and plays on the barely acknowledged insecurity and anger from perceived irrelevancy. The globalists, in response and, somewhat defensively, quote John Donne:

"No man is an island entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as any manner of thy friends or of thine own were; any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind. And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee."

Or, globalists complain about the theft of intellectual property, unfair playing fields, subsidies, and terrible working conditions in lower-income countries – all valid points that so far have little impact on the exports of lower-income countries.

"Does the United States have any cards to play? Yes. We could compete in those sectors where we have a comparative advantage. We have an educated population. We have created an environment incentivizing innovation."

Does the United States have any cards to play? Yes. We could compete in those sectors where we have a comparative advantage. We have an educated population. We have created an environment incentivizing innovation. We have an independent legal system that respects contracts and property rights. We have an independent judiciary.

Perhaps candidates for public office might listen to Bob Dylan: "The answer, my friend, is blowin' in the wind, the answer is blowin' in the wind:" Infrastructure. Renewable energy projects, new schools, highways, hospitals, dams, high-speed transit, airports, new dock facilities, train stations, railroads, soil and dune erosion projects, low-cost housing, reservoirs, concert and performance halls, sports stadiums, museums, aesthetic improvements, parks, river and bay clean-up, food/grain storage facilities, and irrigation systems.

That's a lot of not readily exportable jobs across the entire job spectrum, financed by the dollars we pay to China and others (which are invested in U.S. Government bonds) for their low-cost exports to us. Take their goods and services and be thankful China and other countries remain committed to financing our infrastructure, consumption, and life-style. It makes no sense to waste resources in a futile attempt to compete in manufactured products made by two billion people prepared to work at $3 per hour. Better to be a feudal landlord than a futile one.

Government should invest in research and development institutes, similar to the National Research Laboratories, the Oak Ridge experience in World War II, and the space program, where government partners with the private sector and universities. Government could provide the scarce risk capital for research on alternative and more efficient energy sources, the effects of climate change, aeronautics, materials science research, water salinization, food protection, genetics, biotech, and medical diagnostic equipment. The output of such research institutes, financed mostly by government, could be available at minimal cost to the private sector.

The United States can also afford to subsidize the production of a few products such as electric cars to a far greater extent than provided by recent tax laws. In addition to the substantial favorable environmental impact, a cost of say $10,000 would be highly effective in combating inflation and creating jobs.

And, tariffs could be unilaterally dismantled. They are inflationary and passed on to consumers or stockholders. They are borne primarily by industrialized countries, not China. Tariffs are like the little round silver balls in pinball machines spinning and bouncing on their random and unpredictable journey.

The U.S. might also exert maximum pressure on Saudi Arabia to triple the volume of oil that it produces. That will drive down the price of fuel immediately.

The U.S. could reestablish relationships with Iran. It makes no sense for Iran, on the cusp of having weapons of mass destruction, to be pushed into a détente with Russia and China. And our relationship with China could also be recalibrated. China is a potential friend, not an adversary. China produces goods and services that we want at very low cost.

It makes little sense to apply sanctions and controls for the purpose of making Russia, Iran, North Korea, and others economically bereft. The world is not a safer place if adversaries are economically emasculated. That is exactly what put the National Socialists in power in the 1930s in Germany.

The Brazilian Presidential Election of 2022 and the Crisis in Brazilian Democracy

By Philip Evanson
Associate Professor Emeritus of History
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Rio de Janeiro – March 29, 2023

The Brazilian election of 2022 was followed worldwide because Brazil was clearly an important country, and because of the contenders for president. Former president Luis Inácio Lula da Silva was making a comeback and led in the polls while incumbent president Jair Bolsonaro was seeking reelection feeling certain he would win. From today's perspective, they are the outstanding Brazilian political figures of their generation. Lula raised social democracy, strongly flavored with syndicalism, to a peak during his two terms as president from 2003 to 2010. Bolsonaro, though a marginal figure until his 2018 election as president, brought a hitherto unknown version of conservative governance and presidential leadership to Brazil. By the time of the election, both men carried with them fervent hopes of tens of millions of Brazilians. Votes cast for the two candidates in the presidential runoff on October 30 were more than 120 million. The results gave Lula 50.9% of the votes and Bolsonaro 49.1%, the closest presidential election in Brazilian history.

Both Lula's and Bolsonaro's origins and preparation for the presidency differed greatly from previous presidents. Lula was born in the Brazilian northeast, perhaps the most impoverished area in Latin America, and certain details from his early life still have the power to shock. His first childhood home was a shack built over a beaten earth floor without running water or a bathroom. He later migrated with his family to São Paulo, making the thirteen day long trip in the back of a truck. In São Paulo, he received four years of formal education, followed by training as a skilled machinist operating a lathe. The work was dangerous, and he lost a finger working at a lathe. Lula rose to prominence as a charismatic labor leader commanding autoworkers striking against multinational motor vehicle companies in the late 1970s when Brazil was moving from military dictatorship to democracy. Striking autoworkers (there were several strikes) received ample news coverage inside and outside Brazil. Lula's manifest abilities as a leader had political consequences as middle and upper class collaborators joined him to establish the Workers Party in 1980. His trajectory was no longer linked to labor unions as part of a syndicalist state, but to political party competition with the goal of being elected president. Bolsonaro by contrast grew up in the interior of São Paulo, a product of small-town, lower middle-class life. He knew how to take advantage of educational opportunities as a child and adolescent and later graduated from the army military academy at Agulhas Negras. Bolsonaro learned, though, that he lacked the vocation of the

professional soldier; he was unwilling to submit quietly to the hierarchical discipline of the army. He left the military with a rank of captain in 1988 and entered politics in Rio de Janeiro.

In the late 1970s, Lula was the newest Latin American political phenomenon to capture international attention as had Emiliano Zapata three generations before in Mexico, and Fidel Castro and Che Guevara a generation earlier in Cuba. For the United States government and a large swath of U.S. public opinion, Lula and his autoworkers had a definite advantage over Castro's guerrillas since they were not communists. In fact, they were strongly supported by Brazil's progressive Catholic Church, then receiving much attention for liberation theology activism in behalf of the poor. Lula's brother was a communist, and had tried to convince him to join the party to no avail. An upper-class woman, one of the historic founders of the Workers Party in 1980 who knew Lula very well, explained to me that he did not become a communist because "Lula was very Catholic." The social democracy of Lula and the Workers Party emphasized the message "Everyone knows we have a permanent commitment to the poor," a message I remember hearing Lula say with quiet conviction during a speech in Rio de Janeiro in 2010. His two terms as president from 2003 to 2010 were considered largely successful and won Lula international acclaim.

On January 1, 2023, Lula began his third term as president, this time over a deeply polarized Brazil. He was haunted by the strong popular support for Bolsonaro, admitting that Bolsonarismo had been "consolidated." As early as 2018, he foresaw a deadly struggle between his Workers Party and Bolsonaro. Lula's social democracy and activist state was pitted against Bolsonaro's newly minted, combative conservatism that strove to minimize the state and privatize state owned firms, and, to the extent possible, the whole economy. Lula nevertheless began his third term vigorously active. He made his first foreign trip on January 23 to Buenos Aires for the meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). CELAC brought together delegations from thirty countries comprised of political voices from both the left and right. Lula delivered a keynote address on the importance of CELAC countries becoming a consequential region in an emerging multipolar world. While Lula recommended tilting towards Europe rather than Asia, particularly China, Uruguay's center-right president Lacalle Pou disagreed and argued that Uruguay needed to "open to the world." Though Uruguay was a member of the Mercosur trade bloc alongside Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and seven other associated states, Pou ignored the bloc's rules and signed commercial agreements with China and New Zealand. Lula also joined with Argentine president Luis Fernandes in arguing that it was the left that defended democracy. Pou dissented, stating that "it's not necessary to be a leftist to defend democracy," adding that not everyone present "at the table" had democratic values, a thinly veiled reference to Cuba. Pou believed that CELAC could not be a "club of ideologues." The next day Lula travelled to Uruguay, where Pou welcomed him by commenting, "I've always thought that Brazil, because of its size, ought to be generous with neighbors such as Uruguay." In both Buenos Aires and Montevideo, Lula unexpectedly revived grievances from Brazil's recent political history. He attacked former vice president Michel Temer and the Brazilian congress for carrying out the *golpe de estado* that removed his handpicked successor president Dilma Rousseff in 2016 and made Temer president for nearly two years. According to Lula, the presidencies of Temer and Bolsonaro destroyed all the advances Brazil achieved during the thirteen years of Workers Party governance, leaving Brazil in dire straits today, economically and socially. Late in the afternoon in Montevideo, Lula met with Pepe Mujica, an old friend, ex-guerrilla, and former president of Uruguay. Mujica pointedly asked, "What is this mess you got yourself into?"

As the first months of Lula's presidency draw to a close, there is a continuing crisis in Brazilian democracy that recalls some features of previous periods (1922-1930, 1961-1964), where several years of disruptive political acts culminated in the overthrow of a regime. Brazil has had seven constitutions since 1824, six of them since the establishment of the Republic in l889. Nevertheless, the current crisis has three features not seen before. The first is an activist Federal Supreme Court (STF) that extends to the Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE), the two tribunals together playing an important role during the October general and runoff elections. The second and third features follow a suggestion of Ademar Borges, an authority constitutional law, who notes that democracies can have combative and militant characteristics. Brazil's combative democracy features Lula, Bolsonaro, and STF minister Alexandre de Moraes as protagonists, each of whose combativeness increases public controversy. Militant democracy was exemplified by large daily pro-Bolsonaro protestors who began gathering at military and government buildings with the announcement of Lula's victory. After protestors invaded government buildings at the Plaza of the Three Powers in Brasília on January 8, the army and federal police dissolved these mass protests. The invasion served as a green light to the Lula administration to end the protests.

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JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

Today's judicial activism has, to some extent, grown out of an academic argument that members of the executive and legislative branches mean well, but are largely controlled by outside pressure groups and cannot defend the interests of electors or do what they promised voters. The congress especially had faltered in recent years in writing good legislation and not investigating the pernicious influence of pressure groups. Using the Constitution, Brazil's carefully elaborated codes of law, and the constitutional power of the judicial branch to investigate, the Federal Supreme Court (STF) sees itself rectifying illegalities and omissions of the legislative and executive branches. This plunge into activism was not part of the writing of the 1988 Constitution, nor had it ever been part of the STF's history. Minister Alexandre de Moraes, who joined the court in 2019, has emerged as an outsized exponent of activism. A fellow minister labeled Moraes the court's "sheriff," while the Workers' Cause Party, whose assets he froze, scathingly referred to the bald justice as a "skinhead in a toga," the toga being the signature vestment of STF ministers. Moraes's supporters find him well prepared and courageous. Investigative journalist Glen Greenwald of WikiLeaks fame, a twenty year resident in Brazil, notes the power deployed by Moraes and the danger it represents to civil liberties: "I find it dangerous that a judge may have so much power to initiate accusations, and afterwards to declare the accused guilty without a trial or being given notice."

STF activism and Alexandre de Moraes' leadership has grown for several reasons. First were concerns over the safety of the court and its ministers in politically polarized Brazil. As with each federal branch of government located in Brasília, the STF produced its own safety protocol. The STF

originally limited this safety protocol to include only its own modernist Supreme Court building and immediate surrounding environs. However, social media platforms allowing free-for-all discussion and an abundance of "fake" news caused the STF to include internet posts as a threat to its safety. In 2021, federal deputy Daniel Silveira posted a video on social media with violent verbal attacks against members of the STF. On the recommendation of Prosecutor General of the Republic (PGR) Augusto Aras, Moraes arrested, convicted, and sentenced Silveira for crimes against the democratic rule of law, and stripped him of his congressional mandate. His parliamentary immunity offered no protection. It did not extend to freedom of speech on social media. Silveira would never have been prosecuted had he limited his inflammatory speech to the Chamber of Deputies. In making a video and putting it on the internet, he was judged as endangering the STF and its ministers. The day after conviction, President Bolsonaro combatively pardoned Silveira, which opponents immediately decried as *golpismo*, or an attempt to seize power.

Moraes chose to take charge of cases of persons arrested for the January 8 invasion of government buildings in the Plaza of the Three Powers, during which the door of his own office was torn off its hinges. They numbered 1,459 people. He assumed the responsibility of deciding whether to hold them in preventive custody or to release them, redefining the rules of the custody hearing in the process.

Custody hearings are a new feature of Brazilian due process. Introduced in 2015, custody hearings are required in the Federal District (DF). Arrested individuals have the right to a lawyer (public defenders are also available), while a public prosecutor is present to represent the state. All are questioned by a judge to determine whether the individual should continue to be held or released. If mistreated, an investigation is ordered. Custody hearings are an advance over the long established system of arrest where the only record was a written statement by a member of the state government civil police. Moraes put federal police and state civil police of the DF to work around the clock, completing forms that became the basis for decisions. He insisted on custody hearings, but denied judges the power to hold or release individuals, which he would decide, surely a troubling innovation in applying this newly acquired citizen right. Some were released, but with restrictions such as curfews or the requirement to wear electronic anklets. A larger number were held in preventive detention, so called because the purpose is to prevent the individual from committing more crimes or destroying evidence. Their ordeal was not over, since precautionary measures and preventive detention can lead to long periods of confinement or semi-confinement. Preventive detention is the most common form of lengthy imprisonment in Brazil, and much more likely to occur than a sentence following a speedy criminal trial, a relatively rare event. Former Rio de Janeiro governor Sergio Cabral recently emerged from five years of preventive detention. Though charged with a long list of corruption related crimes, he never went to trial.

Alexandre de Moraes has acted in a number of ways his critics find arbitrary and unconstitutional. For example, he also imposed prior restraint censorship on written, televised, radio, and social media platforms in order to remove what he judged as fake news and uses of defamatory language. He treated violations of prior restraint as breaking the democratic rule of law. Defamatory language during the election and presidential debates had included calling Lula a thief (*ladrão)*, and Bolsonaro genocidal (*genocida*), a feature of partisan name calling alluding to crimes for which neither candidate had been convicted. Lula had been convicted of money laundering, but the STF annulled the verdict because of due process violations, and it was now against the democratic rule of law to call Lula *ladrão.* Censorship imposed during the general and runoff elections was

originally intended only for that period, but has continued after Lula's government has been sworn in, and nobody knows when it will end. Moraes also refused to accept formal complaints questioning the outcome of the presidential election after he declared Lula the winner. Liberal party president Valdemar Costa Neto acceded to Bolsonaro's request to ask Alexandre de Moraes as president of the Superior Electoral Tribunal to review presidential runoff election results after technical studies revealed the electronic voting booths were vulnerable to sophisticated attacks by hackers, and pointed to cyber anomalies in casting and counting votes. Moraes dismissed the request as a temerity undeserving of standing, and fined the Liberal Party 4.5 million dollars for bringing it forward. This recalled an earlier case of recorded radio messages that were allowed on air shortly before the runoff election. Bolsonaro's team of experts monitoring his messages noted they were not always aired while those for Lula were. Bolsonaro complained to Moraes, who gave him an evening to develop a study. While Bolsonaro dozed nearby, his team worked through the night and produced the study. Presenting it to Moraes, the minister declared the election over, would not consider the report he had asked for, and wanted to know where Bolsonaro's group received the money for the study.

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Critics of Alexandre de Moraes have no trouble citing what they believe are several arbitrary, unconstitutional acts, especially during and after the 2022 election and the assault on the Plaza of the Three Powers. Still, what he and the STF would do in the future remains uncertain. For example, how long would prior restraint censorship continue? What was Lula's view of the judiciary in late January? After replacing several leaders in the federal police and federal highway police, Lula concluded that the executive, legislative, and military branches of government would now be able to fulfill their duties. He omitted any reference to the judicial branch fulfilling its duties.

COMBATIVE DEMOCRACY

That combativeness is a prominent feature of contemporary democracy in Brazil can be blamed or credited to Lula, Bolsonaro, and Moraes. Each contributes something to the mix. Commentators have noted a spirit of *revanche*, a desire for revenge, in Lula missing from his earlier political life. In 2017, Lula was convicted of money laundering, though the condemnation was annulled in 2021. For Lula, both the conviction leading to incarceration and its subsequent overturning appeared to be humiliating tricks, or *artimanhas*, played on him, and responsible to some extent for a petulance often present in speeches and interviews. The assault on the Plaza of the Three Powers remains an unfinished and vexing issue for Lula, with hundreds of people still detained. Lula is at his worst when talking about whom to blame, discussing the connivances of those responsible for protecting the area, the participation of the military in the assault, and insisting he does not want a CPMI (congressional investigation) because it would bring "confusion," prompting opponents to believe he hopes to avoid discovery of information damaging to his administration, in power since January 1. Lula's administration now pursues a policy of charging detained people with committing crimes of *lesa*

pátria, meaning injuring or offending the nation, a lesser offense in the penal code than terrorism or treason, treason being Brazil's only capital punishment crime. In 2022, for example, Jair Bolsonaro was charged with the crime of *lesa pátria* for questioning the integrity of upcoming national elections thereby bringing the reputation of Brazil into disrepute at home and abroad.

There remains a question of whether Lula can control an impulse to lash out against political opponents, at times in profanity laced language. In politically polarized Brazil, Lula's leadership will continue to be strongly contested. As president, he has the power to issue provisional measures (MPs) that become law if approved by Congress within 120 days, but his MPs remain unapproved. Many federal appointments still need to be made, and the pace of filling them is slow by Brazilian standards. A series of gaffes marked Lula's presidential campaign in 2022, and his presidency in 2023. In 2022, candidate Lula called Bolsonaro ignorant for doubting the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines, suggesting the cause was growing up a country bumpkin in the interior of São Paulo. In 2023, President Lula was so unwise as to declare slavery a misfortune *(desgraça)* that "caused a good thing…miscegenation, the mixture of indigenous, blacks and Europeans permitting that beautiful people might be born here." He was immediately condemned for saying anything good was caused by slavery.

Minister Alexandre de Moraes is an apparently imperturbable combatant in polarized Brazil. Strongly supported by nine of eleven colleagues on the court – a support that grew during controversies over fake news, free speech, and the 2022 election turmoil that seemed to presage a coup – he stands out as a fierce defender of the democratic rule of law as he defines it, even when he is seen as coming close to breaking the law himself. A memorable example of imperturbability was Moraes noting before an audience the large number of individuals arrested in the United States for the January 6, 2021 riot at the Capitol. He laughed and mused: "We have a lot of people to arrest here to keep up with those numbers." Despite criticism at home and abroad, Moraes, ensconced in the judiciary, proceeds calmly with a sense of security and certainty unavailable to either Lula or Bolsonaro.

For Jair Bolsonaro, combativeness seems a way of life. In 1986, as a low ranking army officer, he published a one page article in VEJA, a large circulation weekly news magazine, stating that reports of expulsion of dozens of cadets from the Agulhas Negras military academy for homosexual acts, use of drugs, and supposed lack of vocation for a military career was the result of low salaries that were destroying the officers of the Brazilian army. The article cost him fifteen days of detention. A year later he was quoted in VEJA that if salary increases remained below 60%, there would be bombs exploded in bathrooms of certain military installations, but in a way that prevented anyone being harmed. For this he was tried and convicted by a lower military court, but later absolved by the Supreme Military Tribunal. In 1988, feeling unable to earn enough as a soldier to support his family, Bolsonaro left the army with the rank of captain and entered politics, immediately winning an election for Rio de Janeiro city councilman. Beginning in 1990, he was elected a federal deputy six consecutive times. By late 2017, he was on the cover of VEJA identified as "The Bolsonaro Threat." "With extremist ideas and an insulting discourse," he was said to be the choice of thirty million Brazilians, enough for second place in presidential polls. In 2018, Jair Bolsonaro, the combative federal deputy, defeated Workers Party candidate Fernando Haddad in the presidential election.

Bolsonaro's victory ended over a quarter century of social democratic government. In its place, Brazil now had a government with policies and a tone often starkly at odds with social democracy. Opponents of Bolsonaro saw many qualities in the

one-time army captain they disliked, even abhorred. He was an unwelcome militarist. His administration had retired generals and active duty military occupying important government positions. Opponents either feared or insisted he would revive some version of authoritarian rule, though Bolsonaro stated again and again that he governed within the boundaries of the Constitution, and never took away anyone's freedom. Completely unacceptable to the left were Bolsonaro's views on gender and LGBTQ issues. Damares Alves, his minister of Human Rights and the Family, said boys should wear blue and girls pink. Bolsonaro himself had notoriously made homophobic statements. Was Bolsonaro a racist? He was against quotas based on race, claiming they divided people, a common argument and enough for his opponents to label him a racist. Addressing a largely white audience in Rio de Janeiro as a federal deputy, he accused descendants of fugitive slave communities (*quilombolas)* who had the constitutional right to apply for grants of land and government financial support of *engordando*, or getting fat and taking it easy, an insult Bolsonaro also applied to well-paid labor union officials. After visiting a *quilombola* community, he joked that no adult male weighed less than 250 pounds, using not the standard word for body weight *quilos* but *arrobas* instead, a term that recalled the weighing of sugar bags on Brazil's slave labor plantations. He added being so overweight must have made difficult the siring of children. These remarks got a laugh, but were also deemed disrespectful and racist by a judge who levied a heavy fine on the federal deputy. Bolsonaro has been a determined opponent of further demarcations of Amazon rainforest lands for Indigenous groups and *quilombolas*, even though they continue to have a constitutional right to apply for them. During the 2018 presidential campaign, he went so far as to say that if elected president he would not demarcate an additional centimeter of land. In defending his rainforest policies, Bolsonaro has been at his most combative.

Bolsonaro's combativeness put him in direct conflict with Alexandre de Moraes in the run up to the 2022 election. Neither Bolsonaro nor Moraes yield in arguments when they believe they are right. Buoyed by large enthusiastic turnouts wherever he went, Bolsonaro was convinced he would win the election even if the Superior Electoral Court and the voting machines were against him. He seemed stunned upon losing by a small margin and withdrew for three days into silence. Though he did not concede defeat, he did end his aggressive questioning of electronic voting security in the final weeks of 2022. He recommended to his followers that they had a constitutional right to peaceful protest, but also directed his chief domestic advisor Senator Ciro Nogueira to initiate work on the transition of power with Vice President elect Geraldo Alckmin. Bolsonaro himself would have a cordial meeting with Alckmin as part of the transition. Bolsonaro was an uncertain defeated candidate as Brazil moved toward Lula's inauguration, even as the disputed presidential election continued in play when anti-Lula militants appeared throughout Brazil protesting in front of military instillations.

"[Lula's critics'] future is uncertain, but it's unlikely they will waver in their convictions, meaning half the voting population in Brazil will continue strongly against Lula and his government, and believes the worst about both."

MILITANT DEMOCRACY

The combativeness of Jair Bolsonaro might be in abeyance, but others still fight his battles. Beginning

on October 31 and continuing to January 9, hundreds of thousands of people gathered daily at military installations throughout Brazil protesting the results of the presidential election in open disagreement with Alexandre de Moraes and the Superior Electoral Court that declared Lula the winner. The cause of Jair Bolsonaro, and even more the sense of his followers that they had been deprived of constitutional rights such as freedom of speech, added another chapter to the history of political militancy in Brazil.

Right and left leaning militant groups can flourish in times of democracy. Militancy by definition is a full time endeavor, involves sacrifice, and may be dangerous for militants. At the same time, people's commitment to stop everything else in order to militate for a cause is widely admired. The classic example was the Brazilian Communist Party of the twentieth century. The Communist Party, or *partidão*, (the political party with a vanguard of militants) featured a cultural elite best exemplified by novelist Jorge Amado and architect Oscar Niemeyer. Their longtime leader was legendary captain Luis Carlos Prestes (1889-1990), who led a column of rebellious soldiers, including fifty women combatants, on a march through Brazil's interior from 1924 to 1927. During the march, Prestes came face to face with the depths of Brazilian poverty and concluded that the only thing he could do was join the Communist Party.

Partisan militants supporting Bolsonaro strongly believed in their cause during the closing months of 2022 and opening months of 2023. Throughout November, December and into the first days of January in Rio de Janeiro, militants could be found in front of the Military Command of the East next to the central railroad and bus station. Most were mature middle and upper middle class men and women. Militants dressed in yellow and green with the Brazilian flag prominently displayed on their clothing. A leader with a microphone could be heard calling "SOS [Save Our Soul]" and the protesters answered with "Armed Forces." Another call and response was "All power," answered with "comes from the people," a statement in the first article of the 1988 Constitution. The largest single group of militants encamped in front of the army General Command in Brasília. They set up tents, had eateries, chemical toilets, and places to bathe. A pregnant woman even gave birth to a boy named João. Militants mixed with soldiers and their families, and were an indispensable presence in Brasília doing much to make the arrival of dozens of busloads of protestors to the January 8 mass protest possible. Though the militants were labeled "Bolsonaristas" by the media, they did not bring placards of Bolsonaro or release large inflated figures of him called *pixulecos*. Instead, they focused on issues – their rights as citizen protesters and calls for the end of censorship. Their future is uncertain, but it's unlikely they will waver in their convictions, meaning half the voting population in Brazil will continue strongly against Lula and his government, and believes the worst about both.

Book Reviews

Kagan, Robert. *The Ghost at the Feast: America and the Collapse of World Order, 1900-1941*. New York: Knopf, 2021.

Could the United States have done more to safeguard global security in the first half of the twentieth century? Further, how did American insular thinking contribute to the breakdown of world order during this time? Robert Kagan seeks to answer these questions in his book, *The Ghost at the Feast: America and the Collapse of World Order, 1900-1941*. Part of Kagan's trilogy on U.S. foreign policy history, this book begins after the War of 1898, where the first volume, *Dangerous Nation*, ends and takes the reader to the American entry into World War II. These years, says Kagan, brought the United States into the ranks of the world powers and forced Americans to engage with world affairs, however reluctantly. Kagan leads the reader through a series of key events – the colonization of the Philippines, Woodrow Wilson's internationalism, and Franklin Roosevelt's tactful diplomacy, to name a few – to articulate where U.S. intervention made an important impact around the world. In just about every case, however, the United States retreated from using its full power to uphold the liberal world order and deter aggressive foreign states. Kagan, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a devout supporter of liberal interventionism, contends that the United States could and should have used its ascendant economic, political, and military power to "preserve the peace in Europe" and confront the "have-not powers" that came to plunder the world in war (220). Instead, Americans, politicians and public alike, rested on their "historic traditions" of isolation and refused to acknowledge the role they now played as a world power (464). Only when war was thrust upon them did Americans come to accept the inextricable link between world affairs and their interests. Readable and incisive, *The Ghost at the Feast* offers the casual reader of U.S. history a view into how global peace was lost during this tumultuous time.

Kagan succeeds in describing the fraught nature of the nation's overseas imperial ventures at the dawn of the twentieth century. He brings in the qualms that the business class and academic community had towards the taking of the Philippines and Cuba. Further, Kagan paints U.S. operations in Latin America and the Far East as critical to the interests of the nation. However, the true strength of the book lies in Kagan's examinations of two wartime presidents: Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. Kagan examines the ideological grounds on which Woodrow Wilson kept the United States out of, and then plunged headlong into, the Great War. Wilson was committed to balancing the nation's overseas interests with that of its diverse and conflicted population. With many wishing for the president to keep the United States out of war, Wilson held to that conviction until German brutalities and unrestricted submarine warfare threatened the liberal world order and "thrust" the nation into war (182). Kagan deftly traces how Wilson moved from the champion of neutrality to that of internationalism, giving the reader a stimulating outlook of Wilson's decision-making vis-a-viz Germany and the Allied Powers. Likewise, Kagan presents the Franklin Roosevelt administration's battle against anti-interventionists in an accurate light. For Roosevelt, who was more prone to internationalist thought than many of his political peers, the thought of rival powers swallowing up large spheres of influence was unacceptable and he moved the nation further into the camp of the democratic powers until the totalitarian states brought war to him.

These strengths notwithstanding, *The Ghost at the Feast* is not free of flaws. First, Kagan places too great an emphasis on the notion of American isolationism. Kagan argues that, when it came to the collapsing world order in Europe and Asia, the United States elected to withdraw from any substantive involvement and opted for isolationism. Sure, Americans were wary of getting involved in European imbroglios after the calamity of the Great War. Many U.S. citizens also remained aloof from developments in the Far East or the European continent for they were, as Kagan states, the beneficiaries of the liberal world order and had no

direct threats to their stateside security. That does not mean, however, that the United States was isolationist. Throughout the Western Hemisphere, the United States exercised colonial power, meddled in the affairs of sovereign states, and even held several under occupation. This was done for a variety of reasons, including to enhance the U.S. strategic position vis-a-viz other Great Powers. Though one may commend Kagan's brief treatment of U.S. intervention in Panama, Cuba, or Nicaragua, he, by and large, considers these intrusions to be less foreign affairs than backyard upkeep. Kagan, in an attempt to explain the lack of U.S. force in Asia and Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, claims that Americans had a historic propensity to resort only to violence in the name of self-defense (464). Any scholar of U.S. relations with Native Americans, Latin America, or the history of the early republic's expansion could easily refute such a notion. Further, Washington, D.C. was never disinterested in developments across Asia or Europe. As Kagan even states, successive administrations brokered arms limitation treaties, restructured European war debt, and took measures to uphold the peace short of war (335). With business interests the world over and colonial outposts in Asia to protect, the United States was never truly isolationist toward these regions during the first half of the twentieth century.

Yet Kagan insists that the United States failed to uphold the liberal world order during the world wars. In so doing, he overstates the role that U.S. power could have played in restraining the fascist states. The United States, in Kagan's view, could have stabilized post-WWI Europe by channeling its newfound economic primacy into rebuilding, and not punishing, Germany while keeping "a few thousand troops in Europe – no more than it kept in the Philippines" (302, 467). Whereas the former assertion holds some water, the latter is fantastic. First, the U.S. garrison in the Philippines never totaled less than 10,932 troops between the world wars, according to the Annual Reports of the War Department. Second, as a U.S. possession, the Philippines held a vastly different strategic mandate than continental Europe. Washington was responsible for its defense and needed to maintain its position there to assert its interests in resource-rich Asia – a region that even Kagan knows required more force in place (333). Kagan's confidence that a small armed U.S. force in Europe would have deterred Germany and Italy is relatively baseless. A 20,000-man American occupation force remained in the Rhineland until 1923, when domestic pressures called them home. Larger British and French forces stayed until 1930. Those very domestic pressures to refrain from permanent commitments, only exacerbated when the Great Depression caused most powers to constrict to their own economic blocs, made it exorbitantly difficult for any U.S. president to convince Congress to deploy a force outside U.S. possessions. These very factors led to the recall of Army units at China's Tientsin district in the 1930s, whose presence did not deter Japanese aggression. How, then, could a small U.S. force have done much to keep the peace in Europe?

The Ghost at the Feast is suitable for lay readers interested in U.S. foreign relations during the twentieth century. Though scholars may find some of its claims dubious and easy to counter, any work aimed at broadening the history of the United States in the world merits attention by those who study it. This reviewer, like many, awaits the final installment of this trilogy to see how Kagan treats the United States as the global hegemon.

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Roth, Tanya L. *Her Cold War: Women in the U.S. Military, 1945-1980*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2021.

In *Her Cold War: Women in the U.S. Military, 1945-1980*, Tanya L. Roth argues that, to understand the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s, historians should first look at women's military integration as a key moment in the movement toward gender equality. According to Roth, the U.S. military was not a stagnant environment simply affected by the civilian society it served, but rather a place for social change. The military allowed American women to engage with national defense in ways that moved them closer towards equality. As discussions to expand the draft occurred, military leadership recognized an unused and readily apparent force, womanpower. Since women had proven themselves during World War II, and since the U.S. military believed that a strong and expansive military force was key to national security, leaders saw women as a ripe new influx of power that could contribute to the national defense.

The military was forced to reckon with the fact that it was not only a defense organization, but also a social institution. Roth argues that female Cold War military service was racially integrated from the very beginning. Despite this racial integration, military leadership was first and foremost trying to recruit educated, white women. The early style guides gave pages of guidance on how to style hair and makeup for white women but did not provide guidelines to help African American women do the same. Roth argues that in the later 1950s and 1960s African American women did appear in photographs and recruitment posters, but they were typically presented in the background in a tokenistic way. Officials required enlisted women to have at least a high school degree, but they ignored discrimination that Black women faced due to their race.

Part I, "A Shared Responsibility," focuses on the early realities of making women a permanent part of the military. Men and women in military leadership roles publicly advocated for the Women's Armed Services Integration Act (WAISA) but faced challenges from members of Congress and concerns from civilians. Roth also demonstrates the efforts to identify servicewomen with the domestic American ideal of a civilian woman. The military pushed the narrative in their recruitment materials that, just as the military had made boys into gentlemen for centuries, the military would now be responsible for turning girls into proper ladies. Presenting servicewomen in media was a useful tool for recruitment and a way to help adjust the public to the idea of military women playing gender-appropriate roles in national defense. Image was everything and the military and film studios worked together in the 1950s to ensure that the right image of the American servicewoman was onscreen. In addition to excluding women from combat, women's military training also differed from men's training by including extensive instructions on how to maintain their appearance.

Part II, "The Possibilities and Problems of Wielding Womanpower," tracks how the military dealt with pregnancy, marriage, and homosexual servicewomen. Roth argues that military service provided women the opportunity to take on the responsibilities of citizenship and access new career paths not available in the private sector, but these opportunities were only given to certain women (namely white, educated women). Until the 1960s, the military normally offered women a discharge when they married, while they immediately dismissed women who became pregnant (in or out of wedlock) regardless of whether she wanted to stay or not. Military leadership also believed that a tremendous threat to womanpower was women's sexual misbehavior. Leaders had concerns about women's promiscuity, but the military believed that homosexual women were a far greater threat. The military desperately made efforts to keep lesbian women out of the service, conducting witch hunts that led to many women being questioned about their sexuality and dismissed from the service with little to no recourse.

Part III, "Integration Is Not Enough," focuses on military and civilian attempts to give equal opportunities to servicewomen. Roth highlights the vital role played by the Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Service

(DACOWITS), a committee created in 1951 that included both military and civilian women that advocated for the advancement of servicewomen in the face of frequent resistance from military leadership. Roth looks at the partnership between DACOWITS and the President's Commission on the Status of Women (PCSW), which was the first time DACOWITS worked with a civilian group, to show the growing public interest in American women's changing roles both inside and outside of the military. Roth also explores the discussions around the Equal Rights Amendment and how they prompted civilian and military conversations about who should be responsible for national defense and whether Americans were ready to eliminate sex as a qualification. Roth also demonstrates that, even though many barriers for servicewomen were eliminated in the later 1970s such as the end of women's exclusion from service academies, the job of changing the attitudes of a patriarchal military and the people in it continues to the present day.

Readers might wish that Roth had spent more time on the passage of the WASIA and the heated debates that occurred both inside and outside of Congress regarding military gender integration. The specific complaints and concerns made by Congressmen and civilians are fascinating and the ways military leadership responded to them could shed valuable light on why the legislation looked the way it did and how that influenced women who served after the act was passed in 1948. While she consistently references the act in other chapters, more firsthand dialogue would have enriched her work. This is just a small critique in an otherwise valuable book. *Her Cold War* is an important contribution to military history that highlights the vital role women have played in the military and the ways in which military service benefitted women and pushed feminism forward on a larger scale. As Roth effectively shows throughout her book, to understand the way ideas around gender evolved in U.S. society in the twentieth century, one must first analyze the ongoing integration of military women.

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Stone, Erin Woodruff. *Captives of Conquest: Slavery in the Early Modern Spanish Caribbean*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021.

In *Captives of Conquest: Slavery in the Early Modern Spanish Caribbean,* Erin Woodruff Stone examines the development and evolution of the Indigenous slave trade during the Spanish conquest and early years of colonization in the circum-Caribbean. Focusing on Spanish imperial expansion from 1491 to the prohibition of the Indigenous slave trade in 1542, Stone argues that "the enslavement of and trade in Indians was central to the processes of conquest," helping "to construct economic, legal, and religious colonial policies in the nascent Spanish Empire" (2). Throughout Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, Cuba, the Bahamas, Florida, the Lesser Antilles, Tierra Firme, and what is now the southeastern United States, Spanish exploration and the Indigenous slave trade fueled each other during this period, leading to imperial expansion and eventually the growth of the Atlantic slave trade. Borrowing from anthropologist Marshall Sahlins, Stone argues that the Indigenous slave trade began as a "structure of the conjuncture," or a period "when two distinct cultural systems collide to produce a moment in which multiple cultural schemas are present and interpreted in distinct ways." By the 1520s, however, Indigenous negotiation in the direction of the trade had largely diminished and the Caribbean shifted to what she characterizes as a "shatter zone" of "violence, warfare, disease, and slavery" (6).

Drawing on methods from anthropology, archeology, and history, Stone combines her reading of Spanish documents and chronicles with archeological sources to create an ethnohistory that traces both the evolution of this slave trade and its impact on the Indigenous populations of the Caribbean. Organizing the book chronologically and, at times, regionally, Stone begins with a chapter-long examination of pre-contact conceptions of slavery in both the Caribbean and Spain. Stone illustrates the kinship ties, political alliances, and trade networks that existed between islands to highlight the deeply interconnected nature of the pre-conquest Caribbean, which she argues "helped to shape both the pattern of Spanish conquest and the development of the earliest indigenous slave trade" (13). Stone uses the remaining five chapters to illustrate the vacillating policy of the Spanish Crown toward Indigenous slavery, which was largely determined by the immediate needs of the empire or a specific region at a given time. Throughout these chapters, Stone highlights the various legal methods of enslavement, which at certain times included those determined to be "Caribs," those living on islands deemed "useless" by the Spanish because they did not possess gold, those captured through "just war," and those already enslaved and later bartered for by the Spanish in what they called the "rescate" system. As she traces the expansion of the legal trade, Stone also reveals the existence of "an endemic illegal, and undocumented Indigenous slave trade," which she argues "flourished due to the contradictory nature of Spanish laws, the distance of American territories from Spain, and the general ambivalence of Spanish officials toward the plight and legal status of Indigenous peoples" (5). Ending her study with the passage of the New Laws, which outlawed the Indigenous slave trade, Stone asserts that it was not moral arguments that ended this trade, but the empire's need to make the colonies stable and profitable.

Captives of Conquest makes many important interventions in the historiography of the conquest and early Spanish colonization. Throughout her detailed examination of the Indigenous slave trade, Stone illuminates important political, economic, and cultural structures in the Caribbean both before and after contact. This region, which remains largely understudied as a whole during this period, emerges not as a backdrop to the areas that would become Spain's first two viceroyalties, but as an area that was vital to the establishment of the Spanish colonial project. Importantly, Stone applies to the Caribbean the recent developments of conquest historians who move beyond the frameworks of Indigenous resistance, removal, or isolation to highlight the paradoxes of the early period of

colonization.[1] Stone illustrates the persistence of pre-contact political structures and connections between islands and regions to show "evidence of survival, incorporation, and knowledge sharing" among those who were impacted by the trade (9). Throughout her work, Stone also traces the complex and diverse ways that Indigenous individuals and groups negotiated the expansion of this trade at the hands of the Spanish. From the Taíno ideas that drove the earliest laws of enslavement in the empire, to the deceit and abandonment of enslaved individuals forced to lead colonizing missions known as "entradas" into both North and South America, and the numerous and lengthy rebellions that brought the trade to its final end, Stone underscores the instances where Indigenous groups influenced Spanish expansion and policies.

Stone's focus on the Spanish Empire in the sixteenth century also makes an important contribution to the larger historiography of the Indigenous slave trade, which has remained heavily centered around the Dutch and British Empires in the seventeenth century. Stone joins a number of historians who are attempting to illuminate the importance of slavery and the slave trade to the early Spanish imperial project.[2] Building on this work, Stone brings together the history of the Indigenous slave trade with that of the African slave trade to examine the ways that they coexisted in the first half of the sixteenth century and influenced each other. Instead of viewing African slavery as a replacement for Indigenous slavery, Stone highlights the ways that these two institutions and their victims worked and, at times, rebelled alongside each other, fundamentally shaping the establishment of the Spanish Empire and its policies in the Caribbean. Stone's close and critical readings of a wide variety of Spanish documents and decrees from this period also vastly alters previous understandings of the size of the Indigenous slave trade in the Caribbean, with Stone's estimations of the actual number of Indians enslaved to be between 250,000 to 500,000.

Overall, *Captives of Conquest* is an impressive work that makes many important contributions to the study of the Indigenous slave trade, the early colonial Caribbean, and the Iberian Atlantic. The length and writing style make it an accessible work that serves as an excellent introduction to the largely understudied Indigenous slave trade in the Spanish Empire and the early colonial Caribbean.

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[1] James Lockhart, *The Nahuas after the Conquest: A Social and Cultural History of the Indians of Central Mexico, Sixteenth through Eighteenth Centuries* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Camilla Townsend, *Annals of Native America: How the Nahuas of Colonial Mexico Kept their History Alive* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[2] Emily Berquist Soule, "From Africa to the Ocean Sea: Atlantic Slavery in the Origins of the Spanish Empire," *Atlantic Studies* 15, no. 1 (2018): 16–39.