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News from the Director

By Alan McPherson

It's hard to believe that this is only the second issue of *Strategic Visions* since I took over as Director of the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy in summer 2017. What a year it has been! Day-to-day happenings at CENFAD have not changed much—I hope—from when my predecessor Richard Immerman was in charge, but they have kept us busy with thinking of how best to serve and expand the CENFAD community. In addition to the seven talks we hosted in Fall 2017, this Spring 2018 we put on a half-dozen more, ranging in time from the 18th century to the present and in topics from Trump and Europe, to African Americans in World War I, to migration in India. We also collaborated with Global Studies, Temple ROTC, and Political Science and especially co-sponsored a conference on "Cuba in War and Peace."

Spring 2018 Colloquium

Guest speakers for this semester's colloquium were all recommendations to me from our wonderful Temple faculty, who continue to keep CENFAD vibrant through their active participation in its planning and events.

On January 25, Stephen Szabo, Senior Resident Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University's American Institute for Contemporary German Studies and Adjunct Lecturer at the School of Advanced International Studies, spoke on "The Trump Era or Interregnum? The Changing View of Europe in the United States." He argued that, despite the presidency of Donald Trump damaging the U.S. image in Europe, most Americans shared many values in common with Europeans, and he was optimistic that trans-Atlantic relations would improve after Trump. You can read an interview with Szabo here.

On February 14, Adriane Lentz-Smith, Associate Professor of History from Duke University, discussed "African Americans and the War for Democracy," making the case that World War I, somewhat like World War II, had profound consequences in shaping the opportunities (or lack thereof) of African Americans, including for many of the future leaders of the freedom movement.

One week later, CENFAD hosted Vanya Bellinger, National Security and Strategy Visiting Professor at the U.S. Army War College. Her talk, "The Other Clausewitz: Marie and Carl von Clausewitz and the Creation of On War," provocatively advanced the theory that Marie von Clausewitz played an unusually

substantive role in producing her husband's seminal work.

Danielle Sanchez visited on March 15 from Muhlenberg College, where she is Assistant Professor of African History, to discuss "Free(ing) France in Colonial Brazzaville: Propaganda and Resistance in Afrique Française Libre." Her talk was a ground-level look at Africans experiencing urban development, hostile race relations, and intensified colonial repression during wartime.

On April 4, Madalina Veres, a Postdoctoral Fellow in Digital History at the American Philosophical Society and Visiting Fellow at CENFAD, gave a fascinating presentation on "From the Carpathians to the Bay of Bengal: Cartography and the Eighteenth-Century Habsburg Empire" in which she used maps to uncover the failed global ambitions of the Habsburgs.

Finally, on April 19, Sanjeevini Lokhande, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Temple University, talked about "International Human Rights and Forced Migration in National Politics: India since 2002." She explained the rise of Narendra Modi on the heels of anti-Muslim riots and nationalist sentiment.

Cuba in War and Peace

On April 20 and 21, the History Department hosted "Cuba in War and Peace," a conference organized by Temple's own Assistant Professor of History Mónica Ricketts. CENFAD co-sponsored the event alongside History, the Office of the Dean, the Department of Spanish and Portuguese, the Global Studies Program, the Department of Political Science, the Temple University Library, the Faculty Senate, and the Center for the Humanities. Sixteen scholars gave panel presentations on Cuba's history from 1502 to the present, and Cuban writer Antonio José Ponte opened the proceedings with a Friday afternoon talk titled, "¿Qué hace el asesino de Trotski en La Habana? Escritores cubanos e imaginación política." You can view all the panels below.

Keynote
Antonio José Ponte

Panel 1
War, Slavery, and Empire: 1502-1898

Panel 2
State Formation, Unruly Peace: 1898 - 1959

Panel 3
War, Revolution, and the World: 1959 - Present

Panel 4
Exile, Art, War, and Memory

Spring 2018 prizes

In April, the following five graduate students won CENFAD funds to advance their research:

- James Kopaczewski, Marvin Wachman Fellowship in Force and Diplomacy, to pursue research in Minnesota and Florida for his dissertation on the connections between the Civil War and the West, heretofore completely

separate topics.

- Manna Duah, CENFAD Conference Travel Grant, to present on "African Students in U.S. International Education: Mass Democracy and a Cold War Revolution in Ethiopia, South Africa, and the United States," at the African American Intellectual History Society Conference at Brandeis University.

- Brian McNamara, CENFAD Conference Travel Grant, to present on "From Civil Rights Activist to Republican Senate Candidate: Maurice Dawkins and Conservative Black Internationalism" at the "Constructing America: Identities, Infrastructure, and Institutions" Conference in Detroit.

- Thomas Reinstein, CENFAD Conference Travel Grant, to present on "Analogical Peril: Intelligence, History, and Policy in the Vietnam War," at the Organization of American States in Sacramento.

- Silke Zoller, CENFAD Conference Travel Grant, to present on "The Shifting Levels of Hijacking Negotiations at the International Civil Aviation Organization" at the "Historians Without Borders: Writing Histories of International Organizations" Conference at Leiden University in the Netherlands.

CENFAD also presented University of Kansas undergraduate Holden Zimmerman with the 2018 Edwin H. Sherman Prize for Undergraduate Scholarship in Force and Diplomacy for her paper "Defensive Humanitarianism: Swiss Internment Camps in WWI," a deeply researched and beautifully written exploration, with significant primary sources from Europe, of Switzerland's efforts to define a new humanitarian way to protect Europe's prisoners of war.

Congratulations to all the winners!

TURF-CreWS Papers

Several Temple undergraduates also presented CENFAD-related papers at the Temple Undergraduate Research Forum and Creative Works Symposium (TURF-CreWS). You can find their papers here.

Fall 2018 Colloquium Preview

All but one of next semester's colloquium speakers will be recent PhDs from Temple who have recently published books. All talks will take place in 914 Gladfelter Hall at 3:30pm. Here is the Fall 2018 lineup as it now stands:

Wednesday September 5 at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room). **David Foglesong**, Rutgers University, on U.S.-Russia relations since 1776

Thursday, 20 September at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room). **Matthew Shannon**, Emory and Henry College, *Losing Hearts and Minds: American-Iranian Relations and International Education During the Cold War*

Wednesday, 3 October at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room).

Martin Clemis, Rutgers University-Camden, on *The Control War: The Struggle for South Vietnam, 1968-1975*

Wednesday, 17 October at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room).
Kelly Shannon, Florida Atlantic University, on *U.S. Foreign Policy and Muslim Women's Human Rights*

Thursday, 15 November at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room).
Jason Smith, Southern Connecticut State University, on *To Master the Boundless Sea: The U.S. Navy, the Marine Environment, and the Cartography of Empire*

Thursday, 29 November at 3:30 PM in 914 Gladfelter Hall (Weigley Room).
Drew McKevitt, Louisiana Tech University, on *Consuming Japan: Popular Culture and the Globalizing of America*

Final Words

None of the above—and especially not *Strategic Visions* itself—could have been possible without the 2017-2018 Thomas J. Davis Fellow, Eric Perinovic. Not only did he manage the nuts and bolts of the operation, but Eric also successfully passed his comprehensive exams and will spend much of the next academic year in Germany as a Fulbright fellow. Congrats, Eric!

Thanks also to everyone who participated in this issue of *Strategic Visions*, whether writing a book review, an original piece, or a short update of your activities this year.

Our Davis Fellow next year will be Michael (Mike) Fischer, a Ph.D. student in U.S. foreign relations with an M.A. from Villanova interests in Wilsonianism, Russia, and more. If you have any ideas for CENFAD or *Strategic Visions*, feel free to email him at tuh29881@temple.edu.

And now, on to Year Two!

Note from the Davis Fellow

Dear CENFAD Community:

What a terrifically successful year we experienced at CENFAD! We had thirteen colloquium presentations, a conference, several expert panels, and numerous interviews, profiles, and book reviews that all stand as testament to the interdisciplinarity and vibrancy of our Center. Thank you all for your support over the past year. I would also like to say that it was a privilege to work with Dr. Alan McPherson in his inaugural year as director. He has underscored CENFAD's missions of diverse scholarship and support for graduate research while articulating his own vision for the Center. I know that CENFAD truly has a bright future ahead of it under his leadership, and I wish him nothing but success in the future.

In moving on from the Davis Fellowship, I'm beginning two grand adventures. In September I will be departing to Freiburg, Germany as the recipient of a J. William Fulbright Doctoral Research Award. I will spend eight months embedded with the history department at the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg and will pursue dissertation research at the Federal Military Archive on the long-term political and military implications of the Luftwaffe's F-104 Starfighter Crisis. Beyond academia, I will also be embarking on an adventure of a totally different kind as my wife and I welcome our first child this year.

I leave the administration of the Center in the very capable hands of my colleague Michael Fischer, who will formally take on the role of the Davis Fellow over the summer. In the meantime, please do not hesitate to reach out with any questions or suggestions you may have on all things CENFAD, particularly if you'd like to be involved with the Center as a reviewer, or a profile subject.

I hope to see many of you at our talks and activities in the years to come. It will be nice to get out from behind the camera.

Best Regards,

Eric Perinovic

News from the CENFAD Community

Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio, Implacable Foes: War in The Pacific, 1944-1945 (New York: Oxford, 2017), was awarded a Bancroft Prize in American History and Diplomacy for 2018. Professor Heinrichs taught for many years in the Department of History at Temple. Marc Gallicchio earned his B.A. and Ph.D. from Temple. He wrote his thesis under the direction of Waldo Heinrichs, Russell Weigley, and Shumpei Okamoto.

Dr. Jay Lockenour continues to serve as chair of the History Department, and was happy to see his essay on "Media and War," appear in the Routledge anthology edited by alumni Matthew Muehlbauer and David Ulbrich. Make sure your library has a copy of The Routledge Global History of War and Society (2018), which includes contributions by the department's Eileen Ryan as well as several essays by alumni of Temple's PhD program.

Alan McPherson became the CENFAD director and professor of history at Temple in July 2017. Since then, he has been teaching graduates and undergraduates in U.S. foreign relations and will be Director of Graduate Studies in the History Department in 2018-2019. In October 2018, the Society for Historian of American Foreign Relations, in collaboration with Brill publishers, released The SHAFR Guide Online, of which he was General Editor and which presented a 2.1-million-word annotated bibliography of American foreign relations, the most comprehensive available anywhere (http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/the-shafr-guide-online). He also submitted several articles and a book manuscript on the assassination of Chile's Orlando Letelier in a 1976 car bomb in Washington, D.C.

Amy C. Offner of the University of Pennsylvania's Department of History published, "Homeownership and Social Welfare in the Americas: Ciudad Kennedy as a Midcentury Crossroads," in A. K. Sandoval-Strauss and Nancy H. Kwak, eds., Making Cities Global: The Transnational Turn in Urban History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).

Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin had his article for War in History, "'To Bring the American Army under Strict Discipline': British Army Foraging Policy in the South, 1780-81," published by Sage Journals via Online First, on December 11, 2017. The print version will appear in the journal sometime in the future. Urwin will have another article, "'The Bose Regiment is Excellently Armed': How a Hessian Regiment Rearmed with British Muskets," published this summer in The Hessians: Journal of the Johannes Schwalm Historical Association. Urwin is currently meeting with two senior staff of the Museum of the American Revolution, R. Scott Stephenson, Vice President of Collections, Exhibition, and Programming, and Philip Mead, Director of Curatorial Affairs and Chief Historian, to plan a major temporary exhibit that Urwin will curate. The World Book Encyclopedia recently commissioned Urwin to edit and rewrite ten of its entries on the American

War of Independence and the War of 1812.

Alexandre Caillot presented "Individualism and Authority: Vermont Soldiers' Attitudes toward Military Discipline in the Civil War" at the Popular Culture / American Culture Association Conference in March 2018. He was the panel commenter for the "Global Military History" panel at the 23rd Annual James A. Barnes Graduate Student Conference in March 2018. During the 2017/18 academic year, he served as the History Department representative on the Graduate Student Advisory Board for the College of Liberal Arts.

Paul Cook participated in Louisiana State University's Graduate History Conference in Baton Rouge March 9-10, 2018. He presented his paper, "Rattlesnakes, Scorpions and Fleur de Lis'" that examined the role of the 1916-1917 Punitive Expedition in preparing the US Army for overseas service in World War I. His paper was presented in a panel considering elements of both the Mexican Revolution and the evolution of Spanish fortifications in the Caribbean with LSU's Dr. Stephen Andes as the commentator.

Since her acceptance to Temple last spring, Abigail Gruber conducted research in Bermuda in July with the cooperation of the National Museum of Bermuda. She presented a portion of her findings at the 2018 Phi Alpha Theta Biennial Convention in New Orleans with the help of a Temple CLA Travel Grant. Her paper was entitled, "'Thieves, Robbers, and Such Pests of Society': The Ambiguous Loyalties of Bermudian Elites, 1775-1784". This paper is part of her larger forthcoming article, "'Ruined as to Our Estates': Eighteenth-Century Merchant-Class Families' Search for Security in an Atlantic World at War", to be published with the Bermuda Journal of Archaeology and Maritime History in coming months.

Former Davis Fellow Brian McNamara has had a productive year. In the fall, he was elected to the council of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations as a graduate student representative, and he also received the Wachman Fellowship from CENFAD. This summer, Brian will present some of the results from that research at a conference in Michigan, as well as at the SHAFR annual meeting right here in Philadelphia. Ben Talton will join Brian on his SHAFR panel.

Former Davis Fellow Kaete O'Connell left for Germany in April, where she is a dissertation fellow at the Leibniz Institute for European History in Mainz. She had a busy spring presenting at workshops in Scotland and Georgia, and a food conference at Texas Tech. She will be in Germany thru September but is looking forward to the SHAFR annual meeting in Philadelphia this summer where she organized a panel on food diplomacy.

Thomas J. Davis Fellow Eric Perinovic was awarded a Fulbright Doctoral Research Grant to pursue dissertation research in Freiburg, Germany on the long-term political and military implications of the Luftwaffe's F-104 Starfighter Crisis. During his stay, he will be embedded within the History Department at the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg. In addition to his duties as Davis Fellow, Eric also served as the President of the Temple History Department's graduate student organization, the James A. Barnes Club.

Profile of Dr. Eileen Ryan

Interviewed by Eric Perinovic

Tell us a bit about yourself.

I grew up in North Carolina. My father was a philosophy professor at East Carolina University. I did my undergrad at UNC Chapel Hill where I majored in religious studies and Italian. After college, I taught English in Japan for a few years, and then I went to graduate school at the University of Chicago where I earned my MA in religious studies. I received my PhD from Columbia University in 2013.

What sparked your interest in studying history?

I came at it through religious studies. History was my favorite class in high school, but when I went to college I wanted to major in religious studies because I felt that I didn't understand much about religion. At the time it was so prevalent in politics with these big debates on school prayer, and I wanted the tools to understand it. When I started my MA at the University of Chicago, I was in a field known as History of Religion that at the time was in a state of crisis. One of the founders of the department was uncovered as a Romanian fascist, and there was a great deal of institutional turmoil over it. So then I segued into history at Columbia, and found Victoria De Grazia to explore something about Italy and the modern Mediterranean. I started taking Arabic there and I knew I wanted to do something on the intersection of Islam and Catholicism and the modern Mediterranean. I took a class called "Empire, Nation, and the State" and that's where I learned that there had been this colonial moment in Libya that's really absent in public discussions of Italy's past.

Tell us about your research.

While at Columbia, I started reading Italian ethnographies of Muslims in Libya, which were readily available and accessible. They were all talking about this group of Sufi notables called the Sunusiyya in Eastern Libya. I started to realize that I wanted to find out what it meant to be part of the Sunusiyya at the start of the 20th century. The more I read, the more I realized that I was chasing a ghost. What these sources told me instead was how Italian imperialists conceived of themselves and how thought of their religious and imperial identity in relation to how they thought of the Sunusiyya, and they invented themselves through the reflection of the Muslim other. In the process my book also investigates and rethinks the history of Islam in Libya in the colonial era and takes serious the strategy that Muslim elites used to carve out autonomous political power in the colonial context.

Because I'm not able to go back to Libya anytime soon, the next book is more Italian-based. I'm working on two distinct projects. The first is about Italian decolonization, British occupation, and the lives of people in the Italian colonies and metropole that were stuck during this period. Settlers classified as refugees that navigated a bureaucracy designed to get them home against their wishes to stay and people that were in Italy at the end of the war who became colonial subjects in spite of their Italian citizenship.

The other project, which I'll probably write first, is a book on black Italians. I came to that topic by looking at stories of black African colonial subjects and

citizens that were stuck in Italy during and after the Second World War and thinking about how I could contextualize that into a broader history about black bodies in Italy. I saw a film by a black Italian filmmaker called *Blaxploitalian* that explores the history of black people in Italian cinema. In it he mentioned Andrea Aguyar, who was a formerly enslaved black man from Uruguay who fought and died with Garibaldi in Italy. I had read about Aguyar before, but that really sparked this project.

What I want to do is use the story of Aguyar as a place to start telling stories of race, slavery, and abolition in 19th century Italy and how they relate to nationalism and unification. I want to focus on a different person in each chapter as a way to investigate major political moments in Italian history. I'm thinking about it more in terms of studying blackness in Italy in relation to the ambiguity of whiteness, especially in the South. Recent waves of immigration are clearly not the beginning of this racial ambiguity, as the notion that Southern Italians are not quite white has long been at the heart of Italian identity. I want this book to highlight the longevity of stories of black people in Italy and also to explore the ambiguity of whiteness in Europe as a whole by looking at this country that is something of a borderland for Europe.

What book do you think should all historians read? Why? How has it influenced you and your scholarship?

What I've been thinking about the most recently is Ginzburg's *The Cheese and the Worms* and the tradition of microhistory. I've also been thinking of Michel-Rolph Trouillot's *Silencing the Past*. What I have found most frustrating in my work as a historian is in giving the historical figures that I examine, the people that are left out of colonial archives, the kind of detailed voice that Ginsburg articulated. That's inspiring me to be more creative about how I approach narrative and think about the line between fact and fiction. I think that historians should all be reading novels and paying close attention to narrative. It's important that we be methodologically sound and tell factual narratives, but at the same time we have a moral obligation to make the history we write accessible to a wider audience by paying attention to narrative, form, and the art of storytelling.

What methodological/historiographical trends have you excited?

This attention to narrative is exciting because of its potential to expand our reach. I'm excited about focusing on black European histories as it forces Europeans to come to terms with a longer history of relationships between whiteness and blackness in the region.

How did your association with CENFAD contribute to your time here at Temple?

I think one thing that is wonderful about CENFAD is how it promotes a global perspective of history both by focusing on how the US relates to the world and looking at global issues beyond the U.S. perspective. If you think about the original mission of CENFAD to study force and diplomacy, imperialism is all about how those two work together. My first book is a close study of a relationship based on negotiating contracts that had a level of coercion and force underlying them. Thus, the relationship between

force and diplomacy is pretty obvious. It's less apparent in my second book, but by studying the history of blackness in Italy, what I'm doing is examining Italian history from a more global perspective with an African diaspora lens, which is global in nature. The first story I'm telling in this book is how Garibaldi's experience in Uruguay was critical to his role in Italian unification. Part of my mission as a historian is to tell a story of Italy that places it in the broader world, which I think is in line with CENFAD's mission.

The U.S. Military's 2018 National Defense Strategy

By Tyler Bamford (Ph.D. Candidate, Temple University)

On January 19, 2018, United States Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis announced the *2018 National Defense Strategy* for the U.S. military. Mattis outlined several key tenets of the new strategy including commitments to improve efficiency in defense spending as well as simplify the process for defense procurements. The most significant part of the announcement, however, was that the new strategy will again make conventional warfare against other nation-states the military's principal mission. Mattis declared "we will continue to prosecute the campaign against terrorists that we are engaged in today, but great power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of U.S. national security."[1] The military's decision to switch its focus to conventional state versus state warfare is the most significant strategy revision in a decade and fits well with President Donald Trump's foreign policy. However, it risks strategically isolating the United States and creating a force that is less prepared for the kinds of conflicts it has most frequently fought over the past sixty years

While the new *National Defense Strategy* also lists non-state militant groups such as ISIS, Lebanese Hezbollah, and al-Qaida as enemies, it asserts that America's new focus is on the threat posed by the revisionist powers of China and Russia. The official unclassified summary of the strategy states these nations seek to create "a world consistent with their authoritarian model – gaining veto authority over other nations' economic, diplomatic and security decisions."[2] The *2018 National Defense Strategy* also singles out North Korea and Iran, which, according to Mattis, "persist in taking outlaw actions that threaten regional and even global stability."[3]

The state threats identified in the new strategy challenge America's global vision and predominance, but labeling some of these powers as enemies contradicts the actions of some of America's strongest allies and trade partners. The official *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* published by the Pentagon accuses China of being a strategic competitor that uses "military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries."[4] This

[1] Jim Garamone, "National Defense Strategy a 'Good Fit for Our Times,' Mattis Says," U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1419671 (accessed March 29, 2018).

[2] "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge," U.S. Department of Defense, p. 2, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed March 29, 2018).

[3] James N. Mattis, "Remarks by Secretary Mattis on the National Defense Strategy," U.S. Department of Defense Press Operations, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1420042 (accessed March 29, 2018).

[4] "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge," U.S. Department of Defense, p. 2,

comes less than a year after Germany and China committed to reducing bilateral trade restrictions, increasing business partnerships, and fighting climate change.[5] Germany is America's most important ally on the European continent, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel's actions stand in stark contrast to recent American tariffs levied against China. Nor is Germany the only country that is expanding economic ties with China. Great Britain is also seeking a new free trade agreement with China ahead of Britain's withdrawal from the European Union.

Publicly branding Iran as an enemy is another potentially problematic decision. Iran's moderate President, Hassan Rouhani, as well as the signing of the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, have improved Iran's global image. Though Iran exercises considerable influence in Iraq and supplies weapons and advisers to various groups in the Middle East, it appears to be abiding by the international agreement on its nuclear program.[6] As a result, many nations are expanding economic ties with Iran. In February 2017, India, the world's largest democracy and second most populous nation, committed to a large trade deal as well as closer defense cooperation with Iran in fighting extremist groups in Afghanistan.[7] If the United States decides to escalate tensions with Iran, it will put nations like India in a difficult position and may force them to choose sides. The United States also has over 10,000 troops still fighting terrorist groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, where Iran has significant strategic interests.[8]

To combat these state threats, the authors of the *2018 National Defense Strategy* assert the military needs to restore its lost competitive edge in all domains of warfare. The document reaffirms America's commitment to project its power anywhere in the world, a capability currently unrivaled by any other nation. Maintaining a premier military will allow the United States to fulfill the strategy's goals of protecting the American people, promoting American prosperity, and advancing American influence.[9] As Mattis explained, the

https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed March 29, 2018).

[5] "Germany and China vow to deepen ties amid Trump concerns," *Reuters*, June 1, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-china/germany-and-china-vow-to-deepen-ties-amid-trump-concerns-idUSKBN18S4CC (accessed March 19, 2018).

[6] For Iran's influence in Iraq see: Tim Arango, "Iran Dominates in Iraq after U.S. 'Handed the Country Over,'" *The New York Times*, July 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-iraq-iranian-power.html (accessed March 29, 2018).

[7] "India, Iran to step up cooperation on Afghanistan," *The Seattle Times*, Feb. 17, 2018, https://www.seattletimes.com/business/india-iran-to-work-for-stability-in-afghanistan/ (accessed March 29, 2018).

[8] Tara Coop, "The Pentagon Keeps a daily count of troops in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria – but won't publicly disclose it," *Military Times*, August 24, 2017, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2017/08/24/the-pentagon-keeps-a-daily-count-of-troops-in-iraq-afghanistan-and-syria-but-wont-publicly-disclose-it/ (accessed March 29, 2018).

[9] "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge," U.S. Department of Defense, p. 4,

military does not protect just geography but rather "a realm of ideas."[10] This statement alludes to one of the military's largest and most frequent missions since World War II: nation-building. As part of America's effort to spread democracy around the globe, since 1945 the United States military has undertaken the creation of new governments in Germany, Japan, Italy, South Korea, South Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.[11] Most American military leaders would undoubtedly rather fight conventional conflicts than engage in guerilla wars of attrition or nation-state building, but they have very little choice in which missions American political leaders assign the military. Moreover, it does not seem far-fetched that the United States could again find itself engaged in nation-state building. The *2018 New Defense Strategy's* implied goal of changing the behavior of governments in the countries of North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia means that, in any direct conflict or proxy war with these nations, nation building will likely be a key component of any long-term success.

The primacy of conventional forces in the past has at times diminished the United States military's effectiveness in other types of missions such as counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and nation-building. Accordingly, a focus on clearly defined, politically safe, and morally preferable conventional warfare could diminish American capabilities to confront other types of threats. In Iraq, from 2003 to 2007, the U.S. military struggled to maintain order, restore basic services, and establish a functioning government after the end of major combat operations. In South Vietnam from 1964 to 1973, the U.S. military's focus on defeating North Vietnamese forces on the battlefield overlooked the causes of the war and hindered the establishment of a democratic government. Developing one force capability does not preclude performing others, but as the military shifts priorities to focus on conventional warfare, it will be imperative for service members of all ranks to also study and prepare for the many other types of missions they may have to perform. These missions are politically, morally, and professionally challenging. However, their past frequency suggests the U.S. military may again have to perform them in the future.

Of course, conventional forces are a crucial part of any modern military, and strong conventional forces served the United States well in the Korean War (1950-1953), the Gulf War (1990-1991), and the invasion of Iraq (2003). Against nuclear-armed states, the effectiveness of a large conventional force is less evident. Some historians have argued that American conventional forces deployed in Western Europe during the Cold War

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https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed March 29, 2018).

[10] James N. Mattis, "Remarks by Secretary Mattis on the National Defense Strategy," U.S. Department of Defense Press Operations, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1420042/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-on-the-national-defense-strategy/ (accessed March 29, 2018).

[11] On America's efforts to spread democracy see: Susan Brewer, *Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

helped deter Soviet aggression.[12] Since Western Europe was likely also a region that the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons to protect, however, it is possible these forces were less effective deterrents than commonly assumed. Moreover, it is doubtful that China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea will intentionally engage the United States in a conventional war, a type of conflict in which the United States has never been defeated.

In their efforts to assert their own strength and improve their strategic position, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are instead focusing on relatively small, calculated actions as well as untraditional forms of warfare such as cyber warfare. Russia and China have so far limited their aggressive actions to places where they believed the United States would not risk an open confrontation. Russia's invasion of Crimea and China's construction of islands in the South China Sea, for example, were movements meant to assert Chinese and Russian regional power and gain small strategic advantages without provoking a significant American response. Expanded conventional American forces might deter similar future aggressive actions, but only with an increased American willingness to risk armed conflict with these nations.

The United States must be cautious in selecting its future enemies. America remains the world's only superpower, but as the *New Defense Strategy* states, China and Russia are revisionist powers seeking to change the global status quo. Together these nations encompass over 1.5 billion people, or nearly twenty percent of the world's population. In the past, American leaders have enormously underestimated the cost of armed conflicts against far smaller powers.

The 2018 *National Defense Strategy* is policy document, and as a result, it is primarily a guide. It is significant because of the impact it will have on America's military leaders, who wield a growing influence on American foreign policy. Still, it is not a formal binding document, and President Trump's administration has previously made comments that contradict the document by calling into question the commitment of America's allies and threatening existing trade agreements. While America's new strategy will play a large role in shaping its force structure and soldiers' outlooks, it will also influence American allies and rivals alike. They will examine it carefully to see how America is prioritizing its existing partnerships and commitments.[13] In this way the document will influence developments outside the United States military as well. Strong relationships with American allies, trading partners, and influential international bodies will be essential to shaping an international order that benefits the United States and

[12] Ingo Trauschweizer, *The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008).

[13] Charlotte Gao, "China Reprimands US Over 2018 National Defense Strategy" *The Diplomat*, January 23, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/china-reprimands-us-over-2018-national-defense-strategy/ (accessed March 29, 2018).

invests all nations in peace. Political and economic policies will be just as important as military power to ensuring future American prosperity. The new defense strategy takes a step toward aligning these policies and hopefully prepares the U.S. military to accomplish future missions.

Book Reviews

Doyle, Don. H., ed. *American Civil Wars: The United States, Latin America, Europe, and the Crisis of the 1860s*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017.

Reviewed by Alexandre Caillot (PhD Student, Department of History, Temple University).

American Civil Wars is the product of a 2014 University of South Carolina conference. Directed toward teachers and students, this anthology of eleven papers reflects a push to internationalize the Civil War by centering on slavery, republicanism, and European involvement in Latin America.[14] Editor Don H. Doyle declares the war so intertwined with other struggles "that we cannot understand any one part . . . in isolation from the larger web of conflict and imperial ambition that pervaded the Atlantic world in the 1860s" (3).

To start, Jay Sexton judges "the Civil War . . . instrumental to the realization . . . of U.S. national power . . . the social, political, and economic relationships" facilitating Confederate defeat and territorial expansion (15). The Monroe Doctrine developed into an assertion of United States sovereignty, while Latin American republicans anxious over European pretentions championed it as a rejection of monarchy. Due to American antistatism, the Union effort had relied on cooperation among state and non-state actors, and Sexton positions this as the basis for late nineteenth-century U.S. foreign policy. Howard Jones finds that the Battle of Antietam and ensuing Emancipation Proclamation did not immediately discourage European involvement. The French believed a divided United States would permit their installation of a monarchy in Mexico, while the British – alarmed at the war's financial and human costs – considered intercession. The status quo changed a month later, as both powers recognized that embracing emancipation strengthened the Union cause. Though the French pondered Confederate recognition, the British looked forward to the destruction of slavery by the North. Ultimately, fear of a hostile Union discouraged the two states from pursuing intervention. Patrick J. Kelly emphasizes "the South's fundamental weakness in the Americas" (60). To attract allies, it renounced antebellum rhetoric about spreading slavery through conquest. Negotiations with European monarchies achieved little, however, and angered Latin American republics uninterested in working with beleaguered, aggressive rebels. Wary of growing French power in Mexico, the Confederates pondered

[14] Thomas Bender links the Civil War to a broader debate over freedom and nationality, while Stephen Berry suggests that current-day globalization has led historians to reconsider the significance of political boundaries. See Thomas Bender, *A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), 122; Stephen Berry, "Predictions," *The Journal of the Civil War Era* 2 (2012): 6-7, http://journaloftheciviwarera.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Final-Berry.pdf. Note Berry's footnote listing several recent conferences with related themes. Doyle has published a study of public opinion in *The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), and a series of articles dedicated to "Crises of Sovereignty in the 1860s" was featured in the December 2017 issue of *The Journal of the Civil War Era*.

forming an alliance with the Union to expel the European newcomers, followed by a peace settlement to end the Civil War. They turned to the Monroe Doctrine, hoping to establish a collaborative foreign policy to safeguard the New World.

Richard Huzzey stresses "tensions between British anxieties to preserve dominion . . . and pluralist pressures on the boundaries of race, territory, and authority within the . . . Empire" (99). For example, the British were intent on ending the slave trade, yet stopped searching vessels near Cuba because such behavior reminded infuriated critics of conduct that precipitated the War of 1812. While they crushed a Jamaican slave rebellion, the British accepted white Canadian self-governance to accelerate their development. Stève Sainlaude contends that Napoleon III established a Catholic monarchy in Mexico to challenge the U.S. on political and religious levels. He wished to position France as the preeminent Latin nation, and ally with the Confederacy at the expense of the Civil War-stricken United States. Concern over facing a large Union force ended French support for the Mexican project, and its collapse left "the United States . . . the undisputed master of the future in the North American continent" (120). Christopher Schmidt-Nowara explains that Spain re-annexed Santo Domingo to strengthen its hold on Cuba, convinced that the war-torn U.S. could not enforce the Monroe Doctrine. Lincoln's example, Union emancipation, Anglo-American pressure on the slave trade, Cuban instability and the growing profitability of the Philippines all worked to increase momentum for abolition. Consequently, Spanish rulers and Cuban planters accepted industrialization and other labor forms.

Anne Eller claims that Santo Domingo welcomed re-annexation to quell political strife and thwart the United States' interests. Spain's modernization effort failed because of restrictive civil codes, unequal treatment of Dominican soldiers, inadequate funding, and callous attitudes. Rebels enjoyed support throughout the Americas, driving out the Spanish during the Dominican War of Restoration. Erika Pani notes that a monarchy seemed implausible for Mexico because it had suffered from unstable authoritarian rule. She maintains, however, that "the outbreak of civil war in the United States and French commitment to military involvement . . . [made] . . . the old, discredited project of reestablishing a Mexican empire . . . viable" (174). Conservatives envisioned a balanced government that drew investors, but its collapse led Mexico to adopt secular republicanism. Hilda Sabato writes that republican ideals in Spanish America suffered when imperialist European powers emboldened conservatives, and the U.S. conflict sowed doubts among liberals. Debates over military organization followed. While citizen-soldiers had resisted despotism by supporting rival politicians, nations emerged from revolution partially reliant on regulars. The War of the Triple Alliance furthered military professionalization among these states.

Matt D. Childs observes that "the U.S. Civil War . . . paired . . . warfare with emancipation, which made slavery seem less secure on . . . Cuba" (205). American and Spanish slave trading with the island ended due to the Lyons-Seward Treaty of

1862 and growing domestic abolitionism, respectively. As the labor system ended throughout Latin America, Cuban planters turned to Yucatan Indians and Chinese coolies, while slaves gained freedom by serving as rebel soldiers during the Ten Years' War. Rafael Marquese purports that "the United States became a sort of protective wall for . . . Brazilian slavery in the world-system until the early 1850s" (222). The Civil War changed this dynamic, as Brazilians fearful of national schism pointed to the prosperous, post-slavery United States to pass a free-womb law. The country's inability to compete in sugar and cotton led to increased coffee production to match American demand, and this shifted slavery to the south, signaling the institution's lessening national significance.

American Civil Wars convincingly demonstrates how Europeans and Latin Americans enacted conquest, liberation, and transformation while the divided United States failed to pursue its Monroe Doctrine. The range of topics, though, justifies more explanatory material to enhance the book's teaching utility. Innovative rather than comprehensive, this contribution illustrates just how much work remains to produce a more complete assessment of the Civil War's global significance. Concerning the transnational turn in recent scholarship, Stephen Berry wrote that the newfound ability to "look back into the past and see global flows of connections and consequences . . . is a *new way of seeing*."[15] The authors here chart a path for others to follow and by employing different methodologies (e.g. cultural, military, social), they may see much more than prior generations of historians have revealed.

[15] Berry, "Predictions," 7.

McAdams, A. James. *Vanguard of the Revolution: The Global Idea of the Communist Party*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.

Reviewed by Mathias Fuelling (PhD Student, Department of History, Temple University).

What was the Communist Party? This deceptively complex question is the guiding point of A. James McAdams' new book. Many great works have been written on the subject of the ideological and philosophical history of communism, as well as the histories of various individual communist parties. Yet surprisingly little has been written on the history of the internal functioning of communist parties in a comparative framework. For too long it has been assumed that the Communist Party was a monolith and that to understand communist ideology was to understand the party, regardless of the local context. McAdams has done a great service by dispelling this old historiographical prejudice.

McAdams argues that the Communist Party as an idea is an inherently schizophrenic one, caught between the ideologies of revolutionary leadership and historical inevitability. On the one hand, if history moves inevitably in stages towards communism, why the need for a party? On the other hand, how will history move forward towards communism if workers do not become class conscious? The theoretical dilemma pivots on the question of whether or not workers can become class conscious on their own. McAdams holds that this dilemma is the origin point of the Communist Party. Composed of those who have the correct understanding of the development of history, its stated task is to lead the workers and induce their class consciousness, speeding up what is also held to be an inevitable process, hence becoming the vanguard of the revolution. This leads to a centralization of power however, for if the party is composed of those who have a correct understanding of history, the party can never be wrong, and thus whoever leads the party has the ultimate understanding.

McAdams then sees the history of the Communist Party in all its iterations across the globe as a conflict between centralization of power within the party leadership and the party's stated desire to develop a society in which the mass of workers will have ultimate power. McAdams sees this conflict as leading to the rise of dictatorial power in almost every Communist Party. Marxists centralized power under one leader that claimed to have the ultimate understanding of history and did it all under the stated goal that this centralization would lead to the final implementation of policy to perversely create the decentralized communist society. This schizophrenic dynamic, however, made the Communist Party weak at its heart. The Party's centralization of power led to succession crises after the death of a Party leader and also made the Party unresponsive outside of military force against popular discontent. The Party, far from its stated and truly believed aims of creating a free and just society, created a new and perhaps even more pernicious dictatorship than the empires that it helped to topple.

McAdams provides a persuasive analysis to understanding the inner political workings of the Communist Party throughout its history from Marx to Gorbachev. His emphasis on comparing party dynamics moves the historical discussion from the esotericism of pure ideology to a better understanding of how and why communist parties made the decisions that they did. McAdams is particularly insightful about the Chinese Communist Party and Mao's motivations for his policies and conflicts with his party leadership. I am confident that this work will become a standard reference in the future for students and scholars of communism. It should be emphasized that this is not a work of primary or original research but rather a creative and exhaustive synthesis of prior research and document collections. McAdams draws on a wide range of secondary sources and his bibliography doubles as an insightful overview of the historiography of communism in English. His source work is not unique in its material but in the way that he synthesizes them. McAdams has extracted new insights from older works, going beyond the surface to reveal inner workings. His book will be useful to students as an introduction to the history and nature of the Communist Party as well as to established scholars and researchers as a reference work and benchmark of current scholarship.

Judith L. Van Buskirk. *Standing in Their Own Light: African-American Patriots in the American Revolution.* Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 2017.

Reviewed by Abigail S. Gruber (PhD Student, Department of History, Temple University).

During the American War of Independence, revolutionaries touted rhetoric that likened colonial rule to slavery. Soldiers of the Continental Army were passionate about these ideals, but there were "higher stakes experienced by men who had been enslaved for life" (69). Until recently, historians have sidelined the stories of black soldiers with little more than a passing reference. However, Judith Van Buskirk studies these men – African Americans who enlisted with the Continental Army – to highlight their often-disregarded significance in the war and, in turn, the war's significance in the lives of the soldiers and their descendants. Indeed, she argues that the American Revolution inspired African Americans to claim their due after the war's end despite the government's efforts to ensure inequality.

In order to trace the story of these black soldiers, the author begins with an analysis of their pre-war environments. From South Carolina to Massachusetts, she notes regional differences in the treatment of slavery. While the South restricted the economic autonomy and mobility of their slaves to reinforce a patriarchal planter society, northern society did not rely as heavily on slave labor and there was some degree of contestation about the institution. Despite this contestation in the North, the author rightly points out that slavery "went unquestioned by all but a few before the Revolution" (24).

As the Continental Army grappled with the enlistment of black soldiers, these regional differences appeared again when Rhode Island and South Carolina proposed the creation of all-black units. Rhode Island negotiated successfully for the creation of the First Rhode Island Regiment, despite the state's complicated ties to slavery in Newport. However, John Lauren's attempts to sway his father and other elites to act in favor of such a regiment in South Carolina were unsuccessful due to the perceived threats to white planter dominance and the plantation economy. Van Buskirk argues that, despite the conflicts surrounding their inclusion, African Americans' war experiences allowed them "to prove one's competence and assert oneself in way unheard of for black men in peacetime" (92).

After the war, African Americans continued asserting themselves. Van Buskirk notes that the early abolition movement was infused with the emancipatory rhetoric of the Revolution, but also invigorated by "the example of their fathers and grandfathers who had fought to create the Republic" (5). With clever turns of phrase like "No Taxation without Representation" and "Death or Liberty," African Americans petitioned the government for freedom and suffrage or attempted an armed revolt (186).

Veterans also petitioned the government for their pensions in 1818 and 1832. Often calling on the references of white veterans or close personal connections, black veterans circumvented issues in the application process in 1818

and submitted their request to a relatively impartial bureaucracy. However, many veterans were unable to successfully navigate their way to pension acceptance in 1832, due to increasing bureaucratic inequality, which eliminated applicants based on enslaved status at time of enlistment. Nonetheless, the author reinforces that, although imperfect, the American Revolution had a "liberating potential" which spurred black veterans to action (25).

True to its word, Van Buskirk's work is an effort to let African Americans – a demographic that Gary Nash famously called *The Forgotten Fifth* – stand in their own light. She does so using five-hundred pension records, written either by the veterans themselves or by someone close to them. While historians such as Alan Gilbert have noted the significance of African American soldiers on both sides of the conflict, Van Buskirk's work provides a focused view of the Continental soldiers and their stories.[16]

Van Buskirk deftly explains the limitations of her source base, yet one wonders how she might have employed different popular publications to supplement the military sources. Was there a public discourse on military masculinity, especially within civilian circles? Did the racial dynamics of an integrated military complicate views of that masculinity?

Despite the lack of an in-depth analysis of the larger gender discourse of the period, *Standing in Their Own Light* is an intriguing and well-researched monograph. Clear in her tone and transparent in her evidentiary limitations, Van Buskirk's most recent work is an engaging read for anyone interested in the period. Indeed, this book clearly presents the American Revolution as a war that "spawned a language that ended up with a power all its own" (233).

[16] Alan Gilbert, *Black Patriots and Loyalists: Fighting for Emancipation in the War for Independence* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012).

Burnidge, Cara Lea. *A Peaceful Conquest: Woodrow Wilson, Religion, and the New World Order.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017.

Reviewed by Devin C. Manzullo-Thomas, (PhD Candidate, Department of History, Temple University).

Over the last decade or so, the field of American diplomatic history has experienced a religious turn. Scholars have come to believe that those ideas, actions, and institutions understood as "religious" played a critical role in shaping the United States' political engagement with other nations. Their work has placed religion alongside economics, national security, race, and gender as a category of analysis. Established scholars such as Andrew Preston and Ray Haberski Jr., as well as younger scholars such as Mark Edwards, Michael Thompson, Emily Conroy-Krutz, Gene Zubovich, Lauren Turek, and others, have led the way in this still-emerging but much-needed turn. Their scholarship has demonstrated how taking religion seriously can re-shape the way we understand familiar figures, events, and themes within diplomatic history.

Cara Burnidge's fascinating *A Peaceful Conquest* contributes meaningfully to this historiographical trajectory. In the book, Burnidge centralizes a well-known historical actor—Woodrow Wilson—and reinterprets his significance through the lens of American religion. Her conclusions are important. Since the time of his presidency and for many decades since, Wilson and his variety of American internationalism have been understood as idealistic and, more importantly, logically inconsistent. In the wake of World War I's then-unprecedented devastation, Wilson's prewar vision to make the world anew seemed overly optimistic, unrealistic, even naïve. Similarly, his wartime declaration to "make the world safe for democracy" *by force* appeared irreconcilable. Burnidge claims that evaluating Wilson in terms of his "idealism" and "inconsistency"—words she understands as pejorative—overlooks the *religious* dimension of his vision, the *consistency* of that vision at the time, and the important historical *changes* that occurred within Wilson's own segment of American Christianity in the years after his presidency that ultimately reformulated that vision. In other words, Burnidge challenges readers to re-examine Wilson, Wilsonians, and Wilsonian internationalism within the particular contexts of early twentieth century American Protestant evangelicalism, social Christianity, and intrareligious conflict. Doing so, she concludes, changes the way we understand Wilson.

Burnidge's narrative begins in the Reconstruction-era U.S. South in which Wilson came of age. She ably locates Wilson's religious identity within a Presbyterianism shaped by Southern evangelical culture, and concludes that he learned from this culture a vision of social order that expected white men to earn an education and apply themselves in service to "the least" within society. This Christian paternalism, Burnidge shows, decisively shaped Wilson's public and political persona, including his presidency.

One of the book's best chapters centers on that two-term presidency and the influence of social Christianity on Wilson's political imagination. Burnidge

skillfully reconstructs this version of American Protestantism, which dominated religious life in the early decades of the twentieth century. Social Christianity was almost exclusively populated by white Protestants; these Christians believed they offered the best cures to what they perceived as the nation's "ills": problems associated with women, blacks, immigrants, and laborers. Buoyed by an optimism about human nature as essentially good and about inevitable progress as the telos of human history, these white Protestant reformers set about to remake the social order, at home and abroad, in their image. Their approach to domestic and global political affairs—applying a particular understanding of (white, male, Protestant) Christianity to both the individual and social spheres—was inherently paternalistic, because they saw themselves and their faith as the only viable solution to the world's problems.

By sketching out this context, Burnidge can then demonstrate how profoundly Wilson's particular definitions of equality, service, and democracy—definitions that defined his particular brand of internationalism—were drawn from this tradition of social Christianity. Wilson insisted that the United States "served" other nations, and that the best form of democracy necessarily intertwined with Christianity to remake the world. Like the social Christians who wanted to remake the world in their image, Wilson wanted to recast the global political order in his own white, male, Protestant image. Thus within this historical and religious context, Wilson's ideas did not seem hopelessly idealistic or internally inconsistent at all. Rather they were, as Burnidge convincingly argues, "the culmination of a specific white middle-class American Protestant movement" (6).

But Wilson, Burnidge further claims, was never narrowly sectarian. Religion functioned as one of many political concerns but received no special status. That fact shone through in Wilson's decision not to invoke any specific religious language in the Treaty of Versailles or at the Paris Peace Conference. Most Americans expressed discontent with Wilson in this regard, including many of his most ardent Christian supporters. Tensions continued to escalate during the debate over the League of Nations. Burnidge shows how this debate became an arena in which other politicians of Wilson's era, Democrat and Republican alike, articulated "their own ideological convictions about God's order, nationalism, and millennial expectation" (6). Prior to these debates, white Protestantism had functioned as a consensus movement despite its internal divisions and disagreements. But in the wake of the League battle, clear cleavages emerged. One cabal of Protestants continued to reflect the ideal of social Christianity, seeking to link the state with their understanding of religion's social mandate. By contrast, a second segment adopted an anti-statist posture and insisted "that Christian identity belonged outside the secular endeavors of the state and inside the religious mission of the church" (130). This "great war" within the Protestant establishment, sparked at least in part by the battle over Wilson's League of Nations, resulted in the movement's fragmentation into "modernist" and "fundamentalist" camps.

The resultant change in America's religious landscape paralleled changes in its political and social landscape: the isolationism of Wilson's Republican presidential successor, Warren G. Harding; the nativism of a resurgent Ku Klux Klan; the economic and moral uncertainty of the Great Depression; and more. As a result, Wilson's heirs were forced to reformulate the public presentation of their internationalism. It transitioned from an explicit effort to "Christianize" the globe into a more secularized attempt to forge a "brotherhood of mankind" (133). Similarly, it moved from a project rooted in white Protestant identity into an expression of American pluralism, welcoming Catholics and Jews into its vision of world order. By World War II, it discarded its explicitly Christian motivation and adopted the more generic term "idealism." Over time this notion of Wilsonian "idealism" would become tainted with derogatory connotation, especially as modernist Christianity embraced the "Christian realism" of Reinhold Niebuhr. Yet at the time, the secular "idealism" was more appealing than the paternalistic religiosity that originally motivated Wilson. As Burnidge concludes, Wilson's heirs articulated a political vision "based upon Wilsonianism but not a message espoused by Wilson himself" (150).

Burnidge's book, as previously indicated, meaningfully contributes to the recent religious turn within diplomatic history. It also fits into at least two other historiographical traditions. The first is, quite obviously, the body of scholarship on Woodrow Wilson. *A Peaceful Conquest* is not the first effort to understand Wilson's faith and its influence on his politics. But in carefully historicizing its central actor, Burnidge's book offers fresh insights. She fully understands the internal complexities of social Christianity: its progressive vision of human history alongside its rigid assumptions about the natural order, its optimism about human nature alongside its support for segregation and scientific racism. These careful reconstructions of the past enable her to situate Wilson and Wilsonian internationalism in new and interesting ways. She conclusively shows that we cannot fully understand this moment in American presidential and diplomatic history without attending to its religious dimensions.

The second historiographical tradition to which Burnidge contributes is the study of that community of religious reformers to which Wilson belonged—a group that Burnidge calls "social" and later "modernist" Christians. Over the last decade or so, scholars of American religious history have sought to show how profoundly these religious actors shaped American politics, business, and culture in the early twentieth century. They have done so because this historical reality is sometimes obscured by the movement's numerical decline and loss of influence by the late twentieth century. The work of historians such as David Hollinger, Margaret Bendroth, Susan Curtis, Matthew Hedestrom, and Matthew Bowman, among others, has demonstrated the profound influence of these social/modernist Christians. Burnidge also ably contributes to this historiographical tradition. She showcases how social Christianity profoundly shaped Wilson's political imagination if not always his particular policies. Moreover, she makes clear that

battles over the League of Nations at least partly contributed to the fragmenting of American Protestantism into demarcated "conservative" and "liberal" camps.

But *A Peaceful Conquest* also suggests the limits of this historiographical tradition. Scholars became interested in social/modernist Christians after a boom in historical scholarship on their religious counterparts, conservative fundamentalist and evangelical Christians, in the 1980s and 1990s. The historians who recovered the history of social/liberal Christians felt that too much attention had been paid to conservatives; the time had come, they said, to retrieve the importance of the left flank of Protestant Christianity. Now, about a decade into that revisionist turn, it makes sense to ask if we have started to lose sight of the importance of fundamentalists and evangelicals. Burnidge's book provides a perhaps unintentional but nevertheless potent indication that we have, given how she traces the evolving trajectory of Wilson's liberal Protestant heirs but not his conservative evangelical detractors. To what extent did Christian fundamentalist ideas such as premillennial dispensationalism (the idea that Christ would descend from Heaven to earth and culminate world history) shape new, postwar American visions of world order, such as isolationism? Burnidge hints at but does not fully explore such questions, and rightly so; they are outside the scope of her study. Nevertheless her work reminds us that, even as we continue to learn more about how social/modernist Christians influenced American domestic politics and foreign relations in the 1910s and 1920s, we also need to know about how evangelical and fundamentalist beliefs and actions shaped those same spheres during those same decades. Indeed, given the sudden rise of the Religious Right in the 1980s and 1990s and the eighty-one percent of white evangelicals that lifted Donald Trump to office in 2016, we desperately need to understand the long history of conservative religion's influence on American politics, diplomacy, and foreign relations.

Nevertheless this concern about the direction of diplomatic history's religious turn should not distract from the value of *A Peaceful Conquest*. This important book demonstrates "how American religion and foreign relations were constituted between the Civil War and World War II" (5). Moreover, by applying this Venn diagram of religion and diplomacy to the presidency and post-presidency of Woodrow Wilson, this book provides a new and compelling way to read and understand the nation's twenty-eighth president and his brand of internationalism. In offering this fresh perspective, Burnidge has accomplished a significant feat.