Temple University

Strategic Visions

Volume 24 no. 1 (2024)

Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy

Table of Contents

News from the Director

By Alan McPherson

- **Fall 2024 Lecture Series**
- **Fall 2024 Prizes**
- **Gift from Todd Davis**
- **Emerging Scholar Award**
- **Spring 2025 Lecture Series Lineup**

Fall 2024 Lecture Series

This semester saw a first-rate lineup of scholars from the United States and Europe and on a host of topics. Particularly relevant was any talk of the November presidential election. Please click on the hyperlinks to see the talks on the CENFAD Website, now recorded and posted on our site more efficiently—and from a different angle!—by our Davis Fellow.

Our first event was co-sponsored by the Feinstein Center for American Jewish History and ably hosted by its director and my colleague, **Lila Berman**. On September 9, she held an illuminating conversation with journalist **Aaron Gell** and historian and author of *Our Palestine Question: Israel and American Jewish Dissent, 1948-1978*, **Geoffrey Levin**, who uncovered the long history of Americans who opposed Israel's treatment of the Palestinians. See the interview with Gell and Levin here.

Dr. Artemy Kalinovsky introduces Aaron Gell and Dr. Levin as Dr. Lila Berman prepares to monitor their conversation

On September 23, Chapman University historian **Mateo Jarquín** discussed his new book, *The Sandinista Revolution: A Global Latin American History*, which looks at the under-explored role of Latin American nations from Venezuela to Panama in mostly supporting the coming to power and struggle against the United States of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas in the 1970s and 1980s.

Dr. Mateo Jarquín presenting on his work at CENFAD

The following week, on September 30, **Florian Wagner** from the University of Erfurt in Germany talked about his own book, *Colonial Internationalism and the Governmentality of Empire, 1893-1982*, a study of efforts at colonial reform through the little-known International Colonial Institute.

An engaged audience listens to Dr. Drew McKevitt

A few days after that, on October 3, Professor **Andrew (Drew) McKevitt**, a Temple PHD who is now the John D. Winters Endowed Professor of History at Louisiana Tech University, visited Temple for the second time in about five years. This time he discussed his buzzy new book, *Gun Country: Gun Capitalism, Culture & Control in Cold War America*, a fascinating tale of how Cold War fears inspired Americans to import cheap guns and thus feed the already-unusual culture of firearms in America.

An attentive crowd listens to Dr. Gvosdev giving his CENFAD talk

A few weeks before the U.S. presidential election, **Nikolas Gvosdev**, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College, helped the CENFAD audience understand what stakes that election held for America's relations with the world. His talk was titled, "Competing Visions for Global Engagement: The 2024 Elections and Possible Futures for U.S. Foreign Policy." CENFAD interviewed him after the election here.

Finally, the day after the election saw us discussing the life of Merze Tate, a pioneering black woman scholar of U.S. foreign policy in the mid-twentieth century. **Barbara Savage**, an emeritus professor of American social thought and Africana studies at the University of Pennsylvania, presented her new book about the life and scholarship of Tate.

Fall 2024 Prizes

The following graduate students won CENFAD research awards:

- **Ethan Cohen** won a $2,000 Marvin Wachman Fellowship for research in Spain.
- **Anthony Guerrero** won a $1,300 Marvin Wachman Fellowship for a language acquisition program in Guatemala.
- **Joseph Johnson** won a $3,300 Marvin Wachman Fellowship for research in Washington, DC, New York City, and Charlottesville, VA.
- **Ryan Langton** won a Marvin Wachman Fellowship of $1,500 for research in California.
- **Audrey Rankin** won a Jeffrey Bower Endowed Research Fellowship of $2,000 for research in Spain.
- **Laura Grace Waters** won a John Votaw Endowed Research Grant of $1,500 for research in the United Kingdom.

These numbers and research destinations demonstrate the CENFAD community's continuing dedication to archival research, including in international archives, and promises a bumper crop of high-level dissertations in the years to come.

In addition, the following students received CENFAD funds to present their work at academic conferences:

- **Andrew Santora**, at the German Studies Association conference in Atlanta.
- **Jake Wolff**, at the Western History Association conference in Kansas City.

Congratulations to all!

Gift from Todd Davis

Thanks again to a new annual gift from **Todd Davis** (Temple History PHD), CENFAD now has an established source of funding for the recurring one-day conferences/ workshops that it is planning. In 2021, it held a workshop (online because of the pandemic) for PHD students working on Latin American international relations, pairing them with "dream" mentors. In 2024, CENFAD held a well-attended one-day conference at Temple's Center City campus that highlighted recent work on the battle of Gettysburg. Todd visited this last event and was inspired by it to help fund future ones.

So CENFAD is looking for ideas! What should the next conference, likely held in 2027, be about? Something the History Department specializes in? A current event whose history needs illuminating? A long-forgotten event worth remembering? A special commemoration? Let me know if you have any ideas. If we don't use your idea at the next conference, then maybe it'll be the next one.

Emerging Scholar Award

Thanks—again—to the generosity of Todd Davis, CENFAD funds a yearly Emerging Scholar Graduate Award, a scholarship for applicants to the Temple University MA Program in History. The purposes of the award are to recruit and support MA-level students interested in diplomatic and military history and to do so especially among underrepresented candidates, including women.

Each year, one awardee receives $12,000 in tuition remission over a two-year period (covering about one 3-credit course per semester at in-state rates). If the awardee's GPA is below a 3.5 after his/her first year of studies, second-year funding is subject to review.

The competition is now open for the 2025-2026 academic year, and the deadline to apply to the Temple MA Program in History is February 15, 2025. There is no application procedure. All students admitted to the MA program, including the MA Concentration in Public History, will automatically be considered.

This year's Emerging Scholar is Ella Scalese. *Strategic Visions* will feature her in its next issue.

Spring 2025 Lecture Series Schedule

Come join us for another great lineup! All lectures will be held in the Weigley Room, Gladfelter 914, at 4:30pm.

Thursday, January 23:
David Suisman, University of Delaware, author of *Instrument of War: Music and the Making of America's Soldiers*

Tuesday, February 11:
Kate Epstein, University of Rutgers-Camden, author of *Analog Superpowers: How Twentieth-Century Technology Theft Built the National Security State*

Friday, February 21:
Samuel Moyn, Yale University, "Making War Humane"

Thursday, March 13:
Osamah Khalil, Syracuse University, author of *A World of Enemies: America's Wars at Home and Abroad from Kennedy to Biden*

Thursday, March 27:
Michael Kimmage, Catholic University, *Collisions: The Origins of the War in Ukraine and the New Global Instability*

Monday, April 7:
Heather Venable, U.S. Air Force, "Flying into the Future: The Role of Airpower in Today and Tomorrow's Warfare"

Note from the Davis Fellow



I'm honored to serve as the Davis Fellow for the 2024-2025 year at the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy (CENFAD) at Temple University. Over the years, I've had the privilege of attending CENFAD talks and receiving generous support to attend conferences across the United States. When the opportunity to become more involved with the Center through the Davis Fellowship arose, I was thrilled to apply. This position offers a unique perspective—distinct from teaching—and provides a fantastic opportunity to connect with scholars from universities across the country and around the world.

As part of my fellowship, I help manage logistics, update the website, attend all of CENFAD's talks and dinners, and oversee the publication of *Strategic Visions*. I'd like to express my gratitude to Aaron Gell, Dr. Geoffrey Levin, Dr. Lila Berman, Dr. Mateo Jarquín, Dr. Florian Wagner, Dr. Drew McKevitt, Dr. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and Dr. Barbara Savage for sharing their fascinating research with us this semester. It has been an incredible privilege to hear from these scholars and engage with them at the dinners following their well-attended talks. We are excited to welcome another outstanding lineup of scholars in the spring.

In this edition of *Strategic Visions*, we are pleased to feature two thought-provoking interviews, each offering in-depth insights into critical contemporary issues. The first is with Aaron Gell, a thoughtful reporter for *The New Republic*, whose nuanced perspective on the campus responses to the situation in Gaza bring a rare depth to our understanding of this complex conflict. His interview provides not only timely analysis but also a deeper exploration of the geopolitical dynamics at play.

The second interview is with Dr. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, a distinguished expert in international relations, who offers a fascinating analysis of what foreign policy under a second term of President-elect Donald Trump might look like. He visited Temple prior to the election and our conversation took place a couple weeks after the election to break down the aftermath. Dr. Gvosdev's nuanced and informed perspective sheds light on potential shifts in American foreign policy and provides readers with a well-rounded look at the challenges and opportunities the U.S. may face in the years ahead.

We're also proud to feature several excellent pieces by our graduate students, who've been able to conduct archival research in part with the support of CENFAD. One of our graduate students, for instance, has written an in-depth and thought-provoking

review of Kathleen Murphy's *Captivity's Collections: Science, Natural History, and the British Transatlantic Slave Trade* (2023).

Additionally, I'm excited to highlight Sofía Valdes's methodology piece, in which she details the research behind her award-winning paper, "Violent Reverberations of the American War on Drugs in Latin America: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis." Sofía was honored with CENFAD's 2024 Edwin H. Sherman Prize for Undergraduate Scholarship in Force and Diplomacy for this work, which exemplifies the critical thinking and academic excellence that our community fosters.

It has been a true joy working with CENFAD this semester, and I look forward to another exciting spring of engaging scholarship and collaboration. As always, please remember to share your news with CENFAD so we can celebrate the accomplishments of our incredible faculty and graduate students here at Temple.

Sincerely,
Grace Anne Parker

Sofía Valdes – Winner of Edwin H. Sherman Prize for Undergraduate Scholarship in Force and Diplomacy

Editor's Note: *In 2024 Sofía Valdes, a student at Temple University was awarded the annual Edwin H. Sherman Prize for Undergraduate Scholarship in Force and Diplomacy. The paper must address an issue, contemporary or historical, that demonstrates the intersection of force and diplomacy in international affairs. Her paper is titled, "Violent Reverberations of The American War on Drugs in Latin America: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis". Valdes wrote the following piece about how she discovered CENFAD and shares her methodology in writing this paper.*

Political science and global studies students at Temple often overlap in both classes and social circles. By my third semester at Temple, most of my classes were filled with the same people and, more than once, with the same professors. It was only by coincidence that I took two classes in the same semester—in the same room, actually!—with Dr. Alan McPherson. Moreover, it was only because of my classes with Dr. McPherson that I was added to the CENFAD Listserv. Frankly, I likely would not have attended any lectures without the extra credit promised! One of the classes I took with Dr. McPherson that semester, Superpower America, was one of the best classes I ever took in my undergraduate career. While studying history is not my specialty, this class and its emphasis on the intersection of American history and foreign policy fascinated me. Not only did I learn a lot from the class, but I also wanted to continue learning and extrapolating some of the contemporary implications of current foreign policy due to the history of American imperialism and interventionism. Through the CENFAD Listserv, I was inspired to apply

for the Edwin H. Sherman competition. The announcement of the deadline and prize value amount also highlighted the open-ended nature of addressing a contemporary or historical issue that demonstrates the intersection of force and diplomacy in international affairs.

Past competition winners had been history projects, which makes sense as CENFAD is part of the history department, but my political science capstone project—a drug policy proposal—aligned slightly with the competition's prompt. So, I spoke to my capstone professor, Dr. Nyron Crawford, about what he thought about a modified timeline to finish my policy paper. He agreed to work with me so I could submit it on time for the competition and ensure it was on par with the parameters of his class. Dr. Crawford specializes in American drug policy, and his capstone class focused on researching failing or successful drug policy and what should change about it. I had decided to narrow the focus of my project on drug policy in Latin America, and with knowledge of the CENFAD competition, I set an even deeper focus on American imperialism and counter-narcotics initiatives—a rather inherent demonstration of force and diplomacy (or lack thereof). While this paper was my second capstone project—my global studies capstone was about linguistic vitality—this paper was specifically engaging for me to research because of the policy aspect of the paper. I really enjoyed researching and consolidating all the information that composed this paper, from the historical aspects of American imperialism to the policy successes of other countries and practical policy implementations that other countries are enacting today. Much of what we learned about in Superpower America formed a basis to support my research and strengthen both my argument—especially in the case studies—and my policy suggestion.

Because of the paper's scope, I could compile my research into a more comprehensive analysis that combined three regions of Latin America, their distinctive historical contexts with American interventionism, and subsequent contemporary policy analysis. I began with archival research to examine the history of American interventionism in Latin America. A foundational understanding of U.S. actions and their long-term consequences, especially regarding foreign policy and counter-narcotics efforts, was crucial to configure the rest of my paper. Analyzing specific case studies of comparative policy implementation of drug, education, and prison reform policy in other countries *proved* the need for reform in Latin America because of their evident overall successes. Because my paper was intended to be persuasive in nature, as a policy *suggestion*, the development of this nuanced and comprehensive argument was critical, and so it aligned with the competition's focus on the intersection of force and diplomacy in international affairs.

American interventionism and its implications on diplomacy should be included in any discussion of contemporary policymaking. The United States's forceful history of military interventions—including but not limited to Latin America—no doubt still has implications on diplomacy beyond just foreign policy. I briefly mentioned anti-Americanism in my paper, and it is still rising globally, impacting cross-cultural camaraderie and geopolitical stability beyond bonafide diplomatic relations. Policy can be successfully proposed, written, and reformed in the future by researching policy and its successes, failures, and shortcomings throughout history. In turn, policymaking can inform things like prioritization of how foreign aid is spent and sent and hopefully inspire a more benevolent and diplomatic perception of Americans and their policy abroad. According to the Brookings Institute, Americans generally support

American foreign aid to other countries. However, how this American taxpayer money is being spent and its prioritization is an ongoing point of contention. When researching policy suggestions and success in other countries, such as prison reform, drug policy improvement, and economic aid prioritization, it gives me hope that success is, in fact, possible. Those successes can be proven by research and, more importantly, policy reform. Though I proposed policy reform in Latin America in this paper, research and policy improvement in other countries can also be used as models for reform here in the United States. In my professional future, I hope to use research to shape and reform future policy, just as I propose in this paper.

Interviews with CENFAD Speakers

"Protests, Power, and the Price of Silence: A Conversation with Aaron Gell on Gaza, Free Speech, and Higher Education"

Grace Anne Parker: Thank you so much for taking the time to speak with me today. For more than a year now, college campuses around the country have been experiencing intense protests related to what is happening in Gaza. Can you provide some insight into the historical precedent for this?

Aaron Gell: Anti-war protests have been a factor in college life for decades. During Vietnam, students and their friends were being drafted and sent against their will to fight in the war, so they had a very personal stake in ending the conflict. But even when I was in college in the late 1980s, a relatively peaceful period for the US, there was a healthy anti-apartheid movement and protests of US involvement in Nicaragua. And it's a constant because the United States keeps involving itself in these violent conflicts around the world. In this case, we're not even technically at war—we are funding and supporting the war—but there's nothing surprising or unusual about the student protests. It's part of a long tradition. So by this point, you would think that campuses would be able to handle a certain amount of dissent by their students. What is disturbing to me about this instance is the response of college administrators, which really exposed the hypocrisy and the moral and political bankruptcy of the US higher educational system.

Universities, in theory, represent one of the most important institutional pillars of American society, along with government, news media, the private sector, labor unions, churches, the military, the arts and so on. In theory, higher education stands for certain ideals: free inquiry, critical thinking, thoughtful debate, reason, negotiation, compromise, intellectual curiosity. So we have schools facing a challenge—a controversial issue with various stakeholders, including students and faculty, who have differing opinions, donors, government regulators, and other outside forces in conflict. So what do they do? With a few exceptions, rather than employing and uplifting the ideals they represent, such as debate, inquiry, and critical thinking, instead the administrators called the cops. They abdicated their social function and tossed out their own stated ideals. Instead, they partnered

with another important institution, the police, which essentially stands for only one thing, controlling behavior through violence.

So, while it is questionable for administrators to call for violent repression against their own students and faculty, especially in the name of "safety," the more lasting harm will come from their refusal to model their own stated principles.

So, while it is questionable for administrators to call for violent repression against their own students and faculty, especially in the name of "safety," the more lasting harm will come from their refusal to model their own stated principles. Take, for example, Columbia University, an educational institution. What lessons is it teaching? When you're in a conflict, use force. That's it?

They have essentially made themselves irrelevant as a positive social force at a time when we desperately need our institutions to stand for something. And now that we have a government that's pledged to co-opt, politicize, or essentially destroy the university system, they have no real moral authority with which to fight back. If you cannot defend your students' right to protest, who will defend you when your academic freedom is threatened, when they come for your departments and tell you what to teach?

GAP: Is media coverage challenging the university's response, or is it also reinforcing what it is doing?

AG: Yeah, I find that a hard question because there is so much media. I have been impressed with campus newspapers, which often produce better reporting on these protests than their professional peers. In general, what you might call the corporate media seems to have accepted the premise, which Israel advocacy groups pushed quite hard, that the antiwar or pro-Palestine protests are de facto antisemitic. To make this case, the media often cherry-picked particular incidents—many of which fell apart under minimal scrutiny—and used them as evidence of a pattern that I do not think existed. I do believe antisemitism is a real ideological force in our society, and leftist groups need to be vigilant about not letting it grow within their movements, just as they need to insulate themselves against racism, misogyny, Islamophobia, and other bigoted ideologies. But in this case, the claim of antisemitism was weaponized against antiwar groups, and the media bears a lot of responsibility for that.

But in this case, the claim of antisemitism was weaponized against antiwar groups, and the media bears a lot of responsibility for that.

GAP: This makes me think about the rhetoric around all of this in terms like Zionism and anti-Zionism and genocide and war and all these terms that media outlets and people in general use to discuss what is happening. Can you talk about the role of rhetoric?

AG: I think you're onto something interesting, particularly in this debate, which is that we do have a huge focus on language, the use of phrases such as "from the river to

the sea,"" genocide," "apartheid," and so on. For the most part, this focus distracts us from the material reality, which is mass civilian deaths and individual tragedies on this unthinkable scale. When people are literally dying, this question about the precise technical definition of apartheid or the implications of "globalize the intifada" feels like a distraction to me. The term genocide has a variety of definitions, but probably the most salient one here is a legal one, so I tend to leave that to experts in international law. But whatever you call it, what's happened is a tragedy. Almost everyone agrees on that. Then the question is, how do we address that tragedy? It is a rhetorical technique to jump on a single word and use it to distract from the more fundamental questions that would otherwise be raised: is it legitimate to fight the war in this way? How do we prevent more suffering? I would add, this is not just a tactic employed by the Zionism camp. I saw somebody yesterday taking Bernie Sanders to task online because he had not used the word genocide, even though Sanders has been the most aggressive member of the Senate so far in calling for an end to weapon sales to Israel.

GAP: Can you discuss the relationship between the protests, the media coverage, and the Biden administration's response?

AG: The demands by student protesters fell roughly into a few categories: Some focused-on university endowments and how money was invested. Others focused on university-supported institutions, such as Hillel, or a given professor or guest speaker. They might protest a particular school policy or incident specific to that school, like firing a teacher or expelling students.

But overall, most were protesting US government policy, which was seen as wantonly funding, enabling and even encouraging the mass murder of civilians, refusing to hold Israel accountable for apparent war crimes and violations of international law, and making bad faith or insincere efforts to bring about a ceasefire.

The response from the Biden administration to these protests has been simply to ignore them. And Vice President Harris, for whom Michigan, with its large constituency of Arab American voters, was considered a must-win state, seemed to do her best to avoid taking a meaningful stand on the legitimate question of whether the US is funding a genocide. There was a viral moment in the campaign when Harris was confronted directly by protesters during a rally, and she delivered this huge applause line, "Everyone's voice matters, but I am speaking now." Unfortunately, not everyone's voice matters. The Democratic Party was not even willing to allow a Palestinian American to address their convention for five minutes—a convention at which even Liz Cheney was afforded a slot. I assume the calculation by Harris's advisors was that foreign policy is never high on the list of voter concerns, which may well be true. When so many lives are being lost, though, dismissing them that way sends a disastrous message. What it said was that the Democratic Party's rhetoric cannot be taken seriously, and if Harris is willing to prevaricate about this issue—claiming repeatedly that she was working "around the clock" to end the bloodshed when it was obvious she was in fact in the middle of a busy political campaign—one had reason to wonder whether she meant anything she was telling people.

As for how things might change under Trump, it is hard to say. There's a reasonable assumption that Trump will be worse. He has criticized Biden for being insufficiently supportive of Israel, which seems ridiculous. He said Israel should "finish the job," which I find horrifying. Meanwhile, the Netanyahu government plainly favored Trump's election.

That said, Trump does not seem to have a lot of moral convictions. His policies tend to be very transactional. I doubt he feels any real allegiance to Israel. If he thinks he can derive some benefit—say, from the Saudis or other Gulf allies—from engineering a deal, I can imagine him putting pressure on Israel or the Zionist lobby in the US. You never know.

GAP: Can you envision a scenario in which colleges stand up to defend their students' right to protest and try to scramble back onto the ground they lost?

AG: I mean, who knows? Under Trump, with colleges' own rights under attack, they might be more inclined to stand up for their students' right to free expression. It'll depend on the issues. One can imagine various actions of the Trump administration leading to another cycle of mass protests, and college administrators feeling more sympathetic to a student movement and actually turning back toward a support of "the right of the people peaceably to assemble," as the First Amendment puts it. They will have considerably less moral authority to do that after their terrible response to the Gaza protests, but they might be inclined to try.

GAP: Do you think the Gaza protests have been productive overall?

AG: Most protests don't deliver on their stated goals, but I think it's essential to acknowledge the other vital benefits they provide. First, everybody who has participated in any street activism has experienced a feeling of solidarity, political identity, and belonging, which is incredibly important for students and everyone else. That habit of dissent will become crucial in the coming years, maybe in the coming months, as we face various forms of repression that do not necessarily involve US foreign policy. I would also say that to some extent Occupy Wall Street, the George Floyd protests, the protests at Standing Rock, Gaza, and protests about climate all feed into each other. People exposed to one of these movements often brought that experience into subsequent actions. And to me these issues are all manifestations of the same critique of a broken political reality. At the root of so many of these problems is the capture of our political system by corporate interests and billionaires, the failure of our democracy, and the use of violent repression to stifle dissent. In that sense, you do not have to choose the "right" issue. Any of these issues could be the vehicle that presents a real challenge to the system. And success or failure isn't entirely the point—the point is the act of standing up for your beliefs and seeing that as a responsibility win or lose. There's a whole strategic question that's worth considering—how can a given movement be more effective? And there's a lot of great research on this. For people who are interested, This Is an Uprising by Mark and Paul Engler does an excellent job of examining those questions. But I would also say there is tremendous value in simply being out there in solidarity with others on behalf of something you care about.

GAP: I really appreciate your insights, and I think they're very refreshing. Thank you so much for your time.

"The Trump Doctrine Revisited: A Conversation with Nikolas Gvosdev on Foreign Policy, Cybersecurity, and the Shifting Global Order"

Nikolas Gvosdev gives his CENFAD lecture while Grace Anne manages the technical aspects of the talk

GRACE ANNE PARKER: Thank you for meeting with me today to follow up on your talk. First, were you surprised by the election results, and how much of a role do you feel foreign policy played in everything that happened?

NIKOLAS GVOSDEV: It is an excellent place to start. There's always an element of surprise when an election is expected to be close as to why it flips the way it does. Donald Trump, more as an individual than Republicans, made inroads in traditionally democratic-leaning constituencies. It reflects a reality that we've been dealing with for a while: the electorate is unpredictable, and there is a lot of this phenomenon of voters who do not feel that the system is necessarily generating the outcomes they want. So, they are attracted to candidates who they see as outsiders.

In terms of foreign policy, foreign policy generally doesn't exercise a particular influence on the general electorate. Still, it can have impacts at the margins, and indeed, the results from Michigan indicate that among some voters, how the Biden-Harris administration was handling the Middle East was a factor in how they voted. More generally, among voters, you did have a sense that the Biden administration, because of what's been happening in Ukraine and because of the escalation in Ukraine, a sense that perhaps was the United States headed towards greater involvement with conflict. Again, Donald Trump's message is that he can get deals and end wars. Now, whether he can do all of that is a separate question. However, on the campaign trail, the idea that a future Trump administration would be able to stop conflicts in the Middle East, Ukraine, and elsewhere may have had an impact and then tied into the economic question. Those were fantastic poll results moving into the election, with many Americans saying they did not feel the country was moving in the right direction.

GAP: Yeah, it makes me think about how the rest of the world is responding to this news. Is Trump's policy of America first reflected in the news? Is that happening globally, or is it more specific to the United States?

NG: Well, I was in Europe after the elections, consulting colleagues. It's a wake-up call. Even though some of us have been warning that these trends are apparent in American politics, this greater reluctance for American intervention, the sense that America needs to pull back, I think that at least in Europe, many Europeans did not believe that Donald Trump would return to the White House, that there would be a continuation of the Biden administration into a Harris administration.

And so there is this sense of what it means if the United States becomes less involved in Europe. Can Europe transition to a relationship with the United States, where the United States supports European security but is not the main provider of European security?

Can Europe transition to a relationship with the United States, where the United States supports European security but is not the main provider of European security?

On the other hand, Europeans look at their own elections and see that traditional politics are not producing results. This was reflected in the French elections and the collapse of the German governing coalition, which put Germany into new elections. What you have is that around the world, people are evaluating what a second Trump administration would mean. Is it going to be more transactional? Does it mean coming up with a "deal" that looks good? What does it mean regarding how the Trump administration looks at competition with China, for instance? Is it likely that the President has signaled the real resumption of economic competition, economic warfare, for lack of a better word, tariffs, trade interruptions, and the like? Is he going to follow through on that? What happens in the Middle East? Is he going to go back to a very rigid position on Iran? And we see it now with an Iranian government trying to determine whether it can salvage something from a nuclear arrangement with an outgoing Biden administration before a new team comes in. So there's a lot of uncertainty. That uncertainty is also fueled by the fact that when we're looking at the nominations, we're looking at who is being announced for senior positions in the sense of trying to understand and saying well, what's up? What's our approach here? Hence, you have, you know, a Secretary of Defense pick who is very reluctant on alliances and has questioned alliances in Hegseth. You have a Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard, someone who was very anti-interventionist and questioned American interventions over the last decade, but balanced against Senator Rubio, would not have been out of place in a John McCain administration or a George, sorry, or a Jeb Bush administration. So, these choices are more traditional but certainly, you know, it is more interventionist, has a strong use of American power, reassures allies, and the like.

And so, you're looking at this and trying to determine who will have the ear of the President. There is this dynamic between Donald Trump and Elon Musk, where Elon Musk, at times, has almost functioned as a vice president in the traditional role of what we would expect a vice president to play, meaning that he is at the President's side, being on calls that the president-elect is having with world leaders and the like.

GAP: What will happen to NATO, the United Nations, and those sorts of establishments? Will he handle it the way he did in his first term? Or is it going to be something different?

NG: So, the announcement that Congresswoman Elise Stefanik will become the new UN ambassador, at least in his administration, raises questions because, on the one hand, she is very critical of the United Nations, but on the other hand, again, very much someone who in her earlier career would have been very much part of an establishment Republican approach to foreign policy that would not have been out of place again in a McCain or Bush administration. She started in the Bush administration in terms of public

service. So it's always hard to tell: is Trump picking people he agrees with and empowering and saying, take the football and run with it? Or is he empowering people that he believes are loyalists? And the question will be the extent to which the Senate rubber stamps appointments or holds them up. Democrats, of course, are a minority in the incoming Senate. However, they still retain influence as well, if by nothing else, by being able to put holds on nominations for moving forward or to make demands for documents, to have people come in and explain policy stances or behaviors.

With Congress weighing in, the President can only unilaterally withdraw the United States from specific organizations. So, as a slight aside, we had the United States rejoin the Paris Agreement. States were just represented at the climate conference in Baku, the COP 29 sessions. But obviously, people are taking the US stance there with a grain of salt because they know it rests on a presidential decision that once he's inaugurated President, future president Trump is likely to, once again, withdraw the United States from the Paris Accords. A president can reverse that in areas where US participation rests on presidential decisions. The other, of course, is the security agreement with Ukraine. President Biden negotiated that with President Zelensky as an executive agreement, which was never sent to Congress, is not a treaty, and therefore, President Trump, once he's in office, can abolish it at will.

GAP: This makes me think about the role of the American public and the influence that the American public has or may not have on Trump's foreign policy decisions.

NG: How economics works can immediately impact people; when you impose tariffs and interrupt the flow of goods and services through supply chains, that immediately impacts people. If I'm an American farmer and I sell a good chunk of my produce to China and there's a new trade war with China, I may be unable to sell. If I'm an American manufacturer and I require specific supply chain inputs from China and those get tariffs placed on them, which raise the costs, maybe the good I'm producing is no longer viable, so that's an immediate issue. The issues of war, military intervention, and conflict hit home. And then, of course, the question is the motivation. What I'm fascinated to see is to hear people talking about military engagement in Mexico, so not talking about Ukraine or the Middle East, places that we usually associate with American intervention, the idea that the US military might be used in a combat role against cartels in Mexico and the idea of what we have not had a military intervention to Mexico in more than a century. The last time we went into Mexico to go after different military groups, militant groups, Pancho Villa, and the like, it was something that drew Americans in and didn't necessarily end successfully. So that would be very interesting if you have an intervention to say, we're going to secure the southern border we're going to go in, and we're going to think about the cartels not as a law enforcement issue as a military issue and what that might mean. We are moving forward if you have low-level insurgency developing in northern Mexico that then spills over into the southern United States as part of an operation. Most people have not thought about that.

GAP: Do you think his tendency to engage in personal diplomacy with foreign leaders is a little bit more consistent in terms of his foreign policy, and are we likely to see a lot of that sort of thing again in his second term?

NG: It speaks to part of his cognitive style. He is someone who believes that top guys should be able, the two of them, in any given case, to work something out, and you don't want, you know, you don't want a significant coterie of

advisors and people who are going to naysay you and raise all the objections. We saw it with his attempts with Vladimir Putin in the first term, with Kim Jong-un. And, of course, there's a certain personality type that he jibes with. And this time, in contrast to the first term, he is going to look for people around him who will not try to manage him, not try to control his ability to do that. And then the question will be, does he go out and pick up the phone and say to Xi Jinping, you and I ought to have a one-on-one in a dramatic location, and we'll work all of this out? Of course, the problem that he's going to have that foreign leaders, particularly leaders from more authoritarian states, are well aware of is that the American process still constrains him. So there's a lot he can promise, but unless he shows that he, for example, has a Congress, a Republican majority in both the House and Senate that moves in lockstep with him, then that will undercut some of his diplomacy. And keep in mind, right, that Trump's term is limited. He can't run again in 2028. And, you know, you have people in the Senate who are young enough to think about running in 2028 in a contested Republican primary. So, the Senate's institutional interests combined with the senators' personal ambition can often act as a check on what presidents hope to accomplish.

GAP: Can we shift gears a little bit to discuss the importance of cybersecurity and hybrid warfare and how Trump and his administration are thinking about these national security threats that go beyond traditional military threats?

NG: Yeah, cyber now falls into a category of what we call weapons of mass disruption rather than physical destruction. And the extent to which you can mess up a society's economy, communication systems, and ability to interact and do business by disrupting cyber networks is extensive.

Cyber now falls into a category of what we call weapons of mass disruption rather than physical destruction. And the extent to which you can mess up a society's economy, communication systems, and ability to interact and do business by disrupting cyber networks is extensive.

It also touches on questions of trust and verification. People don't trust information, and you can interfere in the cyber realm either by misinformation or disinformation or by saying that data is not secure. Does it begin to produce a lower trust society?

And we certainly have seen the belief of at least several people on the incoming team that the efforts undertaken during the Biden years to try to deal with cyber were not designed to make the system secure, but they were designed to penalize and go after people who were supporters of the Trump administration or who were affiliated with pro-Trump movements.

GAP: Social media has changed much about how the public understands our government's decisions. Trump had a particular relationship with social media, announcing policy decisions through that. Is that something we'll see going forward after Trump's second term? Will presidents use social media directly with a more significant portion of the public?

NG: Yeah, social media is part of that evolution. That was why, back in the 1930s, Franklin

Roosevelt turned to the radio and said, why should I give press conferences to reporters when I can speak directly to the American people? He had fireside chats and could uninterruptedly and unchallengingly give his message to the American people. In a way, social media continues to have unfiltered access to the President. This is why you've constantly pressured presidents before Donald Trump to give up social media access and not have unfiltered access. Trump's tweets are a stream of consciousness that reveals a lot about him and his thinking, and sometimes, people in the policy process don't want others to have that unfiltered look into the President's mind and decision-making.

This raises some more significant questions we're going to be grappling with. Every 20 to 30 years, a sea change in American politics occurs, in which the old ways of doing things are disrupted. The old norms are disrupted. The old coalitions are disrupted. Ronald Reagan, in 1980, reflected this type of disruptive change. Then Bill Clinton picked that up as a successor. Reagan and Clinton created the political era we live in up to this point. We'll have to see whether or not Donald Trump is a one-off with his disruption and reorganization of political coalitions. People in the future may look back and say that the period after 2016 was another one of these sea change moments.

GAP: This is excellent and very informative. Thank you so much for taking the time to do this follow-up companion piece after the election.

Graduate Student Pieces

Kathleen Murphy, *Captivity's Collections: Science, Natural History, and the British Transatlantic Slave Trade* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2023).

In *Captivity's Collections: Science, Natural History, and the British Transatlantic Slave Trade*, Kathleen Murphy explores the connections between developments in early modern natural science and the expansion of the British transatlantic slave trade. Focusing on the eighteenth century when the study of natural history reached its peak and the British began to dominate the slave trade, Murphy examines the individuals, including slaving surgeons, first mates, and even well-known British naturalists James Petiver and Hans Sloane, who used the trade to acquire observations and objects related to natural history. Murphy argues that "British naturalists exploited the routes, personnel, and infrastructure of the transatlantic slave trade to collect the seeds, shells, preserved animals, pressed plants, fossils, and other *naturalia* from around the Atlantic basin" that were integral to the creation of British natural science (5). Highlighting the ways that the slave trade provided the British with unique access to plant and animal specimens in West Africa and, for a time, port cities in Spanish America, Murphy encourages readers to "think broadly about the profits of the slave trade," which she demonstrates included scientific collections and knowledge (10). Though

British naturalists rarely acknowledged their reliance on this trade, Murphy shows that the connections between natural history and the British transatlantic slave trade went far beyond the ships that transported these collections to England. Instead, employees of slaving companies and naturalists from the metropole depended heavily on the infrastructure of the trade itself, as well as the knowledge and labor of free and enslaved Africans who largely determined what objects were collected. This appropriated knowledge was used to further natural science and, as Murphy highlights, to identify valuable commodities that could increase the profits of British slaving companies. According to Murphy, acknowledging the "entangled histories of early modern science and the slave trade" is an integral step to decolonizing the field of science (1).

Using the records of slaving companies, alongside the correspondence and account books of British naturalists, Murphy "traces the itineraries traveled by African and American specimens in British natural history museums" to illuminate the reliance of early modern collecting on the slave trade (6). Beginning in the 1670s and moving chronologically until the 1780s, Murphy creates a history of the expansion and shifts of the British transatlantic slave trade that centers the Atlantic rather than British imperial borders. The first two chapters examine the reliance of British naturalists on the employees of the Royal Africa Company to acquire plants and information from the West African coast that were rare or medically useful to further the study of natural history and be used as commodities to improve company profits. Chapters three and four center on how British naturalists exploited the *asiento*—a contract allowing the British to send enslaved Africans to the Spanish Americas—to acquire plants and animals from Spanish America that they could not otherwise obtain. In these chapters, Murphy emphasizes that it was the infrastructure of the slave trade that provided South Sea Company employees, and in turn, metropolitan naturalists, access to the plants, animals, and information that they smuggled out of Spanish American ports. Finally, chapters five and six return to West Africa to examine how British naturalists benefited from the expansion of the slave trade at the end of the century. Murphy closes with the collecting expedition of the naturalist Henry Smeathman in Sierra Leone, which she shows depended so heavily upon the infrastructure of the slave trade that he eventually became an agent for a slaving merchant. Using the experiences of naturalists and company employees, Murphy emphasizes the dependence of natural history on nearly every aspect of the British transatlantic slave trade.

Captivity's Collections makes several critical interventions within the history of science and collecting. Murphy builds on the work of scholars who have argued that scientific knowledge was co-constructed in a variety of locations outside of Europe by the diverse participants who engaged with the creation and circulation of this knowledge. Through her meticulous archival research, Murphy illuminates the reliance of company employees and naturalists in London on natural and medical knowledge appropriated from free and enslaved Africans from across the Atlantic to create what became known as British natural science. Murphy also highlights the unique structures of the transatlantic slave trade that proved to be particularly valuable for the field of natural history. The British transatlantic slave trade provided naturalists with access to environments from which they were otherwise restricted in West Africa and Spanish America, as well as a wide variety of employees who were targeted to collect objects in exchange for money or, in the case of slaving surgeons who usually had some training in natural

history, career advancement. While scholars have recently examined the connections between British science and slavery, Murphy shifts the focus to illuminate the ways that the slave trade itself was entangled in the development of natural history.

Demonstrating the myriad of connections between the British transatlantic slave trade and eighteenth-century British naturalists, *Captivity's Collections* encourages readers to think about the history of modern science and the legacies of the slave trade in new and expansive ways. Murphy creates a history of the British transatlantic slave trade that is also a valuable contribution to discussions on the need to acknowledge the role of colonialism in the creation of scientific knowledge and European collections. Clearly argued and organized, *Captivity's Collections* can be read in its entirety or as standalone chapters and will be helpful to historians of the slave trade, natural science, and the Atlantic World more generally.

Audrey Rankin, ABD
Temple University

Editor's Note: *Santora and Wolff are PhD candidates at Temple who have been given the opportunity to conduct research with the support of CENFAD funds: Wolff performed research in several US states and Santora conducted research in Germany.*

Locating Perpetrator Emotions in Freiburg's Military Archives – Andrew Santora

Located in the German territory of Baden in the southwestern foothills of the Black Forest, Freiburg im Breisgau stands as a fascinating site of Anglo-German cultural exchange. Just a stone's throw away from the French border near Colmar, the city serves for many as a gateway into exploring the Black Forest, and modern advertising now blends with the city's ornate Gothic architecture. At the heart of the city still stands the city's cathedral, *das Freiburger Muenster*, which was completed in the mid-sixteenth century and whose surrounding courtyard still hosts a vibrant market. Within the city's limits stands one of Germany's oldest universities, *Universitaet Freiburg*, whose ornate buildings and sizable student body, along with their bicycles, make up a significant portion of the city's downtown landscape. Beyond the tourists, the city boasts a vibrant American expatriate community, with pockets of English speakers scattered across the city's cafes and tramcars, and with the university and several cultural centers facilitating such exchanges. With the generous support of a Wachman grant through CENFAD, I was fortunate to be able to travel to this eclectic town and conduct two weeks of research at the city's *Bundesarchiv Militaerarchiv* over the summer of 2024.

Located towards the outskirts of this city, the *Militaerarchiv* is the branch of the German national archives that houses the majority of Germany's military records from across the nation's long and jaded military past, with the most significant concentration of records centering around the long twentieth century. Located within a secure complex, the archives and its staff are perhaps surprisingly welcoming and accessible, with German and

American researchers alike populating the workspaces and perusing German after-action reports and ego documents. As a scholar of military culture, emotions, and masculinities of perpetrators of the Holocaust, my research targets came from *Wehrmacht* training and disciplinary files that reveal institutional efforts at regulating soldier emotions on and off the battlefield. Some of the Third Reich records are charred around the edges, with some pages near illegible—enduring evidence of the scars on the historical record caused by the devastation of the war and its aftermath. This research will form the backbone of a chapter of my dissertation, which will offer a glimpse into the institutional understandings of emotions and the force's efforts to regulate them, so that other chapters can then evaluate the degree of individual conformity to or deviation from these ideas.

As a scholar of military culture, emotions, and masculinities of perpetrators of the Holocaust, my research targets came from *Wehrmacht* training and disciplinary files that reveal institutional efforts at regulating soldier emotions on and off the battlefield.

The *Militaerarchiv's* holdings offered two clusters of records that will prove essential to my research, and that offer meaningful insight to scholars on their own right. The first cluster came from Wehrmacht service regulations and pedagogical records from army schools aimed at disseminating doctrinal content. Within the pages of Wehrmacht regulations, readers can glean a sense of the force's expectations of its soldiers in emotional terms. For example, several editions of *Wahrung der Ehre* (Preservation of Honor) were revised and rereleased between 1935 and 1940. These pamphlets outlined the ways in which officers were expected to properly conduct themselves while in uniform, and expectations adapted through editions to reflect shifting soldierly expectations as the war progressed. Several regulations, including *Zur Verhuetung des Selbstmordes* (On the Prevention of Suicide) from 1934 and *Richtlinien fuer die Behandlung und Verteilung der Soldaten mit seelisch-nervoesen Stoerungen* (Guidelines for the Treatment and distribution of Soldiers with Mental and Nervous Disorders) from late 1939, focused on how to mitigate suicide within Wehrmacht ranks. These shifts once the war began likewise reflect incremental shifts in force approaches to mental health in the Wehrmacht as an extension of regulation of proper emotional behaviors of its men.

Paired with service regulations, these records not only offer the emotional centers in which the Wehrmacht sought to regulate performance of soldierly behaviors, but also demonstrates how the institution and its instructors sought to adjust and refine these mechanisms over time as the force's situation on the ground dictated.

In addition to these regulatory materials, the *Militaerarchiv* also houses pedagogical notes, which include annotated leaflets and materials about how to teach certain soldierly virtues housed in regulations, from several army schools from across Germany. Paired with service regulations, these records not only offer the emotional centers in which the Wehrmacht sought to regulate performance of soldierly behaviors, but also demonstrates how the institution and its instructors sought to adjust and refine these mechanisms over time as the force's situation on the ground dictated. This change over time is an essential question for Holocaust scholars and military historians in this context alike.

A second lucrative body of materials from the *Militaerarchiv* comes from the dozens of issues of *Wehrpsychologische Mitteilungen*, Wehrmacht Psychological Reports, scattered across several record groups. These reports, which range over several years yet are concentrated in the early years of the war, served as internal journals for Wehrmacht psychiatrists to report findings and work out new approaches to war neuroses. Each issue features at least one entry devoted to field observations, in which doctors can present evolving soldier mental health in theater and suggest potential room for new attention. A through-thread of entries centers on soldierly character, which doctors sought to preserve for the mental sake of the Reich's warfighters. Several issues in 1941 centered around the problem of suicide and workshopped potential explanations and treatments to keep more men in the field. Interestingly, several issues between 1940 and 1942 contain entries relating to sexuality, which is described as both an "unpredictable factor" for soldiers and an "ominous" one, suggesting the potential connotations prescribed to its expression in the eyes of its authors. As with pedagogical records, these issues likewise demonstrate the Wehrmacht's continued efforts to refine its approaches to soldierly emotions as service conditions evolved as the war progressed, suggesting too the priorities placed upon such objects by the force revising how to best regulate them. These shifting points will form the foundation of my dissertation's chapter on institutional regulation.

The research conducted on this trip graciously supported by CENFAD was also important as a preliminary excursion to scope out potential record targets in following trips. This archive will continue to be useful in offering its holdings on courts martial proceedings and military psychiatric evaluations, which will inform the final chapters of my dissertation. I am grateful for CENFAD's support, not only in facilitating this lucrative research trip, but also for informing my planning for upcoming ones, as I work towards completing my dissertation.

Research Notes from the Road – Jake Wolff, ABD

Studying the history of transportation is great fun because it involves a lot of travel. When I drove out west in 2015 to work on a master's degree, I captioned an Instagram post of Route 66 "a dead end idea." Then, just six years later, I sold my car and set out to write a dissertation about how the open road has come to represent freedom in the United States.

Although I originally thought I'd be writing a cultural history from "the bottom up," the intellectual community at Temple has encouraged me to think hard about the geopolitical imperatives of domestic infrastructure.

Although I originally thought I'd be writing a cultural history from "the bottom up," the intellectual community at Temple has encouraged me to think hard about the geopolitical imperatives of domestic infrastructure. Route 66, with its popular lore and strategic location through the militarized Sun Belt, lets me do both. During this 2024-2025 academic year, a generous Marvin Wachman Fellowship award and two conference travel grants from CENFAD have helped get me to numerous archives throughout the United States—and not once using a rental car.

Transcontinental highways generate a wealth of records, but rarely are they archived in one spot. I've walked along the Camino Real de Tierra Adentro on my way to read the papers of New Deal governors housed at the New Mexico State Archives and taken free buses on Route 66 in Albuquerque, the "heart of the Nuclear-Space Age" as one pamphlet boasted. It was a treat flying into Kansas City, the historic home to TWA, where I spent time at the Linda Hall Library before taking a Lyft across the plains to Topeka, Kansas to work in the corporate archives of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad. Thankfully, I racked up points on my Amtrak card, making it easier to lengthen trips from Philadelphia to the Franklin Roosevelt Presidential Library in Hyde Park and the National Archives outside Washington, DC.

The window seat, too, has provided me ample time to think. Nearly three million miles of paved roads connect the United States. More freight travels by truck than any other mode and over ninety percent of personal travel is by car. A quarter of all traffic flows over the 46,876 miles classified as Interstate highways. It is, as environmental scholar Christopher Wells puts it, "the most wide-ranging, landscape altering public works project in U.S. history," and among the most misunderstood.[1]

We've often taken President Dwight D. Eisenhower at his word, comparing the utility of good roads against their absence rather than their antithesis. Prior to the then-Lieutenant Colonel's two month caravan across the United States in 1919, rural communities in the heartland were neither isolated nor hard to reach. Kansas, alone, touted five transcontinental railroads with direct service to the California coast.[2] But due to their

[1] Christopher W. Wells, "Fueling the Boom: Gasoline Taxes, Invisibility, and the Growth of the American Highway Infrastructure, 1919–1956," *Journal of American History* 99, no. 1 (2012): 72-81.

[2] Richard White, *Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 519-521.

competing interests and shared loyalty to the profit motive over patriotic causes, these private-sector firms bottlenecked domestic supply chains in the First World War. President Woodrow Wilson nationalized the railroads in 1917 and did not relinquish control until March 1920, over a year after Armistice Day and well after the Treaty of Versailles had been signed. The United States led the world in railroad mileage and technological innovation—all improved during nationalization—yet federal policy quickly reprioritized financing a national highway system instead. Why, in the wartime crisis at the apex of antimonopoly politics, did federal transportation policy shift?

The United States led the world in railroad mileage and technological innovation—all improved during nationalization—yet federal policy quickly reprioritized financing a national highway system instead.

The reason for this federalization of the Good Roads Movement lies in moderate, bipartisan support for highways that did not require collaborating with radical, industrial unionists employed by the private railroads. In constructing a public network of federal, state, and local roads under the auspices of national security, a coalition of urban professionals, small business owners, and rural farmers aligned their commercial interests to topple railroad monopolies over the movement of passengers and freight.

I would not be able to write this dissertation without CENFAD's support. From my disparate research trips, I've accessed a variety of federal, corporate, and local records that have not yet been analyzed together. It is due, in part, because the archives are strewn so far about the country and also from sub-disciplinary traditions that silo important methods to studying how national transportation networks formed. Cultural and social historians typically study the regional competitions for paved roads between urban progressives and populist farmers, but without looking at the shared values that brought them into political coalitions for national legislation. Likewise, historians of science and technology do study highways and railways; however, as isolated systems and from the perspectives of experts trained in economics or engineering. We've also learned from military historians that policymakers in Washington often depend upon local knowledge, and buy-in, to successfully construct infrastructure of strategic importance. The wide-ranging speakers who join CENFAD's colloquia series have taught me to make connections between roads and empire that I otherwise would not have seen.

With two travel grants from CENFAD in addition to departmental support, I've workshopped various dissertation sections at several conferences this year. I first traveled to a graduate student conference on the Cold War at George Washington University in May, and later that month I presented a working draft of my prospectus at a symposium hosted by the University of Cologne. In June, I was selected to workshop a chapter on Dust Bowl border checkpoints during a daylong session preceding the Agricultural History Society's annual meeting in Las Cruces, New Mexico. I most recently participated on a panel about imperial infrastructures at the Western History Association in October. A long form of my conference paper on innovation districts has been accepted for

publication in an edited volume on *Colleges and Their Communities* under contract with Rutgers University Press. I now have friends at other universities who work on arctic oil diplomacy, transnational religious activism, animal rights and atomic testing, and settler-colonial regimes of water management.

I feel exceedingly lucky to train in history at Temple University. The Marvin Wachman Fellowship in Force and Diplomacy is generously endowed by the family of Marvin Wachman, a past president of the university who helped found CENFAD to foster "interdisciplinary faculty and student research on the historic and contemporary use of force and diplomacy in a global context." My research is made stronger, certainly, from generous financial support through the center, but most importantly from the community of scholars who constantly push me to think through policy questions from local and international scales.

Photograph of Jake Wolff at White Sands National Monument and Missile Range in Alamogordo, New Mexico. June 2024.