

Interviews with CENFAD Speakers

Soft Power, Hard Truths: Rethinking U.S. Foreign Policy with Osamah Khalil



GRACE ANNE PARKER: I thought a good place to start might be to ask how the events of September 11, 2001, changed U.S. foreign policy. What strategic shifts occurred in the wake of the War on Terror, and how did this impact America's military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq?

DR. OSAMAH KHALIL: It's a great question. One of the things I try to show in my new book is that there has been a militarization of responses to social problems, crime, and narcotics. So, terror, which had been mainly treated as a criminal justice issue, with some exceptions, after September 11, is now treated as a military issue. Previous attempts to deal

with terrorism had not worked so the Bush administration is going to argue that the gloves had to come off. One of the things I talk about in the book is that the Bush administration is going to adopt a broad conflation of what they will define as terrorist groups with global influence, who are a threat to our allies, not just the United States, but also our allies and partners. What this means is that several groups who are entirely unrelated to al-Qaeda are covered by this national security policy and the Bush administration's approach. Some of these groups were antithetical to al-Qaeda, but that didn't matter. They had very different aims. Now, what they may have shared were some tactics. This also gets into the second piece of the shift, which is the idea that terrorism was an ideology, not a strategy, that it was knowable but, at the same time, undefinable. We know terrorism when we see it. We know it is planes flying into buildings. It's suicide bombers.

This creates all kinds of broad responses to September 11. There's the War at Home, which includes now pervasive surveillance, the combination of massive warrantless wiretapping of every American, not just those who are identified as suspicious. We have another, much more hands-on approach, including the "if you see something, say

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something” approach. So, some of this predates the month or two before the Patriot Act was passed. What we also see in the Patriot Act, which is quite deliberate, is this idea that if we can use certain laws and specific tactics to respond to crime or narcotics, we can also use them for terror. Also, at home is the beginning of looking at charities and individuals to see possible connections.

There were even options after September 11 for a negotiated agreement. But the Bush administration decided that they would go into Afghanistan with military force. This is where the humanitarian component comes in.

Another consistency I try to trace out in the 90s is the use of humanitarian intervention, and that it’s really about regime change. In Afghanistan, one of the things the Bush administration is going to talk about is, of course, liberating Afghan women, completely reforming Afghan society from the ground up, and turning it into if not a democratic society, certainly not a theocracy. That humanitarian argument is going to make its way into Iraq as well. If there was one significant change after September 11, it was the ability to use the horrible images of that day and the trauma of that day to justify a myriad of policies at home and abroad that most Americans would not have agreed with beforehand. President Bush will say we must fight them over there, so we’re not fighting them here. At the same time, he’s arguing that the War on Terror is over there and here. So, you had several different ways the Bush administration approached this.

Fear is palpable...

The Obama administration did the same thing more subtly. But that use of fear and the constant generation of fear was essential and palpable. The Bush administration

needed to launch a deliberate deception campaign to garner support for an invasion of Iraq, and that tells us how weak their actual case for an invasion was and, ultimately, how much of a foreign policy disaster this turned out to be and remains with us.

GAP: That’s an excellent answer to the question and highlights this idea of fear. Is using fear as a tool a typical pattern across these various administrations, and is it one of the ways the U.S. has justified these military interventions? How does fear tie into national security?

One of the things that politicians like George Herbert Walker Bush and then Bill Clinton, tap into is not so much fear, but hope.

OK: It’s a great question. Fear is palpable, and when the United States comes out of World War II, it is the only atomic power. It is the world’s lone superpower, effectively. It emerges virtually unscathed from the War and is now globally the predominant economic, military, and political power. It is shaping post-war institutions. Yet, very quickly, when you think by March 1947, less than two years after the end of the war, we have President Truman now warning about the threat that is posed by our former ally and what it could pose to both Europe and the Middle East, and how the need for containment is very real. Fear emerges very quickly when the Soviets get their first atomic weapon. Then the arms race begins. That’s also where you could argue when we look at humanitarian interventions. One of the things that politicians like George Herbert Walker Bush and then Bill Clinton,

tap into is not so much fear, but hope. This notion that we can do these humanitarian interventions plays to our best nature. This is a demonstration of American power for good.

In the case of George H.W. Bush, there's this idea that we liberated Kuwait. We didn't overthrow Saddam Hussein but we've liberated Kuwait from an evil dictator. We are going to Somalia to prevent a famine. President Clinton will tap into some of that with Bosnia and eventually Kosovo. As an initial claim, this will cover up many other ongoing messy policies. In a way, we're still untangling and understanding some key drivers. Was it just about humanitarianism? What is missing from the broader political discourse in the U.S. is how that combination of the invasion of Iraq under false pretenses, the invasion of Libya under false pretenses, the U.S.'s response to the Ukraine war, and then an opposite response to Israel's War in Gaza. What that's done to a generation or so, especially of young Americans, is that they're seeing that these excuses and rationales don't add up and that they're not consistent. Even comparing Ukraine and Russia with Israel and the Palestinians, how the Biden administration responded, and how the Trump administration is behaving has, of course, you could argue led to a bit of cynicism, but even more so, a lack of credibility in the part of policymakers in Washington that I think at least one if not two generations are still struggling with.

GAP: There's a lot there to pick up on, but one of the things that made me think about it was the idea that the West is exhausted. How are the U.S.'s allies worldwide responding to this global shift? Are there patterns that we can pick up? How are those patterns changing as we move into the present day?

OK: That's a great question. What's often missed is that Trump is not wrong. That America's allies in NATO had not been paying

their fair share. It's a claim he made in 2016 on the campaign trail, and enters office and insists to the U.S.'s allies you will have to start paying for our protection. Or at least paying if it's not your fair share, at least the percentage you should pay into NATO. But let's keep in mind that since NATO was created, this is precisely the structure the United States wanted. Without the United States, there would be no NATO. The expansion of NATO post-Cold War was an American project. It was not necessarily a project by America's European allies. In some respects, there's a lot of disagreement about this. I agree with John Gaddis and George Kennan that this was wholly unnecessary, and that the opportunity missed at the end of the Cold War was to fully integrate Russia into the Western Alliance. History doesn't repeat, but it rhymes. Not learning those lessons at the end of the Cold War has been a profound error.

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NATO's ability to fight a war without the United States is severely limited. Some of that has come to a head with the War in Ukraine, where you've had the much smaller states that devote much smaller amounts NATO, pushing for consistently stronger or more aggressive policies. How much of that weakens the coalition? America's allies are unequal, and the U.S. doesn't treat them equally, but we expect them to follow us without criticizing our actions.

GAP: That's interesting. So, the U.S. expects total support from its allies abroad. What

about at home? We saw much criticism of how the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan. Does public opinion have a tangible effect? Has it always? Is it stronger now because of things like social media?

The party in power displays an utter dismissiveness towards what the youth have to say.

OK: It's a great question. One of the challenges of looking at foreign policy is how much influence public opinion has. One of the things I did in the book was look at this intersection of domestic politics and policy with foreign policy. Foreign policy doesn't generally play a significant role in presidential elections. Presidents don't come in with a foreign policy strategy. It's often very reactive. Even if they had talked about a strategy, one of the things you end up hearing from them later is that it just became reactive. Everything became reactive. What can be very frustrating, particularly for younger Americans, is what happened with Vietnam, Iraq, and now in Gaza. The party in power displays an utter dismissiveness towards what the youth have to say.

There were remarkable comments made by the Democratic Party leadership towards college protesters in 2024. It can be highly demoralizing for younger voters. And we saw that in '68, for example. Humphrey lost in a very narrow election to Nixon. We saw it again in 2024. You have Kamala Harris who is in a terrible situation. She only has a hundred days or so to put a campaign together. She's not particularly well-known to the American public. She's effectively selected and doesn't go through a primary. She's unknown to even the

base effectively. She was not a very prominent vice president. And then, at the same time, she did not separate herself from a president who was becoming deeply unpopular and an electoral base that felt misled, particularly Democratic Party voters who felt like they'd been lied to for at least a year, probably longer, about the state of the president's health. And then a general dismissiveness from the administration that appeared to be playing to the polls and saying we're working towards a ceasefire. Instead, what we kept seeing was escalation after escalation.

One of the challenges there is, much like in 1968, and what's interesting about that year is that there was a general belief among supporters and some that knew both men, that Nixon and Kissinger would enter office and end the War in Vietnam. Then Nixon doesn't and instead he escalates, which contributes to the events at Kent State and the explosion of protests. Then, we see something similar when Trump comes in and says these wars were terrible. That's what he said in 2016, and we're not going to do them, but then he escalates. He promises to "end all wars" in the 2024 election and then comes in and starts bombing Yemen again. It can make people receptive to specific arguments. So that's one group of the electorate, and then others just become completely disillusioned with politics and start looking at other avenues to try and influence foreign policy. That can be anything from grassroots activism to various types of activities. I think the best thing that you can say about a kind of public protest, is that perhaps it limits or forces an administration to respond in a way that silence doesn't. Now, it doesn't mean you're going to be able to change policy as we saw with Gaza. The Biden administration didn't change anything. There were subtle changes in the way that the Biden administration talked about Palestinian suffering or the

number of casualties or claiming they were working toward a cease-fire, but that was gaslighting the American public. And there was no significant shift in policy.

GAP: It was very striking to many young people to see how hostile the government and their academic institutions were to the protests, especially as we think about academic institutions as ideally being a place to explore and have those difficult conversations. Because if not there, then where can you do it?

OK: It should have been a place to explore, but it's not new that it wasn't. For example, what's missed about the Vietnam War experience is that it depended on your campus. Of course, there are outliers, such as Columbia, but even then, there's a buildup. These were small movements that just grew. By the time you get to Kent State, and the response to the Kent State protests and the invasion of Cambodia, 20% of college campuses shut down. Students think the Vietnam War protests ended the War. They didn't. Did they limit or change the things that LBJ had hoped to do? Yes, but that wasn't the only factor.

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Let's keep in mind that by the time you get to the protests in Gaza, you are now 20-plus years into the War on Terror, which has become institutionalized. You have college administrators and faculty who completed their Ph.D.s and rose through the ranks during the War on Terror. You have broader trends in academia that contribute to this. First, there is a greater power of the boards,

some of whom want to run these universities. Second, you have administrators who are very subservient to their board. Third, you have the diminishing of tenured and tenure-track positions in academia, so the vast majority of them are contingent faculty members who are in precarious positions. Keep in mind that only two years earlier, Russia invaded Ukraine. This is an outrageous violation of state sovereignty, international law, and human rights. The universities embraced Ukraine, and this was permissible. Gaza was not. Gaza is controversial. This is why some students feel they can't trust the government, or academic institutions, or the media. One of the challenges is whether there is enough space for students to explore these topics in college.

GAP: Many young people feel disillusioned with how the Democratic Party has handled the Trump administration.

OK: Yes, I think the Democrats will try to paper over their weak response. But for a generation, especially of college students, this is damning. They've hurt themselves with an entire generation. It's not that students are going to gravitate towards Trump. Who or what do they gravitate toward? Or do they become disengaged? That is unclear.

GAP: There's just so much that fits into all of this. When we think about interventions, how integrated are military intelligence and diplomacy? Has that changed a lot from previous decades? Is there an appetite for less U.S. intervention?

OK: Those are great questions. If anything, what I tried to talk about in the book was the over-reliance on military force and the use of the military. The United States is involved in conflicts that most Americans do not know are happening. When we think about what they keep calling the Signalgate controversy, what was the controversy? Not

that we were bombing another country without congressional approval. The controversy was that a reporter was on the chat. This tells us something about the state of U.S. foreign policy, it's yet another one of these examples where the use of force for political means is no different than what we were doing in Vietnam. You're using the military for political means.

GAP: Yeah, that reminds me of the quote that you shared at the end of your lecture when President Biden said that bombing the Houthis was not effective, but the bombing was going to continue.

So, we have embedded geographic ignorance and historical ignorance.

OK: Yes, and it is striking. One of the implications of the Vietnam War was the move from the draft to a volunteer force. The reality is that we have such a small footprint of individuals involved in the military who are impacted by this. The broader American public is generally unaware. Yemen is a place that the vast majority could not find on a map. A polling company asked me to respond to a poll they conducted two months after Russia invaded Ukraine. The reporter told me that the poll showed Americans wanted more aggressive action. When I reviewed the polling data, it also revealed that 59% of those polled could not correctly identify Russia on a map, and 79% could not identify Ukraine on a map. But, most strikingly, 19% of American registered voters could not find the United States on a map. According to the crosstab, they were also the ones who wanted the most

aggressive action. So, we have embedded geographic ignorance and historical ignorance.


One of the many reasons I used Vietnam as a kicking-off point for the book is that it is a great way to tap into historical amnesia about specific policies and tactics, claiming they were a success when they were an absolute failure, and then replicating them in different combat zones. So we have American power that is both limitless and has limited impact. The fact that you can send a drone anywhere and bomb whatever village you want. You can do a decapitation strike; you can kill any number of people. But as we're repeatedly learning in Yemen, that won't get down to the core issue. Unfortunately, we've come to a point where the United States is so powerful that we don't believe we have to talk to these countries. We don't want to give them the credibility of talking to them one-on-one.

In some cases, I think Trump deserves credit because he was willing to do actual talks in the first administration and some signs of it in the second administration. He signed a peace treaty with the Taliban, something that had been on the table for a while. We must recognize that military force will not achieve everything we want, but we haven't. This is difficult because it leaves little room for American soft power. I think there is a potential for a very different foreign and military policy. It is just not one that the U.S. has been willing to adopt consistently, and keeps reverting to the same old airstrike intervention model. Until that changes, I'm afraid, we will see diminishing American power on the world stage.

GAP: That makes sense, yes. This has been fantastic. Thank you so much for your time!

OK: I'm glad you like it. I enjoy doing it.

Talk Loudly and Carry No Plan: Dr. Michael Kimmage on U.S. Strategy in the Age of Trump



GRACE ANNE PARKER: Thank you so much for taking the time to talk to me today. A big part of President Trump's reelection campaign was his desire to improve relations with Russia and, more specifically, end the war in Ukraine quickly. Overall, how do you evaluate his administration's actions regarding the war in Ukraine thus far?

DR. MICHAEL KIMMAGE: There has not been a massive U.S. policy shift toward the war in Ukraine. So, except for five or six days, the Biden administration's military commitments to Ukraine continued. The sharing of intelligence and targeting has continued, and there has not been a structured withdrawal of U.S. support from Ukraine. I would evaluate that positively, as it is necessary for any sound U.S. policy toward the region. The second

point that I would make, trying to begin on the generous side, is that it's undoubtedly the right, the deserved right of a new president to initiate talks, to see where the Russians stand, to know where the Ukrainians stand, to shake things up, to try a different approach, to try to find the points where a previous policy was working. Still, you have no visible coordination of U.S. policy with European policy on the war. That's a mistake. What the U.S. is trying to do is to be neutral. But it results in statements about the war that are very factually inaccurate, such that Russia is 20 times the size of Ukraine, or Ukraine is about to lose the war, or it's Zelensky's fault for starting the war.

So, the adoption of Russian talking points is a mistake.

All these statements come from the White House, which only makes managing the messaging communications part of this puzzle much more difficult. So, the adoption of Russian talking points is a mistake. Also, the Biden and Obama administrations had many difficulties with the Ukrainian government. The Trump-Zelensky meeting in the Oval Office burst out those tensions and frustrations. My three most critical points are the erosion of the U.S.-European Alliance, which will make the Ukraine war more difficult, not easier, to solve. Second, the adoption of Russian talking points is a mistake. It muddles the waters. Thirdly, bringing into the open all kinds of difficulties with the Ukrainian government is not going to get the U.S. any closer to a satisfying solution to the problem of this war.

GAP: You brought up a couple of interesting points. Trump positions himself as the guy who can single-handedly fix all these issues. I'm curious if Trump genuinely planned to

bring a speedy end to the war, but because that failed, he now must readjust his strategy, or were those just campaign promises?

MK: It's a great question. So, I'll give you two answers to the question, one that Trump himself might provide and one that he probably wouldn't like to hear. But the first answer goes back to your previous question about things being changed or diminished, broken down in Washington now. I think Trump genuinely, sincerely believes that President Biden and others before him were bad presidents, that they were foolish, that they overcommitted the U.S., that they were engaged in a kind of nation-building and, liberal internationalism that was in and of itself per se foolish, and that it stepped on the toes of other countries and involved the U.S. in conflicts that the U.S. was unable to finish. In that sense, he's probably sincere when he says the Ukraine war was unnecessary; there was no point. And even to the extent that one can parse his points on this matter, this notion that Ukraine started the war or that the U.S. began the war, which you get sometimes from Trump. It follows from this. It's not a factually accurate reading of the war. Russia invaded Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022. But Trump presents it otherwise because he does think that the foreign policy elite was mistaken and idiotic and got the world into this terrible mess.

Trump, more than anyone, knows the incredible value of wishful thinking.

There was a high degree of sincerity in that outlook on the part of Trump when he ran for president in 2024. Life is much more difficult in the office. The second point is

far more cynical and less from Trump's way of seeing the world, or only adjacent to that way of seeing the world. Trump is a marketing master. He's a master at appealing to voters, in a sense, as customers. He has vast experience in various sorts of business enterprises that he's worked in throughout his career. Trump, more than anyone, knows the incredible value of wishful thinking.

When you look at the war in Ukraine, you and I, anyone, what we would want to see more than anything is for the war to be over, for the suffering to be finished, for the bloodshed to be done with. As a presidential candidate, you're not bound to all that much. It's very easy to sell a narrative in which the war comes to a quick conclusion, costless, straightforward, almost effortless, and to appeal to the wishful thinking of the electorate. That puts your political opponents in a challenging position, especially with the war in Ukraine, which is long, inconclusive, and messy, and will not have a neat end to it the way that the Second World War did. Kamala Harris had to defend an indefinite, indeterminate war in which victory is elusive. And you put that up against the wishful thinking of a quick end to the war, and it's just not a winning proposition to do what the opposition had to do to Trump in the 2024 election. So cynically again, now that that wishful thinking is being tested, it's much more difficult that the U.S. doesn't have the leverage to end the war. Trump will phase out the Ukraine war from his active set of concerns. You can retire the problem because it's done its work. But the work was to get Trump re-elected; it wasn't to end the war in Ukraine.

GAP: Absolutely. Why isn't Russia any closer to winning the war than they were three to four months ago? Why is Putin still relentlessly continuing this effort?

MK: I'm happy to get the question because one of the illusions of the Trump era is that the

world revolves around Trump. But the fact is that the U.S. is 25% of the world's GDP. It has the world's preeminent military. It's a mighty country, but the U.S. is, and for a long time, always has just been one factor among many, many other factors. It's great to turn the gaze to Russia and look at the problem of the war from the Russian point of view. The Russian problem with this war is not the White House. It's not the nuances of American policy. Even if U.S. policy were much tougher on Russia or more lenient, that would not fundamentally change the war. The Russian problem with this war is that it was a strategic mistake.

They are living in agonizingly slow ways, the reality of that failure.

Russia invaded Ukraine with insufficient military means to dominate the country. Russia invaded Ukraine in such a way as to mobilize and provoke Ukrainians into very, very fierce opposition to the Russian invasion. Russia currently occupies about 19% of Ukraine's territory in ways that are lawless and brutal. And all that is very well known by the people in Ukraine living in the 81% of Ukraine that's not occupied. Russia has systematically undermined its powers of persuasion in Ukraine, its powers of attracting Ukrainians to its point of view, and its project of turning Ukraine into a colony. It's a massive strategic blunder because there's just so little sense to it. Either you colonized through brute force and were willing to do all the things that the Soviet Union was willing to do when it colonized countries, or perhaps you didn't do it at all. But Russia has pursued an in-between strategy that is disastrous. So, Russia is faced with the

choice of suing for peace in one way or another, maybe holding on to a bit of Ukrainian territory and just trying to put an end to things, which would be enormously humiliating for Putin or any other Russian leader. Or Russia can perpetuate the war, like many great powers do. Hundreds of thousands of Russians are going to die for the sake of an unwinnable battle, but it's going to sustain that war because the personal cost to Putin and the political cost to Putin and his regime are too great to change gears. So, the reason that Russia is failing in Ukraine is that it cannot succeed in Ukraine. What is going to be the nature of Russia's failure in Ukraine? Again, Trump can modify outcomes and shape outcomes. Of course, Ukraine will alter and shape outcomes in that story. But ultimately, that's a Russian story. However, by the invasion they mounted on the 24th of February 2022, they ensured their failure in this enterprise. They are living in agonizingly slow ways, the reality of that failure.

GAP: You raised several key points there. Can you please provide more Cold War context for this current conflict?

MK: It's a great question. On the surface, Afghanistan has a few similarities: it was a war of choice for the Soviet Union in 1979. It didn't go very well for the Soviet Union. That has been like the war in Ukraine for Russia. But in the end, it's much different from the war in Afghanistan. Putin has thrown all his political capital into the war in Ukraine. It is a considerable enterprise. It's a restructured Russian society. It's imposed incredible suffering on the people of Ukraine. That may be like what the Afghanistan war did to the people of Afghanistan. But I don't think that Putin can pull out. It's too big. It's too much of a commitment. How the war has changed schooling in Russia, museums, and popular culture, and all of that puts the war in Ukraine on a very different

footing from the war in Afghanistan. So, in 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev decided that the war in Afghanistan was a mistake. He pulled out. That's not an option for Putin.

It's unlike a Cold War conflict. Let's recall the great proxy wars of the Cold War. The U.S. pulled out of Vietnam and eventually decided it wasn't that important after years and years and years of struggle and suffering. So, the proxy wars were terrible, tremendous, and a prominent part of the Cold War. But they were also negotiable in a way that the Ukraine war does not feel to me.

So, we're between a kind of Cold War and World War II. It's a hybrid of those two kinds of wars. We've gone back in time as much as we've gone forward technologically.

On the other hand, it's fascinating to see Trump amid this situation because it's not where he would have wished to be, understandably. The U.S. is directly involved in a war. It is not best described as a proxy war for the United States. Indeed, Ukraine is not formally an ally of the U.S., but Ukraine is a very close military partner of the U.S. and vice versa. The kinds of support that the U.S. gives are extremely overt. The trajectory of the Ukraine war for the U.S. and its European partners has been upward. The U.S. and its partners have been willing to escalate the war in Ukraine because it's so important. That is unlike the conflicts of the Cold War, where the fear of nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was so great that it hemmed in the escalatory options. It's something bigger, deeper, and more intense than a proxy

war. So, we're between a kind of Cold War and World War II. It's a hybrid of those two kinds of wars. We've gone back in time as much as we've gone forward technologically.

GAP: That's interesting, and it makes me want to ask more about the public perception piece. How do Americans feel about the war in Ukraine? Is public pressure having an effect in the U.S. or in Russia?

MK: This is an excellent question, and I wish I had more evidence on both sides of the war to answer it adequately. On the Russian side, it's simply mysterious to me. My guess is, that the Russian people are most clearly described as anti-anti-war, at least most Russian people are. You can keep your head down in Russia for the most part. But if the population is anti-anti-war, that is good enough for Putin. The Russian state has enough money to buy people's participation in the war and to pay off families where people die. That has kept the war effort afloat in Russia. The war is growing more unpopular over time, which is the story of every war. Putin is a dictator so that he can control the formal media structures. At the same time, every six or every three months, Putin seems to promise that the war is about to end. Well, there's something costly about that for a wartime leader when you keep promising that and not delivering on an end to the war. So Russians are living with an endless war.

For most Americans, Ukraine is not all that important. In the absence of the vivid videos and images we had at the beginning of the war, people's attention went to their personal lives, national issues, or international issues apart from Ukraine. It's not one of the things that's dominated the Trump presidency. Yes, the Trump-Zelensky relationship was one of the big stories for a while, but I don't know if Ukraine has been one of the big stories. The bottom line with the war in Ukraine, when

it comes to American public opinion, is that it's pretty elastic. Trump has tremendous freedom of operation here. Putin has almost no latitude, and Trump has a lot of latitude. So, it's interesting to watch as these two leaders go against each other, as they have a very different political context for working.

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GAP: That's a fascinating framework. I'm curious about the idea that Putin has almost no latitude. So if he were knocked out of power or passed away, then what would happen? I'm thinking about the context of when the Soviet Union was helping support the North Koreans during the Korean War. And then, in 1953, Stalin died, and then an armistice followed quickly. On the other side, if Trump were to suddenly say, Putin is our friend, and we need to help him conquer Ukraine, would that latitude still be there?

MK: These are two great questions. It's probably true that the U.S. missed some significant opportunities between 1953 and, I don't know when, 1959 and 1960, where patterns that had been set in the early Cold War that were very particular to Joseph Stalin's leadership were uncreatively applied to leadership in Moscow after Stalin's death in the spring of 1953. In this case, the flexibility of mind is essential when looking at Russia.

We start to align the country with Putin and confuse the country with Putin. Putin himself does this, saying, I am Russia, and Russia is me. It's maybe unlikely, but certainly very possible, that a post-Putin leader of Russia would say, for pragmatic reasons, maybe we'll hold on to Crimea, but let's perhaps withdraw all the soldiers in Russia from the rest of Ukraine and think of a way to normalize our relations with the neighbors in the region. If that were to happen, it would be a massive dilemma for transatlantic policy because then you would see all the significant divisions. Estimating how the U.S. and Europe would deal with that challenge is hard. It's precisely the kind of thing that we in the academic context should be thinking about because we are the ones who are entitled to a lot of flexibility of mind in our academic line of work. To your second question, Trump will start encountering all kinds of limits in the coming months. I think time will tell, but the period of greatest power for President Trump is now. Nobody can rein him in; nobody can control him. That trajectory may go in very radical directions and prove me wrong, but I think that limits will establish themselves.

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On this issue, it's important to note that while Trump can impose his will on his party and on public opinion, he does care about both and sees a limit. If he were to join forces with Putin in some strong way, the Republican

Party would begin to impose sanctions as the Republican Party did in Trump's first term, where they sanctioned Russia because they didn't like how close Trump was getting to Putin. I don't think that that's completely different now, and that might be one of the issues where Republicans would be willing to go to bat. I don't think the issue of Ukraine matters enough to him for Russia to be the one that breaks apart the Republican Party. So, he's forced to work within certain limits.

GAP: That is so interesting. So, to wrap up here and bring all this together, where do you see the situation in Ukraine heading? How do you think U.S. foreign policy will influence the outcome, if at all?

MK: To be as frank and candid as possible, it's a rather depressing moment for American foreign policy in Europe. Ukraine has figured out ways to build up its defense capacities. That's the most crucial story that one can tell. Germany is committing one trillion dollars to defense spending in the next couple of years, and Germany will be a much more active player in Europe. I don't think that NATO will disintegrate on Trump's watch.

The U.S. is antagonizing a whole array of European allies and partners. The Trump administration has shown itself to be erratic and unreliable with the tariffs. That has been the European conclusion since the

inauguration of Trump in January 2025. The U.S. is going its own way. It's going down its path, and it's a very unreliable and, to a degree, even an antagonistic partner, if that's not a contradiction. So, trust, cooperation, deliberation, and collaboration are all eroding and diminishing. Since 1945, with any number of mistakes, screw-ups, and strategic blunders on the part of Washington, the U.S. has been a force for order and stability, first in Western Europe and then in Europe writ large. Russians would look at this very differently and give you a very different analysis, but this is the analysis I'm eager to give. Since 1945, the U.S. has been a force for stability and order in Europe. The Trump administration, for no benefit to the United States as far as I can see, is giving up on that role. It's undermining some aspects of order and stability in Europe through fights that are picked, especially over Greenland, that have no strategic benefit to anyone, especially to Americans. At the same time, we'll have a degraded transatlantic relationship that will be less effective in Europe than it could be and certainly less effective globally than it could be. There's no inevitable structural reason pushing us in this direction, yet that's the direction we're traveling in.

GAP: This is fascinating. Thank you so much for taking the time to do this!

MK: These are such great questions. I'm so glad that we had the opportunity to do this.